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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the return to schooling and human capital externalities in 
Indonesia.  It approaches these issues from two different, but related perspectives. 
First, it examines the estimates of the returns to schooling and human capital 
externalities based on years of schooling. Second, it allows for non-linearity in 
returns to schooling by evaluating the estimates of the return to schooling and human 
capital externalities based on levels of education. In terms of estimation method, this 
study adopts two major approaches, namely Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and 
Instrumental Variables (IV).  
While there have been numerous studies on the returns to schooling and human 
capital externalities, there are few empirical studies from Indonesia. This study 
attempts to fill this research gap.  
On the basis of conflicting empirical findings, there has been an ongoing debate on 
the magnitude of the private returns to schooling and human capital externalities. 
This study attempts to contribute to the current debate by investigating the returns to 
education and human capital externalities in Indonesia using recent and 
comprehensive data from the Indonesian Family Life Survey wave 4 (IFLS4). The 
work for this thesis is unique in four respects. First, as distinct from previous studies 
using Indonesian data, this study proposes to provide a comprehensive analysis of the 
returns to education and human capital externalities for every level of education. 
Second, this study also utilises an augmented Mincerian equation and an 
instrumental variable approach to overcome the ability bias problem, whereas 
previous studies generally used a simple correlation between years of education and 
wages. Third, the major novelty of this study is that it canvasses a wide range of 
potential instruments for use in the estimation of the private return to schooling in 
Indonesia. Fourth, in contrast to previous studies that only examine the benefit of 
education, this study adopts an alternative perspective - proposed by Oreopoulos 
(2003) - by taking into account foregone earnings to quantify the opportunity cost of 
dropping out from school. These estimates are argued to provide a more useful guide 
for private, and even public, investment in education. 
 
vii 
 
Three empirical analyses are presented in this study. The first analysis examines the 
return to schooling based on years of schooling and level of education using the OLS 
approach. The results show the return to schooling in Indonesia ranges between 4.36 
and 6.46 percent across the different samples and estimating equations. Furthermore, 
a notable finding of this study is the substantial non-linearity in returns to schooling 
in Indonesia: returns increase with the level of education.  Female workers earn a 
higher return to schooling compared to their counterpart male workers. 
The second analysis evaluates the return to schooling based on years of schooling 
using the IV approach. When the IV approach is applied, the returns to schooling 
vary from 4.59 to 8.92 percent across the different sample groups and estimating 
equations. Although adopting the IV approach has increased the return to schooling 
for Indonesia, the estimated returns remain low compared to other Asian countries 
and less developed countries. 
The last analysis investigates human capital externalities in Indonesia. The results of 
this component of the study provide evidence that human capital spillovers exist in 
Indonesia. Furthermore, the finding supports the view that investing in education is 
even more important for aggregate economic performance than it is for the 
individuals who do so. This study also provides evidence of the existence of human 
capital externalities as high as, or even much higher than, the private return to 
schooling. Thus, there is clear role for the public sector fostering education and 
human capital development in order to seize the benefit of these externalities 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background to the Study 
Education is often considered as a key determinant of a person’s economic and social 
achievement. It provides both direct and indirect benefits for the individual who 
receives the education and for the society with which this individual connects. At a 
national level, the effect of investment in human capital on productivity, technology 
and growth has long been emphasised by economists. Recognising these benefits, the 
Indonesian government has been making an effort to increase access to education, 
thereby improving children’s school participation. Equalising and broadening access 
to education is one of the three pillars of the Ministry of National Education’s 
(MoNE) current strategic plan.  
Since the 1970s, enrolment rates have increased significantly as a result of the 
government’s sustained drive to build schools across the country. The results have 
been impressive: the net primary school enrolment rate has increased from 72 percent 
in 1975 to nearly universal coverage by 1995. In 2005 the net primary enrolment rate 
was 91 percent. The net enrolment rate for junior secondary education showed an 
even more marked increase, rising from 18 percent in the 1970s to approximately 62 
percent in 2005. The senior secondary enrolment rate has also been increasing, 
although at a more modest rate. However, education services still are not at the 
desired levels. Critical challenges remain to achieve the goals of ‘Education for All’ 
(EFA), particularly increasing enrolment in junior secondary schools, targeting the 
poor and improving the quality of teaching (Granado et al., 2007).  
Given the huge amount of resources devoted to education, both by government and 
parents, it is worth investigating whether these investments in education yield returns 
to individuals that justify the resources invested. In terms of policy making, estimates 
of the returns to education are useful in a number of ways. For instance, they provide 
an indication of the level of the education sector that the government should invest in. 
From a policy perspective, the challenge is to determine how best to allocate scarce 
resources across various types of education. Will the benefit be higher if resources are 
2 
 
invested in schools, technical and vocational education, or universities? An analysis 
of returns to education can also help in the evaluation of broader economic policies. It 
is, for example, well established that human capital is crucial to economic 
development (Ranis et al., 2000). 
Governments should therefore seek to adopt policies that are consistent with human 
capital development. To the extent that returns to education in a particular country 
may show a declining trend, it is necessary to evaluate the causes of such decline. If 
the returns associated with education are high but school enrolments are low, it is an 
indication that individuals are not investing optimally in education. Thus, a study on 
the returns to education has important policy implications (Kimenyi et al., 2006). A 
large number of studies from various parts of the world show that the returns for an 
additional year of schooling are positive, and range between 5 percent in developed 
countries to 29 percent in developing countries (Psacharopoulos, 1985 and 1994). For 
Indonesia, there are few studies on the returns to education. Duflo (2001) estimates 
that the economic returns to education in Indonesia range from 6.8 to 10.6 percent in 
1995. In comparison, Byron and Takahashi (1989) reports that the return to education 
in Indonesia (Java) was as high as 17.0 percent in 1981.  
Given the inconclusiveness of these studies, more accurate and up to date estimates of 
the returns to education are warranted for the purposes of policy making. Such an 
exercise is important because it appears that rates of return to education in Indonesia 
could have varied over time and, therefore, estimates based on dated data may not be 
useful in today’s policy making.  
When estimating the private returns to education, it is normally assumed that returns 
to an individual are independent of the education levels of others. This assumption, 
which dominates most of the previous studies, ignores a major aspect of human 
capital theory, namely human capital externalities. The existence of human capital 
externalities suggests that increasing the education level of one person will have some 
impact not only on the earnings of that individual but also on the earnings of other 
individuals (Weir and Knight, 2004). 
There is an enormous literature devoted to estimating rates of returns to education and 
human capital externalities, but there are few empirical studies from Indonesia. This 
study attempts to fill this vacuum. On the basis of conflicting empirical findings, 
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there has been an ongoing debate on the private returns to schooling and human 
capital externalities. Some authors find relatively high returns to education in 
developing countries and others find the opposite. Some authors find that the return 
declines with the level of schooling, while some find that it rises. Some authors find 
positive and robust human capital externalities, and some authors find no evidence of 
human capital externalities. This study attempts to contribute to the current debate by 
investigating the returns to education and human capital externalities in Indonesia 
using recent and comprehensive data from the Indonesian Family Life Survey wave 4 
(IFLS4). As distinct from previous studies using Indonesian data, this study proposes 
to provide a comprehensive analysis of the returns to education and human capital 
externalities for every level of education. Moreover, this study also utilises an 
augmented Mincerian equation and an instrumental variable approach to overcome 
the ability bias problem, while previous studies generally used a simple correlation 
between years of education and wages.  
1.2 Research Objectives 
The aim of this study is to investigate the private rates of returns to investment and 
the human capital externalities of education for the Indonesian economy in terms of 
increased earnings for each additional year of study. The specific objectives are as 
follows:  
1. To comprehensively estimate the importance and value of education to the 
individual, and to evaluate the returns on investment for the different levels of 
education in Indonesia. 
2. To investigate how large are the human capital externalities of education in 
Indonesia. 
3. To provide further evidence of the effects of education on earnings and to 
present this evidence in a framework for discussing the potential policy 
implications. 
1.3 Significance of the Study 
This study is significant for several important reasons. Firstly, it provides a detailed 
and comprehensive analysis of the returns to education and human capital 
externalities in Indonesia using a recent survey, the fourth wave of the Indonesia 
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Family Life Survey (IFLS 2007/2008).  Secondly, it extends Mincer’s human capital 
earnings function to allow for an evaluation of the returns to schooling based on the 
years of schooling or the level of education, to permit earnings discrimination on the 
basis of gender to be examined, and to yield a framework for the quantification of 
human capital spillovers. Furthermore, in estimating the private return to schooling as 
well as human capital externalities, in addition to the instruments that have been used 
in previous studies, this study employs variables that have not been employed to date 
in Indonesia, and which have received limited attention in the literature in general. 
Thirdly, it aims to foster debate on the issue of the impact of education on economic 
and social outcomes. Fourthly, although there is enormous literature devoted to 
estimating rates of return to schooling and human capital externalities, there are few 
empirical studies from Indonesia. This study helps to fill this gap. Finally, the 
comprehensive and precise estimation of returns to education and human capital 
externalities will be useful to formulate recommendations for education policies in 
Indonesia. 
1.4 Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis contains eight chapters, including the present one. The first chapter 
provides an introduction to the study’s subject matter. The background to the study 
problem is presented, and the objectives and the significance of the study are 
discussed. The next chapter reviews the education sector in Indonesia. It presents an 
overview of the policies in the education sector, and the trend and patterns of student 
enrolment from pre-school to higher education levels.  
The theoretical framework and empirical background relevant to the estimation of the 
return to schooling and human capital externalities are presented in Chapter 3. The 
purpose of the review is to highlight issues that require attention in the analysis of the 
impact of education on earnings and externalities. While much of the literature relates 
to developed countries, where possible the review covers studies of developing 
economies to provide a firmer basis for the analysis for Indonesia conducted in 
Chapters 5 to 7.  
Chapter 4 covers methodological issues relating to the estimation of the theoretical 
models discussed in the previous chapter. Two methodologies are discussed: the 
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Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the Instrumental Variable (IV) approaches.  These 
two methods are the main techniques used in the analysis of the payoff to schooling, 
as well as in the empirical assessment of the externalities of schooling. They can be 
applied to the data set to be used in this thesis. 
 Chapters 5, 6 and 7 constitute the main part of the thesis. The empirical findings 
from the analyses of the economic return to schooling and human capital externalities 
are presented in these three chapters.  Chapter 5 discusses the estimates of the private 
return to schooling obtained using the OLS approach.  The presentation of the results 
commences with estimates from the standard Mincerian model that employs years of 
schooling in the earnings function. Then the return to schooling based on more 
detailed information on educational attainment is examined. Following this the 
discussion turns to estimates of the return to schooling obtained after additional 
control variables are included in the earnings functions. In order to check for the 
possibility of selectivity bias in the analysis, this section also presents estimates of 
Heckman’s two-step model. Separate estimations for males and females are 
undertaken for all specifications.   
Given the evidence on the apparent role of ability bias for other countries it is of 
practical importance to see whether ability bias impacts the estimate of the return to 
schooling in Indonesia. This issue is considered in Chapter 6 by adopting the 
Instrumental Variable (IV) approach.  
Chapter 7 provides estimates of human capital externalities in Indonesia. In 
particular, this study attempts to evaluate the existence and the magnitude of local 
human capital externalities for Indonesia, taking the province as the territorial unit of 
analysis. Both OLS and IV methods are used. Separate estimates of human capital 
externalities are obtained for males and females. 
In the concluding chapter, the key findings from the previous three chapters are 
summed up. Using the evidence revealed in this thesis, the policy implications for 
educational practitioners and policy makers are discussed. This chapter also presents 
the limitations of the study and explores the scope for further research.  
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Chapter 2 
Overview of Education Sector in Indonesia 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents a brief overview of the Indonesian economy. It also provides a 
brief outline of the Indonesian education sector. In particular it discusses the 
Indonesian education system, early childhood care and education, basic education, 
secondary education, tertiary education, and the human capital profile of the 
population. This information provides a foundation for the discussion in subsequent 
chapters. 
The chapter is organised as follows: Section two presents a brief background to 
Indonesia, covering a range of economic and social indicators, such as geography, 
population, religion, and economic growth. Section three provides an overview of the 
education sector in Indonesia. Section four discusses the Indonesian human capital 
profile followed by Section five, which concludes the chapter. 
2.2. Brief Country Profile 
Indonesia is the largest archipelago in the world, stretching from Sabang to Merauke, 
and comprises 17,670 islands, of which 6,000 are inhabited. Together the islands 
have a total area of 1.9 million square kilometres, cover three time zones, and extend 
from the Indian Ocean into the Pacific for about 5,000 kolimetres. The five largest 
islands are Sumatra, Java (the most populous), Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Papua. 
Indonesia lies between two continents, Asia and Australia, and in 2010 was inhabited 
by a population of about 237.56 million that comprises of more than 300 ethnically 
distinct groups who speak about 583 local languages and dialects and practice some 
of the major religions (Islam, Protestant, Catholic, Buddhism, Hinduism, and 
Confucianism). The geography, size and diversity of Indonesia are also reflected in 
the political and public administration system. There are currently 33 provinces and 
over 440 districts. Population density across these provinces varies widely, from 
around 14,469 people per square kilometre in Jakarta to 8 people per square kilometre 
in West Papua. The average population density is around 124 per square kilometre. 
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Currently, Indonesia is the fourth most populous country, after the People’s Republic 
of China, India, and the United States. Although the population is widely dispersed 
throughout the archipelago, the heaviest concentrations are located in the fertile 
islands of Java and Bali, where the population density is 3,277 and 673 per square 
kilometre, respectively. 
Indonesia ranks as a low or lower-middle income country, with a real Gross Domestic 
Product of Rp 2,082,315.90 billion in 2008 (approximately US $208.23 billion).1 
Manufacturing is the largest contributor to GDP. Since 2002, Indonesia’s economy 
has grown slowly, with growth still below the pre-crisis level (Figure 2.1). Economic 
growth in the post-crisis period has averaged about 5 percent per annum. More 
recently, economic growth has started to recover. Thus the GDP growth rate in 2007 
was 6.35 percent per annum, the highest rate since 1996.  
Figure 2.1: Average Annual GDP Growth, Indonesia, 1990 to 2009 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from BPS, August 2010 (BPS, 2010). 
Notes: * Preliminary figures. ** Very preliminary figures. 
 
With a GINI index of 34.3 in 2007/2008, Indonesia does not have particularly large 
disparities in income distribution.  However poverty rates still remain significant, 
despite encouraging economic recovery since the 1997 economic crisis. Education 
development plays a key role in Indonesia’s poverty reduction strategies, through 
expanded access to post-basic education opportunities and subsequent paid or private 
employment. Beyond basic education, Indonesia places attention on its system of 
labour-market oriented technical and vocational education in order to better prepare 
                                               
1 Gross Domestic Product at 2000 constant market prices by expenditure. 
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the huge number of labour market entrants for jobs. This type of life-skills orientation 
also helps to achieve Indonesia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper’s (PRSP) basic 
right to employment opportunities (Asian Development Bank, 2006). Poverty 
eradication programmes through education channels are implemented by providing 
education and training in entrepreneurial skills, providing technical assistance, and by 
promoting entrepreneurial networks and partnerships supported by local 
organisations, local governments, the private sector and universities. Life skills and 
entrepreneurship in education programmes consist of village level life-skills 
programmes, including income generating activities. The Government conducts these 
programmes through small block grants to community groups. At the same time, 
senior secondary vocational schools have also been expanding income generating 
activities through small scale production units and expansion of afternoon and 
evening classes for adults. Furthermore, since 2006 The Directorate General of Non-
formal Education has introduced professional development courses. The objective of 
these programmes is to provide young people with relevant skills, and 
entrepreneurship training in rural villages and urban areas. 
Issues of gender inequality in earnings can be found in Indonesia. Permana (2006) 
reported that based on education, experience, rural-urban location, province, and 
socio-demography-economic characteristics, there are significant gender disparities in 
earnings in Indonesia. Furthermore, Permana (2006) describes that the male-female 
earnings gap decreases with the level of education, reaches a plateau at the “post-
secondary level” and then tapers off. In other words, the profile of earnings disparity 
by gender has a “reversed U” shape.  
2.3 Education Sector in Indonesia 
The scale and structure of Indonesia’s education system reflect the size and cultural 
traditions of the country. The Indonesian education system is complex due to, at least, 
three factors. These are the sparse distribution of population, the considerable ethnic 
diversity, and the complex social structure. These become challenges to the efforts to 
improve the quality of education as well as to expand the education sector, if both 
equality and equity measures are to be taken into consideration. Efforts in improving 
the education sector in Indonesia have encountered various obstacles such as: 
limitations in learning facilities; inadequate quantity, quality, and welfare of teachers; 
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and an inadequate budget for education. Further description of the education system 
in Indonesia is provided below in order to provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of the issues that it needs to confront, and to provide a basis for the 
policy recommendations that will flow from the empirical analysis in this thesis. 
2.3.1 Indonesian Education System 
Indonesia’s national education system is enormous and complex. With over 46 
million students enrolled in all levels of education and 2.7 million teachers in more 
than 250,000 schools, it is the third largest education system in the Asian region and 
the fourth largest in the world (behind only China, India and the United States) 
(National Development Planning Agency, 2010). Two ministries are responsible for 
managing the education system, with 84 percent of schools under the Ministry of 
National Education (MoNE) and the remaining 16 percent under the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs (MoRA).  
Based on the 1999 decentralisation legislation and the education Law 20/2003, the 
government has designed specific strategies and programmes to implement the 
education policy through three strategic pillars. These three strategic pillars consist of 
ensuring expanded access and equity, improving quality and relevance, and 
strengthening governance, accountability and the public image (MoNE, 2007). 
The Indonesian National Education System is organised into three different paths, 
namely formal, non-formal and informal education (Figure 2.2). Formal education is 
conducted in schools through teaching and learning activities that are gradual, 
hierarchical, and continuous. Non-formal or out-of-school education is a substitute 
programme designed to eradicate illiteracy in reading/writing and numerals and the 
Indonesian language. This programme also provides individuals with an opportunity 
to develop the knowledge and skills required to work and generate an income, to 
enable individuals to proceed to a higher level within the formal education system, 
and to fulfil the needs of persons, families, and communities that cannot be met by 
the formal education system. Education within the family, or what is called informal 
education, is an essential part of out-of-school education and provides cultural, 
religious and moral values and family skills. 
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Figure 2.2: Education System in Indonesia 
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According to the Indonesian Education Act number 20 (2003), the national formal 
education system consists of three main levels of education, basic education, middle 
or secondary education, and higher or tertiary education. Apart from the levels of 
education mentioned above, pre-school education is also provided to a small 
proportion of children. Pre-school is the lowest level required to enter elementary 
school. However, the government makes every effort to encourage parents to send 
their children to pre-school education before entering elementary school. 
Basic education consists of six years of Primary/Elementary Schools (PS) and three 
years of Junior Secondary Schools (JSS), which was declared as Nine Years of 
Compulsory Education by the President of the Republic of Indonesia on May 2, 1994. 
Children start formal schooling at the age of seven. 
The types of secondary education include General Senior Secondary School (GSSS) 
and Vocational Senior Secondary School (VSSS). General education gives priority to 
expanding knowledge and developing students’ skills and preparing them to continue 
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their studies to a higher level of education. Vocational secondary education focuses 
on expanding specific occupational skills and puts emphasis on the preparation of 
students to enter the world of work and on developing their professional attitude. 
Middle or secondary education consists of three years of schooling at GSSS or three 
to four years at VSSS. 
Higher education is offered through diploma (D1, D2, D3, and D4) and bachelor 
degree courses (S1). Higher education also includes post-graduate programmes (S2) 
and doctoral programmes (S3). Open universities provide distance learning higher 
education programmes (UT). 
Parallel to the formal system is a set of non-formal programmes known as  Packet A 
Learning Programme (Kejar Paket A), a non-formal programme equivalent to 
primary education; Packet B Learning Programme (Kejar Paket B) for junior 
secondary education; and Packet C Learning Programme (Kejar Paket C) for senior 
secondary education. 
Similar to most countries, there are public and private schools in Indonesia. Both 
types of schools follow the national curriculum developed by the MoNE. There are 
also Islamic schools, called Madrasah. Madrasah Ibtidaiyah (MI) is equivalent to 
elementary school, Madrasah Tsanawiyah (MTs) is equivalent to junior secondary 
school, and Madrasah Aliyah (MA) is equivalent to senior secondary school. 
Different from regular schools, Madrasah follow the curriculum developed by the 
MoRA and, as the name suggests, use Islam as the curriculum’s foundation. Similar 
to regular schools, there are also public and private Madrasah.  
2.3.2 Early Childhood Care and Education 
Although early childhood education is not part of the formal education system in 
Indonesia, the government devotes attention to early childhood education 
programmes. This is because children are essential social capital for the development 
of a nation’s human resources potential. Indonesia has committed itself to providing a 
better future for all of its children, which includes (National Coordination Forum 
Education for All, 2003): 
a. improving children’s health and nutrition; 
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b. ensuring that all children receive adequate education to reach their full 
potential; 
c. providing children with an opportunity to find their identity; 
d. instilling awareness of their spiritual values; and, 
e. ensuring a secure and supportive environment within a stable family 
environment. 
Pre-school education is aimed at stimulating the physical and mental growth of pupils 
outside the family environment before entering primary school or out-of-school 
educational programmes. Early childhood education and development programmes 
are designed to generate a synergy of good health, good nutrition, and appropriate 
cognitive stimulation for healthy development in the early years, which in turn is vital 
for achieving high levels of education and human capital formation later in life. 
National Education System Law 20/2003 recognises early childhood education as a 
stage preceding basic education and stipulates that it can be organised formally, non-
formally or informally. Five main early childhood services can be identified in 
Indonesia. A summary of their profile is provided in Table 2.1. 
Among the types of pre-school education available are Taman Kanak-kanak (TK) or 
kindergartens, Kelompok Bermain (KB) or playgroups, and Tempat Penitipan Anak 
(TPA) or child care centres. TK is the main centre-based pre-primary education 
service catering for children aged 4-6 years. The objective of TK is to help establish 
the foundation for the development of the attitude, behaviour, knowledge, skill and 
creativity of children for further development and growth.  
Raudlatul Atfal (RA) is similar to TK, but with emphasis on Islamic teaching. In RA 
the Islamic atmosphere is very strong and becomes the spirit of the overall teaching 
and learning process. RA falls under the supervision of the MoRA.  
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Table 2.1: Profile of Key Early Childhood Services 
 
 Kindergarten (TK) / 
Islamic Kindergarten 
(RA) 
Playgroup (KB) Childcare Centre 
(TPA) 
Integrated Service 
Post (POSYANDU) 
Mother’s Programme 
(BKB) 
Child age 4-6 2-6 3 months -6 0-6 0-5 
 
Target Child Child Child Child and mother Mother 
 
Focus - Pre-primary education. 
- Child development and 
school readiness.  
- Religious teaching in 
RA. 
- Play-based education.  
- Mental and emotional 
development. 
Care service for 
children of working 
parent, combined with 
a child development 
component. 
Health service for 
mothers and 
children, combined 
with parenting 
education. 
 
Parenting education; 
activities for children 
also offered during 
meetings. 
Opening hours 2 hours, daily. 2 hours, 3 times/week. 8-10 hours, daily. 2 hours, 3 
times/month. 
 
2 hours, 3 times/month. 
Required qualification 
level for teachers 
2 years teacher training 
college diploma (D2). 
Senior secondary 
education with related 
special training, 
including 
apprenticeship. 
Senior secondary 
education with related 
special training, 
including 
apprenticeship. 
Junior secondary 
education with 
related special 
training, including 
apprenticeship. 
 
Junior secondary 
education with related 
special training, 
including apprenticeship. 
Responsible 
government agencies 
Ministry of National 
Education. 
 
Ministry of Religious 
Affairs - supervision and 
monitoring of RA. 
Ministry of Social 
Welfare - supervision. 
 
Ministry of National 
Education - curriculum. 
Ministry of Social 
Welfare - care and 
social service 
component, 
supervision. 
 
Ministry of National 
Education - guideline 
development. 
Ministry of Health - 
technical support, 
supervision. 
 
Ministry of Home 
Affairs - initiated 
the service in 
partnership with the 
Family Welfare 
Empowerment 
Movement. 
Ministry of Women’s 
Affairs - policy. 
 
National Family Planning 
Coordination Board - 
delivery and supervision. 
    Source: UNESCO (2005).
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Playgroup is a type of educational service given to children from the age of 3 until 
they are ready for primary education. Its activities aim at developing the children’s 
potential to the optimum appropriate to their developmental stage through playing 
while learning and learning while playing activities. Playgroups are generally 
organised by a foundation or a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO). Only a few 
of these NGOs are organised by the government. Playgroups are supervised by the 
Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) and its regional offices, and the Ministry of 
National Education and its regional offices. 
TPA caters for children aged 3 months to 6 years while their parents (especially 
mothers) have to go to work or, for other reasons, have to be away from home so that 
they cannot provide the necessary care to their children.  
Bina Keluarga Berencana (BKB) is an activity that is carried out by the society with 
the purpose of providing the necessary knowledge and skills to parents and other 
family members on how to promote optimal infant growth and monitor their growth 
and development. 
Pos Pelayanan Terpadu or Posyandu is a welfare facility for mother and child that 
functions as a centre providing integrated health and nutrition services, especially for 
expecting mothers and children aged 0-5 years. Posyandu is an activity “from the 
community, for the community, and by the community” with supervision from 
medical personnel. 
Figure 2.3: Gross Enrolment Ratios in Pre-primary Education, 2004 
 
 
        Source: World Bank (2006) 
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Low participation in early childhood services is a problem in many developing 
countries; it is especially pronounced in Indonesia. The country’s participation rate in 
early childhood services, especially in education services, is one of the lowest in the 
world. Inequitable access to early childhood services is another problem experienced 
by Indonesia. According to World Development Indicators 2006 (World Bank, 2006), 
Indonesia’s gross enrolment rate of children ages 4-6 years in educational early 
childhood services was 22 percent in 2004. This number indicates that Indonesia still 
lags behind many developing countries in the region. The global average enrolment 
rate for low-income countries was 27 percent, higher than that of Indonesia (Figure 
2.3).  
2.3.3 Basic Education 
Human resources development is one of the strategic efforts for national development 
in Indonesia. The basic education programme is a major part of this. This programme 
was implemented to build an Indonesian nation with at least basic knowledge and 
skills. Such basic competence should enable graduates to either continue their 
schooling or start earning a living in the society. 
Presidential Instruction Decree No. 10 of 1973 initiated Indonesia’s programme of 
compulsory education and, by 1984, the government of Indonesia had fully 
implemented six-years of compulsory school attendance for primary school age 
children (7-12 years). The result of this policy was significant, in that the 
participation rate in primary schools sharply increased from 79 percent in 1973 to 92 
percent in 1993. After this programme came fully into effect, the Indonesian 
government launched the Nine Years Basic Education Programme on 2 May 1994, 
extending compulsory school attendance to the 13-15 year-old population.  
Another vital policy related to basic education program conducted in the period of 
1973-1974 was the construction of Sekolah Dasar (Primary School) INPRES 
(Presidential Instruction). The Sekolah Dasar INPRES program was launched in 
1973-1974. More than 61,800 new primary schools were constructed, and this 
represented about one school per 500 children aged 5 to 14. This program was 
reported as the fastest primary school construction program ever undertaken in the 
world (Duflo, 2001). 
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Education for All (EFA) national and Millennium Development Goals (MDG) 
international targets for Indonesia are to ensure that, by 2015, all Indonesian children 
are able to complete primary and junior secondary education (basic education). A 
number of policy and regulatory measures have been adopted to achieve this target. In 
2005, the Presidential decree set out mutual responsibilities for government and 
parents regarding primary and junior secondary school attendance. The school 
operational block grants are designed to eliminate direct cost barriers for parents. As 
part of quality assurance, MoNE has issued minimum standards for school and 
student performance and related standards for school infrastructure, textbooks and 
teacher deployment and qualifications provision (MoNE, 2007).  
There has been significant progress in gross enrolment rates and net enrolment rates 
at the primary level over the period 1992-2008.2 Net enrolment rates have grown 
from about 88 percent to about 95 percent. Primary gross enrolment rates have 
increased from around 110 percent to around 115.5 percent. These data show that 
there is a significant gap between the gross enrolment rate and the net enrolment rate. 
This pattern indicates two phenomena: first, the high level of 5 and 6 year olds 
(under-age) enrolling in the first grade of primary school; and second, a number of 
over 12 years old (over-age) enrolments in primary schools (Government of 
Indonesia and United Nations System, 2004; MoNE, 2007). Under-age children can 
enrol in primary schools, a trend that has increased, especially in urban areas. Over-
age students may be a result of late enrolment and repeating grades.  
The net enrolment rates for primary school in 2006 were 94.7 percent (Figure 2.4). In 
other words, Indonesia is close to achieving universal primary education, though it 
needs to be noted that there remain pockets of low enrolment, with the enrolment rate 
varying from 96 percent in Central Kalimantan to 78 percent in Papua. Unfortunately, 
many children do not perform well in primary school. Either they have to repeat 
classes or they drop out. Currently, for example, around 9 percent of children have to 
repeat grade 1, and at each grade around 5 percent of children drop out. As a result, 
around one-quarter of children do not graduate from primary school (Stalker, 2007). 
                                               
2 The gross enrolment rate (GER) is a comparative figure for the number of students at a certain stage 
of education as compared to the number of people of school age among the population, expressed as a 
percentage. Net enrolment rate (NER) is the ratio of children of official school age who are enrolled in 
school to the population of the corresponding official school age.  
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This suggests there is still much room for improvement in the provision of primary 
education. 
Figure 2.4: Primary and Secondary Education Net Enrolment Rates and MDG 
Target 
 
 
    Sources: 1992-2006 data: Stalker (2007); 2007-2008 data: Pusat statistik Pendidikan (2007f, 2008f). 
 
Access to junior secondary education has increased significantly since the Nine Years 
Compulsory Basic Education Programme was launched in 1994. This policy led to 
positive results. The transition rate from primary to junior secondary education 
climbed from 82 percent in 2000 to 92 percent in 2006. The net enrolment rate of 
junior secondary education rose from 58 percent to 71.60 percent over the period 
2000-2008. There has been an encouraging increase in junior secondary education 
gross enrolment rates, from 75 percent in 2000 to 92.32 percent in 2008.  
Figure 2.5 shows the trend in the number of primary and junior secondary schools 
from 2005/2006 to 2008/2009. The total number of primary schools tends to slightly 
decrease year by year. In 2005/2006 the number of primary schools was 148,262. 
Three year later - 2008/2009 - the number of primary schools had fallen to 144,228, a 
decrease of approximately 3 percent. One of the reasons for this phenomenon is that 
in certain areas some schools have to be closed or merged due to the low school age 
population. 
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Figure 2.5: Number of Primary Schools and Junior Secondary Schools, 
2006/2007-2008/2009 
 
 
Sources: Statistik Sekolah Dasar, Pusat Statistik Pendidikan (2006b, 2007b, 2008b, 2009b), Statistik Sekolah 
Menengah Pertama, Pusat Statistik Pendidikan (2006e, 2007e, 2008e, 2009e). 
 
Unlike the case of primary school where there has been a modest downward trend in 
the number of schools, the number of junior secondary schools has increased each 
year, from 23,853 in 2005/2006 to 28,777 in 2008/2009. During the three years 
period of 2005/2006-2008/2009 the number of junior secondary schools increased by 
about 21 percent.  
In terms of status of the school, Figure 2.5 shows that primary schools and junior 
secondary schools are mostly public schools, with 131,490 public primary schools, or 
91.17 percent of all primary schools in 2008/2009, and 16,898 public junior 
secondary schools, or 58.72 percent of all junior secondary schools in 2008/2009. 
Although the total number of primary schools decreased continuously during the 
period under review, the number of private schools at this level of education 
increased by 3.98 percent, 9.68 percent, and 5.67 percent in 2006/2007, 2007/2008, 
and 2008/2009, respectively. Similarly, the number of private schools at the junior 
secondary level increased by 8.96 percent during the period of 2005/2006- 
2008/2009. 
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2.3.4 Senior Secondary Education 
As mentioned above, middle or senior secondary education consists of three years of 
schooling at GSSS or three to four years of schooling at VSSS. General secondary 
education gives priority to expanding knowledge and developing students’ skills, and 
preparing them to continue their studies to the higher level of education. Vocational 
secondary education focuses on expanding specific occupational skills and puts 
emphasis on the preparation of students to enter the world of work and on developing 
their professional attitude. The concept of vocational education is to create a 
work/study programme through the participation of industry and commerce. 
Therefore, VSSS is expected to be able to meet the challenge of the development of 
the country. Thus, in the 2005-2009 strategic plan of MoNE, there was a focus on the 
development of vocational schools. The expansion of access to VSSS/GSSS is more 
directed towards the expansion of vocational schools rather than general senior high 
schools in order to reach a balanced composition in the number of general high 
schools and vocational high school students (MoNE, 2005). Table 2.2 shows the 
target student ratio in these schools. 
Table 2.2: Ratio of Students of VSSS:GSSS 
 
 
Year 
 
Target* 
VSSS : GSSS 
 
 Actual** 
VSSS : GSSS 
 
2004 30 : 70 30 : 70 
2005 32 : 68 39 : 61 
2006 34 : 66 40 : 60 
2007 36 : 64 42 : 58 
2008 38 : 64 45 : 55 
2009 40 : 60 n/a 
Sources: * Strategic Plan, Ministry of National Education, The Republic of Indonesia 2005-
2009, MoNE (2005); ** Author’s calculation based on data from Statistik Sekolah Menengah 
Atas, Pusat Statistik Pendidikan (2006c, 2007c, 2008c, 2009c); Statistik Sekolah Menengah 
Kejuruan, Pusat Statistik Pendidikan (2006d, 2007d, 2008d, 2009d). 
 
 
The government’s target is to increase the ratio of students in VSSS/GSSS schools 
from 30:70 in 2004 to 40:60 by 2009. Due to an extensive VSSS infrastructure 
programme, the ratio reached 39:61 by 2005, and by 2006 the final target of 40:60 
had actually reached.  
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Figure 2.6: Senior Secondary Education Net Enrolment and Gross Enrolment 
2001/2002-2007/2008 
 
 
Sources:* Ikhtisar Data Pendidikan Nasional Tahun 2005/2006 Pusat Statistik Pendidikan (2006f);  
** Ikhtisar Data Pendidikan Nasional Tahun 2007/2008, Pusat Statistik Pendidikan (2008f). 
 
Indonesia has made noticeable improvement in terms of the secondary education 
(junior and senior secondary school) net enrolment ratio. Between 2001/2002 and 
2007/2008 Indonesia recorded a 19.8 percentage point increase in the secondary 
education net enrolment ratio (Figure 2.6). This change seems to cover two distinct 
periods. The first, from 2001/2002 to 2005/2006, was a period of gradual growth. 
Thus, in 2001/2002 approximately 36.17 percent of 16 to 18 year old students were 
enrolled in senior secondary school. Four years later the number had increased by 
6.47 percentage points. The second period, from 2005/2006, was a period of more 
rapid growth, with the net enrolment rate rising by around 18 percentage points in the 
space of just two years. 
Figure 2.7 presents a comparison of secondary education net enrolment rates between 
Indonesia and South East Asia. This shows clearly that Indonesia’s secondary 
education net enrolment rate grows steadily, year by year. However, Indonesia still 
lags behind neighbouring countries. For example, compared to the average net 
enrolment rate in South East Asia, that of Indonesia was always slightly lower in the 
period 2000-2007. In 2006, Brunei Darussalam and Thailand achieved a net 
enrolment level of 90.1 percent and 71 percent, respectively, while Indonesia had a 
secondary education net enrolment rate of 60.4 percent. These comparisons show 
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there is still ample scope for improvements in Indonesia’s efforts in terms of 
participation in secondary education. 
Figure 2.7: Secondary Education Net Enrolment in Indonesia and South East 
Asia 
 
 
Note: Data related to Secondary School consist of Junior Secondary School and Senior Secondary School. 
Sources: 2000-2006 = Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific 2008, ESCAP (2008); 2007= UNESCO 
Institute for Statistics. 
 
 
Figure 2.8 shows the trend in the number of public and private general senior 
secondary and vocational senior secondary schools from 2005/2006 to 2008/2009. 
The number of public and private schools, both for general senior secondary and 
vocational senior secondary, increased during 2005/2006 to 2008/2009. From 
2005/2006 to 2008/2009, on average the number of general senior secondary schools 
grew by around 7 percent and 4 percent for public and private schools, respectively. 
The growth in the number of vocational senior schools during the period of 
2005/2006 -2008/2009 was about 16 percent per year for public schools and about 6 
percent per year for private schools. 
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Figure 2.8: The Number of General Senior Secondary Schools and Vocational 
Senior Secondary Schools, 2006/2007-2008/2009 
 
 
Sources: Statistik Sekolah Menengah Atas, Pusat Statisti Pendidikan (2006c, 2007c, 2008c, 2009c). Statistik 
Sekolah Menengah Kejuruan, Pusat Statisti Pendidikan (2006d, 2007d, 2008d, 2009d). 
 
2.3.5 Tertiary/Higher Education 
The first institution of higher education in Indonesia was established by the Dutch 
colonial government in 1851, when Netherlands East Indies established a medical 
school as part of an ethnic policy to educate prospective indigenous doctors. Before 
the Second World War, there were only about 200 students enrolled in this university, 
thus serving only a very elite segment of society (Nizam, 2006). In 1920, a private 
group of Netherlanders established an engineering college (Technische Hogeschool) 
in Bandung, West Java. This was subsequently followed by the establishment of 
Landbouwkundige Hogeschool, an agricultural school in Bogor, and the law school 
Rechtskundige Hogeschool in Batavia (Jakarta). The establishment of higher 
education at that time was to prepare professionals to address the lack of civil 
engineers, lawyers, medical doctors and other professionals due to shortages caused 
by World War I. The number of universities significantly increased from 4 in 1950 to 
133 by 1960 (Fahmi, 2007). Nizam (2006) records that in the 1960s the government 
was successful in achieving its target of having at least one public university in each 
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province. During that period, about 23 new universities, institutes, and teacher 
training colleges were established.   
Higher education in Indonesia has steadily expanded since the enactment of the 
Education Act in 1961. This expansion has been reasonably uniform across the past 
four decades. Thus the number of students grew continuously from around 200,000 
students in 1975 to more than 4 million students by 2009 (see Figure 2.9). Of the 
current enrolment, more than 1.7 million students attend the 82 public higher 
education institutions and 2.5 million students attend the 2,892 private higher 
education institutions. According to Nizam (2006), the rapid growth in the enrolment 
rate was driven by economic growth and an increase in the international trend 
towards mass participation in higher education. 
Figure 2.9: Higher Education Expansion in Indonesia, 1975-2009 
 
 
Sources: 1975-1995: Nizam (2006); 2005-2009: Statistik Perguruan Tinggi, Pusat Statistik 
Pendidikan (2009a). 
 
Similar to the trend in the higher education student numbers, the gross enrolment 
rates for higher education have gradually increased since 1975. During the period of 
1975-1995, the gross enrolment rate rose from 2 percent to 11 percent. Then, in the 
era of the 2000s, enrolment in higher education steadily increased from about 14 
percent in 2000 to about 17.25 percent in 2007 (see Figure 2.10). Although the gross 
enrolment rate for higher education has a positive trend, the growth in this sector has 
been sluggish compared to gross enrolment rates for lower education levels - primary 
and secondary education.  
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Figure 2.10: Indonesian Higher Education Gross Enrolment Rate 1975-2007 
 
Sources: Lee and Healy (2006); Ikhtisar Data Pendidikan Nasional Tahun 2007/2008, 2008 Pusat Statistik       
Pendidikan (2008f). 
 
As with the discussion of the secondary education sector, it is useful to put 
Indonesia’s higher education enrolment data in an international perspective in order 
to better assess its performance. Thus, Table 2.3 presents data on the gross enrolment 
rate in higher education for South East Asian Countries in 1999 and 2007. The rate 
for enrolment in Indonesian higher education is higher than that of some countries, 
such as Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, and Lao PDR. However, the rate for 
enrolment in Indonesian higher education is considerably lower than that of Malaysia, 
the Philippines, and Thailand. These comparisons therefore show that Indonesia has 
had credible improvement in its higher education enrolment rate. They also show, 
however, particularly with reference to Thailand, that much more can be achieved in 
this area. 
Table 2.3:  Higher Education Gross Enrolment Rates in South East Asian 
Countries 
 
Country Gross Enrolment Rate 
(percent) 
Country Gross Enrolment Rate 
(percent) 
 1999 2007  1999 2007 
Brunei Darussalam 12.3 15.4 Myanmar 7.4 n/a 
Cambodia 2.1 5.3 Philippines 28.7 28.5 
Indonesia 14.4 17.0 Thailand 33.0 49.5 
Lao PDR 2.4 9.1 Timor-Leste 9.6 n/a 
Malaysia 23.0 28.6 Vietnam 10.6 n/a 
Source: Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific 2009, ESCAP (2009). 
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Figure 2.11: The Number of Indonesian Higher Education Institutions, 
2006/2007-2008/2009 
 
 
    Sources: Statistik Perguruan Tinggi, Pusat Statistik Pendidikan  (2006a,  2007a, 2008a, 2009a). 
 
Figure 2.11 shows that higher education institutions are mostly privately owned, with 
2,556 institutions or 96.89 percent of the total, 2,598 institutions or 96.94 percent of 
the total, and 2,892 institutions or 97.21 percent of the total of all institutions in 
2006/2007, 2007/2008, and 2008/2009, respectively. On the other hand, only 82 
institutions or 3.11 percent in 2006/2007, 82 institutions or 3.06 percent in 
2007/2008, and 83 institutions or 2.79 percent of all higher education institutions in 
2008/2009 are public institutions. 
2.4 Human Resources Profile of Indonesia 
In terms of the Human Development Index (HDI)3, Indonesia’s ranking remains 
disappointing at 109 out of 179 countries in 2008. Table 2.5 presents Indonesia’s HDI 
by province from 2005 to 2008. Nationally the HDI of Indonesia increases slightly 
year by year, from 69.6 in 2005 to 71.17 in 2008. During this period, the highest HDI 
belongs to the province of Daerah Khusus Ibukota (DKI) Jakarta, with values of 76.1, 
76.3, 76.59, and 77.03 in 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008, respectively. In contrast, Papua 
                                               
3 Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index of four indicators: life expectancy rate, 
literacy rate, average length of school participation, and per capita expenditures. 
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is the province that has the lowest HDI among the 33 provinces, with values of 62.1, 
62.8, 63.41, and 64 in 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008, respectively. 
Table 2.4: Human Development Index by Province, 2005-2008 
No Province 2005 2006 2007 2008 
1 Nangroe Aceh Darussalam 69.00 69.40 70.35 70.76 
2 Sumatera Utara 72.00 72.50 72.78 73.29 
3 Sumatera Barat 71.20 71.60 72.23 72.96 
4 Riau 73.60 73.80 74.63 75.09 
5 Kepulauan Riau 72.20 72.80 73.68 74.18 
6 Jambi 71.00 71.30 71.46 71.99 
7 Sumatera Selatan 70.20 71.10 71.40 72.05 
8 Bangka Belitung 70.70 71.20 71.62 72.19 
9 Bengkulu 71.10 71.30 71.57 72.14 
10 Lampung 68.80 69.40 69.78 70.30 
11 DKI Jakarta 76.10 76.30 76.59 77.03 
12 Jawa Barat 69.90 70.30 70.71 71.12 
13 Banten 68.80 69.10 69.29 69.70 
14 Jawa Tengah 69.80 70.30 70.92 71.60 
15 DI Yogyakarta 73.50 73.70 74.15 74.88 
16 Jawa Timur 68.40 69.20 69.78 70.38 
17 Bali 69.80 70.10 70.53 70.98 
18 Nusa Tenggara Barat 62.40 63.00 63.71 64.12 
19 Nusa Tenggara Timur 63.60 64.80 65.36 66.15 
20 Kalimantan Barat 66.20 67.10 67.53 68.17 
21 Kalimantan Tengah 73.20 73.40 73.49 73.88 
22 Kalimantan Selatan 67.40 67.70 68.01 68.72 
23 Kalimantan Timur 72.90 73.30 73.77 74.52 
24 Sulawesi Utara 74.20 74.40 74.68 75.16 
25 Gorontalo 67.50 68.00 68.83 69.29 
26 Sulawesi Tengah 68.50 68.80 69.34 70.09 
27 Sulawesi Selatan 68.10 68.80 69.62 70.22 
28 Sulawesi Barat 65.70 67.10 67.72 68.55 
29 Sulawesi Tenggara 69.20 67.80 68.32 69.00 
30 Maluku 67.00 69.70 69.96 70.38 
31 Maluku Utara 62.80 67.50 67.82 68.18 
32 Papua 62.10 62.80 63.41 64.00 
33 Papua Barat 64.80 66.10 67.28 67.95 
  Indonesia 69.60 70.10 70.59 71.17 
Source: Trends of the Selected Socio-Economic Indicators of Indonesia, August 2010, BPS (2010) 
 
Figure 2.12 provides a summary of the human capital profile of Indonesia in 2010. 
The total population of Indonesia was estimated to be 237.56 million (119.51 million 
males and 118.05 million females) as of 2010. At the same time, the size of the 
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economically active population aged 15 and over was estimated to be 116 million, 
which consists of 70.84 million males and 45.15 million females. Among this labour 
force, 42.2 percent come from urban areas and 57.8 percent from rural areas. More 
Indonesian women are now entering the labour market. As of 2010, the number of 
working women reached 41.44 million, or about 38.58 percent of all workers. 
Figure 2.12: Human Resources Profile of Indonesian, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Trends of the Selected Socio-Economic Indicators of Indonesia, August 2010, BPS (2010) 
 
The education profile of the labour force is dominated by the labour force having 
only, at most, a primary education, with 57,440,554 workers in this category in 2010 
(or 52 percent of all workers). The proportion of the labour force who attended senior 
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secondary education is 22 percent, whereas 19 percent have junior secondary 
education, and only 7 percent have graduated from higher education institutions. The 
share of workers with high school and university degrees, however, has been rising in 
urban areas, but less-well educated workers are still a majority even in the cities. 
Much of this profile is an historical legacy of previously limited access to secondary 
or post-secondary education. The challenge is therefore to provide life-long learning 
opportunities to those in the labour force who need to upgrade qualifications and 
skills in response to changing work force skill requirements.  
Figure 2.13: Percentage of Population Working by Educational Attainment 2010 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from Trends of the Selected Socio-Economic 
Indicators of Indonesia, August 2010, BPS (2010). 
 
Turning to the average years of schooling for the population 15 years of age and over 
in 2009, from Figure 2.14 it can be seen that this is 7.7 years. This implies that, on 
average, adult Indonesians attend elementary education only. Among 33 provinces, 
18 provinces, or 54.5 percent, have a higher average years of schooling compared to 
the national average, and 11 provinces, or 33.3 percent, have lower figures compared 
to the national average. Most of the provinces with lower average years of schooling 
are located in central and eastern Indonesia. DKI Jakarta is the province with the 
highest average years of schooling for its adult population, with 10.3 years. On the 
contrary, Papua province has the lowest figure, with just 6.4 years.      .  
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Figure 2.14: Average Years of Schooling, Population 15 Years of Age and Over, by Province, 2009 
     
    Source: Trends of the Selected Socio-Economic Indicators of Indonesia, August 2010, BPS (2010). 
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Despite the shift towards manufacturing and labour-intensive industries over the 
previous three decades, agriculture remains the main sector of employment in 2010 
(Figure 2.15). Thus, in the 1980s, agriculture’s employment share declined from 55 
percent in 1985 to 50 percent in 1990. It then fell further, to around 44 percent by the 
late 1990s and by 2010 the agricultural sector’s share of employment had dropped to 
39 percent. This means that even at present around 43 million Indonesians work in 
the agricultural sector.  
Figure 2.15: Population 15 Years of Age and Over Who Worked During the 
Previous Week by Main Industry, 2005 and 2010 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from Trends of the Selected Socio-Economic Indicators of Indonesia, 
August 2010, BPS (2010). 
 
The second largest sector in terms of the number of workers is the wholesale, trade, 
retail trade, restaurant and hotel sector, with more than 22 million workers, or about 
20 percent of the work force. The share of this sector has increased slightly over time, 
from 20.40 percent in 2004 to 20.68 percent in 2010. 
During the period of 2004-2010 the highest increase in the number of workers was in 
the community, social and personal services sector. Employment in this sector 
increased from about 11 million in 2004 to about 16 million in 2010. The community, 
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social and personal services sector is thus an important sector in terms of absorbing a 
significant number of workers.  
The second fastest employment growth has occurred in the manufacturing sector, 
where employment increased by about 2 million people, representing a 0.34 
percentage point increase in the employment share, during the period. Other sector 
that have experienced growth are financing, insurance, real estate and the business 
services sector, where the employment share increased by 0.33 percentage point, the 
wholesale, trade, retail trade, restaurant and hotel sector, with a 0.28 percentage point 
increase in the employment share, and the mining and quarrying sector, though the 
employment share there expanded by only 0.01 percentage point. There were four 
sectors that experienced declines in their worker share during the period of 2004-
2010, namely the agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishery sector (3.46 percentage 
point fall), transportation, storage and communication sector (0.43 percentage point 
fall), construction sector (0.33 percentage point fall), and electricity, gas, and water 
sector (0.05 percentage point fall).  
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter aims to present a background to the education sector and the human 
resources profile of Indonesian. As documented in this chapter, schooling in 
Indonesia has been characterised by rapid development. Indonesia has a particularly 
impressive record of expansion of primary education. In the case of secondary and 
tertiary education, however, while there has been much improvement, Indonesia is 
still struggling with its objective of increasing the participation rate and the 
opportunity to learn, while at the same time improving the quality of the education 
experience at all levels of education. The aim of documenting these features of the 
education sector in this chapter is to identify some factors that may be relevant to 
earnings function estimation, among others: the composition of the average years of 
schooling, level or type of education, industrial sector, number of higher education 
institutions, and the nature of Indonesia’s compulsory education policy. 
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Chapter 3 
 Returns to Schooling and Human Capital Externalities: 
Review of Theoretical and Empirical Literatures 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the theoretical and empirical literatures on the return to 
education and human capital externalities. The purpose of the review is to highlight 
issues that require attention in the analysis of the impact of education on earnings and 
externalities. While much of the literature relates to developed countries, where 
possible the review covers studies of developing economies to provide a firmer basis 
for the analysis for Indonesia conducted in Chapters 5 to 7.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the theoretical 
human capital literature, followed by a discussion of the foundation of the earnings 
function in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 presents a review of the theoretical literature 
relating to human capital externalities, followed by an analysis of findings from the 
empirical literature in Section 3.5. The final section provides a conclusion and relates 
this to the focus for the present study. 
3.2 Human Capital Model 
The human capital model is the model most widely used to explain the relationship 
between education and labour market outcomes. It was first introduced by Adam 
Smith in 1776 in his book, The Wealth of Nations. However, the recent popularity of 
the model is due largely to the developments by Schultz (1961), Becker (1962), and 
Mincer (1974).  
The core of Human Capital Theory (HCT) is the idea that investments are made in 
human resources in order to improve productivity, and therefore employment 
prospects and earnings. These investments involve two types of costs; namely direct 
costs (e.g. tuition fees, cost of books) and opportunity costs through foregone 
earnings. This is illustrated in Figure 3.1. This figure shows the cost of education and 
income streams associated with three levels of education. The lowest income stream 
is for individuals who leave school at an early age (16 years). The middle income 
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stream is for individuals who complete high school (school leaving age of 18 years). 
It is assumed that there are no direct costs of completing high school. However, the 
completion of high school is associated with foregone earnings of area “a”. Finally, 
the highest income stream is for tertiary graduates (completed education at 24 years). 
Tertiary education is associated with direct costs of area “d” in this diagram. The 
completion of tertiary studies is also associated with foregone earnings of area “b + 
c” if the comparison group is viewed as high school graduates. This diagram is drawn 
to reflect the fact that the opportunity cost - the income foregone by not working - is 
the main component of the cost of obtaining human capital. 
Figure 3.1:  Education and Alternative Income Streams 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Benjamin et al. (2007: 258) 
Figure 3.1 also illustrates the benefits of the investment in education. For high school 
graduates the extra earnings they receive is represented by area “b + e”. For tertiary 
graduates, the increase in earnings power compared with high school graduates is 
given by area “f”.  
The shapes of the earnings streams indicate two key factors (Benjamin et al., 2007). 
First, the lifetime earnings profile of more educated individuals lies above the 
equivalent earnings profile of less-educated individuals. This feature is associated 
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with the proposition that education provides skills that increase the individual’s 
productivity and thus earnings power in the labour market.  
Second, for each profile, earnings increase with age, but at a decreasing rate. This 
upward slope reflects the fact that individuals generally continue to make human 
capital investments, in the form of on-the-job training and work experience, once they 
have entered the labour force. The concave shape reflects the concentration of their 
investments early in the career, and the depreciation of skills in later years.  Mincer 
(1974) argues that this concentration occurs because of: (i) rising opportunity cost of 
investment in education with additional labour market experience; (ii) a finite lifetime 
(T in Figure 3.1) which reduces the benefits of later investment; and (iii) diminished 
learning capacity at older ages. 
Figure 3.1 also illustrates a further typical feature of age-earnings profiles: the 
profiles for the better educated are steeper than those for the less-well educated. This 
pattern is usually held to reflect complementarities between formal education and on-
the job training. That is, workers with higher education tend to undertake more on-
the-job training and gain a higher return to such training. 
Because the costs and benefits of education occur in different time periods, it is 
necessary to discount them into present value terms. For the tertiary education 
outcome depicted in Figure 3.1, this involves the investment decision: invest if 
෍
݂(1 + ݎ)௧்ିଵ଻
௧ୀ଻
>  ෍ܾ + ܿ + ݀(1 + ݎ)௧଺
௧ୀଵ
                                            (3.1) 
 where r is the discount rate. 
There are many factors that can impact this investment decision. These include 
uncertainty (Riddell, 2006) and the individual’s background and ability (Becker, 
1964). As these are not the primary focus of this thesis their potential impact will not 
be reviewed.  
An alternative way of looking at the investment decision is to compute the internal 
rate of return. This involves solving  
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෍
݂(1 + ߩ)௧்ିଵ଻
௧ୀ଻
= ෍ܾ + ܿ + ݀(1 + ߩ)௧଺
௧ୀଵ
                                        (3.2) 
for ρ. The investment decision is then: invest if ρ exceeds the cost of funds (r). Much 
of the empirical literature in this field has aimed to quantify the rate of return to 
investment in education. The main method used in this regard is outlined in the next 
section. 
In summary, HCT is based on four major arguments. First, investments in human 
resources are made in order to improve an individual’s productivity and therefore 
their earnings. Second, it is an investment because costs are incurred, both in terms of 
direct costs (fees) and indirect costs (opportunity costs). Third, the optimal choice is 
dependent on the balance between benefits and costs. Fourth, investment in education 
will benefit both the individual and the society. One measure of the benefits is 
provided by the rate of return on the investment. 
3.3 The Human Capital Earnings Function 
The causal link between schooling and earnings has been illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
The primary means of assessing the value of the educational investment is the internal 
rate of return. The key question is:  how much is the return to education? A number 
of methodologies have been proposed to answer this question, but the one that has 
become a cornerstone in empirical research is the human capital earnings function 
proposed by Mincer (1974) in his study, Schooling, Experience, and Earnings. 
Reflecting the discussion of Figure 3.1 above, Mincer argues that the investment in 
human capital takes two complementary forms: formal schooling, measured by years 
of school completed, and on-the-job training, which can be measured by potential 
years in the labour force subsequent to the completion of schooling. 
Mincer’s basic model is: 
ln(ܧ௜) =  ߚ଴ +  ߚଵ ௜ܵ + ߚଶܧ ௜ܺ  + ߚଷܧ ௜ܺଶ + ߝ௜                                              (3.3) 
where Ei denotes the earnings or wages of individual i, Si denotes years of schooling, 
EXi denotes years of labour market experience, and εi denotes the error term, which 
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embodies the effect of all of the determinants of wages or earnings besides schooling 
and experience. 
Equation (3.3) states that the natural logarithm of earnings or wages depends linearly 
on years of schooling, experience and experience squared. The use of natural 
logarithms allows the interpretation of β1 as the percentage effect of an additional 
year of schooling. This coefficient provides a measure of the private internal rate of 
return to schooling discussed in the previous section.  
The model developed by Mincer (1974) has several distinct characteristics that make 
it particularly attractive (Chiswick, 2000). First, the functional form is an equation 
based on the optimising behaviour of individuals and represents the outcome of a 
labour market process.4 Second, it converts the monetary cost of the investment in 
human capital into years of schooling and years of labour market experience. In other 
words, it converts the ‘immeasurable’ into the ‘measurable’. Third, the function is 
adaptable to inclusion of other variables that affect earnings. Examples include 
ability, individual’s characteristics, family background, and quality of schooling. 
Fourth, it allows comparisons across time and demographic groups, since the 
coefficients of the regression model have economic interpretations. For this reason it 
has, for example, been used extensively in studies of gender wage discrimination and 
immigrant wage adjustment. Fifth, although earnings are positively skewed and the 
inequality of earnings rises with the level of schooling, by using the natural logarithm 
of earnings as the dependent variable, the residuals are closer to being normally 
distributed and homoscedastic. Sixth, the functional form generates a commonly used 
measure of relative inequality, the variance of the natural logarithm of earnings, 
thereby facilitating the study of earnings and income inequality across time and 
space. 
3.4 Human Capital Externalities 
The discussion above has focussed on the benefits an individual obtains from 
additional schooling. However, it is widely accepted that education is beneficial to 
society as a whole as well as to the individual. That is, an individual’s educational 
                                               
4 Mincer derives his earnings function using two key assumptions: all potential earnings capacity is 
allocated to human capital investments during formal schooling and in the post-school period the 
investment profile declines linearly over the working life. 
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attainment affects not only the individual’s productivity but also that of others in the 
society. Workers benefit from being close to a dense, skilled, labour market where, 
through different channels, they can learn from others without compensation. Such 
productivity-enhancing external benefits of labour markets are called human capital 
externalities, knowledge spillover effects, learning externalities, or labour market 
local agglomeration economy5 (Fu, 2007). Moretti (2004) argues that there are two 
separate reasons why an increase in the share of educated workers may increase total 
wages over and above the private return to schooling. Firstly, if educated workers and 
uneducated workers are imperfect substitutes, an increase in the share of educated 
workers will raise the productivity of uneducated workers. Secondly, the human 
capital externality raises the productivity of uneducated workers through the learning 
effects noted above. 
Education externalities need not be limited to the market externalities discussed 
above. A wide range of other potential externalities have been discussed in the 
literature (see, for example, McMahon, 2007), such as more informed voting and 
better parenting practices. Given the array of potential externalities, it is useful to 
have a formal categorisation in mind when discussing them. In general, the human 
capital externalities can be categorised into two main groups, namely market 
externalities and non-market externalities. The former can be divided into 
technological externalities and pecuniary externalities (Halfdanarson et al., 2008; 
Heuermann et al., 2010). 
Various theoretical explanations of market externalities have been constructed. 
Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) elaborate on technological externalities (non-
pecuniary externality). They explain that the process of sharing or exchanging of 
knowledge and ideas, and learning by doing, in turn nurtures technological progress, 
and this is more likely to occur in an area with a higher average level of education. 
Technological human capital externalities arise if educated workers increase the 
                                               
5 Fu (2007) proposes that human capital externalities penetrate through four channels. Workers can 
learn from their occupational and industrial peers, who are in the same local labour market, through the 
depth (quality) of the human capital stock in the local labour market; Marshallian labour market 
externalities, or specialisation and peer competition effects; Jacobs labour market externalities or the 
diversity of the local labour market in terms of occupations and industries; and the thickness (density) 
of the local labour market, or labour market pooling effects. 
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productivity of other workers, for example through processes of informal learning, 
without being compensated (Halfdanarson et al., 2008). 
Figure 3.2: Types of Human Capital Externalities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Halfdanarson et al. (2008). 
 
Pecuniary externalities feature in the works of Krugman (1991). This type of 
education externality is not created through technological channels, but rather through 
market interaction processes between firm and worker. Before entering the job market 
workers need to invest in human capital, such as schooling, training, and the 
acquisition of general knowledge. The length of schooling and the type of education 
chosen will generally depend on the available job types, skill required, and type of 
tool and equipment they expect to use. On the other hand, firms will decide the types 
of jobs and physical capital based on the skills and education of the labour force. An 
increase in workers’ education could push firm to invest more. Thus the firms could 
increase their R&D investment to introduce skill-complementary technologies and so 
increase the productivity of skilled workers in the long-run. Although some of the 
workers do not increase their human capital, they will work with more physical 
capital and receive higher earnings (Acemoglu, 1996). 
The final type of human capital externality in Figure 3.2 is non-market externality. In 
order to explain this type of externality it is necessary to distinguish between non-
market private effects and non-market externalities of human capital. Figure 3.3 
reviews the different benefits of education. 
 
 
Human Capital Externalities 
Market Externalities Non-Market Externalities 
Technological Externalities Pecuniary Externalities 
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Figure 3.3: Benefits of Education and the Outcome Category 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Author’s schematisation based on McMahon (2004, 2007); Wolfe and Haveman (2002). 
 
Figure 3.3 indicates that education has direct and indirect effects. Both of these have 
two dimensions. The first dimension relates to market effects (private market benefits 
and social market benefits). The second dimension covers non-market effects (private 
non-market benefits and social non-market benefits). The direct effects of education 
are the higher earnings, better employment prospects and more prestigious jobs 
generally associated with extra years of schooling. Indirect effects occur as education 
works through other intervening variables to generate either market or non-market 
effects. The indirect effects are externalities because the education of one person 
benefits others in the family, the community, and/or in future generations. The 
benefits of these indirect effects are not enjoyed by the individual as the direct result 
of his or her education investment, but are freely available to all (McMahon, 2004 
and 2007). 
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fertility, (7) Own health, (8) Consumer choice efficiency, (9) Labour market search efficiency, (10) Marital choice 
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Based on Figure 3.3, it can be identified that there are four sets of education outcomes 
that can be linked back to the categories discussed above. The first set comprises 
individual market productivity (which is associated with higher earnings), nonwage 
market remuneration, and intrafamily productivity. These are the private market 
benefits (category A.1). The second set includes, among others, all forms of nonwage 
labour market remuneration (e.g. more flexible working hours, more prestigious 
positions), child quality, child health, fertility, own health, etc. Together these are 
referred to as private non-market benefits (category A.2). The third set of outcomes 
covers the enhancement of children of the more highly educated, through better 
education and cognitive development. This set of outcomes forms the external/social 
market benefits of education (category B.1). The last set of outcomes consists of 
matters such as crime reduction, lowering poverty, and improving the civic senses of 
individuals, strengthening civic institutions and so on. Collectively, these are the 
external/social non-market benefits of education (category B.2). 
Most economists agree that social benefits of education of the types noted above 
exist, but they disagree on the size of these externalities. In addition, most 
conventional estimates of the social rate of returns do not take into account the non-
monetary externalities, as these are difficult to measure. This is why the literature on 
the non-market externalities of education is rather sparse. 
In order to evaluate the presence of human capital externalities, the standard 
Mincerian wage equation of Equation (3.3) can be augmented in a number ways. The 
most common approach is to attempt to capture regional human capital externalities 
as follows: 
ln(ܧ௜) =  ߚ଴ +  ߚଵ ௜ܵ + ߚଶܧ ௜ܺ  + ߚଷܧ ௜ܺଶ + ߚସܼ௜ + ߝ௜                       (3.4) 
where Ei denotes the earnings or wages of individual i, Si denotes years of schooling, 
EXi denotes years of labour market experience, Zi  denotes a vector of variables that 
are held to capture the presence of human capital externalities, including measures of 
the average level of human capital in a worker’s local labour market, and εi denotes 
the error term, which again embodies the effect of all of the determinants of wages or 
earnings besides schooling and experience and the regional human capital 
externalities. 
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3.5 Empirical Evidence on the Returns to Schooling and Human 
Capital Externalities 
3.5.1 Returns to Schooling 
The empirical literature on the rate of return to education is divided into two eras: 
before the early 1970s and after the early 1970s. The assessment of the returns to 
education during the first era began in the late 1950s. The estimation procedure used 
in these early studies was the elaborate or full method that was outlined above in 
Equation (3.2). In the early 1970s the returns to education literature progressed to 
using the earnings function outlined in Equation (3.3) above (Psacharopoulos, 1981). 
This Mincer earnings function continues to dominate the current literature. 
Psacharopoulos (1977) argues that the empirical analysis of the relationship between 
earnings and individual worker characteristics using regression analysis can be 
classified into two broad categories. The first category covers studies based on 
exploratory earnings functions that do not have a specific theoretical base. These 
studies treat the dependent variable (earnings) either in absolute or a log form. Some 
include age or labour market experience in linear form rather than as a quadratic. The 
second category comprises the wider set of studies based on human capital theory. 
These studies follow Equation (3.3) and specify the dependent variable (earnings) in 
log form. In addition, to distinguish between the biological and human capital effects 
of time, the human capital theory based regression equations use experience instead 
of age as an independent variable. 
Most research in developed countries, particularly that over the past three decades, 
has been undertaken using the Mincer Equation. In the case of developing countries, 
however, studies of the profitability of education have used various methods, such as:  
cost-benefit measure and net present value (see Equation 3.1), the internal rate of 
return approach of Equation (3.2), and recently, similar to developed countries, the 
Mincer earnings equation.  
This section reports summaries of selected research on the relationship between 
earnings and individual worker characteristics. The selection in this regard aims to 
convey the main methodological issues that empirical studies of the returns to 
schooling have addressed, as well as indicate the range of findings. Eight of the 
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empirical studies covered here focus on developed countries and the other ten focus 
on developing countries. A summary of the returns to schooling studies at a 
microeconomic level is provided in Table 3.1. This table contains additional details 
on the eighteen studies discussed in the following paragraphs, as well as brief 
comments on a number of additional studies of interest.  
With regard to the developed countries, the focus in the first instance is on 
establishing the conventional wisdom with respect to the magnitude of the return to 
schooling. Then studies that addresses major methodological issues are reviewed. The 
eight studies covered are: Hartog et al. (2004), who report returns to educational 
attainment in eight developed counties and a Central European “transition economy” 
using a standard Mincer equation; Rummery et al. (1999), Callan and Harmon 
(1999), Uusitalo (1999), and Leigh and Ryan (2008), who apply the IV approach to 
estimate the returns to schooling; Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) and Miller et al. 
(2006) who exploit samples of twins in their analysis; and Bronars and Oettinger 
(2006) who make use of sibling data. 
Hartog et al. (2004) present information on the returns to educational attainment in 
eight developed countries and a Central European “transition economy” (Poland) 
using the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) database. The eight developed countries 
reviewed are US, Australia, Netherlands, Canada, Spain, Finland, Germany, and 
Italy. They apply a standard Mincer wage equation, utilising years of schooling and 
dummies for educational level as independent variables. When years of schooling are 
used as an independent variable, the estimation results imply that the rate of return for 
each additional year of schooling ranges from 4.4 to 12.3 percent. When the 
estimation was based on dummies for educational level as independent variables, the 
coefficients on these variables were the smallest for the lowest education category 
and they increased with each subsequent level of education. It appeared that the 
returns to education increase with the level of schooling in most countries.  
Rummery et al. (1999) study the returns to education for Australian youth using data 
from the 1985 wave of the Australian Longitudinal Survey. Both OLS and a rank-
order instrumental variable (IV) approach are applied in this study, with the IV 
approach being used in an attempt to address the endogeneity of the schooling 
variable. This arises where the schooling decision (i.e. how many years of schooling 
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to complete) depends on the earnings gains attributable to the extra schooling.6 The 
results show that, after taking into account the endogeneity of schooling, each 
additional year of schooling is related to an increase in wages of about 8 percent. 
Rummery et al. (1999) concluded that there is no strong evidence that the adjusted 
estimate of the payoff to schooling obtained using the rank-order IV method is 
significantly different from the OLS estimate. 
Using OLS and IV methods, Callan and Harmon (1999) estimate the return to 
schooling for Ireland. Parental education and social class variables are exploited as 
instruments with the IV method. This study utilises data from the Survey of Income 
Distribution, Poverty and Usage of State Services, conducted by the Economic and 
Social Research Institute in 1987. OLS estimates of the return to schooling vary from 
around 7 to 9 percent. The IV estimate is about 10 percent. Different from other 
findings for the UK, the results from this study show that OLS estimates are not 
significantly downward biased. In other words, the differences the between estimates 
of the rate of return using OLS and IV approaches are not statistically significant. 
Uusitalo (1999) reports evidence on the returns to schooling using an individual level 
data set from the 1970, 1975, 1980, and 1985 Finnish longitudinal census. In this 
study the author has a focus on ability as an omitted variable in the estimating 
equation.7 There is an attempt to correct for the ability bias in the earnings equation 
by utilising ability test scores as an individual’s ability proxy. Furthermore, to deal 
with the measurement error and/or endogeneity in school choices, IV estimation is 
adopted, using family background as the instruments. The OLS results indicate that, 
without controlling for ability differences, the return to schooling is 8.9 percent. 
Introducing three ability test scores measuring mathematical, verbal, and analytical 
abilities into the wage equation decreases the estimated effect of years of schooling 
on earnings from 8.9 to 7.4 percent. Taking into account the endogeneity of schooling 
                                               
6 The estimation without controlling for the endogeneity of education may generate biased estimates of 
the return to schooling. By controlling for the endogeneity of education using either an IV approach or 
natural experiments, it can be expected that the estimate of the returns to schooling will be higher. The 
extent of the bias depends on the structure of the particular model specified as well as the true values 
of the parameters of this underlying model. 
  
7 The exclusion of a relevant explanatory variable from the earnings equation may bias the estimated 
coefficients of the included variables. The extent of the bias will depend on: (i) the partial impact of 
the excluded variable on earnings; and (ii) the correlation between the excluded variable and the 
particular included variable. Including explicit measures that proxy for the unobserved effect and using 
twins or siblings are ways to minimise the problem of omitted variable bias. 
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through using the instrumental variable approach yields an estimate of the return to 
schooling of 12.9 percent. 
Leigh and Ryan (2008) apply three different econometric approaches (OLS, 
instrumenting schooling with month of birth, and instrumenting schooling with 
changes in school leaving laws) to estimate the return to schooling in Australia. The 
data used are from The Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia 
(HILDA) Survey. The naive OLS estimate of the return to an additional year of 
schooling (controlling for age and gender) is around 13 percent. The implied ability 
bias is 9 percent when instrumenting with changes in school-leaving laws, 10-28 
percent from estimating a fixed effects model with identical twins, and 39 percent 
when instrumenting with their month of birth. 
Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) take advantage of data on identical twins to 
investigate the economic returns to schooling in the US in 1991. Identical twins have 
the same genes and so have the same “ability”. Moreover, if the twins are raised 
together they will have the same family background. Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) 
relate the difference in the earnings of identical twins to the difference in their levels 
of education as this difference in earnings approach should provide an estimate of the 
return to schooling that is not affected by omitted variables (ability and family 
background) bias. They similarly relate the differences in earnings of non-identical 
twins to the difference in their level of schooling to obtain an estimate of the return to 
schooling that is free of family background bias (though which has omitted ability 
variable bias). Both of the returns obtained from the study of twins can be compared 
with the estimated return obtained from the study of individuals (conventional), 
which suffers from both ability and family background bias. Numerous measurements 
of schooling levels were utilised in this study to evaluate the effect of reporting error 
on the estimated private returns to education. For example, the co-twin’s report on 
educational attainment is used as the instrument for the twin’s self-reported 
educational attainment in IV estimation. Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) do not find 
upward bias of the estimated return to schooling created from omitted ability 
variables. In contrast, they find a significant downward bias in standard estimates of 
the returns to education caused by measurement error in self-reported schooling 
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differences.8 The estimation results after correcting for measurement error imply that 
each additional year of schooling raises wages by 12 to 16 percent. The study 
provides no evidence that conventional estimates of the return to schooling are 
misleading.  
Applying Ashenfelter and Krueger’s (1994) approach, Miller et al. (2006) explore the 
natural experiment of twins in labour market analysis for their analyses of the return 
to schooling of young Australian twins. The estimations in this analysis are 
undertaken using both OLS and IV. The estimation results from the analyses of the 
incomes of individuals and for the within-twins analyses for identical twins imply 
that the economic return to schooling ranges between 1.8 and 6 percent. Based on the 
estimates of a number of models of the determinants of annual earnings for non-
identical twins, the economic return to schooling is between 3.6 and 7.7 percent. It is 
concluded that, when considering both genetic and family effects, the economic 
return to schooling in Australia among a sample of young twins is approximately 
between 5 and 7 percent. These estimation results are close to those obtained using 
conventional models. 
Bronars and Oettinger (2006) use sibling data instead of data on twins in their 
examination of wage outcomes in the US. They employ wage data and aptitude test 
scores from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) to obtain 
OLS, family fixed effects, and fixed effects instrumental variable estimates of the 
return to schooling. They find that controlling for aptitude test scores has a substantial 
impact on the estimated returns to schooling. Adding aptitude test scores residuals as 
an independent variable in a log wage regression decreases the estimated return to 
schooling. This finding creates a doubt on the assumption that unobserved ability is a 
pure family factor. They also find that older brothers have a higher return to 
schooling than younger brothers, and women have a higher return to schooling than 
men. The former finding has a major implication: In the standard wage equation 
specification in sibling studies, the returns to schooling (and other characteristics) are 
assumed not to vary by birth order. But the result noted above supports the argument 
that parents overeducate their sons, and specifically their younger sons, relative to the 
                                               
8 Ignoring the measurement error may result in a downward biased estimate of the return to schooling. 
Many advocate the use of instrumental variable estimators to alleviate the problem of measurement 
error. 
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allocation of educational investment that would maximise the aggregate earnings 
potential of their children. Moreover, this indicates that parental preferences or other 
factors typically omitted from recent sibling models of the return to schooling 
influence the educational attainment of children, or that the quality of schooling (e.g. 
curricular content) may vary systematically by sex and birth order within families. 
Then, when the multiple sibling reports of schooling in the NLSY79 are utilised to 
estimate over identified FEIV models, the over identifying restrictions cannot be 
accepted. This finding suggests that sibling reports of schooling from the NLSY79 
data are correlated with wage residuals. Hence these variables are not valid 
instruments for self-reported schooling in within-family estimates. 
Turning to developing countries, it is observed that there is now a large body of 
literature that has investigated the returns to education in developing countries. In 
general, the estimated returns to education are larger in developing countries than in 
developed countries. Comprehensive overviews are provided in Psacharopoulos 
(1985, 1994). The review in this following section will briefly cover studies for 
Africa, Brazil, Russia, Bangladesh, China, and Indonesia.  
A number of studies on the link between education and earnings in Africa find that 
the private rate of return to an additional year of schooling is quite high. The average 
private returns to education in Africa are 45 percent for primary education, 26 percent 
for secondary education, and 32 percent for higher education (Psacharopoulos, 1985). 
Moreover, Psacharopoulos (1981, 1985, and 1994) shows that for countries in Africa 
it was commonly reported in the early literature that the private returns to investment 
in education are highest at primary level and thus primary education should be the 
number one investment priority. However, a number of later studies on education in 
Africa have found that the private rates of return are not only relatively lower than 
suggested in the earlier literature, but contrary to the conventional pattern they also 
increase with the level of education (Kifle, 2007). There is also evidence that the 
returns to education vary within a country. Thus Kimenyi et al. (2006) report that in 
rural areas in Kenya the returns to university education are lower than the returns to 
secondary and college education, whereas the opposite pattern was observed in urban 
areas in that country. 
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Using a comprehensive micro dataset of full-time workers from the Welfare 
Monitoring Survey (WMS) of 1994, Kimenyi et al. (2006) analyse the returns to 
education in Kenya. Several OLS regressions based on the Mincer (1974) equation 
for the entire sample, and for the sample disaggregated by gender and region, were 
presented. The results suggest that generally the private returns to schooling rise with 
the level of education. At the national level, the rates of return to primary education, 
secondary education, college, and university are 7.7, 23.4, 23.6, and 25.1 percent, 
respectively. Rural areas have lower returns to schooling. Furthermore in these areas 
workers who graduated from university have lower returns to education compared to 
workers who graduated from college and secondary education.  
Cohen and House (1994) examine the relevance of the human capital approach to the 
explanation of the variance in workers’ productivity and earnings in the labour 
market of urban Khartoum, Sudan. A key finding is that the returns to primary 
education are lower than the average for other developing countries, while the returns 
to college education are higher. The results are opposite to the popular view observed 
by Psacharopoulos (1994). Based on this empirical evidence, Cohen and House 
conclude that the patterns of returns to education at different levels of education 
remain inconclusive. 
Using household survey data collected in 1989 by the Brazilian Institute of Statistics 
(IBGE), Griffin and Edwards (1993) evaluate the rates of return to education for 
Brazil by using standard and augmented Mincerian earnings equations. The 
augmented Mincerian earnings equation was utilised to obtain the wage effects of 
changes in the educational structure of the labour force. This was accomplished by 
adding labour market condition controls, such as region and sector of employment, 
into the earnings equation. The basic Mincerian regression yielded results that 
suggested that the rate of return to an additional year of schooling is 15.1 percent. 
When region and industry variables were included in the earnings equation, the rate 
of return to an additional year of schooling declined to 12.5-12.8 percent. 
Lam and Schoeni (1993) investigate the effect of family background on the earnings 
of male workers in Brazil. The inclusion of measures of family background in the 
earnings equation allowed the authors to examine the impact of omitted family 
background variables on the estimate of the return to schooling in Brazil as well as to 
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identify the direct effect of family background on earnings. The data used in this 
study are from the 1982 household survey - Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de 
Domidilios (PNAD) - conducted by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica 
(IBGE). A number of wage equations were estimated. First, Lam and Schoeni (1993) 
estimate a wage equation with the schooling of workers as an independent variable. 
Second, they successively add family background variables, such as: the schooling of 
the worker's parents, wife, and parents-in-law. The main conclusion of the study is 
that the family background bias in the returns to education is fairly small and need not 
imply returns to family connections. 
Cheidvasser and Silva (2007) use a representative sample of the Russian Federation, 
the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, to estimate the return to education. The 
authors complement the OLS regression approach with an IV approach. Changes in 
the educational system in the ex-Soviet Union in the 1950s and 1960s are employed 
as instrument variables. Estimates using the IV approach suggest that the exogeneity 
of the education variable cannot be rejected. Hence, this justifies the focus on OLS 
estimates in this study. Using standard regression techniques and the Mincerian 
earnings function, they report that the returns to education in Russia are quite low 
compared with those reported in the literature on countries throughout the world. The 
returns to schooling range around 1-2.3 percent for men and about 3.7-5.9 percent for 
women.  
Asadullah (2006) investigates labour market returns to education in Bangladesh using 
data from the national Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) 1999-2000 
of the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics. This study adopts the standard Mincer human 
capital earnings function, which was estimated by using OLS. In order to address a 
potential sample selectivity problem, the author applies the sample selectivity 
correction framework suggested by Heckman (1979). The average return to education 
obtained for the full sample is 7.1 percent. Returns to schooling for urban workers are 
8.1 percent and 5.7 percent for rural workers. An interesting finding from this study is 
that there is no significant evidence of sample selection bias in the analysis. In other 
words the OLS estimates are robust to potential non-random selection into waged 
work. 
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Applying Mincer’s equation, Qian and Smyth (2008) draw on a survey of urban 
Chinese workers in 2005 from China’s Institute of Labour Studies (ILS) to estimate 
the private returns to schooling. This study finds that, on average, an additional year 
of schooling led to an increase in earnings of 12.06 percent in 2005. Estimates of the 
marginal returns to completing each additional level of schooling result in the 
following pattern: Individuals with junior secondary education earn 39.57 percent 
more than primary school graduates; those possessing senior secondary education 
obtain 24 percent more than a graduate of junior secondary education; and workers 
completing a college or university degree earn 48 percent more than those holding 
senior secondary education or having a polytechnic education. The authors argue that 
the measurement of the years of schooling should have special attention for future 
research, as this has the potential to bias the estimate of the private returns to 
schooling. They explain that most studies using data for China convert the number of 
years of schooling by using the common number of years it takes to obtain a degree. 
However, this measure ignores the number of years of schooling obtained by 
individuals who pursue further study but do not complete the next degree. Thus, this 
measurement of years of schooling tends to create an upward bias. To overcome this 
problem, Qian and Smyth (2008) suggest utilising both the highest degree attained 
and the individual’s actual years of schooling.  
Deolalikar (1993) estimates the return to schooling for Indonesian adults who have 
completed their schooling. He uses data from the 1987 round of the National 
Socioeconomic Survey (SUSENAS) and the Village Potential (Potensi Desa) module 
of the Economic Census 1986. Instead of years of schooling, this study employs nine 
dichotomous variables for the different schooling categories, namely some primary 
schooling, primary schooling, general lower secondary schooling, vocational lower 
secondary schooling, general higher secondary schooling, vocational higher 
secondary schooling, diploma 1 or 2, diploma 3, and university. Similar to other 
studies on the return to schooling, this paper faces a sample selectivity bias problem. 
To correct for sample selectivity Deolalikar follows the Heckman (1979) framework. 
This involves the estimation of a probit model of the probability of wage labour 
participation of individuals over 15 years of age in order to construct the sample 
selection correction term (lambda). Three sets of estimates of the log earnings 
function are obtained: selectivity-corrected estimate of the standard earnings function, 
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uncorrected estimate of the standard earnings function9, and an expanded earnings 
function, which includes marital status, non-labour income and spouse’s age, in 
addition to the variables in the standard earnings function. The selection of correction 
term in the selectivity-corrected equation is highly significant. In contrast to 
Asadullah’s (2006) research for Bangladesh, this implies that sample selectivity is 
important in influencing log earnings. The signs and significance of the schooling 
coefficients are mostly similar across the first equation and the third equation. 
However, the magnitudes of the schooling coefficients appear to be larger in the first 
equation than in the third equation. The schooling coefficients ranged from 0.116 to 
1.406 for the first equation, from 0.022 to 1.378 for the second equation, and from 
0.011 to 1.323 for the third equation. Generally the results suggest that adult female 
workers have significantly higher returns to schooling than males at the secondary 
and tertiary levels. Another interesting result from the earnings function estimates is 
that there appears to be an important age-cohort difference in the returns to schooling. 
Specifically, the older cohorts gain higher return to schooling, particularly at the 
secondary and tertiary levels, than younger cohorts. 
Duflo (2001) studies the impact of the INPRES10 program on the relationship 
between educational attainment and wages in Indonesia. She utilises data from the 
1995 intercensal survey of Indonesia (SUPAS), and concentrates on adult males born 
between 1950 and 1972. She links the individual-level data on education and wages 
with district-level data on the number of new Sekolah Dasar (Primary Schools) 
INPRES built between 1973-1974 and 1978-1979 in the worker’s region of birth.  
The author compares the educational attainment and the wages of individuals who 
had little or no exposure to the INPRES program (they were 12 to 17 years old in 
1974) to those of individuals who were exposed the entire time they were in primary 
school (they were 2 to 6 years of age in 1974), in “high program” and “low program” 
regions. The number of schools built in the individual’s region of birth and the 
individual’s age when the program was launched are used to determine the exposure 
                                               
9 A semilog earnings function is estimated in which the independent variables are dichotomous 
variables for the nine different schooling categories recorded in the survey, a quadratic in age, and a 
disturbance term. 
 
10 In 1973, the Indonesian government launched a major school construction program, the Sekolah 
Dasar (Primary Schools) INPRES program. INPRES stands for Instruksi Presiden (Presidential 
Instruction). Between 1973-74 and 1978-79, more than 61,000 primary schools were constructed, an 
average of two schools per 1,000 children aged 5 to 14 in 1971. 
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of an individual to the program. Interactions between dummy variables of 
individual’s age in 1974 and the intensity of the program in his region of birth are 
employed as instruments in the wage equation. Duflo confirms that these instruments 
have good explanatory power and the individuals born in the regions that benefitted 
from the program were more likely to stay longer at school and to earn more once 
they entered the labour force. The returns to education are estimated in a selected 
sample. The author focuses on men born between 1950 and 1972. There are 152,989 
individuals in the sample, with an average level of 7.98 years of completed education. 
There are 60,633 individuals who work for a wage, meaning only 45 percent of the 
individuals in the sample is working for a wage, with most remaining individuals 
being self-employed. The probability of working for a wage is potentially affected by 
education. To evaluate this issue, a 2SLS (two stage least square) approach is applied. 
The results show that, on average, the program led to an increase of 0.25 to 0.40 in 
years of education and an increase of 3 to 5.4 percent in wages. Combining the effect 
of the INPRES program on years of schooling and wages generates 2SLS estimates of 
the economic returns to education ranging from 6.8 to 10.6 percent. The estimated 
coefficients in the 2SLS estimations are close to, and not significantly different from, 
those of the OLS estimations. Based on this evidence Duflo (2001) concludes that 
OLS coefficients do not appear to be biased upwards, as argued by Behrman (1990) 
in the context of developing countries. 
Using a standard Mincerian earnings function, Comola and Mello (2010) explore the 
determinants of employment and earnings in Indonesia. They use data from the 2004 
Indonesian labour market survey (Sakernas). The authors aim to address two main 
problems: selection bias and the endogeneity of educational attainment in the wage 
equation. The former problem is tackled by employing a full-information maximum 
likelihood system of equations. Earnings are observed for salaried employees, and the 
selection into the different labour market statuses is modelled in a multinomial choice 
setting. The authors follow Hill (1983) in describing the Indonesian labour using 
three categories: people may be inactive, people may work as wage-earners or people 
may work in non-salaried jobs. A binomial selection equation (where individuals are 
either employed or not employed) is also considered. The endogeneity of educational 
attainment problem is handled by instrumenting years of schooling in the equations 
by exposure to Sekolah Dasar INPRES, measured as the intensity of school 
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construction in an individual's district of birth and his/her age when the program was 
launched. This paper thus uses a similar identification strategy as Duflo (2001). In 
this study the authors compare wage determinants estimation using OLS, binomial 
selection (Heckman selection), and their multinomial selection model. Estimates are 
obtained which treat educational attainment as exogenous, and for when educational 
attainment is instrumented by program exposure.  Comola and Mello (2010) control 
the workers’ sector of activity in the third set of results. The estimate of the return to 
education from a Mincerian wage equation for 2004 obtained by standard OLS 
ranged from 9.49 percent to 10.32 percent. Under the binomial selection procedure 
using Heckman’s (1979) approach, the estimate of the return to education ranged 
between 10.79 and 11.61 percent. The return to education obtained using the 
multinomial selection procedure ranged between 10.21 and 11.21 percent. These 
estimates of the returns to education are comparable to the interval of 6.8-10.6 
percent reported by Duflo (2001). The estimated coefficients were very similar 
whether or not the educational attainment is treated as endogenous. This supports 
Duflo’s conclusion that OLS estimates are not likely to be biased upwards (Duflo, 
2001).  
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Table 3.1: Summary of Selected Studies on the Private Returns to Education 
 
No Author and Year Data Set Country/countries Econometric 
Technique(s) 
Conclusion(s) 
1 Comola and Mello 
(2010)  
 
The 2004 Indonesian labour market 
survey (Sakernas). 
Indonesia OLS, IV The return to education ranges from 9 to 10.8 percent. 
2 Qian and Smyth 
(2008) 
 
2005 survey of urban Chinese workers. China OLS The study finds that, on average, an additional year of schooling led to an 
increase of earnings of 12.06 percent in 2005.   
3 Andini and Pereira 
(2007) 
Portuguese male workers from the 
European Community Household Panel, 
from the wave of 1994 to the wave of 
2001, and focusing on a sample of 
former working students. 
Portugal Random-Effects 
estimator (RE), 
Between-Effects 
estimator (BE), OLS, 
and Quantile-Regression 
estimator (QR) 
 
The conditional average earnings return to one year of part-time schooling is 
much lower than the analogous return to one year of full-time schooling. 
4 Kifle (2007) 363 employees (salary and/or wage 
earners) working in public and private 
sectors of the Eritrean economy 2001-
2002. 
 
Eritrea OLS The rates of returns to education increase with the increase in levels of 
education. 
5 Cheidvasser and Silva 
(2007) 
The 1992-1999 Russian Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey (RLMS). 
 
Rusia OLS, IV The returns to schooling are around 2.6 percent for men and approximately 5.9 
for women. 
6 Asadullah (2006) The 1999-2000 Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey (HIES). 
 
Bangladesh OLS The average returns to education obtained for the full sample is 7.1 percent. 
7 Kimenyi et al. (2006) 1994 Welfare Monitoring Survey 
(WMS). 
Kenya OLS The results suggest that generally the private returns to schooling rise with the 
level of education. 
 
8 Miller et al. (2006) Young Australian twins. Australia OLS, IV The economic return to schooling in Australia among a sample of young twins 
is between 5 and 7 percent when account is taken of genetic and family effects.   
 
9 Hartog et al. (2004) Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). US, Australia, 
Netherlands, Canada, 
Spain, Finland, Italy, 
Germany, and Poland 
 
OLS The estimation results imply that the rate of return to education for each 
additional year of schooling ranges from 4.4 to 12.3 percent. 
10 Trostel et al. (2002) International Social Survey Programme 
data, 1985-1995. 
28 countries OLS, IV Conventional OLS estimates suggest a worldwide average rate of return to 
schooling of about 5 percent for men, and 6 percent for women. There is no 
evidence for a worldwide rising rate of return to education from 1985 through 
1995. In general, instrumental-variable estimates are over 20 percent higher than 
OLS estimates. 
 
11 Duflo (2001) The 1995 intercensal survey of 
Indonesia (SUPAS). 
 
Indonesia OLS, 2SLS The economic returns to education range from 6.8 to 10.6 percent. 
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No Author and Year Data Set Country/countries Econometric 
Technique(s) 
Conclusion(s) 
12 Tsakloglou and 
Cholezas (2000) 
Household Budget Surveys HBSs (1974, 
1988 and 1994). 
 
Greece OLS Returns to education increase as the level of education rises. 
13  Liu et al. (2000) 1990 Taiwan “Human Resource 
Utilization Survey”. 
Taiwan OLS Returns to schooling increase with the level of education. The effect of father’s 
schooling is larger than the effect of mother’s schooling in the wage function. 
However, the effect of wife’s schooling is even larger. 
 
14 Lauer and Steiner 
(2000) 
The 14 waves of the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP). 
 
Germany OLS The return to schooling is around 8 percent for men and 10 percent for women. 
15 Rummery et al. (1999) The 1985 wave of the Australian 
Longitudinal Survey. 
Australia OLS, IV Taking into account the endogeneity of schooling, the results show that an 
additional year of schooling is associated with an increase in wages of about 8 
percent. 
 
16 Callan and Harmon 
(1999) 
The 1987 Survey of Income 
Distribution, Poverty and Usage of State 
Services. 
 
Ireland OLS, IV There is no difference between estimates of rates of return using OLS and IV. 
17  Bedi and  Gaston 
(1999) 
May 1990 survey of Honduran 
households. 
Honduras OLS, IV The IV estimates are significantly higher than the OLS estimates. The higher 
rate of return estimates are driven by the greater schooling attainment and the 
higher marginal returns for individuals from more privileged family 
backgrounds.   
 
18 O’Donoghue (1999) 
 
The German Socio-Economic Panel, the 
Irish Survey on Income Distribution, 
Poverty, and the Usage of State Service 
Research Institute and the Survey of 
Italian Households, UK Family 
Expenditure Survey. 
 
Germany, Ireland, 
Italy and the United 
Kingdom 
OLS Private returns are higher than social and fiscal returns to education. This 
implies that individuals gain more from education than society in general and 
more than the public finances do. 
19 Uusitalo (1999) 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990 
censuses. 
Finland OLS, IV Cognitive abilities are found to have a significant effect both on the choice of 
the length of schooling and on subsequent earnings.  Instrumental variable 
estimates that utilise family background variables as instruments produce 
estimates of the return to schooling that are approximately 60 percent higher 
than the least squares estimates. 
 
20 Ashenfelter and 
Krueger (1994) 
New survey of identical twins. US OLS, GLS, IV The estimation results indicate that each additional year of schooling raises 
individual’s wage by 12 - 16 percent. 
 
21  Deolalikar (1993) The 1987 round of the National 
Socioeconomic Survey (SUSENAS). 
Indonesia OLS, Probit Generally the results suggest that adult female workers have significantly higher 
returns to schooling than males at the secondary and tertiary levels. 
 
22 Lam and Schoeni       
(1993) 
1982 household survey - Pesquisa 
Nacional por Amostra de Domidilios 
(PNAD). 
Brazil OLS The main conclusion of the study is that the family background bias in returns to 
education is fairly small and need not imply returns to family connections. 
Source: Author’s compilation.  
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The empirical studies from the various countries discussed in this section provide two 
essential messages. The first message concerns the magnitude of the return to 
schooling. The rate of return to schooling ranges from approximately 5 to 16 percent. 
These figures confirm that schooling is an important determinant of earnings.  
The second main message relates to technical aspects of the earnings function. Three 
kinds of estimation bias may exist in this function, namely omitted variable bias, 
measurement error bias, and endogeneity bias. Many studies attempt to deal with 
these three potential biases using various approaches. The omitted variables bias (e.g. 
ability, family background) can be solved by adding explicit measures that proxy for 
the unobserved effect. Some studies use IQ, aptitude test, and other related test scores 
as a proxy for unobserved ability (Griliches and Mason, 1972; Bronars and Oettinger, 
2006). However, this approach is not without its problems. It has been criticised 
because is very difficult to develop reliable ability measures (Ashenfelter et al., 
1999). The second approach to overcome the omitted variable bias is by using twins 
or siblings (see Ashenfelter and Krueger, 1994; Miller et al., 1995 and 2006; Bronars 
and Oettinger, 2006). Empirical studies utilising twins or siblings approaches provide 
varying results. However, many of the within-twin studies indicate that ability bias is 
relatively small (Ashenfelter et al., 2000). The second problem is measurement error. 
Many studies deal with this problem by applying an IV approach (see Uusitalo, 1999; 
Ashenfelter and Krueger, 1994). The endogeneity bias problem can be overcome 
using two methods: utilising natural variation in data caused by exogenous influences 
on the schooling decision or applying an IV method (see Rummery et al., 1999; 
Callan and Harmon, 1999; Uusitalo, 1999; Leigh and Ryan, 2008; Duflo, 2001; 
Comola and Mello, 2010). The results from IV studies are varied. Some studies point 
towards the presence of a downward bias in OLS estimates, while others report that 
the results from IV and OLS are close.  
The discussion above shows that to measure the relationship between earnings and 
schooling we can employ some relatively sophisticated methods such as: using 
proxies for unobserved variables, utilising natural variation in schooling outcomes, 
and exploring twins or siblings methods, or we can apply a simple (standard) method. 
However, many of the previous studies provide evidence that there are no significant 
differences between results obtained from innovative methods and those from the 
standard OLS approach. Thus, the majority of the empirical studies confirm that the 
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standard (OLS) method is a reasonably robust way to assess the link between 
schooling and earnings. 
3.5.2 Human Capital Externalities 
In Section 3.4 the significant aspect of human capital externalities has been discussed 
from the theoretical perspective. This Section complements that earlier discussion by 
presenting the main finding from selected empirical studies on human capital 
externalities. The first part of the section covers empirical evidence on market 
externalities. The second part reviews empirical studies on non-market externalities. 
3.5.2.1 Market Externalities 
There is a vast body of research on human capital externalities at the macroeconomic 
level, gained largely through investigating the determinants of economic growth. 
These studies typically show that education is an important contributor to the growth 
of nations. However, fewer researchers have studied human capital spillovers at the 
microeconomic or individual level (Rakova and Vaillancourt, 2005; Liu, 2007), 
particularly in the case of less developed countries (LDCs). This section provides 
summaries of some of this research. Ten papers are reviewed in this section. The first 
seven estimate human capital externalities in developed countries and the three others 
cover less developed countries.  
Rauch (1993) and Morreti (1998, 2004) investigate human capital externalities in the 
US at the metropolitan areas (cities) level. Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) and Rudd 
(2000) study human capital externalities in the US at the state level. The next two 
papers are similar studies conducted for other developed countries. The first of these 
covers Canadian cities, and the second one covers Italian local labour markets. The 
three studies for less developed countries cover Iran (manufacturing sector), Kenya 
(district level), and China (city level). A summary of human capital externalities 
studies at a microeconomic level is provided in Table 3.2. This table contains 
additional details on the ten studies discussed in the following paragraphs, as well as 
brief comments on a number of additional studies of interest. In terms of Figure 3.2, 
all of the studies reviewed in this section represent the category of market 
externalities, either technological externalities or pecuniary externalities. Moreover, 
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all the studies can be seen to correspond to panel B.1 of Figure 3.3, that is 
external/social market benefit. 
Using the augmented Mincerian model of Equation (3.4), Rauch (1993) estimates 
average-schooling externalities in a cross section of US cities in 1980. He uses US 
individual data from the Public Use Microdata Sample of the 1980 Census of 
Population, together with data for the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
(SMSA), to assess the effect on the wages of individuals of the average level of 
human capital in their region of residence. He finds that the SMSA average education 
and the SMSA average experience are both significant in raising individual wages. 
An additional average year of schooling means an increase of 5.1 percent in the wage, 
and an additional average year of experience means a 0.46 percent increase in the 
wage of the typical individual. These appear to be economically important 
magnitudes. 
Moretti (1998) similarly analyses the external return to education to individuals who 
work in cities in the US. The empirical analysis of this study uses individual micro 
data from the 1970, 1980 and 1990 Censuses. In particular, he exploits the 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) as a local labour market and the 1989 March 
Current Population Survey (CPS) to determine average education by city. The 
estimation results show that a 1 percent increase in the share of college educated 
workers raises high-school drop-outs’ wages by 2.2 percent, high-school graduates’ 
wages by 1.3 percent and the wages of workers with a college degree by 1.1 percent. 
Again, these externalities appear to be quite large. 
In a further study, Moretti (2004) explores several data sets. The focus of the study is 
the existence of unobservable characteristics of individuals and cities that correlate 
with the share of college graduates and which could raise individual wages, thus 
biasing the coefficient of the aggregate human capital measure. In order to tackle the 
problem of unobservable characteristics this study employs an Instrumental Variable 
(IV) method of estimation. The two instrumental variables that are used are the 
(lagged) city demographic structure and the presence of a land-grant college. He 
concludes that there is an externality at the city level because a greater share of 
college graduates in cities leads to an increase in their wages in both 1980 and 1990.  
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Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) extend the static approach of the above studies to a 
panel of US states and account for state-fixed effects as well as for the endogeneity of 
average and individual schooling. This study uses a sample of white men aged 40-49 
from the 1960-1980 US Censuses. They employ the variation in educational 
attainment associated with compulsory schooling laws and child labour laws in the 
US to examine whether there is evidence of external returns to higher average 
schooling. Instead of the metropolitan area level, Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) 
measure aggregate human capital by the average years of schooling at the state level. 
The main findings of this research suggest that a small external return of about 1 
percent (mostly ranging from 1 to 3 percent) is possible, but that there is little 
evidence of sizeable external returns to education.  
Rudd (2000) investigates whether the average level of human capital in a state affects 
the earnings of an individual residing in that state in a manner external to the 
individual’s own human capital. He uses data from the 1978-1991 March Current 
Population Survey (CPS). His results show that there is little evidence of an external 
effect of human capital at the state level in US. The main difference between Rudd 
(2000) and Moretti (1998, 2004), and Raunch (1993) seems to be in the level of 
disaggregation: to the state level in Rudd (2000) and finer regional disaggregation in 
the other studies. This suggests that the design of the study may affect the empirical 
results. 
Rakova and Vaillancourt (2005) estimate the externalities resulting from the local 
concentration of human capital that raise labour productivity of all workers in 
Canadian metropolitan areas. They use the 1991 and 2001 Canadian Censuses of 
Population. In order to assess the presence of human capital externalities, Rakova and 
Vaillancourt (2005) utilise a sample of individuals aged 15 years or more who had a 
job in the reference year (the year prior to the census year) and who were not full time 
students. They propose four alternative measures of human capital: (i) a combination 
of average education and average experience variables; (ii) the share of workers with 
university degrees; (iii) the share of workers with postgraduate degrees; and (iv) the 
share of scientists and engineers. The results of their estimation of the impact of the 
aggregate human capital at the level of Canadian Census Metropolitan Areas (CMA) 
on the individual labour productivity over different samples and in different time 
periods indicate the existence of human capital externalities. Using 1990 and 2000 
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data and employing the share of workers with university degrees, share of workers 
with a postgraduate degree and share of scientists and engineers as measures of 
human capital, the results suggest that an increase of 1 percent in each of these three 
measures of human capital increases the labour productivity of other workers by 0.6 
to 1.3 percent, by 1.5 to 5.8 percent and by 2.1 to 3.1 percent, respectively.  
Dalmazzo and Blasio (2007) examine the effects of local human capital on 
household-level rents and individual-level wages for a sample of Italian local labour 
markets (LLM). In this research a LLM is defined as “a territorial unit resulting from 
the organisation of social and economic relations in that its boundaries do not reflect 
geographical particularities or historical events” (Dalmazzo and Blasio, 2007, pp 
366). They exploit data from the 1993, 1995, 1998, and 2000 Survey of Household 
Income and Wealth (SHIW). The authors adopt three strategies. The baseline model 
in their study included local human capital, a set of dummies that control for time 
effects in the years of the surveys, and the basic Mincerian set of individual 
characteristics.  First, they check the robustness of the baseline estimates by including 
additional household/individual controls such as: a dummy for branch of activity of 
the company for which each individual works and a dummy for firm size. Second, 
they test whether the estimated effects of local schooling are robust to the inclusion of 
additional territorial variables. Third, they deal with a reverse causality problem by 
instrumenting local schooling. The results show that there is an economically 
important correlation between local human capital and average wages after 
controlling for individual characteristics. This implies that human capital generates 
positive externalities at the local level.  
Naderi and Mace (2003) employ multilevel models to examine the existence of 
human capital externalities in the manufacturing sector of Iranian industry. They use 
data about the characteristics of 15,755 full-time male employees working in 35 
manufacturing firms in Iran. This empirical study provides evidence for the pecuniary 
externality effects of human capital. A worker working in a firm that has a higher 
average accumulation of human capital embodied in workers earns more than a 
worker working in a firm with less human capital.                             .                        
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Table 3.2: Summary of Selected Studies on Human Capital Externalities at a Microeconomic Level 
 
No Study Data Set Country/countries Econometric 
Technique(s) 
Conclusion(s) 
1 Canton (2009) Dutch survey data and Working Conditions Survey 
(WCS) from the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Employment 1992-2006. 
Netherlands Fixed Effects estimation The regional fraction of high-skilled workers or the region’s 
average educational attainment appears with a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient in an augmented Mincer 
specification. However, the impact on individual wages 
completely vanishes when the firm’s human capital stock is 
included as an additional control. 
 
2 Kirby and Riley (2008) United Kingdom Labour Force Survey (LFS) 1994-
2004. 
UK OLS estimation and 
Feasible GLS estimation 
A one year increase in industry average schooling raises the 
wages of workers within that industry by 2.6 to 3.9 percent, 
giving a social return to schooling that is significantly above the 
private return. 
3 Muravyev (2008) Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey 1992-
1994. 
Russia OLS and Random Effects 
estimation 
A one percentage point increase in the share of people with 
higher education in a city results in an increase of city residents’ 
earnings of about 1 percent.  
4 Wirz  (2008) Linked employer-employee data from for the year 
1996 from the Schweizerische 
Lohnstrukturerhebung (LSE).  
 
Switzerland Weighted least squares There is clear empirical evidence for education spill-over 
effects on individual wages within occupational groups (about 4 
percent) and at the firm level (about 2 percent). 
5 Dalmazzo and Blasio (2007)  1993, 1995, 1998 and 2000 from the Survey of 
Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). 
 
Italy OLS and IV The results show that human capital generates positive 
externalities at the local level. 
6 Liu (2007) 1988 and 1995 Chinese Household Income Projects 
(CHIP). 
China OLS and IV OLS estimates of the external returns range from 4.9 percent to 
6.7 percent. 2SLS estimates suggest that a one-year increase in 
city average education could raise individual earnings by 
between 11 and 13 percent.   
 
7 Ciccone and Peri (2006) Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) of the US 
Census (US Bureau of Census, 1970, 1990). 
 
US 2SLS Empirical results yield no evidence of statistically significant 
average schooling externalities at the city level or the state 
level. 
 
8 Kimenyi et al. (2006) Welfare Monitoring Survey (WMS) of 1994. Kenya OLS In the rural areas male average human capital at the district 
level has a negative and significant effect on earnings while 
female average human capital at the district level has a positive 
but insignificant effect. On the other hand, in the urban areas, 
the effect of the district level average education for males and 
females on earnings is positive and statistically significant. At 
the national level, the female average human capital has a 
positive, statistically significant effect on earnings of workers 
while the average male human capital has a positive but 
insignificant effect.   
 
9 Isacsson (2005) 1993 and 1998 Statistics for Sweden. Sweden OLS, Fixed Effects The cross-sectional models suggest, in general, that externalities 
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No Study Data Set Country/countries Econometric 
Technique(s) 
Conclusion(s) 
are positive and significantly different from zero. However, 
after accounting for individual fixed effects and dummy 
variables for the county in which the individual works, the 
results indicate no statistically significant external effects of 
education on earnings in Sweden.   
 
10 Rakova and Vailancourt 
(2005) 
1991 and 2001 Canadian Census of Population. Canada OLS Empirical results indicate there is a positive human capital 
externality. 
 
11 Morreti (2004) The 1979-1994 Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(MSA), the 1970, 1980 and 1990 Census, the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), 
Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs). 
 
US OLS and IV The results indicate that an increase in the supply of college 
graduates raises high school drop-outs’ wages by 1.9 percent, 
high school graduates’ wages by 1.6 percent, and college 
graduates’ wages by 0.4 percent. 
12 Naderi and Mace (2003) 15,755 full-time male employees working in 35 
manufacturing firms in Iran. 
 
Iran  Multilevel Modelling The estimation results provide evidence for the pecuniary 
externality effects of human capital in the manufacturing sector 
in Iran. 
 
13 Rudd (2000) Individual data on a period from 
1978 to 1991.  
 
US 2SLS Most of the results were found to be insignificant. 
14 Morreti (1998) Individual data from the 1970, 1980 and 1990 
Census and the Current Population Survey (CPS).  
 
US OLS and IV Empirical results suggest the existence of a positive human 
capital externality. 
15 Maani (1996) The 1991 New Zealand Census of Population and 
Dwellings. 
New Zealand OLS The estimates of the social rates of return to education are 
positive and significant, indicating that investments in 
education result in positive economic returns. 
 
16 Rauch (1993) Cross-sectional micro-data for the year 1980 from 
the United States Census of Population. 
US GLS Wages increase, ranging from 2.8 to 5.1 percent and from 0.2 to 
0.7 percent, after one year increase in average education and 
average experience, respectively. 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
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Kimeny et al. (2006) apply the augmented Mincer equation to analyse returns to 
education and the social externality of education at the district level in Kenya. The 
data used in this study come from the Welfare Monitoring Survey (WMS) of 1994 
undertaken by the Central Bureau of Statistics (Ministry of Finance and Planning, 
Government of Kenya). The estimation results provide evidence of human capital 
externalities in the urban areas. At the national level, women’s education has a 
significantly larger impact on male earnings compared to the impact that is associated 
with men’s schooling on female earnings. Another important point from the results is 
that public policies that provide wide opportunities for disadvantaged people benefit 
the whole society in term of earnings and productivity improvement.  
Liu (2007) investigates the external returns to education using city average education 
in the standard earnings equation. The study utilises data from the Chinese Household 
Income Project 1988 (CHIP88) and the Chinese Household Income Project 1995 
(CHIP95). The focal point of this study is on urban individuals between 16 and 65 
years of age who had full-time jobs, and reported complete information on wage 
earnings, schooling, work experience, gender, and employment. Several approaches 
to estimate the impact of human capital externalities are employed, such as OLS 
estimation using city average education for city-level education, OLS estimation 
using the fraction of college-educated workers for city-level education, IV estimation, 
and estimation of the external returns by education group. The estimates show that a 
one year increase in city average education raises individual earnings by 11 to 13 
percent. The social returns to education, which consist of the private and external 
returns, were able to reach 16 percent in the mid-1990s in urban China. The study 
also finds evidence that the economic reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s 
increased the external returns to education in Chinese cities. 
Based on the literature surveyed in this section, there are several points that can be 
highlighted. First of all, it appears from all previous studies that the importance of 
human capital externalities depends on the level of disaggregation. Significant results 
are obtained when the aggregate human capital is measured at the city or district 
level. In studies where the level of analysis is extended to a wider geographical area, 
such as state level, the human capital externalities are generally not significant. 
Second, several measure of human capital that are commonly utilised are the average 
of the years of schooling, the proportion of workers with college or higher degrees, 
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and the average of work experiences. All of the studies discussed in this section 
indicate that human capital externalities are important regardless of the human capital 
measure of externalities. Third, most of the studies suggest that when estimating 
human capital externalities there should be consideration of a potential endogenity 
problem. Instrumental Variable estimation is recommended to tackle this problem. 
Fourth, some studies measure the effect of human capital externalities separately for 
various groups, such as male/female, rural/urban area, and occupational group. These 
studies reveal that the measures of human capital based on these criteria have 
different magnitude of effect on earnings. 
Although there is enormous literature devoted to estimating the rates of return to 
schooling and human capital externalities, there are few empirical studies for 
Indonesia. The information learned from the studies discussed in this section will 
provide a valuable foundation for examination of the issue for Indonesia. 
3.5.2.2 Non-market Externalities 
In comparison to the literature on market externalities covered in the previous section, 
empirical studies on the non-market externalities of education are rather sparse. One 
of the reasons for this is that it is extremely difficult to measure this type of 
externality. This section reviews five papers that discuss non-market externalities of 
education. The two first papers cover education non-market externalities in terms of 
the intergenerational transmission of education. The third and fourth studies provide 
brief discussion on the health benefits of education. The last paper examines the 
impact of schooling on civic participation and attitudes. Covering just these five 
studies is sufficient to convey the typical approach in this field of enquiry, and to 
illustrate the types of finding established. A summary of studies on non-market 
externalities of education is presented in Table 3.3. This table contains additional 
details on the five studies discussed in the following paragraphs, as well as brief 
comments on a number of additional studies of interest. 
Daouli et al. (2010) report on an empirical study of education non-market 
externalities in terms of the intergenerational transmission of education among Greek 
women. These intergenerational educational correlations are investigated using the 
educational attainments of parents and their daughters. The authors make use of data 
from the 1981, 1991, 2001 Greek censuses and the 2004/2005 Greek Household 
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Budget Survey. They find that there was substantial intergenerational educational 
mobility during the last three decades in Greece. The results support the existence of 
non-market externalities of human capital. 
Using the 1986, 1994, and 2001 waves of the Canadian General Social Survey, Sen 
and Clemente (2010) assess the correlation between the educational attainments of 
different generations in Canada. They estimate the effects of parental post-secondary 
educational attainment on the child achieving any type of post-secondary education. 
This study finds evidence of an intergenerational spillover from parental education. 
The results show that children belonging to a father (mother) with post-secondary 
education are approximately 0.2 (0.17) more likely to attend university than children 
belonging to parents with only a high school education.  
Lundborg (2008) studies the health returns to education. This study had two 
objectives. The first objective was to estimate the causal effect of education on health 
employing data from the first wave of the Midlife in the United States (MIDUS) 
survey collected in 1995. The second objective was to explore some of the 
mechanisms through which the effect occurs. He evaluates the effect of education on 
a variety of lifestyle factors, occupational hazards, and health insurance coverage to 
investigate potential mechanisms. A sample of identical twins was used to assess the 
health returns at different levels of education. The study finds strong evidence of a 
positive link between education and health. Higher education levels were positively 
correlated with self-reported health and negatively correlated with the number of 
chronic conditions. Regarding the second aim, the author provides the following 
remarks: (i) The results imply that lifestyle factors, such as smoking behaviour and 
being overweight, make only a modest contribution to the education/health gradient. 
(ii) There is no evidence that job risks have an impact on the education/health 
gradient. (iii) Using the pooled twins sample, the results suggest that education is 
associated with a greater likelihood of being covered by health insurance. In contrast, 
the twin Fixed Effect estimation shows that the relationship between education and 
health insurance is non-causal.  
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Table 3.3: Summary of Selected Studies on Non-market Externalities of Education 
 
No Author and year Data Country/contries Estimation Method Results 
1 Daouli et al. (2010) The 1981, 1991, 2001 Greek censuses 
and the 2004/2005 Greek Household 
Budget Survey. 
 
Greece OLS, Probit There was substantial intergenerational educational mobility during the last three decades 
in Greece. 
2 Sen and Clemente 
(2010) 
The 1986, 1994, and 2001 waves of the 
Canadian General Social Survey. 
 
Canada OLS Parental education has significant intergenerational spillovers. 
 
3 Becker et.al. (2009) The Population Census Prussian county 
data, 1816 and 1849. 
Prussia  
 
OLS and IV  Counties with higher school enrolment rates in 1849 show a steeper fertility decline, both 
in terms of crude birth rates and marital fertility rates. 
 
4 Silles (2009) The General Household Survey for 
England, Scotland and Wales. 
UK OLS, IV The results of the estimation suggest that one additional year of schooling increases the 
probability of being in good health by between 4.5 and 5.5 percent.  
 
 
5 Lundborg (2008) The first wave (1995) of the Midlife in 
the United States Survey (MIDUS). 
 
US OLS, twin FE The results suggest a causal effect of education on health.  
6 Siedler (2007) Fourteen waves (1980-2004) of the 
German General Social Survey 
(ALLBUS).  
Germany Probit, OLS, and IV Simple probit and OLS estimates suggest a strong and significant positive relationship 
between years of schooling and a broad range of political outcomes.  However, IV 
estimates utilising exogenous variation in secondary schooling in Germany over the period 
1949 to 1969 across Federal states find no evidence that these correlations represent a 
causal effect of schooling on citizenship.  
 
7 Dee (2004) The High School and Beyond 
longitudinal study and the 1972-2000 
General Social Surveys (GSS).   
US OLS, 2SLS, Probit Educational attainment contributes to most measures of civic engagement and attitudes. 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
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Using changes in compulsory schooling laws in the United Kingdom as a natural 
experiment, Silles (2009) evaluates the causal relation between health and education. 
This study is based on data from the 1980-2003/2004 General Household Survey for 
England, Scotland and Wales. The main result is that there is a causal effect of 
schooling on health, and this is established by relying on changes in educational 
participation caused by the raising of the minimum school leaving age in the United 
Kingdom. The results suggest that an additional year of schooling increased the 
probability of being in good health by between 4.5 and 5.5 percent. 
Dee (2004) attempts to provide evidence for the presence of education non-market 
externalities in terms of the effects of schooling on civic participation and attitudes. 
He identifies the effects of educational attainment using two channels; availability of 
junior and community college and changes in teen exposure to child labour laws. The 
effects of college entrance on adult voter and volunteer participation are assessed 
using data from the High School and Beyond longitudinal study. In addition the 
effects of years of schooling on adult voter participation, on group memberships and 
on attitudes towards free speech are estimated using data from the 1972-2000 General 
Social Surveys (GSS). This study provides evidence that educational attainment 
contributes to most measures of civic engagement and attitudes. The results confirm 
that additional schooling has strong and statistically significant effects on voter 
participation. Furthermore it finds that the additional secondary schooling raises not 
only the frequency of newspaper readership but also the amount of support for 
allowing most forms of possibly controversial free speech. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter provides an outline of the literature relating to returns to education and 
human capital externalities. It highlights the key issues that are significant in the 
development of this thesis. The first part of this chapter explores human capital 
theory. It concludes that this theory is an appropriate basis for analysing the return to 
education and the human capital externalities of education. 
This chapter also provides a brief overview of the theoretical foundation of Mincer’s 
human capital earnings function. It then discusses the three types of human capital 
externalities. The chapter argues that investment in education and training not only 
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provides private benefits but also social benefits. Furthermore, it is emphasised that 
the education externalities consist of market and non-market externalities. 
After discussing human capital externalities, this chapter also summarises some of the 
empirical evidence on the returns to education and human capital externalities. There 
is a large amount of literature devoted to estimating rates of returns to education and 
human capital externalities, but there are few empirical studies from Indonesia. 
Research is needed in order to assess the effectiveness of the current education in 
terms of the earnings returns in Indonesia. This study attempts to address this issue 
and fill this research gap. 
Most of the previous studies emphasise private returns to education and market 
externalities of education. Little attention has been given to analysing the non-
monetary externalities of education because these are difficult to measure. In contrast 
to the previous studies on the returns to education and human capital externalities, 
this study seeks to examine private returns and market externalities from education in 
Indonesia. The subsequent chapters will address these issues. 
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Chapter 4 
Econometric Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
Having reviewed the most relevant literature on the topics of measuring the private 
return to schooling and measuring the externalities associated with schooling in 
Chapter 3, attention is now given to the econometric methodology. The objective of 
this chapter is to describe the methodological issues relating to the estimation of the 
theoretical models discussed in the previous chapter. The rest of the chapter discusses 
briefly the methodological steps for Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the 
Instrumental Variable (IV) approach. These were identified in Chapter 3 as two of the 
main techniques used in the analysis of the payoff to schooling, as well as in the 
empirical assessment of the externalities of schooling. These techniques can be 
applied to the data set used in this thesis.11  
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 provides a brief overview of the 
OLS approach. The IV model is discussed in Section 4.3, followed by a conclusion in 
Section 4.4.  
4.2 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)  
Estimation of the human capital earnings function is most often undertaken by OLS. 
The method of Ordinary Least Squares is attributed to Carl Friedrich Gauss, a 
German mathematician. Under certain assumptions, the method of least squares has 
some very attractive statistical properties that have made it one of the most powerful 
and popular methods of regression analysis (Gujarati, 2004). 
The goal of linear regression is to estimate the parameters of the linear conditional 
mean. Consider the following model: 
ݕ௜ = ߚଵݔଵ௜ + ⋯+ ߚ௞ݔ௞௜ + ߤ௜                ݅ = 1, … ,݊.       (4.1) 
 
                                               
11 Other techniques, such as random effects and fixed effects models, which cannot be applied with the 
data used in this thesis, will not be reviewed. 
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In matrix notation: 
ݕ =   ܺߚ + ߤ,                                                 (4.2) 
where ݕ = (ݕଵ, … ,ݕ௡)ᇱ denotes a (n x 1) vector of observations on the dependent 
variable, X is a (n x k) matrix of observations on the explanatory variables 
(regressors), ߚ is a (k x 1) vector of unknown regression parameters, and ݑ =(ߤଵ, … , ߤ௡)′ is a (n x 1) vector of errors (unobserved stochastic disturbances). 
The OLS estimator is obtained by choosing the vector ߚ that minimises the sum of 
squared residuals (SSR),  
ܴܵܵ (ߚመ) = ∑ (ݕ௜ − ௜ܺߚመ)ଶ௡௜ୀଵ  ,                                            (4.3) 
                                                    = ൫ݕ − ܺߚመ൯ᇱ(ݕ − ܺߚመ)          = ݕᇱݕ − 2ݕᇱܺߚመ + ߚመ′ܺ′ܺߚመ                                                            = ||ݕ − ܺߚመ||ଶ.    
The usual assumptions that are required to obtain a best linear unbiased estimator 
(BLUE) are as follows (see Wooldridge, 2002; Maddala, 2004):  
(i) Zero mean value of disturbance ui ,  E(µi) = 0  or E(ui|Xi) = 0,  
(ii) Exogeneity of regressors, E(ui Xi) = 0,  
(iii) Homoscedasticity or equal variance of ui, E (ݑ௜ଶ|ܺ௜ = ߪଶ ), 
(iv) Conditionally uncorrelated observations, E(ui uj|Xi,Xj) = 0, i ≠ j. 
Most estimates of the human capital earnings function have been on cross-section 
data. While violation of assumption (iii) is typically a major issue with the use of 
such data, the adverse consequences have been minimised through using 
heteroscedasticity corrected “t” statistics. Autocorrelation (i.e., violation of 
assumption (iv)) is not typically of concern with cross-section data. Most attention in 
this type of research has therefore been directed at possible violation of the 
exogeneity of the regressors (i.e., violation of assumption (ii)). A typical technique 
used in such cases is IV estimation. This approach has been employed by Ashenfelter 
and Krueger (1994), Harmon and Walker (1995), Brunello and Miniaci (1999), 
Callan and Harmon (1999), Uusitalo (1999), Plug (2001), Trostel et al. (2002), 
Lemke and Rischall (2003), Bronars and Oettinger (2006), Miller et al. (1995), Liu 
(2007), Leigh and Ryan (2008), Aslam et al. (2010), among others. The main 
theoretical issues associated with this approach are addressed next. 
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4.3 Instrumental Variables Approach 
The essential assumption for consistency of least-squares estimators is that the model 
error term is uncorrelated with the regressors, i.e. E(uiXi) = 0. If this assumption is not 
fulfilled, the OLS estimator is inconsistent and the OLS estimates can no longer be 
given a causal interpretation. The instrumental variable (IV) estimator provides a 
consistent estimator under the very strong assumption that valid instruments exist, 
where the instruments Z are variables that are correlated with the regressors X that 
satisfy E(ui Zi) = 0, and explain part of the variability in the endogenous regressors. 
Hence, the instruments Z cannot have a direct effect on y. In brief, the IV method can 
be used whenever the error terms are correlated with one or more of the explanatory 
variables, regardless of how that correlation may have arisen. The standard IV 
regression model is obtained by augmenting the standard linear regression model with 
a model for the endogenous regressors and the instruments. In the remainder of this 
section the main theoretical issues of the IV approach are addressed. 
4.3.1 Sources of Endogeneity 
The Instrumental Variable Method was initially proposed by Philips G Wright in 
1928 to deal with the problems arising from using endogenous regressors (Souri, 
2004). In principle, the problem of endogeneity may arise whenever economists make 
use of non-experimental data, because in that setting we can never be totally certain 
what is driving what. In applied econometrics, endogeneity usually arises in one of 
these following three ways: omitted variables, errors in variables or measurement 
error, and simultaneity.  
1)  Omitted Variables 
In many cases, economic theory suggests to control for one or more additional 
variables in the model. Unfortunately the data needed are often not available. 
Therefore, it is not possible to put the required data in the estimating equation. 
This phenomenon may produce omitted variables bias. If a proxy variable is 
available for the unobserved variable, the omitted variables bias can be removed 
(Wooldridge, 2008). In the estimation of the human capital earnings function, 
omitted variable bias generally refers to ability bias. This is usually associated 
with an upward bias in the estimated return.  
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2) Errors in Variables or Measurement Error 
Another way that an endogeneity problem can arise in economic applications is 
when one or more of the variables in the model contain measurement error. Many 
economic variables are measured with error for a variety of reasons. When 
measurement errors exist, the values observed inevitably differ from the true 
values. Although the measurement error problem and the omitted variable 
problem have a similar statistical structure, they are conceptually very different. 
The first conceptual difference between these two problems relates to the nature 
of the variable. In the measurement error case the variable is observed and has a 
well-defined, quantitative meaning, but our measures of it may contain error. In 
the omitted variable case, we do not observe the variable of interest, and we are 
looking for a variable that is somehow associated with this unobserved variable 
(i.e. a proxy variable). The second important conceptual difference is that in the 
measurement error case the mis-measured explanatory variable is the one whose 
effect is of primary interest. In the proxy variable case, however, we are generally 
more interested in the effect of the omitted variable (e.g. ability) on some other 
variable of interest (e.g. schooling) (Wooldridge, 2008). 
In the estimation of the human capital earnings function, measurement error bias 
generally refers to measurement error in the schooling variable. Typically this is 
associated with a downward bias in the estimate of the return to schooling, which 
will tend to offset any upward bias associated with omitted ability bias in the 
study of the private return to schooling. Contrary to the private return case, 
however, unobserved heterogeneity and measurement error in the study of human 
capital externalities do not necessarily bias OLS in opposite directions. The 
direction of bias in the OLS estimates or the effect of endogeneity is influenced 
by the relative importance of unobserved heterogeneity in the demand and supply 
for labour. The OLS estimate will be upward biased if average education variation 
across regions is pushed by unobserved demand shocks. On the other hand, if 
variation in average education across regions is driven by unobserved supply 
shocks, the OLS estimate is biased down (Moretti, 1998). 
3) Simultaneity 
Simultaneity occurs when the regressor and the error term are related to each 
other through a system of simultaneous equations. This phenomenon is known as 
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endogeneity bias, simultaneous equations bias or, simply simultaneity bias. 
(Wooldridge, 2008). This is not of immediate concern in the current study, and 
will not be pursued further. 
Sometimes the distinctions among omitted variable, measurement error, and 
simultaneity as the three possible sources of endogeneity are unclear. In fact, an 
equation may have more than one source of endogeneity.  
4.3.2 Instrumental Variable Estimation: 2SLS 
Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) was invented by Theil (1953) and Basmann (1957). 
The 2SLS estimator has its name from the fact that it can be obtained by two 
consecutive OLS regressions. 
Consider the equation (4.2) 
ݕ =   ܺߚ + ߤ,                                                (4.2) 
where some of the variables in X are potentially endogenous. 
Then proceed with the following steps.  
1. Regress X on Z, i.e. estimate the following model: 
 ܺ =   ܼΠ + ߳,                                                (4.3)  
where X and β are defined above. Z is a n x p matrix containing the instrumental 
variables, and ߳ is a n x k matrix containing the error terms. The matrix Π represents 
the effect of the instruments on the endogenous regressors. The exogenous variables 
in X should appear in Z as well. The variables x which appear in X but not in Z are 
called endogenous regressors, and the ones that are included in Z are called 
exogenous regressors. Additional variables in Z which are not included in X are called 
the instruments (Wooldridge, 2002).  
The OLS estimator for Π is  
Π෡ = (ܼ ′ܼ)ିଵ ܼ ′ܺ.                                      (4.4) 
Equation (4.4) is known as a reduced form equation. 
2. Estimate the following model  ݕ = (ܼΠ෡)ߚ + ݒ. 
In the second step y is regressed on ܼΠ෡ , which is the projection of X on Z. The OLS 
estimator for ߚ from the second step is called a 2SLS estimator, which is an IV 
estimator. 
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In the context of 2SLS, the equivalent condition of correlation between instruments 
and regressor is: 
݌ lim ቀ௓ ′௑
௡
ቁ =  ܳ௭௫, 
where ܳ௭௫ is a p x k matrix that has rank k. This condition is known as the rank 
condition. 
Under the following assumptions: 
(i) Linearity: 
 ݕ௜ =   ܺ௜ߚ + u୧,         and    ܧ(ݑ௜) = 0. 
(ii) Independence:    (ݕ௜ ,ܺ௜ ,ܼ௜) are identically and independently distributed (iid) with y scalar 
and Xi 1 x k, Zi 1 x p, p ≥ k.  This assumption means that regressors, 
instruments and dependent variables are independent across observations. 
(iii) ܧ ቀ௑
 ௑
௡
ቁ =  ܳ௑௑, which is positive definite. 
(iv) ܧ ቀଵ
௡
ܼ  ܺ ቁ =  ܳ௓௑, which is of rank k. 
Condition (iv) means that the instruments should be sufficiently correlated 
with the regressors. This is called the rank condition.  
(v) ܧ ቀଵ
௡
ܼ ∈ቁ =  0. 
Condition (v) means that the instruments should be exogenous. 
(vi) ܧ ቀఢఢ 
௓
ቁ =  ߪଶܫ௡. 
then  
݌ limߚመଶ௦௟௦ =  ߚ, 
and    ݊ଵ/ଶ൫ߚመଶ௦௟௦ − ߚ൯  ௗ→  ܰ (0,ߪଶ(ܳ௫௭ܳ௭௭ିଵܳ௭௫)ିଵ), 
and   ቀ௦
షమ௑ ′௓
௡
(ܼ ′ܼ/݊)ିଵ(௓ ′௑
௡
)ቁభమ ݊ଵ/ଶ( ௜ܾ௩ − ߚ) ௗ→ܰ(0, ܫ௞), 
where ݏଶ = ௘ᇲ௘
௡
−  ݇. When p > k, or there are more instruments than endogenous 
variables, the model is called overidentified. On the other hand, when p = k, or the 
number of instruments is equal to the number of endogenous regressors, the model is 
called exactly identified. The 2SLS estimator simplifies in the exact identification 
case, i.e. when p = k to: 
ߚመଶௌ௅ௌ = (ܼ ′ܺ)ିଵ ܼ ′ݕ  or  ߚመூ௏ = (ܼ ′ܺ)ିଵ ܼ ′ݕ.                  (4.5)  
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The IV estimator can always be reformulated as 
ߚመூ௏ = ( ෠ܺ ′ ෠ܺ)ିଵ ෠ܺ ′ݕ.                  (4.6)  
4.3.3 Instrument Validity and Relevance 
Cameron and Trivedi (2010) state that instrument validity relies more on persuasive 
argument, economic theory, and norms established in prior related empirical studies. 
However, it is generally accepted that a valid instrumental variable must satisfy two 
conditions, known as instrument relevance and instrument exogeneity (see Stock and 
Watson, 2007): 
1. Instrument relevance: corr (Zi, Xi) ≠ 0. 
2. Instrument exogeneity: corr (Zi, µi) = 0. 
The relevance of the instruments means that the instrument is not a weak instrument. 
There is no single definition of a weak instrument. Cameron and Trivedi (2008) 
provide the following signals of a weak instrument: 
(i) Scalar regressor X and scalar instrument Z: A weak instrument is one for 
which ݎ௫,௭ଶ  is small. 
(ii) Scalar regressor X and vector of instruments Z: The instruments are weak 
if the R2 from a regression of X on Z, denoted ܴ௫,௭ଶ  , is small or if the F-
statistic for test of overall fit in this regression is small. 
(iii) Multiple regressors X with only one endogenous: A weak instrument is 
one for which the partial R2 is low or the partial F-statistic is small. 
If an instrument is relevant, then variation in the instrument is related to variation in 
Xi. If in addition the instrument is exogenous, then that part of the variation of Xi 
captured by the instrumental variable is exogenous. Thus, an instrument that is 
relevant and exogenous can capture movements in Xi that are exogenous. This 
exogenous variation can in turn be used to estimate the population coefficient βi.   
Important practical issues in adopting an IV approach include determining whether 
IV methods are necessary and determining whether the instruments are valid. 
Unfortunately, the tests of validity are limited. They require the assumption that in a 
just-identified model the instruments are valid and test only overidentifying 
restrictions. Although IV estimators are consistent given valid instruments, they can 
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be much less efficient than the OLS estimator and can have a finite-sample 
distribution that, for usual finite-sample sizes, differs greatly from the asymptotic 
distribution. These problems are greatly magnified if instruments are only weakly 
correlated with the variables being instrumented. One way that weak instruments can 
arise is if there are many more instruments than needed. This is simply dealt with by 
dropping some of the instruments (see Donald and Newey, 2001). A more 
fundamental problem arises when even with the minimal number of instruments one 
or more of the instruments are weak. 
4.3.4 Testing for Endogeneity of the Regressors 
The discussion in the previous section shows that the IV approach can be used when 
the OLS estimator fails because there is correlation between an explanatory variable 
and the error term. A test for checking the presence of a correlation between an 
explanatory variable and the error term is needed. The procedure to test for 
endogeneity can be dated back to a pioneering paper by Durbin (1954), and it was 
subsequently extended by Wu (1973) and Hausman (1978). This test is called the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, or DWH test. The test is performed by comparing ߚመை௅ௌ  
and  ߚመூ௏:  
ܪ = (ߚመூ௏ −  ߚመை௅ௌ)′[ܣݒܽݎ෣൫ߚመூ௏൯ −  ܣݒܽݎ෣൫ߚመை௅ௌ൯]ିଵ൫ ߚመூ௏ −  ߚመை௅ௌ൯ ௃ܺଶ, 
The null hypothesis is that there are no endogenous variables or that endogeneity does 
not affect the OLS estimator. The null and alternative hypotheses for the DWH test 
can be expressed as: 
ܪ଴: ݕ = ܺߚ+ ∈,         ∈ ~ܫܫܦ(0,ߪଶܫ),     ܧ(ܺ′ ∈) = 0, ܽ݊݀     
ܪ஺:ݕ = ܺߚ+∈,         ∈ ~ܫܫܦ(0,ߪଶܫ),     ܧ(ܺ′ ∈) ≠ 0.                     
Under the null hypothesis, both the OLS and the IV estimators are consistent. Thus, 
the difference between them converges to zero. If the null hypothesis is true, the OLS 
estimator ߚመை௅ௌ  should be used because it is more efficient. Under the alternative 
hypothesis, the IV estimator ߚመூ௏ is consistent, but the OLS estimator ߚመை௅ௌ is not 
consistent. If the null hypothesis is not true, the IV estimator ߚመூ௏ should be used 
because it is consistent. 
The idea of the DWH test is to check whether the difference ߚመூ௏ - ߚመை௅ௌ  is 
significantly different from zero in the available sample. Briefly, the implementation 
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of the DWH test can be described as the following procedure. For notational 
simplicity let  ௜ܺ∗ = ( ௜ܺ,௞ଵାଵ , … ௜ܺ௞)′. First, X* is regressed on Z and the fitted values 
from this regression are ܼ(ܼ ′ܼ)ିଵܼ ′ܺ∗. Then y is regressed on X and on 
ܼ(ܼ ′ܼ)ିଵܼ ′ܺ∗. Let ߜመ be the OLS coefficient on   ܼ(ܼ ′ܼ)ିଵܼ ′ܺ∗. Then an F-test can 
be performed for the null that ߜ = 0 versus the alternative ߜ ≠ 0. Under the null, (k - 
k1) F is asymptotically distributed as ݔ௞ି௞భ
ଶ  , while under the alternative it diverges to 
positive infinity. If we reject (do not reject) the null of ߜ = 0, then we reject (do not 
reject) the null that  ܧ(ܺ′߳) = 0.  
4.3.5 The Instrumental Variables Method in Practice 
 
Estimating the private return to schooling and the value of human capital externalities 
by OLS may not always be appropriate. This is because of the strong possibility of 
correlation between the disturbance u and the schooling variable. As discussed above, 
this correlation may produce a biased estimator. Because of such bias, it therefore 
becomes advisable to apply IV methods. When adopting the IV approach, it is 
important to determine the right instrument for the model. Finding a suitable 
instrument is not easy. However, social and natural experiments can be useful and 
many such instruments have been used (see Harmon and Walker, 1995; Duflo, 2001; 
Plug, 2001; Liu, 2007; Leigh and Ryan, 2008). Alternatively, parental background 
variables are often chosen (see Brunello and Miniaci, 1999; Callan and Harmon, 
1999; Uusitalo, 1999; Trostel et al., 2002; Lemke and Rischall, 2003). But to be 
useful these instruments must satisfy the IV criteria of being correlated with the 
schooling variable and correctly excluded from the earnings equation. The following 
are examples of the variables used as instruments in empirical study: family 
background (Brunello and Miniaci, 1999; Callan and Harmon, 1999; Uusitalo, 1999; 
Trostel et al., 2002; Lemke and Rischall, 2003), sibling’s report of the other sibling’s 
education (Ashenfelter and Krueger, 1994; Bronars and Oettinger, 2006; Miller et al., 
1995 and 2006),  the month of birth (Plug, 2001; Leigh and Ryan, 2008), government 
policy in education (Duflo, 2001), and changes in the minimum school leaving ages 
(compulsory education law) (Harmon and Walker, 1995; Liu, 2007; Leigh and Ryan, 
2008).  
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Tables 4.1 and 4.2 provide a summary of selected studies on, respectively, the return 
to education and human capital externalities utilising IV as the methodological 
approach.  
Given the importance of the IV approach to research in this area, additional comment 
on seven studies (the first four studies are on the private return to schooling and the 
final three studies cover the human capital externalities) are presented below. The 
first and the second of these studies, Angrist and Krueger (1991), and Harmon and 
Walker (1995), utilise institutional features of the education system as instruments in 
the model. Following this we cover studies that adopt family background information 
as instrument variables, namely Ashenfelter and Zimmerman (1997), and Lemke and 
Rischall (2003). The three studies involving the use of the IV method when 
quantifying human capital externalities are by Acemoglu and Angrist (2000), Moretti 
(2004), and Liu (2006). 
Angrist and Krueger (1991) use an individual’s quarter of birth interacted with year 
of birth or state of birth as an instrument for their schooling variable. In general, the 
IV estimates of the return to schooling from this study are slightly higher than the 
corresponding OLS estimates. However, the differences between the OLS and the IV 
estimates are typically statistically insignificant. This study, therefore, can be argued 
to show that there is little endogeneity bias in the conventional OLS estimate of the 
return to schooling. 
Harmon and Walker (1995) use a pair of dummy variables that capture changes in the 
minimum school leaving age in Britain - from 14 to 15 in 1947 and from 15 to 16 in 
1973 - as instruments for their schooling variable. The IV estimate (15.25 percent) 
was reasonably precisely estimated, and was considerably higher than the OLS 
estimate (6.13 percent). Hence, in contrast to Angrist and Krueger (1991), this study 
suggests that the possible endogeneity of the schooling variable should be taken 
seriously. 
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Table 4.1: Summary of Selected Empirical Studies on the Return to Education Using IV as the Methodological Approach 
No. Author (s) Instrument (s)  Control (s) Note (s) 
1 Angrist and Krueger (1991) Quarter of birth interacted with year of 
birth. 
Quadratic in age, race, marital status, and urban 
residence. 
To correct bias in the return to schooling due to omitted ability 
variable, the authors create a natural experiment where quarter of 
birth is used as an instrument for education. 
 
2 Harmon and Walker (1995)  Indicator for changes in the minimum 
school leaving age in 1974 and 1973. 
Quadratic in age, year, and region. To address the endogeneity of schooling, this study exploits the 
experimental nature of two changes in the minimum school 
leaving age to provide instruments for education. 
3 Miller et al. (1995) The co-twin’s report on educational 
attainment. 
Gender, marital status, interaction between gender and 
marital status, race, and quadratic in age. 
To deal with an ability bias problem, this study use one twin’s 
responses on the difference in schooling for the pair in a within-
twin earnings function. The key idea behind this strategy is that 
some of the unobserved differences that bias a cross-sectional 
comparison of education and earnings are reduced or eliminated 
within families. To address measurement error problems, the co-
twin’s report on other twin’s responses is used as instrument. 
 
4 Ashenfelter and Zimmerman (1997) - Brothers’ education. 
- Father’s education. 
Age. The omitted variable and measurement error problems were 
tackled using one brother’s (father or son) schooling as an 
instrumental variable for his sibling’s (son or father) schooling. 
 
5 Lemke and Rischall (2003) - Quarter of birth. 
- College proximity. 
- Parental education (father’s and 
mother’s education). 
Parental  income, Armed Forces  Qualification Test12 ,  
parental education, age, race, living in the South in 
1995, and living in Metropolitan Statistical Area  in 
1995. 
Three types of instruments, namely parental education, quarter of 
birth, and college proximity, were utilised to cope with 
endogeneity of schooling problem.  
6 Aslam et al. (2010) - The distance in metres to nearest 
primary school when the individual was 
of school-going age. 
- Square of the distance in metres to 
nearest primary school when the 
individual was of school-going age.  
-  Father’s completed education in years.  
-  Mother’s completed education in years. 
- The score on the Raven test.13 
Gender and dummy variable for short-literacy test. This study addresses the endogeneity of schooling and cognitive 
skills using two approaches: IV and household fixed-effects. The 
vector of instruments used to control for the endogeneity of 
schooling attainment and of cognitive skills includes: parental 
education (father’s and mother’s completed years of schooling), 
distance to primary school in metres (when individual was of 
primary school-going age) and its square, and the individual’s 
Raven test score. 
 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
                                               
12 The AFQT is a measure of skill for people under 18. 
13 The Raven Progressive Matrices test assesses innate ability via literacy, numeracy and health knowledge tests.    
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Another important set of variables to identify the causal effect of schooling in the IV 
approach comes from family background information, such as father’s education and 
mother’s education. This information can be included in the estimating equation as a 
direct control for unobserved ability, or used as an instrument for completed 
education. Ashenfelter and Zimmerman (1997), Lemke and Rischall (2003), and 
Aslam et al. (2010) are examples of researchers who employ family background as an 
instrumental variable.  
Ashenfelter and Zimmerman (1997) employ father’s schooling as an instrument in 
one set of models, and brother’s schooling in another. The use of brother’s schooling 
as an instrument leads to IV estimates that are 1.5-7.4 percent above the 
corresponding OLS estimates. When father’s schooling is used as an instrument the 
IV estimates are 5.2-6.2 percent higher than the OLS estimates. This study therefore 
shows the importance of considering endogeneity bias via the IV method, and draws 
attention to family background factors being useful instruments. 
Lemke and Rischall (2003) exploit both institutional features of the education system 
(quarter of birth and college proximity) and family background information (parental 
education as instruments). When using parental education to instrument the schooling 
variable and neither parental income nor the Armed Forces Qualification Test 
(AFQT) are included in the wage equation, the return to education is 13.4 percent, 
which exceeds the comparable OLS estimate of 9.4 percent. When the AFQT and 
parental income are introduced into the wage equation, instrumenting with parental 
education actually leads to lower IV estimates than those obtained using OLS. 
Nevertheless, the authors argue that parental education is a valid and useful 
instrument. Different from previous results, when adopting quarter of birth as an 
instrument for schooling, the Basmann test rejects the validity of all of the quarter of 
birth instruments. When utilising college proximity as an instrument for the schooling 
variable, the Basmann test fails to reject the validity of the college proximity 
instruments, and therefore the IV estimates of the return to schooling were imprecise. 
The estimated effects of parental income and the AFQT on wages were also 
statistically insignificant. In sum, when adopting the institutional features of the 
education system as instruments, the weak correlation between the instruments and 
years of schooling generates imprecise estimates of the return to schooling. Hence, 
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these findings suggest a preference for parental education over institutional factors as 
instruments for the schooling variable in the wage equation. 
Thus, studies that use an IV approach in the analysis of the private return to schooling 
generally report an advantage to the method. Moreover, the family background 
information often used as instruments appears to have offered a statistically sound 
basis for this type of estimation. The following passages will review variables used to 
instrument the aggregate human capital that is essential to the empirical assessment of 
human capital externalities. 
Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) measure the aggregate human capital by the average 
level of schooling in the state. To allow for the possibility that education levels may 
be endogenous they instrument for the average level of schooling in each state using 
dummies for compulsory schooling laws in the US and the differences in child labour 
laws across states. In comparison, when the private rate of return was considered, the 
instruments for the individual’s level of schooling were quarter of birth dummy 
variables. Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) show that inconsistent estimates of the 
private return to education will lead to inconsistent estimates of the externality, 
because individual and aggregate schooling are correlated. Under the IV approach, 
the estimates revealed that a year increase in the average level of schooling led to 
only a 1-3 percent increase in wages, and this was not significantly different from 
zero. In contrast, the OLS estimates suggested that externalities were much more 
important, with the impact of an extra year of average schooling being around 7 
percent. This finding can be explained in part by the fact that these two instruments - 
compulsory attendance laws and child labour laws - mainly affect the left-hand side 
of the educational distribution, mostly in middle school or high school, and could be 
weakly correlated with the regional fraction of college graduates (Morreti, 2006; 
Canton, 2009). This study therefore shows that it is necessary to find the instruments 
that affect the entire education distribution.  
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Table 4.2: Summary of Selected Empirical Studies on Human Capital Externalities Using IV as the Methodological Approach 
No. Author (s) Instrument (s)  Control (s) Note (s) 
1 Acemoglu and Angrist 
(2000) 
- Quarter of birth dummy variables. 
- Percentage of child labour. 
- Percentage of compulsory attendance. 
Age, individual education, state average education, state of 
residence. 
- Quarters of birth dummy variables are used to instrument the individual’s 
schooling.  
- To solve the problem of omitted variables bias from correlation between 
average schooling and other state year effects embodied in the error  
component  the authors construct instruments  using  compulsory schooling 
laws effective in individuals’ states of birth at the time they were 14.  
- Dummies of compulsory attendance laws and child labour laws are used to 
instrument individual as well average schooling variables. 
 
2 Moretti (2004)  - The city demographic structure (age 
structure). 
- The presence of a land-grant college in 
a city.  
 
Sex, race, individual education and experience as well as college 
share at the level of 2001 Metropolitan Statistical Area. 
Age structure used as instrument for first differences model and the presence of a 
land grant college used as an instrument for cross-sectional estimations.  
3 Liu (2007) - Compulsory Education Law. 
- The share of college graduates in the 
city population in 1990. 
 
Gender, city average education in years, city-sector average 
education in years, the fraction of college-educated workers, the 
fraction of workers employed in the business sector, the fraction of 
workers employed in the government sector, the fraction of 
workers employed in the industry sector, the fraction of workers 
employed in the commerce sector, the fraction of workers 
employed in the state sector, the fraction of workers employed in 
the collective sector, including the town and village enterprises, 
the fraction of workers employed in the foreign-investment sector, 
including joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises.  
 
The problem of  omitted variable bias is tackled in the  following ways: (i) the 
author  introduces proxy variables for unobserved factors into the earnings 
regression, (ii)  the lagged city average education or lagged dependent variable is 
employed to account for unobserved city-specific factors,  (iii) assuming no 
structural change in the earnings equation between 1988 and 1995, the author ran 
city-fixed-effects regressions to purge city-specific and time-invariant unobservable, 
(iv) this study estimates the external returns to education by implementing city-
fixed-effects regressions using cross-sectional data from 1995 to restrict 
externalities to operate at the city-sector level.  
4 Muravyev (2008) - City college share in 1994. 
- City college share in 1989. 
- Number of higher education 
establishments in a city at the end of the 
Soviet time. 
Index of the cost of living, dummy for the cities whose economies 
are centred on the oil extraction industry, dummy variable for 
cities which are administrative centres of the regions, city size 
(inhabitants), and regional dummies, a dummy variable for the 
presence of wage arrears in either of the two jobs, work 
experience, work experience squared,  and gender. 
 
- To solve identification problems arising from the endogeneity of average 
education, the study exploits a natural experiment.  
- For robustness checks the authors use four important characteristics of cities: 
location, status (an administrative centre of a region or not), prevalence of the 
oil extraction industry in the city economy and city size. 
 
5 García-Fontes and 
Hidalgo (2009) 
Demographic variables. Schooling level, gender, works in agriculture dummy, marital 
status, share of workers by schooling level, fraction of workers 
with secondary or college education, total workers, physical 
capital stock and ICT capital stock, and population proportions for 
each age group. 
- The authors instrument the change in regional schooling levels over the 1981-
1991 period by 1981 demographic structure and the change in regional 
schooling levels over the 1991-2001 period by 1991 demographic structure. 
- For robustness analysis, this study employs total regional physical capital and 
ICT capital. 
 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
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Moretti (2004) examines the spillover effects from a college education among 
different education groups. This externality was measured by comparing wages for 
otherwise similar individuals who work in cities with different shares of college 
graduates in the labour force. The existence of unobservable characteristics of 
individuals and cities that may raise wages and be correlated with college share was a 
major issue in this comparison. The unobservable city-specific demand shocks were 
handled by using two instrumental variables, namely: the (lagged) city demographic 
structure and the presence of a land-grant college.  In this study, human capital 
externalities are identified using variation in the number of college graduates. 
Different from Acemoglu and Angrist (2000), Moretti (2004) does find significant 
human capital externalities for US cities. This shows that adopting instruments that 
affect the upper part of the education distribution is important for identifying external 
returns to schooling. 
Liu (2006) estimates the external returns to education in Chinese cities. Two 
instruments are used in the IV section of this analysis: the first instrument relates to a 
compulsory education law (CEL), whereas the second one is a measure of city-
specific human capital from a past period. The OLS estimates indicate that a one-year 
increase in city average education could raise individual earnings from 4.9 percent to 
6.7 percent. The 2SLS estimates of the external returns range from 11 percent to 13 
percent. This study provides two important conclusions: firstly, the human capital’s 
contribution through externalities is comparable to its direct contribution. Secondly, 
private returns as well as external returns to education respond to institutional 
changes. Hence, this study illustrates the necessity of considering endogeneity bias 
using an IV-2SLS approach, and the importance of adopting CEL and a measure of 
city specific human capital as instruments. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the research methodology that will be utilised in the 
analysis that follows. Two methods of regression analysis have been discussed: OLS 
and the IV model. The IV results from the studies discussed suggest that it is 
particularly important to consider family background in any instrumental variables 
analysis of the return to education. In the next chapter, attention is given to the 
empirical study of the economic returns to schooling in the context of Indonesia.  
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Chapter 5 
Estimates of Mincerian Returns to Schooling in Indonesia 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The focus of this chapter is the presentation of empirical evidence on the private 
returns to education in Indonesia. Although the returns to education has been a topic 
of considerable interest in the empirical labour and education economics literatures 
for around 50 years, the analysis of returns to education remains a relevant issue for 
both the developed and the developing economies. Numerous studies, for many 
different countries and time periods, have confirmed that better-educated individuals 
receive higher wages and have occupations of higher status than less-educated 
individuals. For most developed countries, there is general agreement over the size 
and the patterns of the return to education across sub-groups of the population. In 
terms of the empirical findings from developing countries, however, there has been 
an ongoing debate concerning even the magnitude of the returns to schooling. Some 
studies, for example, provide evidence of a relatively low private return to schooling 
in developing countries, whereas there are numerous other empirical studies that find 
that the return to schooling is quite high. 
Despite the voluminous empirical literatures on the returns to schooling in less 
developed countries, to date there have been only a limited number of studies based 
on Indonesian data. The current set of analyses for Indonesia therefore has the 
potential to fill a major gap in the literature. 
The plan of the chapter is as follows. In the next section we draw upon the previous 
chapters to briefly describe the empirical model and estimation methods. Section 3 
discusses the data sources and documents the decisions made when extracting the 
data set used in the estimations. Results and interpretation are explored in Section 4. 
This presentation of results commences with estimates from the standard Mincerian 
model that employs years of schooling in the earnings function. Then the return to 
schooling based on more detailed information on educational attainment is examined. 
Following this the discussion turns to estimates of the return to schooling obtained 
after additional control variables are included in the earnings functions. In order to 
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check the possibility of selectivity bias in the analysis, this section also presents 
estimates of Heckman’s two-step model. Separate estimations for males and females 
are undertaken for all specifications. Finally, Section 5 concludes the chapter. 
5.2 Empirical Models and Estimation Methods 
In this Chapter, the economic and econometric methods described in the previous 
chapters are applied to Indonesian data. In particular, the analyses presented below 
adopt the standard Mincerian and the augmented Mincerian models that were 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. Thus, this analysis begins by estimating the return to 
schooling using a standard Mincer equation. Following this a number of control 
variables, such as tenure, marital status, and area of residence, are included in the 
estimating equation. The estimates presented in this chapter are mostly obtained by 
the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. The possibility of selectivity bias is 
explored by using Heckman’s two-step approach.  
5.2.1 The Standard Mincerian Model 
The specification of the earnings equation used below is based on the human capital 
model developed by Mincer (1974). This model assumes that (i) the only costs of 
schooling are the foregone earnings, and (ii) each individual starts working 
immediately after completion of school.  The model shows that the natural logarithm 
of earnings can be expressed as a function of years of schooling, post schooling 
labour market experience and its quadratic term. Furthermore, this relationship 
provides a direct measure of the returns to schooling through the coefficient of the 
years of schooling variable in the earnings regression. While Mincer and subsequent 
researchers have added a variety of control variables to this basic model, and 
corrected for ability bias, our analysis begins with this basic earnings equation, which 
may be written as follows: 
 ln(݁ܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ௜) =  ߚ଴ + ߚଵݕݎݏܿℎݕݎ௜ + ߚଶ݁ݔ݌ݎ௜ + ߚଷ݁ݔ݌ݎ௜ଶ + ߤ௜           (5.1-a) 
 
 
where  earningsi is monthly earnings for individual i, yrschyri is years of schooling 
for individual i, expri is a measure of work experience for individual i, ݁ݔ݌ݎ௜ଶ is 
experience squared for individual i, and ߤi is a disturbance term representing other 
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factors which cannot be explicitly measured,  and which are assumed to be 
independent of yrschyri and expri.  According to human capital theory β1 = r, and so 
the estimated regression coefficient β1 is interpreted as the average private rate of 
return to one additional year of schooling. 
As will be discussed further below, the experience variable in the majority of the 
empirical studies in this field of research is a measure of potential labour market 
experience rather than a measure of actual labour market experience. Potential labour 
market experience is typically constructed by subtracting a person’s school leaving 
age from their chronological age. This has been a matter of some controversy.  
Blinder (1976), for example, argues that using potential work experience in the 
earnings function for females is hazardous. This is because potential work experience 
is a suitable proxy only for individuals who have continuous work histories, without 
interruptions such as childbearing, spells of unemployment, and the like. In the 
presence of a discontinuous work history, using age instead of potential work 
experience is probably more appropriate. 
Thus equation 5.1-a can be rewritten by replacing potential work experience with age. ln(݁ܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ௜) =  ߚ଴ + ߚଵݕݎݏܿℎݕݎ௜ + ߚଶܽ݃݁௜ + ߚଷܽ݃݁௜ଶ + ߤ௜         (5.1-b) 
 
Since female workers are included in this study, both potential work experience and 
age will be utilised to check the robustness of the estimates. Hence, each equation 
will be estimated twice. The first specification uses experience and experience 
squared, while the second specification employs age and age squared as regressors.  
There is a further limitation of the potential labour market experience variable that 
needs to be noted. For some individuals their actual number of years spent to 
accomplish a certain education level may differ from the statutory number of years 
for finishing that level of education. The actual years of schooling for completion of 
any given education level could be less or more than the statutory number. This 
occurs because of the possibility of joining acceleration classes, grade repetition, and 
temporary school dropout. Unfortunately, this study cannot accommodate this 
experience, and the statutory number of years is utilised in this study. 
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5.2.2. The Standard Mincerian Model with Level of Education 
The standard model described in Equations 5.1-a and 5.1-b can be modified into a 
more flexible specification by substituting years of schooling with a series of dummy 
variables for different educational levels, such as primary, secondary, university, etc. 
This more flexible approach offers advantages where the rate of return varies across 
education levels. In this chapter, seven levels of education are considered: primary 
school, junior secondary school, general senior secondary school, vocational senior 
secondary school, college, undergraduate and master degree. This modified 
Mincerian earnings equation can be written as follows:                 ln(݁ܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ௜) =  ߚ଴ + ∑ ߚ௞ܵ.ܦݑ݉௜௞௞ + ߚଶ݁ݔ݌ݎ௜ + ߚଷ݁ݔ݌ݎ௜ଶ + ߤ௜         (5.2-a) 
 ln(݁ܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ௜) =  ߚ଴ + ∑ ߚ௞ܵ.ܦݑ݉௜௞௞ + ߚଶܽ݃݁௜ + ߚଷܽ݃݁௜ଶ + ߤ௜            (5.2-b) 
 
where S.Dum consists of  the dummies for the level of education. To calculate the rate 
of return to an additional year of schooling under this flexible approach, this study 
follows Sakellariou  (2003), El-Hamidi (2005), and Kimenyi et al. (2006) by dividing 
the difference between the coefficients of adjacent schooling levels by the difference 
in the years of schooling associated with the schooling levels. Hence, in this 
specification, the private rate of return to education at the kth level of education is 
estimated by the following formula: 
ݎ௞ =  (ఉೖିఉೖషభ)∆௡ೖ                                         (5.3) 
  
where βk is the coefficient of a specific level of education, βk-1 is the coefficient of the 
previous level of education, and ∆n is the difference in years of schooling between k 
and k-1.  
The number of years required to complete primary school is six. Three more years are 
needed to complete junior secondary school, and another three years are required to 
complete either vocational senior secondary school or general senior secondary 
school. A further three years are needed to complete college. An average of four years 
is needed to complete a bachelor’s (undergraduate) degree at the university level, and 
an additional two years are needed to complete a master degree at the university level.  
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5.2.3 Control Variables 
 
To provide more detailed evidence on the returns to education in Indonesia, each 
equation (5.1-a, 5.1-b, 5.2-a, and 5.2-b) is augmented with other variables that may 
influence earnings. The first such variable is tenure. This variable represents the work 
experience in the present job. Current job tenure is usually viewed as a measure of 
firm-specific training and knowledge. The second variable is gender. Typically a 
variable that distinguishes females from males is entered into the estimating equation 
to capture gender discrimination, the effects of intermittent labour force attachment, 
and the earnings consequences of unobserved work-home duties-leisure outcomes 
that are correlated with gender. The third variable is marital status. Marital status is 
typically associated with household specialisation. The specialisation hypothesis 
argues that a married couple can engage in specialisation of their household tasks. 
Then male workers are able to focus their time and effort on labour market activities 
(Gray, 1997), and females, having relatively low market wages, allocate 
proportionally more time to home duties. Therefore, being married most likely affects 
the wages of males positively while having the opposite effect on the wages of 
females due to child bearing and their other domestic tasks.  The last variable is a 
residential dummy (rural versus urban), which is intended to control for the earnings 
differential between urban and rural areas. Hence, the equations with these control 
variables become:  
ln(݁ܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ௜) = ߚ଴ + ߚଵݕݎݏܿℎݕݎ௜ + ߚଶ݁ݔ݌ݎ௜ + ߚଷ݁ݔ݌ݎ௜ଶ +                                 ߚସݐ݁݊ݑݎ݁௜ +  ߚହݐ݁݊ݑݎ݁௜ଶ + ߚ଺݂݈݁݉ܽ݁௜ +                                 ߚ଻݉ܽݎݎ݅݁݀௜ + ߚ଼ݑݎܾܽ݊௜  + ߤ௜              (5.4-a) 
 ln(݁ܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ௜) = ߚ଴ + ߚଵݕݎݏܿℎݕݎ௜ + ߚଶܽ݃݁௜ + ߚଷܽ݃݁௜ଶ + ߚସݐ݁݊ݑݎ݁௜ +                                 ߚହݐ݁݊ݑݎ݁௜ଶ + ߚ଺݂݈݁݉ܽ݁௜ + ߚ଻݉ܽݎݎ݅݁݀௜ +                                 ߚ଼ݑݎܾܽ݊௜  + ߤ௜              (5.4-b) 
 ln(݁ܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ௜) = ߚ଴ + ∑ ߚ௞ܵ.ܦݑ݉௜௞௞ + ߚଶ݁ݔ݌ݎ௜ + ߚଷ݁ݔ݌ݎ௜ଶ +                                 ߚସݐ݁݊ݑݎ݁௜ +  ହݐ݁݊ݑݎ݁௜ଶ + ߚ଺݂݈݁݉ܽ݁௜ +                                 ߚ଻݉ܽݎݎ݅݁݀௜ +  ߚ଼ݑݎܾܽ݊௜  + ߤ௜              (5.5-a) 
 ln(݁ܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ௜) = ߚ଴ + ∑ ߚ௞ܵ.ܦݑ݉௜௞௞ + ߚଶܽ݃݁௜ + ߚଷܽ݃݁௜ଶ +                                 ߚସݐ݁݊ݑݎ݁௜ +  ߚହݐ݁݊ݑݎ݁௜ଶ + ߚ଺݂݈݁݉ܽ݁௜ +                                 ߚ଻݉ܽݎݎ݅݁݀௜ + ߚ଼ݑݎܾܽ݊௜  + ߤ௜              (5.5-b) 
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where ݐ݁݊ݑݎ݁௜  represents the job tenure for individual i, ݐ݁݊ݑݎ݁௜ଶ is tenure squared 
for individual i, femalei denotes the dummy variable for the gender of individual i, 
marriedi denotes the dummy for marital status for individual i, and urbani is a 
residential dummy (urban versus rural) for individual i. All other variables are the 
same as before. 
5.3 Data Sources and Extracting of the Dataset 
5.3.1 Data Sources  
The data set used in the empirical analysis is the Indonesian Family Life Survey 4 
(IFLS4).  IFLS4 is a nationally representative sample comprising 13,536 households 
and 50,580 individuals, spread across provinces on the islands of Java, Sumatra, Bali, 
West Nusa Tenggara, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi. Together these provinces 
encompass approximately 83 percent of the Indonesian population and much of its 
heterogeneity. The coverage area of the survey can be seen in Figure 5.1. The survey 
collects data on individual respondents, their families, and their households. 
Extensive data on the communities in which respondents live, as well as data on the 
health and education facilities they use, are obtained from the household survey. 
IFLS4 was fielded in late 2007 and early 2008. It was a collaborative effort by 
RAND, the Center for Population and Policy Studies (CPPS) of the University of 
Gadjah Mada, and Survey Meter.  
For the analysis of the private returns to schooling, the sample is restricted to 
individuals 15 to 65 years old, who were not full-time students, reported non-missing 
labour income, provided information on schooling, and supplied information on 
family background. Persons in the military during the survey week are omitted, as it 
is generally argued that the wages of those in the armed forces do not necessary 
reflect market forces. A total of 4596 observations satisfy these criteria and are 
utilised in the analysis.  
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Figure 5.1: IFLS Survey Coverage 
 
 
Source: IFLS, http://www.rand.org/labor/FLS/IFLS.html. 
 
5.3.2 Data Extracting Procedure and Variable Definition 
For the purposes of the empirical analysis for this chapter, an extract of data was 
created from the IFLS4 data base. To create the extract, data from the individual-level 
files and household-level files had to be merged. As noted above, persons in the 
individual file who were aged less than 15 and more than 65 were excluded from the 
sample. In addition, only individuals who provided full information about their 
education, employment, and family background were included in the sample.  
Besides that, persons in school or the military during the survey week were omitted.  
The extract contains both IFLS4 variables and derived variables for each person. The 
variables contained in each person’s record are as follows: unique identifiers for 
individuals and their household, years of schooling, highest level of education 
obtained, age, potential work experience, gender, marital status, area (rural-urban), 
and amount of earnings by month. The construction of the main variables is discussed 
below and the definitions are given in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1: Definitions of Variables 
 
  Symbols Variables Definition 
Ln (earnings) Monthly earnings (log) Monthly earnings in log form. 
yrschyr Years of schooling Number of years of schooling of the respondent. 
expr Experience Potential work experience. 
expr2 Experience2 The square of potential work experience. 
age  Age Age of individual. 
age2 Age2 The square of age. 
tenure Tenure Work experience in the present job. 
tenure2 Tenure2 The squared of work experience in the present job. 
female Dummy for gender 1 if individual is female; 0 otherwise. 
married Dummy for marital status 1 if individual is married; 0 otherwise. 
urban Dummy for  area 1 if individual lives in urban area; 0 otherwise. 
 
The dependent variable in this analysis is the natural logarithm of monthly earnings. 
These monthly earnings include the value of all benefits secured by an individual in 
their job. The unit of measurement is rupiah (Rp) (US$1 was approximately equal to 
Rp9,000 at the time of the 2007/2008 survey).  Monthly earnings are used instead of 
an hourly earnings indicator, because this is the figure respondents were explicitly 
asked to supply. While an hourly wage measure could be constructed, calculation of 
hourly wages would require using another variable, hours worked in the reference 
month, which is in turn subject to measurement error. Hence the monthly wage data 
are argued to be less prone to measurement error. There is also a preference for the 
use of monthly earnings based on the fact that in Indonesia employer/employee 
agreements are generally based on monthly wages. 
The IFLS4 has information on the highest education level and the highest grade 
completed. In constructing the years of schooling variable we combine information 
on the highest education level and the highest grade completed to obtain the 
individual’s actual years of schooling. For the set of dummies for education level, we 
employ seven dichotomous variables for the different schooling categories, namely, 
primary school, junior secondary school, general senior secondary school, vocational 
senior secondary school, college or diploma, undergraduate, and master degree. 
There is one independent variable that needs to be constructed from other information 
in the data set, namely potential work experience. Measures of actual labour force 
experience, an important variable in the study of earnings determination, are absent 
from the IFLS4 data sets. However a potential labour force experience variable can be 
calculated from the information available. Most empirical studies usually use the 
following basic formula to derive a measure of potential work experience:  age minus 
91 
 
years of schooling minus official age to start primary school (6 or 7). However, for 
the purposes of calculating potential work experience in this study the following 
formula will be used: age minus years of schooling minus age first attended primary 
school. The aim of using this formula is to obtain more precise data on potential work 
experience since the age individuals first attended primary school varies appreciably. 
It ranges from 5 to 14 years in the data set. 
5.3.3 Distribution of the Sample 
The summary statistics for the main variables used in this chapter are reported in 
Table 5.2. The mean total monthly earnings are Rp1,339,521 across the workers. The 
mean years of schooling are relatively low, specifically 10.68 years, or just one year 
higher than the 9 years of compulsory study. The workers in the sample have mean 
work experience and age of approximately 17.79 years and 35.19 years, respectively. 
The mean length of job tenure is 7.85 years. The Table 5.2 data reveal that male and 
female workers have broadly similar levels of schooling, potential labour market 
experience, age and job tenure. They differ appreciably in terms of earnings, where 
the mean for males (Rp1,476,118) is 38.46 percent above the mean for females 
(Rp1,066,059). We return to this issue below. 
Table 5.2: Summary Statistics of Main Variables 
 
Variables All Males Females 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Dependent Variable       
Monthly earnings (IDR) 1,339,521 1,961,290 1,476,118 2,137,155 1,066,059 1,514,442 
Monthly earnings (log) 5.913 0.4378 5.973 0.408 5.792 0.468 
Independent Variables       
Years of schooling 10.683 3.744 10.608 3.616 10.833 3.986 
Experience 17.788 10.600 18.042 10.259 17.279 11.238 
Experience squared 428.734 479.227 430.709 472.415 424.780 492.716 
Age 35.192 9.741 35.417 9.561 34.741 10.078 
Age squared 1333.327 751.375 1345.776 746.820 1308.406 760.046 
Control Variables       
Tenure 7.852 8.116 7.890 8.036 7.779 8.275 
Tenure squared 127.499 247.153 126.885 246.885 128.943 247.763 
Female (dummy for gender) 0.333 0.471     
Marital status dummy 0.866 0.340 0.899 0.302 0.801 0.399 
Dummy for urban area 0.676 0.468 0.649 0.477 0.730 0.444 
Source: Author’s calculation based IFLS4 data set. 
The distribution of the sample by gender, area, and marital status is examined in 
Table 5.3. Approximately 67 percent (3,108 individuals) of the sample are male and 
about 90 percent of these male respondents are married. The married comprise about 
80 percent of the female respondents in the sample. Based on the rural-urban area of 
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the residence of respondents, 3,108 individuals, or about 68 percent of respondents, in 
the sample come from urban areas and 1,488, or about 32 percent, are from rural 
areas.  
Table 5.3: The Distribution of Sample by Gender, Marital Status, and Area 
 
   Females   Males  Total 
  Married Other Total Married Other Total  
Urban 867 251 1,118 1,743 247 1,990 3,108 
Rural 360 53 413 1,012 63 1,075 1,488 
Total 1,227 304 1,531 2,755 310 3,065 4,596 
  Source: Author’s calculation based on IFLS4 data set. 
 
Figure 5.2: The Distribution of Sample by Gender and Age 
 
 
 Source: Author’s calculation based on IFLS4 data set. 
 
Elaborating further on the characteristics of the sample, Figure 5.2 presents the 
distribution of the sample according to gender and age group. The age of the 
individuals in the sample varies, by construction, from 15 to 65 years old. The 
number of the respondents in the sample initially increases with age and then 
decreases. The greatest number of individuals in the sample belongs to the age group 
of 26-30 years old, with around 21 percent of the male and female workers. The 
youngest group, which is 15-20 years old, has approximately 3 percent of the sample. 
The oldest age group, which is 61-65 years old, consists of about 1 percent of the 
sample.  
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5.3.4 Schooling, Earnings, Experience, and Age: The Basic Facts 
 
The years of schooling of the respondents in the sample range from 1 year to 18 
years. The mean of the years of schooling is 10.68 years. Examination of schooling 
levels across age groups shows that the trend of the years of schooling is downward 
sloping. In other words the older the group the lower the average years of schooling. 
Thus, the highest average years of schooling is 11.2, which occurs in the 36-40 years 
age group. The oldest group, of age 61-65 years, has the lowest average years of 
schooling (8.17). The average years of schooling completed is 10.60 for men and 
10.85 years for women. However, across the 15-20 to 36-40 years age group, female 
workers have a higher average years of schooling than male workers. For the older 
cohorts the average years of schooling for females and males are almost the same. 
These cohort differences, and the difference by gender across age groups, are also 
typical of most western countries. The detailed information about the average years of 
schooling by age group is presented in Figure 5.3. 
Figure 5.3: Average Years of Schooling by Age Group 
 
        Source: Author’s calculation based on IFLS4 data set. 
 
 
Figure 5.4 describes the distribution of the sample based on educational attainment. 
Respondents who do not finish their primary school are approximately 7 percent of 
the total sample. Around 18 percent of the sample graduated from primary school. 
Respondents who hold the junior secondary school level comprise approximately 16 
percent of the total sample. The percentage of the respondents in the sample who are 
qualified in general senior secondary school, vocational senior secondary school, 
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college, undergraduate, and master degree are 24, 16, 7, 11, and 1 percent, 
respectively.  
Figure 5.4: Distribution of Sample by Education Attainment 
 
 
Notes: Not finish PS: not finished Primary School; PS: Primary School; JSS: Junior Secondary School; 
VSSS: Vocational Senior Secondary School; GSSS: General Senior Secondary School; COLL: College; UG: 
Undergraduate; MASTER: Master degree. 
         Source: Author’s calculation based on IFLS4 data set. 
 
Turning to the information on educational attainment by gender (see Figure 5.5), it is 
observed that there is a slightly different pattern in educational attainment 
composition for female and male respondents. For female respondents, the smallest 
percentage is for those holding a master degree, with 0.78 percent of the female 
sample. The second lowest percentage is for the ‘did not finish primary school’ 
category, followed by the college, vocational senior secondary school, undergraduate, 
junior secondary school, and primary school categories, with 8.36 percent, 10.12 
percent, 13.06 percent, 13.78 percent, 16.55 percent, and 16.59 percent respectively, 
and the highest percentage is for individuals with general senior secondary school 
qualification, which is 20.77 percent of the female sample. For male respondents, the 
order from the lowest to the highest percentage is as follows: master degree (0.55 
percent), college (5.12 percent), did not finish primary school (6.48 percent), 
undergraduate (10.11 percent), junior secondary school (16.31 percent), vocational 
senior secondary school (17.1 percent), primary school (18.79 percent), and general 
senior secondary school (25.55 percent).  
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Figure 5.5: Mean Educational Attainment by Gender 
 
 
Notes: Not finish PS: not finished Primary School; PS: Primary School; JSS: Junior Secondary School; GSSS: 
General Senior Secondary School; VSSS: Vocational Senior Secondary School; COLL: College; UG: 
Undergraduate; MASTER: Master degree. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on IFLS4 data set. 
 
The breakdown of the earnings profiles by educational levels separately for men and 
women is presented in Figure 5.6. The patterns in the figure coincide with the main 
prediction of human capital theory, which states that more educated individuals earn 
more as a result of improved productivity. The average monthly earnings range from 
about Rp650,000 for individuals who do not finish their primary school to about 
Rp4,000,000 for individuals with a master degree. Female workers have lower 
average monthly earnings for all education levels than their male counterparts. At the 
lowest education level, female workers who do not finish their primary education 
receive average monthly earnings about Rp300,000 lower than those of male workers 
with the same education level. On the other hand, differences of average monthly 
earnings between female workers and male workers with a master degree are 
approximately Rp800,000. In percent terms, however, the gender earnings gap tends 
to decline as the level of education rises. Thus the differences are 50.04, 38.20, 33.29, 
23.40, 26.24, 27.93, and 28.49 percent for primary school, junior secondary school, 
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general senior secondary school, vocational senior secondary school, college, 
undergraduate, and master degree, respectively. 
Figure 5.6: Mean Monthly Earnings by Educational Attainment 
 
 
Notes: Not finish PS: not finished Primary School; PS: Primary School; JSS: Junior Secondary School; VSSS: 
Vocational Senior Secondary School; GSSS: General Senior Secondary School; COLL: College; UG: 
Undergraduate; MASTER: Master degree. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on IFLS4 data set. 
 
 
Figure 5.7 displays the relationship between average monthly earnings and potential 
work experience based on the IFLS4 data set.14 Initially, earnings rise with 
experience, after around 26-35 years of labour market activity earnings decline with 
additional years of experience. The average earnings for females reach their peak 
when the workers have 16-25 years of experience. In comparison, male workers reach 
their highest average earnings at 26-35 years of work experience. At the peak position 
female workers have average earnings of approximately Rp1200,000, and male 
workers receive about Rp1800,000. This is a female earnings disadvantage of 33 
percent of the male earnings. 
                                               
14  The detailed information on the construction of the potential work experience variable is presented 
in sub-section 5.3.2 Data Extracting Procedure and Variable Definition. 
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Figure 5.7: Potential Work Experience - Monthly Earnings Profile 
 
 
 Source: Author’s calculation based on IFLS4 data set.  
 
Figure 5.8 presents the relationship between average monthly earnings and age. As 
expected given the method of constructing the potential labour market experience 
variable, the shapes of the three curves that show the relationship between average 
monthly earnings and age are similar to the curves that show the relationship between 
average monthly earnings and potential work experience. Initially, earnings rise with 
age, peak around ages 41-50, and then decline in the pre-retirement years. These 
results follow the typical of ‘life cycle hypothesis’ of Modigliani. Moreover, it is 
observed that the age-earnings profiles of females reach their turning point earlier 
than those of males. Thus the earnings-age profile of females peaks in the 31-40 years 
age group, whereas the earnings-age profile of males peaks in the 41-50 age groups. 
These experience-earnings and age-earnings profiles patterns are typically found in 
less developed countries. The tendency for the experience-earnings and age-earnings 
profiles for females to peak before those of males could indicate the existence of 
discrimination in promotion rates in the labour market for females. 
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Figure 5.8:  Age - Monthly Earnings Profile 
 
 
 Source: Author’s calculation based on IFLS4 data set. 
 
5.4 Results and Interpretation  
The analysis commences with results from the standard Mincer equation with no 
control variables. This is followed by empirical findings of the returns to schooling 
from the augmented Mincerian model that includes control variables. Comparisons of 
the results from all specifications are then discussed in detail.  
5.4.1 The Standard Mincerian Model 
In this section, OLS estimates of the earnings function parameters are reported, 
assuming education to be exogenous. Following the common approach used in the 
literature, the econometric analysis of the private returns to schooling starts by 
estimating the basic Mincerian function, where, as described in the empirical model 
and estimation method section, the natural logarithm of earnings is regressed on years 
of schooling, potential work experience and its squared term. The results are reported 
in Table 5.4.15 
                                               
15 The reported coefficients were estimated using STATA 11.1. 
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Table 5.4: OLS Estimates of Standard Mincerian Earnings Function 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
  age proxying experience 
 Model Model Model Model Model Model 
 5.1-a-all  5.1-a-male 5.1-a-female 5.1-b-all  5.1-b-male 5.1-b-female 
Constant  5.12447 
(0.02718)*** 
5.25857 
(0.03354)*** 
4.92210 
(0.04398)*** 
4.84851 
(0.07113)*** 
5.04175 
(0.08816)*** 
4.65561 
(0.11789)*** 
Years of Schooling 0.05663 
 (0.00172)*** 
0.05278 
(0.00206)*** 
0.06459 
 (0.00290)*** 
0.05070 
(0.00160)*** 
0.04704 
(0.00190)*** 
0.05882 
(0.00265)*** 
Experience 
 
0.01603  
(0.00195)*** 
0.01224 
(0.00240)*** 
0.01540 
(0.00327)*** 
   
Experience2 
 
-0.00023 
 (0.00005)*** 
-0.00015 
(0.00006)*** 
-0.00023 
 (0.00008)*** 
   
Age 
 
   0.02393  
(0.00401)*** 
0.01894 
(0.00489)*** 
0.02303  
(0.00691)*** 
Age2 
 
   -0.00024 
(0.00005)*** 
-0.00018 
(0.00007)*** 
-0.00023 
(0.00010)** 
R2 
 
0.2051 
 
0.1899 
 
0.2585 
 
0.2031 
 
0.1890 
 
0.2566 
 
Observations 
 
4596 
 
3065 
 
1531 
 
4596 
 
3065 
 
1531 
 
Chow test (F-test) 
 
  63.53 
   
64.55 
 
p-value   0.0000   0.0000 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 
percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Table 5.4 presents the OLS coefficients estimated for the total sample and for males 
and females, separately. The Chow tests reject the null hypothesis of equality of the 
regression coefficients for males and females. The six standard models explain from 
about 19 to about 26 percent of the variation in actual earnings, figures which are 
comparable to other studies in the literature. All the coefficients reported in the table 
have the expected signs and are statistically significant at the level of α = 0.01, except 
for the age squared variable in model 5.1-b-female, which is statistically significant 
only at the level of α = 0.05.  
According to the Table 5.4 results, an additional year of education is associated with 
an annual 5.66 percent increase in earnings in model 5.1-a-all, and with a 5.07 percent 
increase in earnings in model 5.1-b-all. These estimates of the return to schooling in 
Indonesia are substantially smaller than the Psacharopoulos (1981) average estimate 
of 14 percent for Less Developed Countries, and the Psacharopoulos (1994) average 
estimate of 9.6 percent for Asian countries. However these results are in agreement 
with some empirical studies, for example: Jamison and Gaag (1987) in China, 
Flanagan (1998) in the Czech Republic, Wei et al. (1999) in China, Maurer-Fazio and 
Dinh (2004) in China, Aromolaran (2006) in Nigeria, and Aslam et al. (2010) in 
Pakistan. A relatively low rate of return to schooling is generally faced by countries 
experiencing economic transition, such as China and the former Russian countries. 
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Typically, the return to schooling in such countries is low in the early stage of the 
economic transition process, and then gradually increases after market oriented 
economic reform is implemented. The Indonesian economy shifted from a controlled 
economy to a market driven economy in 1966 (Ananta and Arifin, 2008).  Referring 
to the general pattern of the return to schooling in economic transition countries, the 
low return to schooling in Indonesia in the late 2000s invites a question. At this 
period, where the economic reform process had already reached the market driven 
economy stage, the return to schooling is expected to be higher than the estimates 
described above. Moreover, Duflo (2001), using data from a 1995 intercensal survey 
of Indonesia, found estimates of economic returns to schooling ranging from 6.8 to 
10.6 percent.  This suggests that the relatively low return to schooling in the current 
study of data for 2007-2008 is triggered by some other source. A likely candidate in 
this regard is a decline in the quality of school and a significant increase in the supply 
of educated workers in the labour market, due to a combination of events such as the 
massive school construction program in 1973 and 1974 and the compulsory education 
program in 1984. Both explanations, though particularly the latter, featured in 
accounts of the decline in the return to schooling in the US in the 1970s.  
The estimates of the return to schooling for females (6.46 percent and 5.88 percent) 
are higher than those for males (5.28 percent and 4.70 percent). The t-test confirms 
that these differences are statistically different, indicating that schooling is more 
financially rewarding in the labour market for females than for males. This result is 
consistent with the findings of many empirical studies, such as Deolalikar (1993), and 
Behrman and Deolalikar (1993) in Indonesia, Miller et al. (1997) in Australia, 
Flanagan (1998) in the Czech Republic, Brunello et al. (2000) in Italy, Lopez-
Avecedo (2001) in Mexico, and Asadullah (2006) in Bangladesh. 
The coefficients on the potential labour market experience variable and its squared 
term have the expected signs, and portray the usual concavity of the experience-
earnings profile. The increase in earnings associated with an extra year of potential 
labour market experience is given as: 
߲ ln ݁ܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ
߲݁ݔ݌ݎ
= ߚመଶ + 2ߚመଷ݁ݔ݌ݎ, 
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where ߚመଶ is the estimated coefficient on the experience variable, and ߚመଷ is the 
estimated coefficient on the experience squared variable. Thus this payoff varies with 
the level of potential work experience. Among labour market entrants (experience = 
0) the return estimated for the total sample is 1.6 percent. At 10 years of potential 
labour market experience the return is 1.14 percent, and at 20 years of potential 
labour market experience the return is 0.68 percent. The increase in earnings 
associated with additional labour market experience for females exceeds that for 
males up to around 20 years of experience. For example, among labour market 
entrants it is 1.54 percent for females and 1.22 percent for males. At experience = 10 
it is 1.08 percent for females and 0.92 percent for males. Beyond 20 years of 
experience, however, the increase in earnings per year of labour market experience 
for males exceeds that for females, and for a number of years (e.g. at experience = 25 
and experience = 35) it is positive whereas that for females is negative. This gender 
difference in the payoff to experience across levels of experience could be due to the 
following reasons. First, it could reflect a cohort effect, where the younger female 
workers in the sample have joined the labour force under different - perhaps more 
favourable - circumstances than the older female workers in the sample. Second, it 
could relate to selectivity in labour force participation. In the young cohort, females 
in the labour force may be heavily selected toward more able and talented individuals.  
Third, the younger cohorts in the sample tend to have better education than the older 
cohorts in the sample, and there may be complementarities between labour market 
experience and the level of education. 
Also of interest is the level of experience at which the predicted experience-earnings 
profile peaks. This is where ߚመଶ + 2ߚመଷ݁ݔ݌ݎ = 0. This occurs when potential work 
experience reaches 34.85, 40.80, and 33.48 years for all, male, and female samples 
respectively (see Figure 5.9).  
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Figure 5.9: Experience - Earnings Profiles 
 
 
       Source: Author’s calculation based on Table 5.4. 
 
 
Figure 5.9 uses the estimates from Table 5.4 to predict experience-earnings profiles. 
The figure presents some patterns worth noting. As discussed above, the experience-
earnings profiles have concave, first rising and then falling after reaching a given 
number of years. Based on the previous calculation of the experience-earnings profile 
we know that the earnings of male workers increase with experience until their peak 
at 40.80 years. Thus for a male leaving education at age 16, this peak would be at age 
57. Female workers reach the peak of their experience-earnings profile earlier than 
their male counterparts, at 33.48 years. Thus for females leaving school at age 16 this 
peak would occur at 50 years. This would be well after women with career 
interruptions due to child bearing and rearing have returned to the labour market. 
Estimation of the standard Mincerian model with age in place of potential experience 
leads to estimated coefficients that differ somewhat from the corresponding results 
reported in columns (a), (b), and (c) of Table 5.4. However, the sign of every 
coefficient, and the general pattern of the results, are similar. The rates of return to 
schooling reported in Table 5.4 columns (d), (e), and (f) are slightly lower, by 0.59, 
0.57, and 0.58 percentage points, in comparison with those reported in Table 5.4 
columns (a), (b), and (c), respectively. Thus, an additional year of schooling increases 
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earnings by 5.07, 4.70, and 5.88 percent for males and females combined, males, and 
females, respectively. In other words, using age instead of potential work experience 
results in the same pattern of females having a higher return to schooling. This result 
is comparable with Blinder’s (1976) finding. The differences between males and 
females in the return to schooling is, however, wider for the specification using 
potential work experience.  
Figure 5.10: Age - Earnings Profiles 
 
 
       Source: Author’s calculation based on Table 5.4. 
 
 
Predicted age-earnings profiles obtained from the estimates are presented in Figure 
5.10. These predictions demonstrate the usual concavity of the age-earnings profile. 
The increase in earnings associated with an extra year of age is given as: 
߲ ln݁ܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ
߲ܽ݃݁
= ߚመଶ + 2ߚመଷܽ݃݁, 
where ߚመଶ is the estimated coefficient on the age variable, and ߚመଷ is the estimated 
coefficient on the age squared variable. Thus this payoff varies with the age of the 
worker. The age-earnings profiles display rapid initial earnings growth; they peak 
where ߚመଶ + 2ߚመଷܽ݃݁ = 0 , which is around 49.9 (combined sample), 52.6 (male 
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sample), and 50.1 (female sample) years of age, and decline slightly toward the end 
of the career (see Figure 5.10). 
Similar to the effects of potential work experience on earnings for males and females, 
the changes in earnings associated with additional age for males are lower than those 
for females. Among labour market entrants (age of 15), the increase in earnings 
associated with age is 1.35 percent for males and 1.61 percent for females. However, 
from the age of 50 the change in earnings associated with age is negative for females. 
For males the negative change starts 3 years later, that is at the age of 53. 
Figure 5.11: The Standard Mincerian Return to Schooling 
 
 
              Source: Author’s calculation based on Table 5.4. 
 
Comparison of the return to schooling among the six specifications from Table 5.4 is 
provided in Figure 5.11. Using either potential work experience or age in the earnings 
function to estimate the returns to schooling yields a range of 4.70 to 6.46 percent 
increase in earnings associated with each additional year of schooling. We turn now 
to examine whether these estimates are sensitive to the way the information on 
educational attainment is incorporated into the model. 
5.4.2 The Standard Mincerian Model with Different Levels of Education 
So far the continuous years of schooling variable has been utilised as the measure of 
educational attainment. The estimates obtained using this measure will now be 
complemented with a more detailed investigation by examining returns to specific 
school levels and types. 
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In order to estimate the rates of return to each separate level of education, this study 
utilises a model with dummy variables that take the value of 1 when a level is 
completed and 0 otherwise. When the schooling variable is broken down into the 
seven different types of education - primary school, junior secondary school, 
vocational senior secondary school, general senior secondary school, college, 
undergraduate, and master  -  more insight is gained into the incentives that the labour 
market provides for investing in education by individuals and households in 
Indonesia. As noted earlier, this flexible specification allows any non-linearity in the 
returns to schooling to be captured. The OLS estimates of the standard Mincerian 
earnings function based on the level of education are reported in Table 5.5.  
Table 5.5: OLS Estimates of Standard Mincerian Earnings Function with Level 
of Education Dummy Variables 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
  age proxying experience 
 All Males Females All Males Females 
 Model Model Model Model Model Model 
 5.2-a-all 5.2-a-male 5.2-a-female 5.2-b-all 5.2-b-male 5.2-b-female 
Constant 5.40310 
(0.03171)*** 
5.51588 
(0.03907)*** 
5.28616 
(0.05190)*** 
5.11737 
(0.07629)*** 
5.30074 
(0.09519)*** 
5.00943 
(0.12519)*** 
Primary School 0.08844 
(0.02839)*** 
0.10768 
(0.03326)*** 
-0.00642 
(0.04812) 
0.09780 
(0.02793)*** 
0.10770 
(0.03311)*** 
0.01007 
(0.04629) 
Junior Secondary School 0.21890 
(0.02939)*** 
0.20810 
(0.03458)*** 
0.20702 
(0.05037)*** 
0.21759 
(0.02803)*** 
0.19627 
(0.03364)*** 
0.21626 
(0.04631)*** 
Vocational Senior Secondary School 0.39778 
(0.02907)*** 
0.35739 
(0.03414)*** 
0.41390 
(0.05142)*** 
0.37622 
(0.02729)*** 
0.32860 
(0.03253)*** 
0.40314 
(0.04681)*** 
General Senior Secondary School 0.40897 
(0.02908)*** 
0.38555 
(0.03384)*** 
0.39177 
(0.05251)*** 
0.38551 
(0.02715)*** 
0.35501 
(0.03213)*** 
0.37900 
(0.04735)*** 
College 0.57240 
(0.03330)*** 
0.56612 
(0.04230)*** 
0.61261 
(0.05256)*** 
0.52662 
(0.03180)*** 
0.51723 
(0.04067)*** 
0.57804 
(0.04854)*** 
Undergraduate 0.67959 
(0.03053)*** 
0.64903 
(0.03679)*** 
0.72768 
(0.05121)*** 
0.63311 
(0.02874)*** 
0.59839 
(0.03524)*** 
0.69267 
(0.04615)*** 
Master 0.97564 
(0.05044)*** 
0.96502 
(0.06274)*** 
0.99615 
(0.07343)*** 
0.92272 
(0.04836)*** 
0.90536 
(0.06031)*** 
0.96250 
(0.07056)*** 
Experience 0.01622 
(0.00197)*** 
0.01200 
(0.00241)*** 
0.01693 
(0.00329)*** 
   
Experience2 -0.00026 
(0.00005)*** 
-0.00017 
(0.00006)*** 
-0.00029 
(0.00008)*** 
   
Age    0.02193 
(0.00404)*** 
0.01667 
(0.00492)*** 
0.02128 
(0.00696)*** 
Age2    -0.00022 
(0.00005)*** 
-0.00016 
(0.00007)** 
-0.00022 
(0.00010)** 
R2 
 
0.2045 
 
0.1888 
 
0.2728 
 
0.2020 
 
0.1883 
 
0.2683 
 
Observations 
 
4596 
 
3065 
 
1531 
 
4596 
 
3065 
 
1531 
 
Chow test (F-test) 
   
28.84 
   
29.04 
 
p-value   0.0000   0.0000 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 
percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. “Did not finish Primary School” is the benchmark group for the 
educational attainment categories. 
 
The omitted education category is for the lowest group of “Did not finish Primary 
School”, and the education levels included in the model form a hierarchy, from 
lowest to highest. Hence, it is expected that the estimated coefficients will all be 
positive, and increase in magnitude as one reads down the table. Following this 
change to the way that the information on educational attainment is included in the 
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estimating equation, there is little change to the estimated coefficients of either the 
experience or age variables. Estimating the return to schooling using potential work 
experience or age yields highly statistically significant coefficients for almost all the 
variables. The sole exception is the coefficient for primary school for females. 
Replacing the potential work experience variables by the age variables is associated 
with a decrease in most of the coefficients of the education dummy variables for all 
samples. The result from the F-test confirms that the coefficients of the level of 
education variables for males and females are statistically different. The fact that the 
value of the constant term is higher for males than for females indicates that males, 
without schooling and work experience, earn more than comparable females. This can 
possibly be interpreted as an indication of the existence of wage discrimination 
against females in the labour market.  
Based on the results presented in Table 5.5, the returns to schooling for each type of 
education level can be calculated using Equation 5.3. Figure 5.12 presents the 
marginal return to completing each additional level of education, e.g., junior 
secondary school compared to primary school and general senior secondary school 
compared to junior secondary school. The comparison between general senior 
secondary schools and vocational senior secondary schools also can be 
accommodated. School types are ranked by increasing number of years of schooling 
required to finish that level of education. Figure 5.12 panel (A) shows the return to 
education derived from models 5.2-a-all, 5.2-a-male, and 5.2-a-female, while panel 
(B) presents the return to schooling derived from models 5.2-b-all, 5.2-b-male, and 
5.2-b-female.  
Among the wage earners, the return to schooling at the primary school level is 1.47 
percent in the model based on potential labour market experience (1.63 in the model 
based on age) for the full sample, 1.79 (1.80) percent for males, and -0.11 (0.17) 
percent for females.  The return to schooling for junior secondary school is estimated 
to be 4.35 (3.99) percent for the full sample, 3.35 (2.95) percent for males, and 6.90 
(6.87) percent for females. At the level of general senior secondary school the return 
to schooling is 6.34 (5.60) percent for the full sample, 5.92 (5.29) percent for males, 
and 6.16 (5.42) percent for females. The workers with vocational senior secondary 
school have a return to schooling as much as 5.96 (5.29) percent for the full sample, 
4.98 (4.41) percent for males, and 6.90 (6.23) percent for females. These figures 
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confirm that male workers with vocational senior secondary school have a lower 
return to each year of schooling than general senior secondary school graduate males. 
On the contrary, females with vocational senior secondary school have a higher return 
to schooling than general senior secondary school graduate females. Workers with 
college education receive a 5.45 (4.70) percent return to schooling for the full sample, 
a 6.02 (5.41) percent return for males, and a 7.36 (6.63) percent return for females. 
Individuals with an undergraduate level of education have a return to schooling of 
6.77 (6.19) percent for the full sample, 6.59 (6.08) percent for males, and 8.40 (7.84) 
percent for females. The return to schooling for a master degree is 14.80 (14.48) 
percent for the full sample, 15.80 (15.35) percent for males, and 13.42 (13.49) percent 
for females. All these figures are substantially lower than the average returns to 
schooling in Asian countries. Psacharopoulos (1981, 1985, and 1994) finds that the 
returns to schooling for Asian countries are 31 to 39 percent, 15 to 18.9 percent, and 
18 to 19.9 percent for primary, secondary, and tertiary education, respectively.  
It can be seen in panel (A) that males have lower returns to schooling than females at 
the secondary (junior and senior secondary schools) and tertiary levels (college and 
undergraduate only). Panel (B) confirms that the returns to schooling for males 
exceed those for females for primary school and master degree. These patterns are 
similar to those obtained by Deolalikar (1993). The differences in returns between 
males and females are not very large, however. They range from 0.13 to 1.96 
percentage points.  
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Figure 5.12: Standard Mincerian Return to Schooling Based on Model with 
Level of Education Dummy Variables 
 
 
 (A) 
 
(B) 
 
Notes: PS: Primary School; JSS: Junior Secondary School; VSSS: Vocational Senior Secondary School; GSSS: 
General Senior Secondary School; COLL: College; UG: Undergraduate; MASTER: Master degree. 
*: Primary School coefficient for female sample is statistically insignificant. 
 Source: Author’s calculation based on Table 5.5. 
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Figure 5.13: Experience - Earnings Profiles by Gender and Educational Attainment 
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Notes: PS: Primary School; JSS: Junior Secondary School; VSSS: Vocational Senior Secondary School; GSSS: General Senior Secondary School; Coll: College; UG: Undergraduate; 
Master: Master degree. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Table 5.5. 
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Figure 5.14: Age - Earnings Profile by Gender and Educational Attainment 
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Notes: PS: Primary School; JSS: Junior Secondary School; VSSS: Vocational Senior Secondary School; GSSS: General Senior Secondary School; Coll: College; UG: Undergraduate; 
Master: Master degree. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Table 5.5.
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Figures 5.13 and 5.14 display the predicted experience-earnings and age-earnings 
profiles (for the combined sample as well as those for the separate samples of males 
and females) by education level along with the profiles by level of education within 
each of the three samples analysed. Given the additive nature of the earnings 
equation, each profile displays the same bell shape where earnings rise with work 
experience (age) then decline after reaching the turning point. These experience-
earnings and age-earnings profiles again show a clear tendency for females to reach 
the earnings turning point earlier than males. Thus female workers reach the turning 
point of their experience-earnings (age-earnings) profile at 29.19 (48.36) years of 
potential work experience (age), while males get to the turning point of their 
experience-earnings (age-earnings) profile at 35.29 (52.09) years of potential work 
experience (age). Compared to the estimates obtained using the continuous years of 
schooling variable, these estimated turning points generally occur several years 
earlier. Further, as demonstrated in Figure 5.13 the experience-earnings profiles of 
males and females differ noticeably, with those of males being flatter than those of 
females.  The gender comparison within each level of education (see Panels A to G) 
show that females have lower earnings compared to males with the same level of 
potential labour market experience or age. Moreover, the greater female earnings 
disadvantage among the less-educated than among the better education that was 
commented on earlier is clearly evident in this set of predictions.  
Finally, the predicted profiles by level of education (Panels H to J) reinforce the story 
from Figure 5.12, to the effect that the acquisition of higher levels of education in 
Indonesia is financially rewarding, and the greatest rewards are obtained at the 
highest level of educational attainment. 
5.4.3 Mincerian Earnings Function with Control Variables. 
The specification used above could be viewed as rather naïve, in the sense that it 
assumes away all factors other than for schooling and experience that may influence 
earnings. Accordingly, in this sub-section the analysis proceeds by augmenting the 
basic Mincerian model with additional explanatory variables. These additional 
explanatory variables are tenure, tenure squared, gender, marital status, and the 
control for area of residence.  Table 5.6 presents the private rate of return to education 
from this augmented specification for the full sample and for males and females 
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separately, using Equations 5.4 and 5.5. The estimated coefficients are jointly 
significant, as indicated by the F-test. Moreover, as the controls for the additional 
factors influencing earnings are introduced, the explanatory power of the augmented 
model rises for all specifications compared to the previous specifications (standard 
model). Most of the coefficients are estimated with statistical precision (low standard 
error), and have the expected signs. Tenure, gender (female), and the urban variables 
are statistically significant at the 1 percent level of significance for all specifications. 
The marital status variable, however, is significant only for females. In line with the 
previous estimates, the t-test rejects the null hypothesis of equality of the regression 
coefficients of schooling for males and females. 
Table 5.6: OLS Estimates of Augmented Mincerian Earnings Functions 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
  age proxying experience 
 Model Model Model Model Model Model 
 5.4-a-all 5.4-a-males 5.4-a-females 5.4-b-all 5.4-b-males 5.4-b-females 
Constant 5.21403 
(0.02801)*** 
5.24319 
(0.03406)*** 
4.95118 
(0.04849)*** 
5.04476 
(0.07681)*** 
5.08215 
(0.09599)*** 
4.77053 
(0.13128)*** 
Years of Schooling 
 
0.04930 
 (0.00182)*** 
0.04586 
(0.00221)*** 
0.05429 
 (0.00321)*** 
0.04721 
(0.00161)*** 
0.04357 
(0.00202)*** 
0.05259 
(0.00271)*** 
Experience 0.00768 
(0.00227)** 
0.00734 
(0.00284)*** 
0.00795 
(0.00392)** 
   
Experience2 -0.00013 
 (0.00005)*** 
-0.00012 
(0.00007)** 
-0.00015 
 (0.00009)* 
   
Age    0.01358 
(0.00468)*** 
0.01299 
(0.09600)** 
0.01428 
(0.00811)* 
Age2    -0.00016 
(0.00007)** 
-0.00015 
(0.00008)* 
-0.00017 
(0.00011) 
Tenure 0.01584  
(0.00212) *** 
0.01139 
(0.00260)*** 
0.02432 
(0.00388)*** 
0.01599 
(0.00213)*** 
0.01149 
(0.00259)*** 
0.02455 
(0.00392)*** 
Tenure2 -0.00028 
(0.00007)*** 
-0.00017 
(0.00009)* 
-0.00052 
(0.00009)*** 
-0.00028 
(0.00007)*** 
-0.00016 
(0.00009)* 
-0.00052 
(0.00013)*** 
Female -0.19334 
(0.01223)*** 
  -0.19500 
(0.01219)*** 
  
Married -0.00461 
(0.01633) 
0.03276  
(0.02132) 
-0.05018 
(0.02499)** 
-0.00429 
(0.01653) 
0.03251 
(0.02167) 
-0.04932 
(0.02527)* 
Urban 0.10824 
(0.01330)*** 
0.09994 
(0.01556)*** 
0.13455 
(0.02541)*** 
0.10833 
(0.01330)*** 
0.10008 
(0.01556)*** 
0.13459 
(0.02546)*** 
R2 0.2735 0.2152 0.3032 0.2732 0.2150 0.3019 
 
Observations 
 
4596 
 
3065 
 
1531 
 
4596 
 
3065 
 
1531 
 
Chow test (F-test) 
   
37.43 
   
37.93 
 
p-value 
   
0.0000 
   
0.0000 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 
percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
The coefficient of the dummy variable for gender (female) in the pooled sample, 
whether using experience or age in the earnings function, is negative and highly 
statistically significant. These results indicate that, holding other variables constant, 
females face an earnings disadvantage in the Indonesian labour market of around 20 
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percent. These results are consistent with some previous estimates of the Mincer 
equation in other developing country samples, for example, Kazianga (2004) in 
Burkina Faso and Qian and Smyth (2008) in China. 
The first new variable (other than the gender variable) to consider is job tenure. This 
measure is included in the model along with work experience (age). By doing so, it is 
possible to obtain an indication on the relative importance of general and firm 
specific human capital for earnings determination. The increase in earnings associated 
with an extra year of tenure is given as: 
߲ ln ݁ܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ
߲ݐ݁݊ݑݎ݁
= ߚመସ + 2ߚመହݐ݁݊ݑݎ݁, 
where ߚመସ is the estimated coefficient on the tenure variable, and ߚመହ is the estimated 
coefficient on the tenure squared variable. Thus this payoff varies with the level of 
tenure. All the specifications show that tenure has a larger partial effect than 
experience and age over much of the early parts of the experience-earnings and age-
earnings profiles. For example, in model 5.4-a-male (5.4-a-female), the coefficient for 
potential work experience is 0.00734 (0.00795), and the coefficient for tenure is 
0.01139 (0.02432). This suggests that seniority in terms of job tenure is relatively 
more important than potential work experience among those in their first year in the 
labour force or in their current job. This pattern holds over much of the early career. 
For example, after 10 years of seniority an additional year in the job increases 
earnings by 0.799 (1.392) percent for males (females), while after 10 years of work 
experience an additional year of experience increases earnings by approximately 
0.494 (0.495) percent for males (females). When experience is replaced by age the 
results suggest the same pattern, where, for 25 years old workers an additional year 
increases their earnings by 0.549 percent for male workers and by 0.578 for female 
workers, while following 10 years of job tenure an additional year on the job raises 
earnings by 0.829 percent for male workers, and by 1.415 percent for female 
workers.16 
The estimates also suggest that, on average, residents of urban areas receive 
significantly higher earnings than individuals living in rural areas. The coefficient of 
the urban dummy variable ranges from 0.09994 to 0.13459 in the 6 specifications 
                                               
16 These calculations are comparable for workers who join the labour market at 15 years of age. 
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presented in Table 5.6. These estimates imply that the workers from urban areas earn 
9.99 to 13.46 percent more than workers from rural areas, with the difference being 
significant at the 1 percent significance level.17 Comparing the male and female 
samples, the coefficient of the urban dummy variable is higher for females than it is 
for males.  This gender differential in the estimates of the partial effects of urban area 
residence in the earnings equation, where the effect is larger for females, is consistent 
with the evidence in relation to schooling and job tenure. 
As mentioned earlier in this sub-section, the marital status variable is significant only 
for females. Being married has a positive, though statistically insignificant, effect on 
earnings for males but leads to around 5 percent lower earnings for female workers, 
presumably because of the extra home duties they undertake and child bearing/rearing 
activities. In other words, being married is most likely to have little effect on the 
wages of male workers while it has a negative effect on the wages of female workers.   
Figure 5.15 compares the experience-earnings and the tenure-earnings profiles. 
Similar to the experience-earnings and age-earnings profiles, the tenure-earnings 
profiles display rapid initial earnings growth, and then decline after reaching a 
maximum point. For all three samples (Panels A, B, and C), the tenure-earnings 
profiles lie above the experience-earnings profiles and have a steeper shape. This 
pattern reinforces the comment above, to the effect that tenure is a more important 
determinant for earnings than potential labour market experience among both males 
and females. That is, employers value seniority in terms of job tenure more than 
potential work experience. The profiles in Panel C, for females, have a different 
pattern from those in Panel A (all) and Panel B (males). In Panels A and B the tenure-
earnings profiles are above the experience-earnings profiles at all relevant years of 
work experience, while for female workers (Panel C) the changes in earnings with 
experience over the first few years in the labour market and the few years near to the 
retirement age exceed the changes in earnings with tenure. 
                                               
17 The detailed explanation of how to calculate relative effects from dummy variable coefficients can 
be found in Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980). To avoid confusion between numbers discussed in the 
text for relative effects computed using Halvorsen and Palmquist’s (1980) algorithm and the 
coefficients in the Table, the approximations provided by the estimated coefficients are used in the 
discussion. For example, the coefficient of the urban dummy variable ranges from 0.09994 to 0.13459 
across the 6 specifications in Table 5.6. Using  Halvorsen and Palmquist’s (1980) algorithm, the 
relative effect on earnings is 0.105 (exp (0.09994) -1 = 1.105105 - 1) to 0.144 (exp (0.13459) - 1 = 
1.144068 - 1), and these imply that the workers from urban areas earn 10.5 to 14.4 percent more than 
workers from rural areas, with the difference being significant at the 1 percent significance level. It is 
apparent that the coefficients discussed in the text are close approximations to these effects. 
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Comparison of the experience-earnings profiles by gender (Panel D) reveals patterns 
similar to those discussed in relation to the basic Mincerian model. Male workers 
reach their experience-earnings peak at 30.58 years of experience, while female 
workers reach their experience-earnings peak earlier than their male counterparts, 
which is at 26.50 years of experience.  
Comparing the tenure-earnings profiles for females and males (see Panel E), there are 
two main points of interest. First, the gap between females’ tenure-earnings profile 
and that of males initially narrows with years in the job. However, after females’ 
tenure-earnings reach its peak, the gender gap gets wider. Second, the peak of the 
tenure-earnings profile, where ߚመସ + 2ߚመହݐ݁݊ݑݎ݁ = 0, for females (23.38 years) occurs 
before that for males (33.50 years). This also means that male workers get to their 
experience-earnings peak earlier than their tenure-earnings peak. In the case of female 
workers, however, the tenure-earnings peak comes earlier than the experience-
earnings peak.  
Panel F compares the experience-earnings and tenure-earnings profiles for all, male, 
and female samples.  Both the experience-earnings and tenure-earnings profiles of 
female workers lie below those of male workers and have a steeper shape. Females 
reach the turning point earlier than males in the case of both the experience-earnings 
and tenure-earnings profiles. 
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Figure 5.15: Experience - Earnings and Tenure - Earnings Profiles (Augmented Mincerian Model)18 
 
A B C 
   
D E F 
   
Source: Author’s calculation based on Table 5.6.
                                               
18 In order to avoid a presentational problem due to comparing various groups, to construct these 6 diagrams, the formula of “the mean log earnings - ( ߚመ௘௫௣௥ or 
ߚመ௧௘௡௨௥௘ X ݁ݔ݌ݎതതതതതത or ݐ݁݊ݑݎ݁തതതതതതതതത  +  ߚ෡௘௫௣௥మ  or  ߚመ௧௘௡௨௥௘మ  X ݁ݔ݌ݎଶതതതതതതതത or  ݐ݁݊ݑݎ݁ଶതതതതതതതതതതത)” is used instead of the intercept. 
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Figure 5.16: Age - Earnings and Tenure - Earnings Profiles (Augmented Mincerian Model)19 
 
A B C 
   
D E F 
   
 
Notes: In order to have reasonable comparison, the age-earnings profile that starts from 15 years of age is compared to the tenure-earnings profile that start from 0 year of job tenure. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Table 5.6.
                                               
19 In order to avoid presentational problem due to comparing various groups to construct these 6 diagrams, the formula of “the mean log earnings - ( ߚመ௔௚௘  or ߚመ௧௘௡௨௥௘  
X ܽ݃݁തതതതത or ݐ݁݊ݑݎ݁തതതതതതതതത  +  ߚመ௔௚௘మ  or  ߚመ௧௘௡௨௥௘మ X ܽ݃݁ଶതതതതതതത or  ݐ݁݊ݑݎ݁ଶതതതതതതതതതതത)” is used instead of the intercept. 
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Figure 5.16 shows comparison of the age-earnings and the tenure-earnings profiles. 
Here, age-earnings profiles that start from the age of 15 are compared to tenure-
earnings profiles that start from 0 year of job tenure. In other words, a worker with 5 
years of job experience is compared with a 20 years old worker. Similar to the 
comparison between the experience-earnings and tenure-earnings profiles, the tenure-
earnings profile also lies above the age-earnings profile for all samples (all, males, 
and females) and has a steeper shape than the age-earnings profile (see the 
experience-tenure comparisons for each sample in Panels A, B, and C). Male workers 
reach their age-earnings peak at the age of 43.30 years, while female workers get to 
their age-earnings peak about one year earlier, which is 42 years. In order to achieve 
the tenure-earnings peak, male workers need to work at the same job continuously for 
35.91 years, while female workers reach their tenure-earnings peak at 23.61 years of 
job tenure.  
The gender comparisons of the age-earnings profiles in Panel D have patterns similar 
to those discussed for the experience-earnings profiles in Figure 15.5. Female 
workers reach their age-earnings turning point (42 years) slightly earlier than male 
workers (43.30 years).  
Panel E, which contains the gender comparisons of the tenure-earnings profiles, 
shows the same pattern as the tenure-earnings profiles in Figure 15.5 Panel E, where 
the gap between females’ tenure-earnings profile and that of males initially narrows 
with increases in job tenure, and then increases after the peak of the tenure-earnings 
profile is reached for females. The maximum point of the tenure-earnings profile for 
males (35.91 years) occurs well after that for females (23.61years).  
Panel F compares the age-earnings and tenure-earnings profiles for all, males, and 
females. Females reach the maximum point of their age-earnings and tenure-earnings 
profiles earlier than males, and their age-earnings and tenure-earnings profiles lie 
below those of males. 
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Figure 5.17: Augmented Mincerian Return to Schooling 
 
 
                    Source: Author’s calculation based on Table 5.6. 
 
Using the results from Table 5.6, the estimates of the return to additional years of 
schooling are presented in Figure 5.17. The estimates from the augmented Mincerian 
model (where the extra control variables are for gender (for full sample only), marital 
status, tenure and its square, and urban) yield a return to schooling that varies from 
4.36 to 5.43 percent. The estimate of the return to schooling using age in the earnings 
function is lower than that obtained using potential work experience. This return to 
schooling for females, however, is again slightly higher than that for males. This 
finding supports the results from previous estimations. 
5.4.4 Augmented Mincerian Earnings Function with Levels of Education 
Table 5.7 presents the private rate of return to education from this augmented 
specification with the dummy variables for different educational attainments for the 
full sample, and for males and females separately, using equations 5.5. The estimated 
coefficients are jointly significant, as indicated by the F-test. Moreover, as the 
controls for additional factors influencing earnings are introduced, the explanatory 
power of the augmented model rises for all specifications compared to the previous 
specifications (standard model). Most of the variables are estimated with statistical 
precision (low standard error), and have the expected signs. Similar to the finding 
obtained using the standard Mincerian model, the results from the augmented 
Mincerian model show that the private earnings return to additional years of 
schooling increases as the level of education increases. Consistent with the previous 
estimates, the F-test rejects the null hypothesis of equality of the regression 
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coefficients for the level of education variables for males and females. This confirms 
that the structure of the returns to schooling for females and returns to schooling for 
males are statistically different. 
Consistent with earlier results from the specifications using years of schooling, tenure 
has a greater impact on earnings than potential work experience and age for all 
samples (all, males, and females). Comparing the effects of potential work experience 
and job tenure in models 5.5-a-all, 5.5-a-male, and 5.5-a-female, it can be 
summarised that among labour market entrants (experience and tenure = 0), the 
increase in earnings associated with potential work experience is 0.79, 0.69, and 0.98 
percent for the pooled, male, and female samples, respectively. On the other hand, the 
return to job tenure is 1.54, 1.14, and 2.29 percent for the pooled, male, and female 
samples, respectively. When the workers have 10 years of potential work experience 
and job tenure, the increase in earnings associated with additional potential work 
experience is 0.29, 0.41, and 0.52 percent for the pooled, male, and female samples, 
respectively, and the increase in earnings associated with additional job tenure is 
1.04, 0.84, and 1.39 percent for the pooled, male, and female samples, respectively. A 
similar pattern is revealed from the comparison between the age and job tenure 
effects on earnings. Among workers with 0 tenure (age of 15), the increase in 
earnings associated with an additional year of age is 0.65, 0.65, and 0.73 percent for 
the pooled, male, and female samples, respectively, and the increase in earnings 
associated with an additional year of job tenure is 1.62, 1.19, and 2.43 percent for the 
pooled, male, and female samples, respectively. At 10 years of job tenure or age of 
25, the increase in earnings associated with an additional year of age is 0.39, 0.43, 
and 0.41 percent for the pooled, male, and female samples, respectively, and the 
return to an additional year of tenure is 1.06, 0.83, and 1.43 percent for the pooled, 
male, and female samples, respectively. 
The marital status variable is significant only when the male and female samples are 
examined separately, and it is not significant for the specification estimated using the 
full sample. This latter result is presumably due to the pooling of two samples that are 
characterised by opposite impacts of the married variable. Being married has a 
positive effect on earnings for males. However, for females the effect is the opposite 
to that for males. This probably is evidence that is consistent with the specialisation 
hypothesis.  By being married male workers can devote more of their time and effort 
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to labour market activities. As a result married male workers gain an increase in 
earnings. On the other hand, female workers experience a contrasting story. Being 
married leads to lower earnings for female workers, presumably because of the extra 
home duties they undertake and child bearing/rearing activities. 
Table 5.7: OLS Estimates of Augmented Mincerian Earnings Functions with 
Level of Education Dummy Variables 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
  age proxying experience 
 All Males Females All Males Females 
 Model Model Model Model Model Model 
Constant 5.48788 
(0.03259)*** 
5.47758 
(0.03955)*** 
5.28159 
(0.05577)*** 
5.34357 
(0.08179)*** 
5.34218 
(0.10334)*** 
5.10884 
(0.13560)*** 
Primary School 0.05838 
(0.02755)** 
0.08796 
(0.03370)*** 
-0.01075 
(0.04751) 
0.07194 
(0.02699)*** 
0.09685 
(0.03335)*** 
0.01153 
(0.04599) 
Junior Secondary School 0.16145  
(0.02880)*** 
0.16233 
(0.03512)*** 
0.15651 
(0.05068)*** 
0.17514 
(0.02739)*** 
0.16950 
(0.03408)*** 
0.18321 
(0.14599)*** 
Vocational Senior Secondary School 0.29428 
(0.02925)*** 
0.28233 
(0.03550)*** 
0.31844 
(0.05229)*** 
0.30183 
(0.02713)*** 
0.28339 
(0.03360)*** 
0.33873 
(0.04687)*** 
General Senior Secondary School 
 
0.31181 
(0.02921)*** 
0.31320 
(0.03513)*** 
0.30747 
(0.05317)*** 
0.31915 
(0.02693)*** 
0.31395 
(0.03304)*** 
0.32740 
(0.04748)*** 
College 0.49607 
(0.03334)*** 
0.47589 
(0.04265)*** 
0.51007 
(0.05495)*** 
0.49619 
(0.03105)*** 
0.46943 
(0.04049)*** 
0.52214  
(0.04922)*** 
Undergraduate 0.58669 
(0.03096)*** 
0.56321 
(0.03821)*** 
0.61310 
(0.05316)*** 
0.58874 
(0.02843)*** 
0.55826 
(0.03602)*** 
0.62728 
(0.04670)*** 
Master 0.85669 
(0.05104)*** 
0.86161 
(0.06791)*** 
0.82363 
(0.07638)*** 
0.85908 
(0.04886)*** 
0.85421 
(0.06569)*** 
0.84360 
(0.07130)*** 
Experience 0.00794 
(0.00228)*** 
0.00690 
(0.00287)** 
0.00977 
(0.00390)** 
   
Experience2 -0.00025 
(0.00017)*** 
-0.00014 
(0.00009)** 
-0.00023 
 0.00009)** 
   
Age    0.01044 
(0.00471)** 
0.00984 
(0.00589)* 
0.01213 
(0.00807) 
Age2    -0.00013 
(0.00006)** 
-0.00011 
(0.00008) 
-0.00016 
(0.00011) 
Tenure 0.01541  
(0.00212) *** 
0.01143 
(0.00015*** 
0.02290 
(0.00388)*** 
0. 01623 
(0.00212)*** 
0.01194 
(0.00257)*** 
0.02433 
(0.00391)*** 
Tenure2 -0.00025 
(0.00007)*** 
-0.00015 
(0.00009)* 
-0.00045 
(0.00013)*** 
-0.00028 
(0.00007)*** 
-0.00018 
(0.00009)** 
-0.00050 
(0.00013)*** 
Female 
 
-0.20404 
(0.03259)*** 
  -0.20523 
(0.01231)*** 
  
Married -0.00563 
(0.01613) 
0.03528 
(0.02109)* 
-0.05584 
(0.02473)** 
-0.00011 
(0.01642) 
0.03765 
(0.02154)* 
-0.04575 
(0.02508)* 
Urban 0.11515 
(0.01347)*** 
0.10970 
(0.01582)*** 
0.12851 
(0.02571)*** 
0.11491 
(0.01349)*** 
0.10931 
(0.01583)*** 
0.12917 
(0.02580)*** 
R2 0.2785 0.2176 
 
0.3150 
 
0.2772 
 
0.2169 
 
0.3124 
 
Observations 
 
4596 
 
3065 
 
1531 
 
4596 
 
3065 
 
1531 
 
Chow test (F-test) 
   
23.85 
   
24.03 
 
p-value 
   
0.0000 
   
0.0000 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 
1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
The estimates for the dummy variable for urban area of residence suggest that, on 
average, residents of urban areas receive significantly higher earnings than 
individuals living in the rural areas. The coefficients of the urban dummy variable for 
males are 0.10970 (specification using experience) and 0.10931 (specification using 
age), while for females they are 0.12851 and 0.12917. These results thus show that 
male workers from urban areas earn 10.97 (10.93) percent more than male workers 
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from rural areas. They similarly show that female workers from urban areas earn 
12.85 (12.92) percent more than their counterparts from rural areas. 
Figure 5.18: Augmented Mincerian Return to Schooling Based on Model with 
Level of Education Dummy Variables 
 
(A) 
 
(B) 
 
Notes: PS: Primary School; JSS: Junior Secondary School; VSSS: Vocational Senior Secondary School; GSSS: 
General Senior Secondary School; COLL: College; UG: Undergraduate; MASTER: Master degree. 
*: Primary School coefficient for female sample is statistically insignificant. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Table 5.7. 
 
The estimated returns to schooling at each educational qualification are presented in 
Figure 5.18. Panel A compares the return to schooling by gender and educational 
attainment derived from the specification using the potential work experience 
variables. Panel B compares the return to schooling by gender and educational 
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attainment derived from the specification based on the age variables. Males have a 
higher return to schooling than females at the levels of primary school and master 
degree. However the coefficients of the primary school variable for females are 
insignificant. Comparing between general senior secondary school and vocational 
senior secondary school, females who hold vocational senior secondary school 
education earn a higher return to schooling than females with general senior 
secondary school education. Among males the opposite relativity is observed. As 
noted previously, in these specifications, the F-test rejects the null hypothesis of 
equality for males and females of the regression coefficients of the level of education 
variables. 
5.4.5 Selectivity Bias 
It is frequently argued that the returns to education for females derived from either the 
standard or augmented Mincerian models may be biased because the females who 
participate in the labour force are not representative of all females. This is known as 
sample selection bias, and it is generally regarded as a potentially important, though 
difficult to address, econometric issue in this type of applied research. 
In order to correct for such a potential selectivity bias, a two-step Heckman (1979) 
selection correction approach can be adopted.20 This two-step approach re-casts the 
sample selection problem as an omitted variable problem, and so provides, in 
principle at least, a tractable means of addressing the issue. A probit model of the 
labour force participation probability of a female is estimated in the first step. Then, 
in the second step, the derived inverse Mills ratio (λ) is included in the earnings 
function as an additional explanatory variable. In addition to years of schooling or the 
dummies for education level, potential experience or age, experience squared or age 
squared, marital status and urban area of residence, household size, a dummy variable 
for the existence of a child younger than five years old in the household, a dummy 
variable for religion, and a dummy variable for the existence of either a father or 
mother in the household are included in the probit model. These four variables are 
included in the model of the decision of whether females participate in labour market 
because it is presumed that they are some of the factors that directly influence 
whether females join the labour market and which do not affect market earnings. It is 
                                               
20 The Heckman two-step method is outlined in Appendix A5.1. 
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argued that household size, the presence of children younger than five years old, and 
the presence of the father or mother in the household influence females’ decision to 
join the labour market since these three variables have an impact on females in terms 
of the amount of domestic duties and time that has to be devoted to their family. The 
religion of the respondent (Islam) is included in the probit model since 
religious/Islamic values are of critical importance in many parts of Indonesia. Many 
believe that female Muslims are not supposed to join the labour market. Given this 
model of labour force participation, and the earnings equations used previously, it is 
seen that the dummy variable for the existence of a child younger than five years old 
in the household, the dummy variable for religion, the dummy variable for the 
existence of father or mother in the household and the variable for household size are 
used, along with the non-linearity of the sample selectivity (λ) term, for identification 
purposes.21 
The Heckman model estimates are reported in Tables 5.8 and 5.9. All the variables in 
the probit labour force participation model have the expected signs and are 
statistically significant in all eight sets of estimates. All the identifying variables have 
strong, negative impacts on the participation probability. Each of these effects is 
highly statistically significant, which suggest that there should not be any major 
multicollinearity problems following the inclusion of the λ term in the earnings 
equation. However, when the inverse Mills ratio, λ, is included in the earnings 
function for the augmented Mincerian model based on the years of schooling variable 
(see Table 5.6) it turns out to be statistically not significant. Therefore, it can be 
argued that the corresponding estimates for this model reported in Table 5.6 do not 
suffer from selectivity bias. However, in the Heckman equations for the standard 
Mincerian model based on the years of schooling variable, the standard Mincerian 
model with the educational attainment dummy variables, and the augmented 
Mincerian model with the educational attainment dummy variables, the selectivity (λ) 
term is significant at either the 10 or 5 percent levels of significance. Note, moreover, 
that the estimated coefficient on the selectivity term is negative. One interpretation of 
this is that there is negative selection into the paid labour force. That is, there are 
unmeasured factors that lead to lower earnings among labour force participants.  
                                               
21 Summary statistics for the sample used in the first-step of the Heckman correction are presented in 
Appendix A5.2. 
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Table 5.8: Estimates of the Selectivity Bias Corrected Earnings Equations (Standard Mincerian Model) 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
  age proxying experience  age proxying experience 
 Probit Mincerian Probit Mincerian Probit Mincerian Probit Mincerian 
Constant 
 
0.01614 
(0.10157) 
5.01873 
(0.07413)*** 
-1.40818  
(0.19618)*** 
4.79431 
(0.13785)*** 
-1.03794 
(0.09953)*** 
5.47520 
(0.11028)*** 
-1.76206 
(0.21108)*** 
5.22700 
(0.16633)*** 
Years of Schooling 
 
-0.00181  
(0.00567) 
0.06451 
(0.00299)*** 
-0.01112  
(0.00507) 
0.05823 
(0.00268)*** 
    
Primary School 
 
    0.35796 
 (0.06357)*** 
-0.03727 
(0.04757) 
0.32754 
(0.06236)*** 
-0.01603  
(0.04575) 
Junior Secondary School 
 
    0.57157 
(0.06710)*** 
0.16189 
(0.05310)*** 
0.51736 
(0.06611)*** 
0.17824 
(0.04905)*** 
Vocational Senior Secondary School 
 
    0.88651 
(0.07521)*** 
0.34510 
(0.06129)*** 
0.80133 
(0.07288)*** 
0.34443 
(0.05524)*** 
General Senior Secondary School 
 
    0.89153 
(0.06894)*** 
0.32294 
(0.05907)*** 
0.79601 
(0.06606)*** 
0.32097 
(0.05229)*** 
College 
 
    1.55581 
(0.09393)*** 
0.50373 
(0.07705)*** 
1.44096 
(0.09094)*** 
0.48338 
(0.06829)*** 
Undergraduate 
 
    1.86879 
(0.09298)*** 
0.60505 
(0.08078)*** 
1.73529 
(0.08946)*** 
0.58625 
(0.07054)*** 
Master 
 
    2.57776 
(0.41313)*** 
0.85178 
(0.14468)*** 
2.43835 
(0.40346)*** 
0.83464 
(0.13838)*** 
Experience 
 
0.02150 
(0.00503)*** 
0.01444 
(0.00319)*** 
  0.03530 
(0.00532)*** 
0.01494 
(0.00332)*** 
  
Experience2 
 
-0.00073 
(0.00011)** 
-0.00019 
(0.00007)*** 
  -0.00068 
(0.00111)*** 
-0.00026 
(0.00007)*** 
  
Age 
 
  0.08687 
(0.01014)*** 
0.01810  
(0.00009)* 
  0.06753 
(0.01063)*** 
0.01769  
(0.00685)* 
Age2 
 
  -0.00126 
(0..00013)*** 
-0.00016  
(0.00009)* 
  -0.00095 
(0.00014)*** 
-0.00017  
(0.00009)* 
Household size 
 
-0.03083 
(0.00649)*** 
 -0.03344 
(0.00644)*** 
 -0.03029 
(0.00678)*** 
 -0.01702 
(0.00671)** 
 
Child under 5 
 
-0.42703 
(0.03751)*** 
 -0.43155 
(0.03741)*** 
 -0.42234 
(0.03928)*** 
 -0.51033 
(0.03943)*** 
 
Muslim 
 
-0.44424 
(0.05412)*** 
 0.44954 
(0.05414)*** 
 -0.33787 
(0.05662)*** 
 -0.35471 
(0.05686)*** 
 
Father/mother  lives in the same house -1.79403 
(0.13816)*** 
 -1.78893 
(0.15020)*** 
 -1.83621 
(0.14549)*** 
 -1.92391 
(0.14519)*** 
 
λ 
 
 -0.07352  
(0.04274)* 
 -0.08837  
(0.04303)** 
-0.09162  
(0.09953)* 
-0.09128  
(0.04731)* 
 -0.08733 
(0.04393)** 
Adj R2 
 
 0.0459  0.1016 0.2147 0.2353  0.1871 
Observations 
 
7911 7911 7911 7911 7911 7911 7911 7911 
Censored observations 
 
6380 6380 6380 6380 6380 6380 6380 6380 
Uncensored observations 1531 1531 1531 1531 1531 1531 1531 1531 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 5.9: Estimates of the Selectivity Bias Corrected Earnings Equations (Augmented Mincerian Model) 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
  age proxying experience  age proxying experience 
 Probit Mincerian Probit Mincerian Probit Mincerian Probit Mincerian 
Constant 
 
0.35173 
(0.11293)*** 
5.02265 
(0.06938)*** 
-1.58430 
(0.20587)*** 
4.95700 
(0.16880)*** 
-0.64129 
(0.10928)*** 
5.44357 
(0.10208)*** 
-1.93534 
(0.21823)*** 
5.34256 
(0.17905)*** 
Years of Schooling 
 
-0.01695 
(0.00584)*** 
0.05499 
(0.00317)*** 
-0.00003  
(0.00522) 
0.05253 
(0.00268)*** 
    
Primary School 
 
    0.34977 
(0.06409)*** 
-0.04076  
(0.04681) 
0.34801 
(0.06332)*** 
-0.01582  
(0.04507) 
Junior Secondary School 
 
    0.53183 
(0.06858)*** 
0.11361  
(0.05217)** 
0.50777 
(0.06800)*** 
0.14482 
(0.04836)*** 
Vocational Senior Secondary School 
 
    0.80916 
(0.07788)*** 
0.25549 
(0.06002)*** 
0.73662 
(0.07585)*** 
0.28487 
(0.05381)*** 
General Senior Secondary School 
 
    0.82537 
(0.07121)*** 
0.24315 
(0.05807)*** 
0.74205 
(0.06860)*** 
0.27290 
(0.05119)*** 
College 
 
    1.49863 
(0.09654)*** 
0.40615 
(0.07647)*** 
1.38927 
(0.09372)*** 
0.43277 
(0.06702)*** 
Undergraduate 
 
    1.80802 
(0.09592)*** 
0.49470 
(0.08063)*** 
1.66900 
(0.09227)*** 
0.52611 
(0.06968)*** 
Master 
 
    2.50108 
(0.41508)*** 
0.68456 
(0.14263)*** 
2.34880 
(0.40288)*** 
0.72202 
(0.13548)*** 
Experience 
 
0.03595 
(0.00539)*** 
0.00601 
 (0.00378) 
  0.05112 
(0.00571)*** 
0.00654  
(0.00396)* 
  
Experience2 
 
-0.00112 
(0.00012)*** 
-0.00009  
(0.00009) 
  -0.00108 
(0.00012)*** 
-0.00017  
(0.00009)* 
  
Age 
 
  0.12494 
(0.01114)*** 
0.00756 
 (0.00843) 
  0.10946 
(0.01154)*** 
0.00545 
(0.00815) 
Age2 
 
  -0.00180 
(0.00014)*** 
-0.00008  
(0.00011) 
  -0.00152 
(0.00015)*** 
-0.00007  
(0.00011) 
Tenure 
 
 0.02422 
(0.00369)*** 
 0.02439  
(0.00370)*** 
 0.02270 
(0.00366)*** 
 0.02407 
(0.00367)*** 
Tenure2 
 
 -0.00052 
(0.00012)*** 
 -0.00051 
(0.00012)*** 
 -0.00045 
(0.00012)*** 
 -0.00049 
(0.00012)*** 
Married 
 
-0.63521 
(0.05638)*** 
-0.01260 
 (0.03679) 
-0.70964 
(0.05748)*** 
-0.00634 
 (0.03820) 
-0.67668 
(0.05798)*** 
-0.00698  
(0.03755) 
-0.74590 
(0.05989)*** 
0.00465 
 (0.03804) 
Urban 
 
0.43750 
(0.03760)*** 
0.11234 
(0.02765)*** 
0.43036 
(0.03780)*** 
0.11150 
(0.02751)*** 
0.17998 
(0.04026)*** 
0.11688 
(0.02445)*** 
0.20378 
(0.04032)*** 
0.11651 
(0.17905)*** 
Household size 
 
-0.03515 
(0.00662)*** 
 -0.03194 
(0.00665)*** 
 -0.03478 
(0.00688)*** 
 -0.02059 
(0.00683)*** 
 
Child under 5 
 
-0.34892 
(0.03867)*** 
 -0.36606 
(0.03882)*** 
 -0.33924 
(0.04023)*** 
 -0.42678 
(0.04033)*** 
 
Muslim 
 
-0.43157 
(0.05521)*** 
 -0.43788 
(0.05562)*** 
 -0.33553 
(0.05745)*** 
 -0.35516 
(0.05784)*** 
 
Father/mother  lives in the same house 
 
-2.00666 
(0.11293)*** 
 -2.04009 
(0.14533)*** 
 -2.04244 
(0.14893)*** 
 -2.17925 
(0.15016)*** 
 
λ  -0.06906   -0.07288  -0.09291   -0.08754  
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 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
  age proxying experience  age proxying experience 
 Probit Mincerian Probit Mincerian Probit Mincerian Probit Mincerian 
 (0.04528)  (0.04501) (0.04919)* (0.04591)* 
Adj R2  0.1198 
 
 0.1688  0.2666  0.3106 
Observations 
 
7911 7911 7911 7911 7911 7911 7911 7911 
Censored observations 
 
6380 6380 6380 6380 6380 6380 6380 6380 
Uncensored observations 1531 1531 1531 1531 1531 1531 1531 1531 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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The signs and significance of the schooling coefficients are broadly similar across the 
uncorrected and the corrected earnings functions. The magnitudes of most 
coefficients appear to be slightly smaller in the selectivity-corrected specifications. In 
sum, it seems that sample selection bias is not a serious problem in this study, since 
the estimated returns to schooling do not change much after they are corrected using 
Heckman’s two-step approach. 
5.4.5 Standard Mincerian, Augmented Mincerian, and Heckman Selectivity Bias 
Corrected: A Comparison of Returns to Schooling 
The estimated return to schooling using both the standard Mincerian and the 
augmented Mincerian earnings functions, obtained using OLS and the Heckman 
selectivity correction model, have been discussed in the previous sub-sections. 
Comparing across the results from these alternative models for when a continuous 
years of schooling is used (see Table 5.10), some differences and some similarities 
are found. Employing the augmented Mincerian earnings function with the variables 
for tenure, tenure squared, gender, marital status, and urban area of residence lifts the 
explanatory power in all specifications. Moreover, estimating the return to schooling 
using the Mincerian earnings function with these five extra control variables results in 
a slightly lower return to schooling for most specifications compared to the results 
obtained from the standard Mincerian model. Furthermore, estimating the return to 
schooling using the Heckman selectivity correction model for both the standard and 
the augmented Mincerian earnings function leads to a lower return to schooling for all 
samples compared with the results obtained from the Mincerian model without 
correction for selectivity bias. This confirms that the results from the standard model, 
which show that the return to schooling in Indonesia is much lower than the average 
return to schooling in Asian countries, are robust to these specification and the 
methods of estimation issues. 
Table 5.10: A Comparison of the Returns to Schooling 
 
 
Standard 
Mincerian 
(experience) 
Standard 
Mincerian 
(age) 
Augmented 
Mincerian 
(experience) 
Augmented 
Mincerian 
(age) 
Standard Mincerian-
Heckman Selectivity 
Corrected (experience) 
Standard Mincerian-
Heckman Selectivity 
Corrected (age) 
All 5.66 5.07 4.93 4.72   
Males 5.28 4.70 4.59 4.36   
Females 6.46 5.88 5.43 5.26 6.45 5.80 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Tables 5.4, 5.6, and 5.8. 
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The differences in the return to schooling between any two adjacent schooling levels 
are generally moderate or even quite small. This can be seen in Table 5.11, which 
presents the comparison of the returns to schooling across the standard Mincerian, 
augmented Mincerian and Heckman selectivity corrected models based on the 
dummy variables for educational attainment. On average, workers with junior 
secondary school earn a return to their investment in schooling 3 times more than 
those with primary school. Individuals with vocational senior secondary school and 
general senior secondary school have a return to schooling 1.3 and 1.42 times higher 
than those with junior secondary school, respectively. Workers with college and 
undergraduate levels of education receive a return to schooling 1.01 and 1.22 times 
more than those with general senior secondary school, respectively. Individuals with 
a master degree get a return to schooling 2.12 times higher than those with a 
undergraduate degree. These patterns are not sensitive to the specification of the 
earnings equation or the method of estimation. 
Comparing the returns to additional years of schooling for males and females, on 
average females have a 1.24 times higher return to schooling than males. The patterns 
in the return to schooling across the education levels for the standard Mincerian and 
augmented Mincerian estimates are comparable, with the return to schooling 
increasing with the level of education. In terms of vocational and general education, 
the results, both in the earnings function without and with additional control 
variables, are consistent. Males with general senior secondary school earn a higher 
return to schooling than those with vocational senior secondary school. On the other 
hand, females with vocational senior secondary school receive a higher return to 
schooling than those with general senior secondary school. The possible explanation 
for this case is that for males vocational senior secondary school is not considered as 
a terminal degree but as a route to college or university, whereas it is a terminal 
degree for females. 
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Table 5.11: A Comparison of the Return to Schooling from the Model Using Dummy Variables for Educational Attainment 
 
  
Standard Mincerian 
(experience) 
 
 
Standard Mincerian (age) 
 
 
Augmented Mincerian 
(experience) 
 
 
Augmented Mincerian (age) 
 
 
Standard 
Mincerian-
Heckman 
Selectivity 
Corrected 
(experience) 
Standard 
Mincerian-
Heckman 
Selectivity 
Corrected 
(age) 
Augmented 
Mincerian-
Heckman 
Selectivity 
Corrected 
(experience) 
Augmented 
Mincerian-
Heckman 
Selectivity 
Corrected 
(age) 
Education 
Level All Males Females All Males Females All Males Females All Males Females Females Females Females Females 
PS 1.47 1.79 -0.11 1.63 1.80 0.17 0.97 1.47 -0.18 1.20 1.61 0.19 -0.62 -0.27 -0.68 -0.26 
JSS 4.35 3.35 6.90 3.99 2.95 6.87 3.44 2.48 5.22 3.44 2.42 5.72 5.40 5.94 3.79 4.83 
VSSS 5.96 4.98 6.90 5.29 4.41 6.23 4.43 4.00 5.40 4.22 3.80 5.18 6.11 5.54 4.73 4.67 
GSSS 6.34 5.92 6.16 5.60 5.29 5.42 5.01 5.03 5.03 4.80 4.82 4.81 5.37 4.76 4.32 4.27 
COLL 5.45 6.02 7.36 4.70 5.41 6.63 6.14 5.42 6.75 5.90 5.18 6.49 6.03 5.41 5.43 5.33 
UG 6.77 6.59 8.40 6.19 6.08 7.84 6.87 6.25 7.64 6.74 6.11 7.50 7.05 6.63 6.29 6.33 
MASTER 14.80 15.80 13.42 14.48 15.35 13.49 13.50 14.92 13.52 13.50 14.80 10.82 12.34 12.42 9.49 9.80 
Notes: PS: Primary School; JSS: Junior Secondary School; VSSS: Vocational Senior Secondary School; GSSS: General Senior Secondary School; COLL: College; UG: 
Undergraduate; MASTER: Master degree. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Tables 5.5, 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter reports evidence on the returns to schooling in Indonesia and highlights 
some important points. Separate estimates are obtained for males and females. OLS is 
employed as the primary methodological approach to measure the return to schooling. 
In order to correct for the possibility of selectivity bias, Heckman’s two-step model is 
adopted. The results suggest that there is no selectivity bias for the augmented 
Mincerian model based on the years of schooling variable. On the other hand, in the 
Heckman equations for the standard Mincerian model based on the years of schooling 
variable, the standard Mincerian model with dummy variables for educational 
attainment, and the augmented Mincerian model with dummy variables for 
educational attainment, the selectivity correction (λ) term is significant at the 10 and 5 
percent levels of significance. However, after comparing the estimated return to 
schooling from the uncorrected and corrected models, it can be concluded that sample 
selection bias is not a serious problem in this study, since the estimated returns to 
schooling do not change much after they are corrected using Heckman’s two-step 
approach. 
The estimation of the standard and augmented Mincerian earnings functions revealed 
that the return for an extra year of schooling is positive and significant. The standard 
Mincerian approach yields 5.28 (using experience) and 4.70 (using age) percent 
returns to schooling for males, and 6.46 and 5.88 percent returns to schooling for 
females. Taking selectivity bias into account, the return to schooling for females 
decreases slightly to 6.45 and 5.81 percent, respectively, for the specifications based 
on potential labour market experience and age. When employing the augmented 
Mincerian model that includes the control variables for tenure and its square, marital 
status, and urban area of residence, the return to schooling tends to decrease, where 
males’ returns to schooling are 4.59 and 4.36 percent, and females’ returns to 
schooling are 5.43 and 5.26 percent, respectively, for the specifications based on 
potential labour market experience and age. These results confirm that the returns to 
schooling in Indonesia are low in comparison with the return to schooling in many 
other countries, particularly Asian and developing countries.  Furthermore, it is 
clearly shown that the returns to schooling are higher for females than for males, 
which is in agreement with the findings of other studies, e.g. Deolalikar (1993) and 
Behrman and Deolalikar (1993) in Indonesia, Miller et al. (1997) in Australia, 
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Flanagan (1998) in the Czech Republic, Brunello et al. (2000) in Italy, Lopez-
Avecedo (2001) in Mexico, and Asadullah (2006) in Bangladesh. In terms of the 
model based on the dummy variables for educational attainment, the return to 
schooling in Indonesia tends to increase as the level of education increases, reflecting 
an increasing return to schooling. Additionally, males and females have different 
patterns at the senior secondary education level. Males have a higher return to 
schooling if they graduated from general senior secondary school rather than from 
vocational senior secondary school. Females have the opposite pattern, where females 
with vocational senior secondary school have a higher return to schooling than 
females with general senior secondary school. 
Although the conventional economic view, based on the principle of diminishing 
returns, suggests that the earnings return to schooling should decline as individuals 
extend their level of education (Psacharopoulos, 1981, 1985, and 1989; Schultz, 2003 
and 2004), this study finds to the contrary that the private earnings return to schooling 
increases as the level of education increases. This result is supported by previous 
empirical studies by Ryoo et al. (1993), Strauss and Thomas (1994), Liu et al. (2000), 
Tsakloglou and Cholezas (2000), and Aromolaran (2010). 
The results show that statistical control for tenure and its squared term is more 
important than taking account of either potential work experience or age. Marital 
status has a positive impact on earnings for males but it has a negative impact on 
earnings for females. These results support the household specialisation hypothesis. 
The estimates also suggest that, on average, residents of urban areas receive 
significantly higher earnings than individuals living in the rural areas. 
The estimates of the return to schooling based on additional years of schooling and 
the different levels of education using the OLS method presented in this chapter 
provide some valuable information on the Indonesian education sector. However, 
these empirical analyses may have limitations. In particular, in this chapter the 
endogeneity of schooling was not taken into account. Devoting a separate study to it 
may shed more light on the return to schooling in Indonesia. Accordingly, the 
following chapter investigates the return to schooling taking into account the potential 
of endogeneity of schooling.  
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Chapter 6 
Returns to Schooling in Indonesia: Instrumental Variable 
Approach 
6.1 Introduction 
Empirical study of the private return to schooling in Indonesia using Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) is documented in Chapter 5. In that chapter, the analysis did not take 
account of ability bias. Given the evidence on the apparent role of ability bias for 
other countries, documented in Chapter 3, it is of practical importance to see whether 
ability bias impacts the estimate of the return to schooling in Indonesia. This issue is 
considered here by adopting the Instrumental Variable (IV) approach.  
The major novelty of this study is that it canvasses a wide range of potential 
instruments for use in the estimation of the private return to schooling in Indonesia. In 
particular, in addition to the usual instruments of the parents’ levels of education, it 
uses two variables that have not been employed to date in Indonesia, and which have 
received limited attention in the literature in general, namely, pre-school attendance 
and delayed primary school enrolment. It also considers the use of compulsory school 
attendance laws and a school development program as instruments. Furthermore, in 
contrast to previous studies that only examine the benefit of education, this study 
adopts an alternative perspective - proposed by Oreopoulos (2003) - by taking into 
account foregone earnings to quantify the opportunity cost of dropping out from 
school. These estimates are argued to provide a more useful guide for private, and 
even public, investment in education. 
The remainder of this chapter consists of a general discussion on empirical models 
and estimation methods in Section 6.2, followed by a description of the data in 
Section 6.3. Section 6.4 reports and discusses the empirical results. The analysis in 
this section commences by exploring the four sets of instruments that will be 
considered in the IV approach to the estimation of the return to schooling using 
various samples and specifications. The quality, validity, and relevance of each set of 
instruments are evaluated to find the most reliable set. Then all the estimated results 
are compared and discussed.  To enrich the analysis, the discussion in Section 6.4 is 
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closed by relating the benefit of schooling to the foregone earnings. The final section 
summarises and concludes.  
6.2. Empirical Models and Estimation Methods 
It was argued in Chapter 4 that the OLS estimations of the economic returns to 
schooling from Equations 5.1-a and 5.1-b (see Chapter 5) may not be precise, since 
they are affected by three potentially damaging major biases. Measurement error bias 
may arise in the case of the schooling variable because the schooling information is 
provided in levels rather than in years (Chen and Hamori, 2009). To reduce the 
potential impact of this source of measurement error, similar to the analysis in 
Chapter 5, this analysis combines the information on the highest education level and 
the highest grade completed to obtain the individual’s actual years of schooling. The 
second problem that may lead to an endogeneity problem is simultaneity. However, 
simultaneity is not of immediate concern in the current study, and will not be pursued 
further. Omitted ability variable bias is the third of the three problems that may 
adversely impact the estimate of the return to schooling. The schooling endogeneity 
problem caused by an omitted ability variable can be remedied by either employing a 
natural experiment approach or an IV estimation technique. The essence of this 
‘natural experiment’ approach is to find a setting where the explanatory variable of 
interest (here, schooling) is highly likely to be exogenous. For example, Angrist and 
Krueger (1991) adopted quarter of birth interacted with year of birth as instruments, 
Plug (2001), and Lemke and Rischall (2003) employed quarter of birth as 
instruments, and Leigh and Ryan (2005 and 2006) used month of birth, month of 
birth interacted with year of birth, and change of compulsory education law as 
instruments. The basic idea of the IV estimator is to proceed in two stages. First, 
estimate the effect of the instrumental variable on schooling; then estimate the effect 
of the instrumental variable on earnings. Since, by assumption, the instrument is 
correlated with earnings only because it influences schooling, the ratio of the effect of 
the instrument on earnings to its effect on schooling provides an estimate of the 
causal effect of schooling on earnings (Ashenfelter et al., 1999).  
In order to address potential endogeneity bias, this study adopts an IV approach and 
uses several instruments. The following two-equation model describing the natural 
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logarithm of monthly earnings (ln(earningsi)) and years of schooling (ln(yrschyri))  is 
commonly applied to handle the endogeneity of schooling: ln(݁ܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ௜) =  ߜ ௜ܺ  + ߚݕݎݏܿℎݕݎ௜ + ߤ௜                                                             (6.1) ln(ݕݎݏܿℎݕݎ௜) =  ߮ ܼ௜ + ߝ௜                                                                                       (6.2) 
where X and Z are vectors of observed variables, E(Xi µi) = E(Zi εi ) = 0, and β is 
interpreted as the return to schooling (Card, 1993). The explanatory variables 
employed in equation (6.1) in this chapter are the same as those utilised in Chapter 5. 
Hence, X for the standard Mincerian model represents experience and its square (age 
and its square). In the case of the augmented Mincerian model the X vector consists 
of experience and its square (age and its square), tenure and its square, marital status, 
urban area of residence, and gender status (for the pooled sample only).  
The IFLS4 data base contains a number of potential instruments for the years of 
schooling variable. For the purposes of this chapter, two broad categories of 
instruments are considered. The first category is variables that vary across individuals 
in a given age category. These include father’s years of schooling, mother’s years of 
schooling, a dummy variable for pre-school attendance, and a variable that records 
delayed enrolment in primary school (age of primary school enrolment). The second 
category is variables that are the same for all individuals in a given age category. 
There are three of these variables, namely, a dummy variable for the first compulsory 
school attendance law (CSAL-1), a dummy variable for the second compulsory 
school attendance law (CSAL-2), and a dummy variable for the INPRES program. 
These compulsory school attendance laws and the INPRES program were discussed 
in Chapter 2. 
6.3 Data 
The data used in this chapter are the same as the data used in Chapter 5,  other than 
for the additional variables that are used as instruments, namely, father’s and 
mother’s years of schooling, dummy variables for compulsory school attendance, the 
INPRES program, and pre-school attendance, and the age of primary school 
enrolment. The descriptive statistics of the sample are given in Table 6.1. To assist 
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readers, this table also contains the descriptive statistics for the variables previously 
reviewed in Chapter 5. 
Table 6.1: Summary Statistics 
 
Variables All Males Females 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Dependent Variable       
Monthly earnings (IDR) 1,339,521 1,961,290 1,476,118 2,137,155 1,066,059 1,514,442 
Monthly earnings (log) 5.913 0.4378 5.973 0.408 5.792 0.468 
Independent Variables       
Years of schooling 10.683 3.744 10.608 3.616 10.833 3.986 
Experience 17.788 10.600 18.042 10.259 17.279 11.238 
Experience squared 428.734 479.227 430.709 472.415 424.780 492.716 
Age 35.192 9.741 35.417 9.561 34.741 10.078 
Age squared 1333.327 751.375 1345.776 746.820 1308.406 760.046 
Control Variables       
Tenure 7.852 8.116 7.890 8.036 7.779 8.275 
Tenure squared 127.499 247.153 126.885 246.885 128.943 247.763 
Female (dummy for gender) 0.333 0.471     
Marital status dummy 0.866 0.340 0.899 0.302 0.801 0.399 
Dummy for urban area 0.676 0.468 0.649 0.477 0.730 0.444 
Instruments       
Father’s years of schooling 7.469 3.400 7.321 3.317 7.767 3.542 
Mother’s years of schooling 6.490 2.963 6.370 2.934 6.731 3.009 
CSAL-1 0.569 0.495 0.570 0.495 0.568 0.495 
CSAL-2 0.293 0.455 0.276 0.447 0.328 0.470 
INPRES Program 0.732 0.443 0.737 0.440 0.722 0.470 
Pre-School attendance 0.249 0.433 0.221 0.415 0.306 0.461 
Age of Primary School 
Enrolment  
6.721 0.780 6.767 0.796 6.628 0.737 
Source: Author’s calculation based on IFLS4 data set. 
Since the data used here are identical with the data employed in the previous chapter, 
the discussion that follows will focus only on the instruments. The first set of 
instruments relates to parents’ years of schooling (father’s and mother’s years of 
schooling).  
Figure 6.1 shows the relationship between parents’ years of schooling and the years 
of schooling of the respondents in the sample. There are some interesting facts 
captured in this figure. Firstly, this figure exposes that the years of schooling increase 
with the parents’ years of schooling for all sample categories. This pattern provides 
evidence for the intergeneration human capital spillover from parents to their sons 
and daughters. Secondly, the average years of schooling for each group is higher than 
their parents’ average years of schooling. For example, parents with 1 to 6 years of 
schooling have a son or a daughter with around 9 years of schooling, while parents 
with 7 to 9 years of schooling have a son or a daughter with more than 10 years of 
schooling.  This implies that the younger generation tends to have a better education. 
Thirdly, the years of schooling of the daughters exceed those of the sons across all 
sample sets and years of schooling categories, whereas, from Table 6.1, the average 
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years of schooling of the father (7.469) exceed those of the mother (6.490). This 
reveals that the relative schooling levels of males and females in Indonesia are similar 
to those observed in many Western countries, where older males tend to have more 
schooling than older females, but younger males tend to have less schooling than 
younger females.    
Figure 6.1: Years of Schooling and Parents’ Years of Schooling 
 
 
          Source: Author’s calculation based on IFLS4 data set. 
The relationship between monthly earnings and parents’ years of schooling is 
described in Figure 6.2. Monthly earnings are positively correlated with parents’ 
years of schooling for all sample categories. The IV approach needs to maintain, 
however, that the reason for this relationship is that the parents’ levels of education 
lead to a higher level of schooling for their offspring, and it is this superior schooling 
attainment that gives rise to the pattern in Figure 6.2. 
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Figure 6.2: Monthly Earnings and Parents’ Years of Schooling 
 
 
            Source: Author’s calculation based on IFLS4 data set. 
 
Figure 6.3: Pre-School Attendance and Years of Schooling 
 
 
          Source: Author’s calculation based on IFLS4 data set. 
 
Figure 6.3 describes the correlation between pre-school attendance and years of 
schooling.  Individuals who attended pre-school tend to have a greater number of 
years of schooling. Males without pre-school have an average length of schooling of 
10.09 years, while their male counterparts who attended pre-school have 23.09 
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percent more years of schooling, which is 12.42 years. Females who did not attend 
pre-school have an average years of schooling of 10.02 years, whereas for females 
with pre-school the average years of schooling is 12.69 years, and this is 26.65 
percent greater than that of females without pre-school. In other words, there is a 
strong positive relationship between pre-school attendance and the duration of 
schooling.  
Figure 6.4: Pre-School Attendance and Monthly Earnings 
 
 
               Source: Author’s calculation based on IFLS4 data set. 
Figure 6.4 presents the average monthly earnings received by individuals with and 
without pre-school. Individuals with pre-school experience have average monthly 
earnings significantly higher than individuals without pre-school experience. Again, 
the argument for this positive association needs to be that it reflects an indirect 
relationship between pre-school attendance and earnings through schooling. That is, 
individuals with pre-school tend to stay at school longer than their counterparts 
without pre-school, and by having more years of schooling they tend to have higher 
earnings. For the pooled sample, individuals who never attended pre-school have 
average monthly earnings Rp446,080 below the earnings of individuals who attended 
pre-school. Male workers with pre-school experience earn Rp522,763 more than male 
workers who never attended pre-school. Female workers with no pre-school 
experience have average monthly earnings of Rp931,270, and this is well below the 
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average monthly earnings of Rp1,372,214 for female workers who attended pre-
school. 
Figure 6.5: Age of Primary School Enrolment and Years of Schooling 
 
              
               Source: Author’s calculation based on IFLS4 data set. 
 
Figure 6.5 portrays the relationship between delayed primary school enrolment and 
years of schooling for the three samples. Each of these three profiles has a negative 
slope, which indicates a negative correlation between delayed primary school 
enrolment and the years of schooling. That is, the older the individuals start their 
primary schooling the shorter their completed years of schooling. Individuals who 
enter primary school at 6 years of age tend to spend around 11 years at school, and 
there is little difference between males and females in this regard. Males who start 
primary school at the age of 10 tend to have only around 7 years of schooling. 
However, females who start primary school at this age (10 years) tend to have 
significantly lower completed years of schooling, specifically about 4 years. 
Figure 6.6 presents the age of primary school enrolment - earnings profiles for the 
three samples. The ages of primary school enrolments are divided into two categories. 
The first category is for individuals who start primary school at the official age (7 
years) or younger. The second category is for the individuals who first enrol in 
primary school older than the official age. Typically, individuals who start primary 
school when they are older than the official age receive slightly lower average 
monthly earnings. Thus the difference between the average monthly earnings 
received by male workers who start their primary school when they are older than the 
official age and who start primary school at the official age or younger is 
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approximately 16 percent. The comparable earnings disparity among female workers 
is smaller, being about 8 percent.  
Figure 6.6: Age of Primary School Enrolment and Monthly Earnings 
 
 
          Source: Author’s calculation based on IFLS4 data set. 
 
Comparing the average years of schooling between individuals who are assumed not 
affected and affected by the CSAL-1, the CSAL-2 and the INPRES program leads to 
the same general patterns except for the male sample with the CSAL-2. As expected, 
on average individuals who were affected by these three government education 
policies have slightly higher average years of schooling. The CSAL-1 appears to be 
associated with an increase in the average years of schooling from 10.38 to 10.91 
years, or by 5.11 percent, for the pooled sample, from 10.45 to 10.73 years, or by 
2.68 percent, for the male sample, and from 10.24 to 11.29 years, or by 10.25 percent, 
for the female sample. The CSAL-2 increases the average years of schooling from 
10.60 to 10.87 years for the pooled sample, and from 10.57 to 11.36 years for the 
female sample. The average years of schooling for males who were not affected by 
the CSAL-2 is 10.62 years, and it is 10.56 years for males who were affected by that 
policy. There is no obvious reason for the counter-intuitive outcome for males from 
this policy change. Individuals who are assumed affected by the INPRES program 
have an average years of schooling of 10.98, 10.82, and 11.33 years for the pooled, 
male, and female samples, respectively. These mean schooling levels represent 
increases by 11.47, 8.09, and 18.76 percent for the pooled, male, and female samples, 
respectively in comparison to individuals who were not affected by the INPRES 
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program.  These comparisons show that the difference in years of schooling between 
individuals who were affected and not affected by the CSAL-1, the CSAL-2, and the 
INPRES program is higher for females than males. This indicates that these education 
policies have had a greater impact for females than for males. 
The data on the average monthly earnings shows a pattern opposite that for the 
average years of schooling. Individuals who were affected by the CSAL-1, the 
CSAL-2, or the INPRES program have lower average monthly earnings than 
individuals who were not affected by these three policies. In particular, individuals 
who were affected by the CSAL-1 have average monthly earnings of Rp1,156,800, 
Rp1,280,208, and Rp1,203,099 for the pooled, male, and female samples, 
respectively. These are 26.82 (pooled sample), 26.23 (male sample), and 5.46 (female 
sample) percent lower than those of individuals who were not affected by the CSAL-
1.  The individuals who were not affected by the CSAL-2 (INPRES program) have 
average monthly earnings that are 32.04 (23.93), 29.33 (28.99), and 13.64 (10.36) 
percent higher than the earnings of individuals who were affected by these policies, 
for the pooled, male, and female samples, respectively.  The explanation for this is 
most likely that individuals who were affected by these policies are in the younger 
cohorts, while individuals who were not affected by these policies are in older 
cohorts. Individuals from younger cohorts have lower potential work experience, and 
in Chapter 5 the data informed that average monthly earnings increase with potential 
work experience. 
6.4. Results and Interpretations 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, including proxies for ability directly in the 
earnings function is one way of handling the omitted ability variable problem. 
Unfortunately, very few datasets contain ability measures that are convincing. The 
IFLS4 in particular does not provide such data, and therefore this proxy variable 
approach cannot be adopted in this study. The main alternative approach to tackle the 
endogeneity problem is the IV method. As discussed previously, the IV approach is 
based on finding credible instruments that are correlated with schooling and ability 
but not correlated with the residual in the earnings function. This is the approach 
pursued in this section.  
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The discussion commences with instrumenting schooling with parental years of 
schooling for the standard and augmented Mincerian models, followed by 
instrumenting schooling with pre-school attendance and delayed primary school 
enrolment for the standard and augmented Mincerian models, instrumenting 
schooling with the CSAL-1 and the CSAL-2 for the standard and augmented 
Mincerian models, and instrumenting schooling with the INPRES program for the 
standard and augmented Mincerian models. Using these four alternative sets of 
instruments provides a basis for assessing the quality of the instruments and for 
establishing the robustness of the findings to the choice of instruments. Following the 
presentation of the empirical findings for each set of instruments the chapter turns to 
a general discussion of validity and relevance of all the instruments.  
6.4.1 Instrumenting Schooling with Parental Education 
Following Blackburn and Neumark (1991), Uusitalo (1999), and Levin and Plug 
(1999), the first set of instruments used in this study are based on parental education. 
Mother’s and father’s levels of education have become popular variables in 
instrumental variables studies of earnings determination. The earlier studies that 
utilise these variables as instruments assume that parents’ levels of education are not 
correlated with their children’s inherent abilities but influence their children’s 
educational achievement (Li and Luo, 2004).22 The view that more educated parents 
provide a better environment for their children has been the basis of many 
investigations. Generally, studies that examine the correlation between parental levels 
of education and children’s educational attainment find that parents’ levels of 
education have a significant influence on the educational achievement of their 
offspring (see Tansel, 1997; Liu and Lin, 2000; Hudson and Sessions, 2009; Lemke 
and Rischall, 2003). Much of this research has had a focus on developed countries. 
                                               
22 We tested whether parents’ education is correlated with one’s wages by including mother’s and 
father’s education in the wage equation, treating parental education as a proxy for unobserved ability 
variables. This test leads to ambiguous findings. Furthermore the exclusion restriction, that parental 
education has no direct effect on wages, was tested. This test leads to consistent results across 
specifications and samples: the exclusion test is satisfied. 
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Table 6.2: Instrumenting Schooling with Parental Education (Standard Mincerian Model) 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) 
  age proxying experience 
 All Males Females All Males Females 
Variable 
 
 
Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
Constant 
 
8.40798 
(0.19366)*** 
4.82745 
(0.05349)*** 
8.60605 
(0.24778)*** 
4.92776 
(0.06692)*** 
7.95033 
(0.31163)*** 
4.60245 
(0.08436)*** 
3.29939 
(0.58927)*** 
4.72522 
(0.07482)*** 
2.36074 
(0.74833)*** 
4.92105 
(0.09052)*** 
4.14650 
(0.96449)*** 
4.50855 
(0.12479)*** 
Years of Schooling 
 
 0.07962 
(0.00389)*** 
 0.07862 
(0.00490)*** 
 0.08912 
(0.00607)*** 
 0.06839 
(0.00321)*** 
 0.06764 
(0.00406)*** 
 0.07745 
(0.00500)*** 
Experience 
 
-0.03860 
(0.01458)*** 
0.01812 
(0.00195)*** 
-0.04474 
(0.01877)** 
0.01474 
(0.00239)*** 
-0.01861 
(0.02344) 
0.01697 
(0.00322)*** 
      
Experience2 
 
-0.00177 
(0.00032)*** 
-0.00020 
(0.00004)*** 
-0.00141 
(0.00041)*** 
-0.00013 
(0.00005)** 
-0.00263 
(0.00053)*** 
-0.00016 
(0.00007)** 
      
Age 
 
      0.19049 
(0.03165)*** 
0.01951 
(0.00968)*** 
0.24329 
(0.03965)*** 
0.01296 
(0.00484)*** 
0.13784 
(0.05334)*** 
0.01862 
(0.00672)*** 
Age2 
 
      -0.00277 
(0.00041)*** 
-0.00017 
(0.00005)*** 
-0.00325 
(0.00051)*** 
-0.00009 
(0.00006) 
-0.00244 
(0.00071)*** 
-0.00015 
(0.00009)** 
Father's Schooling 
 
0.32376 
(0.01777)*** 
 0.31700 
(0.02208)*** 
 0.33077 
(0.02985)*** 
 0.36728 
(0.01894)*** 
 0.35734 
(0.02319)*** 
 0.38045 
(0.03261)*** 
 
Mother's Schooling 
 
0.20063 
(0.02040)*** 
 0.17174 
(0.02494)*** 
 0.26052 
(0.03524)*** 
 0.25071 
(0.02174)*** 
 0.21797 
(0.02623)*** 
 0.31750 
(0.03838)*** 
 
R2 
 
0.3547  
 
0.3126  
 
0.4328  
 
0.2611  
 
0.2344  
 
0.3185  
 
Adjusted  R2 
 
0.3541  0.3117  0.4313  2606  0.2334  0.3167  
Observations 
 
 
4596 
 
4596 
 
3065 
 
3065 
 
1531 
 
1531 
 
4596 
 
4596 
 
3065 
 
3065 
 
1531 
 
1531 
Test Results 
 
            
Quality23             
 
F  
  
578.197 
  
328.687 
  
254.635 
  
733.108 
  
425.292 
  
310.516 
 
P-Value 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
 
Validity (Sargan test) 
            
 
Chi2 
  
1.09176 
  
1.50852 
  
0.02328 
  
0.79617 
  
1.28249 
  
2.5e-06 
 
P-Value 
  
0.2961 
  
0.2194 
  
0.8787 
  
0.3722 
  
0.2574 
  
0.9987 
 
Relevance (Hausman 
test) 
            
 
F 
  
45.9312 
  
35.9206 
  
22.9775 
  
41.4677 
  
34.5832 
  
20.40520 
 
P-Value 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
                                               
23 The discussion about the quality, validity, and relevance of the instruments is presented in Section 6.4.5. 
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Research on the role of family background, and parental education in particular, in 
explaining earnings and the returns to schooling is less extensive for developing 
countries. The current study makes an effort to establish the contribution of parental 
schooling to the private return to schooling in Indonesia, and can be viewed as a 
pioneering effort in this regard. Separate variables are considered for father’s and 
mother’s years of schooling. Firstly parental levels of education will be utilised as 
instruments in the standard Mincerian model estimated using the IV approach. Then 
these instruments are used when the augmented Mincerian model is estimated using 
the IV approach.   
The reduced-form regressions for the determinants of schooling, which is the first 
stage in the IV technique, and the IV earnings function estimates using parental 
education as instruments for the standard Mincerian model, are presented in Table 
6.2. We commence the discussion with the specifications using experience (columns 
(a) to (f)). The relatively high first stage R2 (ranges from 0.3126 to 0.4328) and 
significant F-statistic in all three samples are an indication of good correlation 
between the instruments and years of schooling.24 Moreover, it is apparent that 
father’s and mother’s years of schooling are acceptable instruments since the value of 
the F-test allows us to reject the hypothesis that these variables do not determine the 
years of schooling. All of the coefficients of father’s and mother’s years of schooling 
variables are statistically significant at the 1 percent level of significance. Both the 
years of education of father and of mother impact positively on the completed years 
of education of the individuals. The coefficient on the father’s years of schooling 
variable is greater than that on the mother’s years of schooling variable in each of the 
three samples, specifically it is 0.324 of a year (pooled sample), 0.317 of a year (male 
sample), and 0.331 of a year (female sample) for the father’s years of schooling and 
0.201 of a year (pooled sample), 0.172 of a year (male sample), and 0.261 of a year 
(female sample) for the mother’s years of schooling. This indicates the relatively 
more important role of father’s education rather than mother’s education in 
determining the educational outcomes of offspring, regardless of the gender of the 
children. 
                                               
24 The R2 from the second stage regression has no statistical meaning in the context of 2SLS/IV (see 
Sribney et al., 2011 at http://www.stata.com/support/faqs/stat/2sls.html). Accordingly, we do not 
discuss the R2 from the earnings function in the IV approach. 
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The returns to schooling estimated using parental education as instruments clearly 
show that the figures are higher than the OLS estimates presented in Chapter 5. The 
returns to schooling obtained using OLS are 5.66 percent (pooled sample), 5.28 
percent (male sample), and 6.46 percent (female sample). Using the IV approach with 
parental education levels as instruments, the return to schooling rises to 7.96 percent 
(pooled sample), 7.86 percent (male sample), and 8.91 percent (female sample). Thus, 
the average difference between the IV and OLS estimates is 2.44 percentage points. 
Thus, on average, the OLS estimates are 29.64 percent less than the IV estimates. All 
the major patterns in relation to the coefficients on the schooling variable found using 
OLS carry over to the IV results, with the return to schooling for females being 
greater than that for males. The difference between the return to schooling obtained 
using OLS and IV is economically important, and along with the results of the 
statistical testing via the Hausman test, shows that the endogeneity of schooling in the 
study of the returns to schooling in Indonesia warrants careful attention. 
The results from the second part of Table 6.2 (columns (g) to (l)) are for the 
specification where the potential work experience variables are replaced by the age 
variables.25 This change results in a slightly smaller first stage R2, which now ranges 
from 0.2344 to 0.3185, though these, along with the significant F-statistic in all three 
samples, provide an indication of a good correlation between the instruments and the 
years of schooling variable. The value of the F-test allows us to reject the hypothesis 
that these variables do not determine the years of schooling. All of the coefficients of 
father’s and mother’s years of schooling variables are statistically significant at the 1 
percent level of significance. The results show that the years of education of both 
father and mother have positive impact on the years of education of their children. In 
line with the results from the specification using experience, the father’s years of 
schooling variable has a greater effect on the years of schooling of his children than 
does the mother’s years of schooling variable. An additional year of schooling for the 
father tends to increase the years of schooling of his children by 0.37 years (pooled 
sample), 0.36 years (male sample), and by 0.38 years (female sample). On the other 
hand, an additional year of schooling for the mother tends to increase the years of 
                                               
25 Given the similarity of the general patterns obtained from the standard Mincerian model and the 
augmented Mincerian model, the estimates associated with the experience and age variables will not be 
discussed here. Discussions on these are provided when the augmented Mincerian model estimates are 
analysed. 
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schooling of her children by 0.25 years (pooled sample), 0.22 years (male sample), 
and by 0.32 years (female sample).  
The results from the standard Mincerian model based on the age variables and 
estimated using IV support the finding discussed previously in this chapter, that the 
return to schooling obtained using the IV approach is higher than that obtained using 
OLS. The return to schooling obtained using OLS with the age-based specification of 
the standard Mincerian model is 5.07 percent (pooled sample), 4.70 percent (male 
sample), and 5.88 percent (female sample). Applying IV to the same model, with 
parental levels of education as instruments, sees the return to schooling increase to 
6.84 percent (pooled sample), 6.76 percent (male sample), and 7.74 percent (female 
sample). The Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of equality of the OLS and IV 
estimates. 
Table 6.3 presents results from the augmented Mincerian earnings model estimated 
using IV. Similar to the ‘OLS augmented Mincerian specification’ in Chapter 5, this 
‘IV augmented Mincerian model’ includes the five control variables, namely tenure 
and its square, marital status, urban area of residence, and gender (for the pooled 
sample only). The layout of this table is the same as that of Table 6.2. 
The results from the specifications based on potential labour market experience 
(columns (a) to (f)) reveal that the additional variables to control for job tenure and its 
square, marital status, urban residence, and gender lift the first stage R2 to 0.4140, 
0.3697, and 0.5030 for the pooled, male, and female samples, respectively.  
Furthermore, all of the F-statistics in the first stage regressions suggest a good 
correlation between the instruments and the individuals’ years of schooling. 
Moreover, it seems that the father’s and mother’s years of schooling are acceptable 
instruments since the value of the F-test allows us to reject the hypothesis that these 
variables do not determine the years of schooling of the individual. Typical of the 
pattern established above, father’s and mother’s years of schooling have significant 
positive effects on the years of schooling of their children. Also similar to the results 
discussed above, the effect of father’s education exceeds that of the mother.  An 
additional year of schooling for the father (mother) increases the years of schooling of 
their children by 0.29 (0.17), 0.28 (0.14), and 0.30 (0.23) years for the pooled, male, 
and female samples.  
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Table 6.3: Instrumenting Schooling with Parental Education (Augmented Mincerian Model) 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) 
  age proxying experience 
 All Males Females All Males Females 
Variable 
 
 
Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
Constant 
 
7.52344 
(0.20591)*** 
4.90386 
(0.05268)*** 
7.52112 
(0.26186)*** 
4.94377 
(0.06763)*** 
7.41438 
(0.32369)*** 
4.62127 
(0.08496)*** 
3.01790 
(0.61297)*** 
4.92460 
(0.07608)*** 
1.98465 
(0.76620)*** 
4.98520 
(0.09340)*** 
4.23893 
(1.01530)*** 
4.61875 
(0.13050)*** 
Years of Schooling 
 
 0.07790 
(0.00436)*** 
 0.07423 
(0.00580)*** 
 0.08317 
(0.00668)*** 
 0.06929 
(0.00351)*** 
 0.06608 
(0.00476)*** 
 0.07384 
(0.00522)*** 
Experience 
 
-0.10657 
(0.01592)*** 
0.01219 
(0.00223)*** 
-0.10047 
(0.02044)*** 
0.01150 
(0.00277)*** 
-0.11559 
(0.02547)*** 
0.01316 
(0.00380)*** 
      
Experience2 
 
-0.00114 
(0.00035)*** 
-0.00011 
(0.00005)** 
-0.00093 
(0.00044)** 
-0.00011 
(0.00006)* 
-0.00154 
(0.00056)*** 
-0.00012 
(0.00008) 
      
Age 
 
      0.16620 
(0.03552)*** 
0.00834 
(0.00437)* 
0.23870 
(0.04414)*** 
0.00630 
(0.00547) 
0.07690 
(0.06019) 
0.01069 
(0.00751) 
Age2 
 
      -0.00251 
(0.00046)*** 
-0.00008 
(0.00006) 
-0.00309 
(0.00056)*** 
-0.00006 
(0.00007) 
-0.00200 
(0.00079)** 
-0.00010 
(0.00010) 
Tenure 
 
0.11740 
(0.01528)*** 
0.01197 
(0.00212)*** 
0.08837 
(0.01876)*** 
0.00863 
(0.00248)*** 
0.17201 
(0.02622)*** 
0.01814 
(0.00400)*** 
0.05169 
(0.01687)*** 
0.01504 
(0.00205)*** 
0.02096 
(0.02009) 
0.01130 
(0.00241)*** 
0.11368 
(0.03029)*** 
0.02202 
(0.00381)*** 
Tenure2 
 
-0.00080 
(0.00050) 
-0.00025 
(0.00007)*** 
-0.00058 
(0.00061) 
-0.00014 
(0.00008)* 
-0.00137 
(0.00086) 
-0.00046 
(0.00012)*** 
-0.00143 
(0.00055)*** 
-0.00025 
(0.00007)*** 
-0.00127 
(0.00066)* 
-0.00014 
(0.0008)* 
-0.00179 
(0.00099)* 
-0.00047 
(0.00012)*** 
Marital Status 
 
0.66684 
(0.13647)*** 
-0.02844 
(0.01858) 
0.88521 
(0.18919)*** 
0.00399 
(0.02514) 
0.31556 
(0.19598) 
-0.06570 
(0.02814)** 
-0.00564 
(0.15099) 
-0.00221 
(0.01827)*** 
-0.19636 
(0.20517) 
0.04043 
(0.02461) 
0.07152 
(0.22472) 
-0.05081 
(0.02793)* 
Urban 
 
1.31188 
(0.09420)*** 
0.05266 
(0.01492)*** 
1.45466 
(0.11362)*** 
0.04100 
(0.01869)** 
1.03111 
(0.16721)*** 
0.08897 
(0.02581)*** 
1.48627 
(0.10319)*** 
0.05677 
(0.01464)*** 
1.53900 
(0.12192)*** 
0.04706 
(0.01800)*** 
1.36811 
(0.18982)*** 
0.08805 
(0.02585)*** 
Female 
 
-0.08109 
(0.09105) 
-0.19495 
(0.01492)*** 
    -0.09906 
(0.09977) 
-0.19633 
(0.01207)*** 
    
Father's  Schooling 
 
0.29080 
(0.01705)*** 
 0.27862 
(0.02133)*** 
 0.30036 
(0.02807)*** 
 0.34142 
(0.01862)*** 
 0.32262 
(0.02275)*** 
 0.36436 
(0.03187)*** 
 
Mother's Schooling 
 
0.17169 
(0.01956)*** 
 0.14102 
(0.02408)*** 
 0.23339 
(0.03315)*** 
 0.21831 
(0.02139)*** 
 0.17805 
(0.02577)*** 
 0.29646 
(0.03756)*** 
 
R2 
 
0.4140  
 
0.3697  
 
0.5030  
 
0.2948  
 
0.2751  
 
0.3538  
 
Adjusted  R2 
 
0.4128  0.3680  0.5004  0.2934  0.2732  0.3504  
Observations 
 
4596 4596 3065 3065 1531 1531 4596 4596 3065 3065 1531 1531 
Test Results             
 
Quality 
            
 
F  
  
470.416 
  
249.088 
  
228.044 
  
593.348 
  
317.171 
  
283.715 
 
P-Value 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000 
  
0.0000*** 
 
Validity (Sargan test) 
            
 
Chi2 
  
0.79358 
  
1.31205 
  
0.00021 
  
0.57412 
  
1.17452 
  
0.01054 
 
P-Value 
 
   
 0.3730 
  
0.2520 
  
0.9884 
  
0.4486 
  
0.2785 
  
0.9182 
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 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) 
  age proxying experience 
 All Males Females All Males Females 
Variable 
 
 
Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
Relevance (Hausman 
test) 
            
 
F 
  
55.4416 
  
29.4551 
  
25.9323 
  
52.3454 
  
28.3995 
  
23.9579 
 
P-Value 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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The results from the earnings function show that the return to schooling obtained 
using the IV method exceeds the return obtained using OLS. Thus, the returns to 
schooling obtained using IV (OLS) are 7.79 (4.93) percent (pooled sample), 7.42 
(4.59) percent (male sample), and 8.32 (5.26) percent (female sample). Thus, the 
average difference between the IV and OLS estimates is 2.92 percentage points. On 
the average, the OLS estimates are 37.21 percent less than the IV estimates. Again the 
Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of equality of the OLS and IV estimates. 
While most interest in the estimates in this chapter is in the change to the estimated 
return to schooling following the adoption of the IV technique, it is of interest to 
provide summary comments on the estimated effects of the various control variables. 
As these estimated effects are quite similar to those obtained using OLS, the 
discussion can be brief.  
Figure 6.7 presents information on the relationship between the marginal or partial 
effects on earnings of experience (tenure) along with the corresponding experience 
(tenure)-earnings profiles for the various samples. In the first row, Panel A shows the 
partial effects of experience and tenure on earnings for the combined sample of males 
and females. Panel D presents the experience-earnings and tenure-earnings profiles. It 
is seen here that the partial effect of labour market experience is greater than the 
effect of job tenure for the entire work lifetime coverage in the sample. That is, the 
change in earnings associated an additional year of potential work experience is 
greater than the change in earnings associated with an additional year of tenure. For 
example the marginal effects of potential work experience (job tenure) are 0.10 
(0.70), 0.78 (0.20), 0.56 (-0.30), and 0.34 (-0.80) percent after working for 10, 20, 30 
and 40 years, respectively. Beyond 24 years the marginal effect of tenure on earnings 
is negative. The partial effect of potential labour market experience on earnings is 
positive over the range of experience relevant to the sample. The gap between these 
two effects initially is very narrow but it widens with additional years of experience 
or tenure. Workers reach the peak of their experience-earnings profile after 
approximately 55.41 years of labour market experience. In the case of the tenure-
earnings profile, workers reach the peak after having job tenure of around 23.94 
years. The experience-earnings profile is always above the tenure-earnings profile 
(see Panel D). This pattern is opposite to the findings in Chapter 5 when OLS was 
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used. Using OLS showed that the tenure-earnings profile was above the experience-
earnings profile. 
Panel B (E) portrays the marginal effect of experience and the marginal effect of 
tenure (experience-earnings and tenure-earnings profiles) for male workers. Similar to 
the pooled sample, the effect of experience on earnings is greater than the effect of 
tenure on earnings for the entire working period, and the partial effect of potential 
labour market experience on earnings is positive over the range of experience relevant 
to the sample. One difference compared to the findings for the pooled sample is that 
the gap between these two effects for the male sample is fairly constant.  Consistent 
with the case of the pooled sample, the effect of tenure reaches its zero point earlier 
(after 31 years) than the effect of experience, thus the tenure-earnings profile also 
reaches the maximum point earlier than the experience-earnings profile. In line with 
the pattern for the pooled sample, the experience-earnings profile is above the tenure-
earnings profile. Again this pattern is contrary to the finding from the OLS estimation 
for males. 
For female workers the effects of experience (tenure) on earnings and the 
corresponding experience (tenure)-earnings profiles are described in Panels C and F. 
The patterns evident in the experience and tenure effects on earnings for females are 
clearly different from those for the pooled and male samples. The marginal effects for 
female workers (Panel C) show that, over the first seven years, the marginal effect of 
tenure on earnings is greater than the marginal effect of experience on earnings. 
Beyond this seven years threshold, however, the marginal effect of potential labour 
market experience for females exceeds that of job tenure, and the gap between these 
two marginal effects widens with additional years of experience and years of tenure. 
The marginal effect of tenure for female workers becomes negative earlier than that 
of male workers, specifically it turns negative around 20 years of tenure. This figure 
is about 10.67 years earlier than that of males. On the other hand, the experience-
earnings profile reaches the turning point only after female workers have been in the 
labour market for about 54.83 years.  
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Figure 6.7: Partial Effect of Experience and Partial Effect of Tenure on Earnings and Experience-Earnings and Tenure-
Earnings Profiles (IV Estimates with Parental Education as Instruments)26 
 
(A) (B) (C) 
   
(D) (E) (F) 
   
   
 
                                               
26 In order to avoid presentational problems due to comparing various groups, to construct the bottom three diagrams the mean log earnings is used as the initial 
level of earnings for both the experience and tenure profiles. 
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(G) (H) (I) 
   
(J) (K) (L) 
   
   
Source: Author’s calculation based on Table 6.3. 
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The second part of Figure 6.7 (Panels G to L) compares the marginal effects of 
experience (tenure) across the pooled, male, and female samples, and relates these 
effects to the experience (tenure)-earnings profiles. Female workers have a higher 
marginal effect of experience for the entire working lifetime (see Panel G). This 
implies that potential work experience is more important for female workers than it is 
for male workers. In other words, the gender differences in the return to the general 
skills captured by the potential work experience variables are the same as found for 
the schooling variable. On the other hand, the marginal effect of tenure on earnings 
shows a different pattern (see Panel H). During the first 15 years, the marginal effect 
of tenure for female workers is greater than that of male workers. Beyond this tenure 
threshold, however, the marginal effect of tenure for female workers is less than that 
of male workers. Note, however, that as the mean of the tenure variable is around 8 
years (standard deviation also 8 years), for most of the sample the effect of tenure for 
females will exceed that of males, and to this extent the situation is similar to the 
situation with respect to potential labour market experience. In addition it is noted 
that the maximum points for the tenure-earnings profile come earlier than is the case 
for the experience-earnings profiles for the pooled, male, and female samples (see 
Panel L). The tenure-earnings profile for female workers reaches its turning point 
earlier than that of male workers (see Panel K), but the experience-earnings profile 
for female workers reaches its maximum point later than that of male workers (see 
Panel J).  
The estimates also suggest that, on average, residents of urban areas receive 
significantly higher earnings than individuals living in rural areas. Specifically, the 
findings show that workers from urban areas earn 5.27 (pooled sample), 4.10 (male 
sample), and 8.90 (female sample) percent more than workers from rural areas. 
Comparing the male and female samples, the coefficient of the urban dummy variable 
is higher for females than it is for males.  This outcome supports the finding in 
Chapter 5 when the OLS method was used.  
In line with the finding from the OLS model that the marital status variable is 
significant only for females, the IV results show that being married only has a 
significant negative effect on the wages of female workers. Married women tend to 
earn 6.79 percent less than unmarried women. 
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Figure 6.8: Partial Effect of Age and Partial Effect of Tenure (IV Estimates with Parental Education as Instruments)27 
 
(A) (B) (C) 
   
(D) (E) (F) 
   
   
 
                                               
27 In order to avoid presentational problems due to comparing various groups, to construct the bottom three diagrams the mean log earnings is used as the initial 
level of earnings for both the age and tenure profiles. 
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(G) (H) (I) 
   
(J) (K) (L) 
   
   
Note: In order to have a reasonable comparison, the age-earnings profile that starts from 15 years of age is compared to the tenure-earnings profile that starts from 0 year of job 
tenure. 
   Source: Author’s calculation based on Table 6.3. 
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Columns (g) to (l) of Table 6.3 report the IV estimates of the augmented Mincerian 
model using age in place of potential work experience. Again, parental levels of 
education are used as instruments. With this specification the reduced-form schooling 
equation exhibits a lower explanatory power than with potential work experience, 
though it remains a good predictor of the schooling variables.28 One additional year 
of father’s (mother’s) schooling tends to increase the individual’s years of schooling 
by 0.34 (0.22) years (pooled sample), 0.32 (0.18) years (male sample), and 0.36 
(0.30) years (female sample). All of these estimates are highly significant. Therefore, 
parental years of schooling are indeed correlated with individuals’ years of schooling. 
This result reinforces the results that have been discussed earlier, where it has been 
concluded that parental education is a good instrument for schooling.  
The estimate of the return to schooling is 6.93, 6.61, and 7.38 percent for the pooled, 
male, and female samples, respectively. These figures are higher than those obtained 
using OLS, but they are slightly lower compared to the results obtained from the 
augmented Mincerian model based on experience. The results from the standard 
Mincerian model using age estimated using IV also reveal a similar pattern, where the 
return to schooling was higher than that obtained from the application of OLS, but a 
little bit lower than that obtained when the standard Mincerian model based on the 
experience variable was estimated using IV. On the average, the OLS estimates are 
31.55 percent less than the IV estimates. The average difference between the IV and 
OLS estimates is 2.19 percentage points. The Hausman test again confirms the 
necessity to use the IV approach. 
Comparisons between the marginal effects of age and the marginal effects of tenure 
on earnings, and their relationship with the age-earnings and tenure-earnings profiles, 
can be seen in Figure 6.8. Panels A, B, and C provide comparisons between the 
marginal effects of age and the marginal effects of tenure on earnings for the pooled, 
male, and female samples, respectively. In order to capture the relationships between 
the marginal effects of age and tenure and the age-earnings and tenure-earnings 
profiles, Panels A, B, and C should be related to Panels D, E, and F, which present 
the age-earnings and tenure-earnings profiles for the pooled, male, and female 
                                               
28 The better explanatory power with the potential work experience variable presumably reflects the 
use of information on the years of schooling in the construction of that variable. The comparable IV 
results established using the age variables are therefore reassuring. 
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samples. The three figures in Panels A, B, and C have similar patterns in that at the 
beginning of the worker’s career the marginal effect of tenure exceeds the marginal 
effect of age, but later on the marginal effect of age exceeds the marginal effect of 
tenure. The sole difference between males and females is that the crossing point 
between the marginal effect of age and the marginal effect of tenure for females 
comes earlier than that for males. Specifically, for females the crossing point happens 
after around 15 years of tenure while for males it occurs after around 30 years of 
tenure. The maximum point of the age-earnings profiles is reached at about 52.13 
years of age (pooled sample), 52.50 years (male sample), and 53.45 years (female 
sample). In Figure 6.8 these points occur at around 37-38 years, since the age-
earnings profile that starts from 15 years of age is plotted to start from the 0 point. 
The tenure-earnings profile reaches its maximum point at about 30.08 years (pooled 
sample), 40.36 years (male sample), and 23.43 (female sample) years of job tenure.  
Panel G (H) compares the marginal effect of age (tenure) for the three samples used 
in this study. Panel I compares the marginal effects of age and tenure across the 
samples. The marginal effect of age (tenure) for females drops more rapidly than that 
of males. Hence, while for the first 37 years of the working period the marginal effect 
of age for females is greater than that for males, later on females have a smaller 
marginal effect than males (see Panel G). In Panel H, it can be seen that the marginal 
effect of tenure on earnings for female workers initially lies above that of male 
workers for about 16 years. Beyond that crossing point, however, the marginal effect 
of tenure on earnings for female workers is less than that for male workers.  
Panel J (K) compares the age (tenure)-earnings profiles across the samples. Panel L 
compares the age-earnings and tenure-earnings profiles across the samples. The age-
earnings profile for males in Panel J and the tenure-earnings profile for males in 
Panel K are higher than those for females for the entire work careers covered in the 
sample. It is seen in Panel L that the age-earnings profiles are much flatter than the 
tenure-earnings profiles, indicating that an additional year of tenure has a greater 
percentage impact on earnings than a one year increase in age. 
Similar to the finding discussed before, residents of urban areas receive significantly 
higher earnings than individuals living in the rural areas. The urban effect on earnings 
is greater for females than it is for males. Female workers from urban areas tend to 
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receive monthly earnings that are 8.81 percent greater than female workers from rural 
areas. Male workers from urban areas have monthly earnings that are 4.71 percent 
greater than their counterparts from rural areas. In terms of marital status, this 
variable has a significant effect for the pooled and females samples. For the pooled 
sample, being married has a positive impact on workers’ earnings, but it has a 
negative impact on female workers’ earnings. Married female workers tend to have 
monthly earnings that are 5.81 percent less than comparable unmarried female 
workers. 
6.4.2 Instrumenting Schooling with Pre-School Attendance and Delayed Primary 
School Enrolment 
The second set of instruments employed in this empirical study that vary across 
individuals in a given age category are the dummy variable for pre-school attendance 
and the variable for delayed primary school enrolment (age of primary school 
enrolment). The rationale for the pre-school attendance variable as an instrument is 
that pre-school experiences are linked to school success (Howes, 1988). Pre-school 
education is a useful preparation for primary schools and is highly effective in 
developing school readiness. In reading readiness and in number readiness, children 
with pre-school education are found to be superior to children without pre-school 
education (Muralidharan and Banerji, 1975). The more recent study by Schütz (2009) 
supports these findings. 
The fact that delay in school enrolment could have an impact on a student’s study 
length at school provides a basis for employing the entry age to primary school as an 
instrument in attempts to address ability variable bias in the earnings function.  This 
sort of delay could be caused by financial limitations of the parent or malnutrition 
problems. Glewwe and Jacoby (1995) explained that malnutrition problems could be 
the reason why children delayed their enrolment in primary school, and in fact found 
that there was a strong positive effect of early childhood nutritional deficiencies on 
delayed enrolment. Moreover, students with malnutrition prior to school enrolment 
performed significantly worse on intelligence tests compared to their well-nourished 
counterparts. However, as children age the effect of malnutrition tends to decrease. 
Similarly, Moock and Leslie (1986) and Jamison (1986) conclude that better 
nourished children complete more grades in school. From this perspective, it is noted 
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that the age of primary school enrolment varies among children in Indonesia. The 
sample data used in this analysis shows that the age of primary school enrolment 
ranges from age of 5 to 14, whereas the official age to start grade 1 is 7. For that 
reason, it seems useful to consider the entry age to primary school when analysing the 
return to schooling in Indonesia.   
In the literature examining the returns to schooling, information on pre-school 
attendance and delayed primary school education has received little attention. 
Fortunately the IFLS4 provides data for these two variables and thus enables them to 
be adopted as instruments in this study. A set of reduced-form regressions for 
schooling and the IV earnings function using pre-school and delayed primary school 
enrolment as instruments is reported in Tables 6.4 and 6.5. Before discussing specific 
coefficients, however, it is worth noting some general points regarding the 
explanatory power of these regressions. The explanatory power for the first stage 
estimations is fairly high. For the specifications that employ age instead of experience 
the value of the R2 for the first stage estimations is slightly low, with a range of 
0.1142 to 0.2070 (range of 0.2070 to 0.3946 with experience). Nevertheless, the F-
test on the excluded instruments allows us to reject the hypothesis that these variables 
do not determine the years of schooling, and confirm that those two variables are 
acceptable instruments.  
Instrumenting schooling using pre-school attendance and delayed primary school 
enrolment for both the standard and the augmented Mincerian models results in an 
increase in the estimate of the return to schooling, but the increase is lower than those 
documented for the IV approach using parental levels of education as instruments. 
The evidence from the Hausman test suggests, however, that instrumenting is 
necessary, except for standard Mincerian model for the pooled sample.  
 Based on the standard Mincerian model with, alternatively, the experience and age 
variables, the return to schooling using IV (OLS) is 6.78 (5.66) and 5.93 (5.07) 
percent for the pooled sample, 7.67 (5.28) and 6.50 (4.70) percent for male sample, 
and 8.30 (6.46) and 7.19 (5.88) percent for female sample. In the case of the 
augmented Mincerian model with, alternatively, the experience and age variables, the 
return to schooling using IV (OLS) is 7.24 (4.93) and 6.24 (4.72) percent for the 
pooled sample, 7.08 (4.59) and 6.04 (4.36) percent for male sample, and 7.51 (5.43) 
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and 6.57 (5.26) percent for female sample. Again these results support the finding 
noted previously that Indonesian female workers receive a higher return to schooling 
than their male counterparts. 
By comparing the marginal effects of potential work experience and that of tenure on 
earnings, the results from the pooled sample show that the marginal effect of 
experience is greater than that of tenure on earnings. That is, an additional year of 
potential labour market experience raises earnings more than an additional year of job 
tenure does. For example, an additional year of potential work experience (job tenure) 
increases earnings by 1.013 (1.020), 0.773 (0.520), and 0.533 (0.020) percent after 
individuals work for 5, 15, and 25 years, respectively.  
The marginal effects of experience and tenure on earnings for males follow the same 
pattern as discussed above for the pooled sample, where the marginal effect of 
experience is consistently greater than the marginal effect of tenure. For females, the 
marginal effect of experience exceeds the marginal effect of tenure in the later years 
only. For example, after working for 10 years an additional year of experience 
increases earnings by around 0.91 percent, while an additional year of tenure 
increases earnings by about 1.027 percent. Five years later, which is after working for 
15 years, an additional year of potential work experience increases earnings by about 
0.78 percent, while an extra year of tenure increases earnings by approximately 0.547 
percent.  
Similar to the estimations using the parents’ years of schooling as instruments, 
females reach the maximum point of their experience-earnings, age-earnings, and 
tenure-earnings profiles earlier than males. Using the data in Table 6.5, columns (d) 
and (f), it can be found that males reach the turning point of their experience-earnings 
profile when they have 50 years of potential work experience, whereas females reach 
their turning point five years earlier. After working for about 29.90 years, males reach 
the maximum point of their tenure-earnings profiles, while females reach the peak of 
their tenure-earnings profile after working for about 20.70 years.  
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Table 6.4: Instrumenting Schooling with Pre-School Attendance and Delayed Primary School Enrolment (Standard Mincerian 
Model) 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) 
  age proxying experience 
 All Males Females All Males Females 
Variable 
 
 
Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
Constant 
 
15.35993 
(0.44170)*** 
4.97989 
(0.09387)*** 
14.84314 
(0.53224)*** 
4.95255 
(0.11849)*** 
16.66054 
(0.80352)*** 
4.68170 
(0.14871)*** 
10.77418 
(0.75024)*** 
4.78865 
(0.07831)*** 
9.32669 
(0.92453)*** 
4.93670 
(0.09405)*** 
13.01922 
(1.30878)*** 
4.55216 
(0.13211)*** 
Years of Schooling 
 
 0.06782 
(0.00713)*** 
 0.07668 
(0.00908)*** 
 0.08304 
(0.01119)*** 
 0.05929 
(0.00485)*** 
 0.06497 
(0.00613)*** 
 0.07192 
(0.00766)*** 
Experience 
 
-0.05163 
(0.01591)*** 
0.01705 
(0.00200)*** 
-0.06240 
(0.02021)*** 
0.01456 
(0.00250)*** 
-0.02247 
(0.02622) 
0.01659 
(0.00325)*** 
      
Experience2 
 
-0.00181 
(0.00035)*** 
-0.00022 
(0.00004)*** 
-0.00133 
(0.00044)*** 
-0.00013 
(0.00005)** 
-0.00290 
(0.00059)*** 
-0.00018 
(0.00008)** 
      
Age 
 
      0.28993 
(0.03444)*** 
0.02179 
(0.00403)*** 
0.32603 
(0.04268)*** 
0.01374 
(0.00500)*** 
0.27128 
(0.05928)*** 
0.01993 
(0.00681)*** 
Age2    
 
      -0.00392 
(0.00045)*** 
-0.00021 
(0.00005)*** 
-0.00420 
(0.00055)*** 
-0.00010 
(0.00006) 
-0.00403 
(0.00078)*** 
-0.00018 
(0.00009)* 
Pre-School 
 
1.63510 
(0.11520)*** 
 1.60028 
(0.14438)*** 
 1.67438 
(0.17431)*** 
 2.23412 
(0.12138)*** 
     
Delayed PS 
Enrolment 
 
-0.50457 
(0.06356)*** 
 -0.42717 
(0.07505)*** 
 -0.71182 
(0.11922)*** 
 -0.83609 
(0.06852)*** 
     
 R2 
 
0.2390  
 
0.2076  
 
0.2983  
 
0.1265  
 
0.1142  
 
0.1571  
Adjusted R2 
 
0.2384  0.2066  0.2964  0.1257  0.1130  0.1549  
 
Observations 
 
4596 4596 3065 3065 1531 1531 4596 4596 3065 3065 1531 1531 
Test Results 
 
            
Quality             
F  
  
141.5820 
  
82.5818 
  
59.4900 
  
266.4090 
  
159.9710 
  
104.9960 
P-Value 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
 
Validity (Sargan test) 
            
Chi2 
  
0.00894 
  
0.26696 
  
0.02182 
  
0.76064 
  
0.89377 
  
0.31342 
P-Value 
  
0.9247 
  
0.6054 
  
0.8826 
  
0.3831 
  
0.3445 
  
0.5756 
 
Relevance (Hausman 
test) 
            
F 
  
2.63995 
  
7.65251 
  
2.99720 
  
3.52364 
  
9.77395 
  
3.37684 
P-Value 
  
0.1043 
  
0.0057*** 
  
0.0084*** 
  
0.0606* 
  
0.0018*** 
  
0.0663* 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 6.5: Instrumenting Schooling with Pre-School Attendance and Delayed Primary School Enrolment (Augmented Mincerian 
Model) 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) 
  age proxying experience 
 All Males Females All Males Females 
Variable 
 
 
Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
Constant 
 
13.38732 
(0.43893)*** 
4.96300 
(0.09483)*** 
12.46717 
(0.52669)*** 
4.98039 
(0.12308)*** 
15.21565 
(0.77087)*** 
4.71381 
(0.14907)*** 
9.22612 
(0.76607)*** 
4.96191 
(0.07868)*** 
7.41855 
(0.92612)*** 
5.00967 
(0.09555)*** 
12.26908 
(1.34271)*** 
4.67690 
(0.13682)*** 
Years of Schooling 
 
 0.07244 
(0.00848)*** 
 0.07076 
(0.01134)*** 
 0.07507 
(0.01264)*** 
 0.06243 
(0.00547)*** 
 0.06040 
(0.00727)*** 
 0.06570 
(0.00824)*** 
Experience 
 
-0.12495 
(0.01714)*** 
0.01133 
(0.00249)*** 
-0.11753 
(0.02170)*** 
0.01099 
(0.00310)*** 
-0.13834 
(0.02819)*** 
0.01170 
(0.00422)*** 
      
Experience2 
 
-0.00106 
(0.00037)*** 
-0.00012 
(0.00005)** 
-0.00084 
(0.00046)* 
-0.00011 
(0.00006)* 
-0.00145 
(0.00062)** 
-0.00013 
(0.00008) 
      
Age 
 
      0.27273 
(0.03817)*** 
0.00997 
(0.00444)** 
0.33044 
(0.04675)*** 
0.00799 
(0.00566) 
0.21044 
(0.06667)*** 
0.01207 
(0.00750) 
Age2 
 
      -0.00370 
(0.00049)*** 
-0.00010 
(0.00006)* 
-0.00409 
(0.00060)*** 
-0.00008 
(0.00007) 
-0.00354 
(0.00088)*** 
-0.00013 
(0.00010) 
Tenure 
 
0.12848 
(0.01640)*** 
0.01270 
(0.00233)*** 
0.09177 
(0.01978)*** 
0.00897 
(0.00264)*** 
0.20350 
(0.02889)*** 
0.01987 
(0.00457)*** 
0.03684 
(0.01812)** 
0.01533 
(0.00203)*** 
0.00375 
(0.02126) 
0.01135 
(0.00239)*** 
0.10885 
(0.03356)*** 
0.02299 
(0.00384)*** 
Tenure2 
 
-0.00097 
(0.00054)*** 
-0.00025 
(0.00007)*** 
-0.00062 
(0.00065) 
-0.00015 
(0.00008)* 
-0.00198 
(0.00095)** 
-0.00048 
(0.00012)*** 
-0.00126 
(0.00060)** 
-0.00026 
(0.00007)*** 
-0.00105 
(0.00070) 
-0.00014 
(0.00008)* 
-0.00187 
(0.00110)* 
-0.00049 
(0.00012)*** 
Marital Status 
 
0.78516 
(0.14636)*** 
-0.02390 
(0.01938) 
0.97477 
(0.19999)*** 
0.00751 
(0.02687) 
0.47256 
(0.21615)** 
-0.06135 
(0.12838)** 
-0.11709 
(0.16211) 
-0.00285 
(0.01807) 
-0.36058 
(0.21676)* 
0.03843 
(0.02446) 
0.02786 
(0.24895) 
-0.05024 
(0.02758) 
Urban 
 
1.74112 
(0.09959)*** 
0.06326 
(0.02049)*** 
1.89853 
(0.11771)*** 
0.04794 
(0.02759)* 
1.37516 
(0.18374)*** 
0.10176 
(0.03065)*** 
1.96210 
(0.10917)*** 
0.07278 
(0.01753)*** 
2.00502 
(0.12635)*** 
0.06044 
(0.02209)*** 
1.80106 
(0.20909)*** 
0.10588 
(0.02916)*** 
Female 
 
-0.09910 
(0.09812) 
-0.19472 
(0.01205)*** 
    -0.15832 
(0.10763) 
-0.19591 
(0.01194)*** 
    
Pre-School 
 
1.31002 
(0.10990)*** 
 1.25815 
(0.13767)*** 
 1.37365 
(0.18068)*** 
 1.92411 
(0.11889)*** 
 1.81373 
(0.14561)*** 
 2.06842 
(0.20335)*** 
 
Delayed PS Enrolment 
 
-0.45570 
(0.06017)*** 
 -0.35614 
(0.07116)*** 
 -0.68010 
(0.11092)*** 
 -0.74255 
(0.06656)*** 
 -0.63293 
(0.07702)*** 
 2.06842 
(0.20335)*** 
 
 R2 
 
0.3249  
 
0.2935  
 
0.3946  
 
0.1859  
 
0.1879  
 
0.2070  
 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.3236  0.2916  0.3914  0.1843  0.1858  0.2028  
Observations 
 
4596 4596 3065 3065 1531 1531 4596 4596 3065 3065 1531 1531 
Test Results             
 
Quality 
            
F  
  
105.7840 
  
57.3667 
  
50.9191 
  
207.2860 
  
118.9620 
  
90.3308 
P-Value 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
 
Validity (Sargan test) 
            
Chi2 
  
0.53469 
  
0.43996 
  
0.28999 
  
1.04707 
  
0.69927 
  
0.56629 
P-Value 
  
0.4646 
  
0.5071 
  
0.5902 
  
0.3062 
  
0.4030 
  
0.4517 
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 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) 
  age proxying experience 
 All Males Females All Males Females 
Variable 
 
 
Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
Relevance (Hausman 
test) 
            
F 
  
8.08242 
  
5.21976 
  
2.95308 
  
8.61055 
  
5.90990 
  
2.86310 
P-Value 
  
0.0045*** 
  
0.0222** 
  
0.0859* 
  
0.0034*** 
  
0.0151** 
  
0.0908* 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Comparing the age-earnings and tenure-earnings profiles based on the data in Table 6.5, 
columns (j) and (l), the results suggest that males (females) reach the peak of their age-
earnings profile at the age of 50 (46.42) years. Females reach the peak of their tenure-
earnings profile after working for about 23.46 years, and around 17 years later males 
reach the peak of their tenure-earnings profile, that is after they work for around 40.54 
years.  
Urban area of residence has a significant effect on earnings in all 6 estimations in favour 
of workers who live in urban areas. The magnitude of the urban area of residence effect 
on earnings ranges from about 4.79 percent to 10.59 percent. This result supports the 
finding discussed previously, both in Chapter 5 and the earlier part of this chapter.  
Marital status is statistically significant only for females in the estimation based on the 
experience variables. The result suggests that married females earn 6.24 percent less 
than unmarried females. 
6.4.3 Instrumenting Schooling with Compulsory School Attendance Laws  
The next category of instruments used in this study are variables that are the same for all 
individuals in a given age category. These comprise dummy variables for the 
compulsory school attendance laws and the INPRES program. Compulsory school 
attendance laws have been employed as instruments by many researchers. These 
researchers usually utilise changes in compulsory education laws directly as an 
instrument in the form of a dummy variable, or they focus on the specific number of 
years of compulsory study or the age of children who must stay at school.  In this 
empirical study, compulsory school attendance laws are treated as dummy variables. A 6 
years compulsory school attendance law was launched in 1984. Ten years after the first 
compulsory school attendance law was implemented, a 9 years compulsory school 
attendance law was introduced in 1994. Hence, there are two dummy variables for 
compulsory school attendance laws for this analysis. Individuals who were born in 1977 
and later are assumed as the persons who were affected by the first compulsory 
education policy. Then these individuals are given a value of 1 for the dummy variable 
of the first compulsory school attendance law (CSAL-1), and all other individuals are 
assigned a value of zero. The 1977 threshold is derived from the year when the first 
compulsory school attendance law was launched (1984) minus the official age to start 
primary education (7 year). The dummy variable for the second compulsory school 
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attendance law (CSAL-2) is derived using the same logic as with CSAL-1, where 1 is for 
individuals who were born in 1987 and later and a 0 is assigned to all other individuals.  
If compulsory schooling laws forced people to get more schooling than they would have 
chosen otherwise then individuals who spent their teens after the compulsory school 
attendance laws were implemented should have more years of schooling. Although 
compulsory school attendance laws have been adopted in many previous studies (Levin 
and Plug, 1999; Leigh and Ryan, 2005 and 2006) this is the first attempt to employ these 
instruments in the study of the returns to schooling in Indonesia.  
Tables 6.6 and 6.7 present estimates from the specification that uses the compulsory 
school attendance laws as instruments. Using these instruments, there are some major 
points that need to be noted.  First, the R squareds of the first stage of the estimation 
based on experience are relatively high. This suggests that there have been major 
changes in schooling attainment over time, and the compulsory school law variables 
capture much of these changes. Second, the compulsory school attendance dummy 
variables both appear, at first glance, to have an unexpected sign. In particular, both the 
variables, which are thought to be associated with greater educational attainment, have 
negative estimated coefficients. However, this appears to be simply an artifact of the 
control for potential labour market experience. Hence, consider two workers of adjacent 
ages at the time of survey in 2007/2008, where the older worker was not affected by the 
compulsory school attendance in 1994 and the younger worker was. To have the same 
potential labour market experience, which is held constant in the schooling regression, 
the younger worker must have attended school for fewer years. This is confirmed when 
the schooling equation is estimated replacing potential labour market experience by age. 
In this set of estimations the variables for the two compulsory school attendance laws 
have positive coefficients, although only that in the equation for females is statistically 
significant. Third, in the case of the estimations using age, the R squareds of the first 
stage are fairly high, yet the values of the F-test on the instruments indicate that the 
dummy variables for compulsory education are not valid instruments for the pooled and 
male samples. Fourth, while the relationship between years of schooling and earnings is 
statistically significant for all estimations based on the potential labour market 
experience variables, the schooling variable is not significant in any of the estimations 
using age as the proxy for experience. Given these apparent deficiencies, the results 
based on the compulsory school attendance laws as instruments will not be discussed 
further here. 
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Table 6.6: Instrumenting Schooling with Compulsory School Attendance Laws (Standard Mincerian Model) 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) 
  age proxying experience 
 All Males Females All Males Females 
Variable 
 
 
Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
Constant 
 
25.16895 
(0.27961)*** 
5.12178 
(0.04173)*** 
25.30784 
(0.34618)*** 
5.29942 
(0.04875)*** 
25.13737 
(0.48803)*** 
4.73604 
(0.07394)*** 
4.96995 
(1.36008)*** 
4.55508 
(0.41659)*** 
4.43603 
(1.72627)*** 
3.87379 
(1.23458)*** 
3.62177 
(2.27073) 
5.58830 
(0.58323)*** 
Years of Schooling 
 
 0.05684 
(0.00291)*** 
 0.04959 
(0.00337)*** 
 0.07887 
(0.00523)*** 
 0.09280 
(0.05876) 
 0.24646 
(0.20837) 
 -0.05933 
(0.07040) 
Experience 
 
-0.76904 
(0.01950)*** 
0.01605 
(0.00190)*** 
-0.79420 
(0.02416)*** 
-0.79420 
(0.02416)*** 
-0.73612 
(0.03410)*** 
0.01632 
(0.00317)*** 
      
Experience2 
 
0.00749 
(0.00036)*** 
-0.00024 
(0.00004)*** 
0.00822 
(0.00044)*** 
-0.00016 
(0.00005)*** 
0.00634 
(0.00063)*** 
-0.00019 
(0.00007)*** 
      
Age 
 
      0.33484 
(0.05969)*** 
0.01341 
(0.01526) 
0.35066 
(0.07552)*** 
-0.03896 
(0.06132) 
0.41020 
(0.10028)*** 
0.05103 
(0.01939)*** 
Age2 
 
      -0.00469 
(0.00066)*** 
-0.00008 
(0.00023) 
-0.00473 
(0.00083)*** 
0.00064 
(0.00087) 
-0.00576 
(0.00114)*** 
-0.00071 
(0.00031)** 
CSAL-1 
 
-4.80266 
(0.12946)*** 
 -4.78421 
(0.15352)*** 
 -4.87563 
(0.24069)*** 
 0.09012 
(0.20436) 
 0.07209 
(0.24524) 
 0.34846 
(0.37340 
 
CSAL-2 
 
-4.38260 
(0.13818)*** 
 -4.29310 
(0.16156)*** 
 -4.59882 
(0.26178)*** 
 0.44273 
(0.22885)* 
 0.29315 
(0.27248) 
 0.91005 
(0.42134)** 
 
 R2 
 
0.4709  
 
0.4610  
 
0.4920  
 
0.0259  
 
0.0219  
 
0.0443  
 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.4705  0.4603  0.4906  0.0251  0.0206  0.0418  
Observations 4596 4596 3065 3065 1531 1531 4596 4596 3065 3065 1531 1531 
 
Test Results 
            
 
Quality 
            
F  
  
1209.63 
  
840.804 
  
373.041 
  
1.87207 
  
0.57893 
  
2.48784 
P-Value 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.1539 
  
0.5606 
  
0.0834* 
 
Validity (Sargan test) 
            
Chi2 
  
2.46881 
  
1.85955 
  
2.99415 
  
2.04907 
  
0.02973 
  
4.87454 
P-Value 
  
0.1161 
  
0.1727 
  
0.0836* 
  
0.1523 
  
0.8631 
  
0.0273** 
 
Relevance (Hausman 
test) 
            
F 
  
0.00784 
  
1.38727 
  
11.319 
  
0.59447 
  
4.36491 
  
6.51706 
P-Value 
  
0.9294 
  
0.2389 
  
0.0008*** 
  
0.4407 
  
0.0368** 
  
0.0108** 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 6.7: Instrumenting Schooling with Compulsory School Attendance Laws (Augmented Mincerian Model) 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) 
  age proxying experience 
 All Males Females All Males Females 
Variable 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
Constant 
 
22.79847 
(0.29876)*** 
5.19023 
(0.04015)*** 
22.71940 
(0.36676)*** 
5.27480 
(0.04750)*** 
22.90201 
(0.51020)*** 
4.78000 
(0.07459)*** 
3.16191 
(1.33256)*** 
4.96365 
(0.28151)*** 
2.71972 
(1.66312) 
4.31638 
(0.78000)*** 
2.53854 
(2.25941) 
5.60343 
(0.50154)*** 
Years of Schooling 
 
 0.05149 
(0.00306)*** 
 0.04287 
(0.00364)*** 
 0.06752 
(0.00569)*** 
 0.06211 
(0.04997) 
 0.22143 
(0.17665) 
 -0.06402 
(0.06533) 
Experience 
 
-0.77043 
(0.01962)*** 
0.00803 
(0.00211)*** 
-0.77377 
(0.02427)*** 
0.00691 
(0.00261)*** 
-0.77361 
(0.03393)*** 
0.01034 
(0.00367)*** 
      
Experience2 
 
0.00725 
(0.00036)*** 
-0.00013 
(0.00004)*** 
0.00762 
(0.00045)*** 
-0.00012 
(0.00006)** 
0.00683 
(0.00064)*** 
-0.00014 
(0.00008)* 
      
Age 
 
      0.33293 
(0.06095)*** 
0.01004 
(0.01261) 
0.36333 
(0.07587)*** 
-0.03985 
(0.05344) 
0.35393 
(0.10456)*** 
0.03400 
(0.01557)** 
Age2 
 
      -0.00456 
(0.00069)*** 
-0.00010 
(0.00019) 
-0.00464 
(0.00085)*** 
0.00056 
(0.00071) 
-0.00522 
(0.00120)*** 
-0.00057 
(0.00027)** 
Tenure 
 
0.04682 
(0.01388)*** 
0.01554 
(0.00203)*** 
0.02469 
(0.01651) 
0.01168 
(0.00238)*** 
0.09442 
(0.02532)*** 
0.02149 
(0.00385)*** 
0.04406 
(0.01896)** 
0.01535 
(0.00295)*** 
0.00897 
(0.02209) 
0.01003 
(0.00480)** 
0.12290 
(0.03562)*** 
0.03840 
(0.00953)*** 
Tenure2 
 
0.00102 
(0.00045)** 
-0.00028 
(0.00007)*** 
0.00110 
(0.00054)** 
-0.00017 
(0.00008)*** 
0.00059 
(0.00082) 
-0.00049 
(0.00012)*** 
-0.00148 
(0.00062)** 
-0.00026 
(0.00010)*** 
-0.00123 
(0.00073)* 
0.00005 
(0.00026) 
-0.00222 
(0.00117)* 
-0.00076 
(0.00023)*** 
Marital Status 
 
0.99603 
(0.12365)*** 
-0.00643 
(0.01790) 
1.04785 
(0.16743)*** 
0.03579 
(0.02404) 
0.88180 
(0.18738)*** 
-0.05729 
(0.02749)** 
-0.11659 
(0.17127) 
-0.00288 
(0.01866) 
-0.36439 
(0.22789) 
0.09503 
(0.07765) 
-0.00990 
(0.26639) 
-0.04115 
(0.04131) 
Urban 
 
1.35290 
(0.08372)*** 
0.10398 
(0.01334)*** 
1.46076 
(0.09789)*** 
0.10619 
(0.01578)*** 
1.09016 
(0.15821)*** 
0.11366 
(0.02475)*** 
2.33299 
(0.11233)*** 
0.07353 
(0.11729) 
2.35296 
(0.12906)*** 
-0.31874 
(0.41683) 
2.18527 
(0.21826)*** 
0.38998 
(0.14708)*** 
Female 
 
-0.12586 
(0.08372) 
-0.19385 
(0.01182)*** 
    0.06416 
(0.11190) 
-0.19589 
(0.01231)*** 
    
CSAL-1 
 
-4.51541 
(0.12551)*** 
 -4.52750 
(0.14831)*** 
 -4.38997 
(0.23420)*** 
 0.15902 
(0.19835) 
 0.11926 
(0.23543 ) 
 0.50652 
(0.36595) 
 
CSAL-2 
 
-4.03935 
(0.13260)*** 
 -3.90868 
(0.15587)*** 
 -4.33606 
(0.24849)*** 
 0.46327 
(0.21878)** 
 0.29935 
(0.25808) 
 0.88423 
(0.40697)** 
 
 R2 
 
0.5243  
 
0.5134  
 
0.5507  
 
0.1132  
 
0.1251  
 
0.1162  
 
Adjusted R2 0.5234  0.5121  0.5483  0.1115  0.1228  0.1115  
 
Observations 
 
4596 
 
4596 
 
3065 
 
3065 
 
1531 
 
1531 
 
4596 
 
4596 
 
3065 
 
3065 
 
1531 
 
1531 
 
Test Results 
            
 
Quality 
            
F  
  
1111.42 
  
773.934 
  
333.027 
  
2.28047 
  
0.68834  
  
2.85966 
P-Value 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.1024 
  
0.5025 
  
0.0576* 
 
Validity (Sargan test) 
            
Chi2 
  
3.45884 
  
2.43180 
  
1.29281 
  
5.34534 
  
0.22819 
  
1.84850 
P-Value 
  
0.0629* 
  
0.1189 
  
0.2555 
  
0.0208** 
  
0.6329 
  
0.1740 
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 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) 
  age proxying experience 
 All Males Females All Males Females 
Variable 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
Relevance (Hausman 
test) 
F 
  
0.76210 
  
1.01695 
  
7.85956 
  
0.09063 
  
3.81439 
  
7.19283 
P-Value 
  
0.3827 
  
0.3133 
  
0.0051*** 
  
0.7634 
  
0.0509* 
  
0.0074*** 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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6.4.4 Instrumenting Schooling with the INPRES Program  
We turn now to the last instrument exploited in this analysis - the INPRES program. 
The Indonesian government received considerable revenue from the oil boom in the 
1970s, and it used part of this revenue to finance centrally administered development 
programs, called the presidential instruction (INPRES). The Sekolah Dasar (Primary 
School) INPRES program was launched in 1973-1974. More than 61,800 new 
primary schools were constructed, and this represented about one school per 500 
children aged 5 to 14. This program was reported as the fastest primary school 
construction program ever undertaken in the world (Duflo, 2001). 
It is believed that investment in schooling infrastructure has an impact on educational 
attainment for the more recent cohorts in Indonesia. More specifically it is assumed 
that the presence of more schools raises the probability of enrolment. Based on this 
argument, the INPRES program is utilised as an instrument when estimating the 
returns to schooling. A dummy variable is formed. It is assumed that this program has 
an impact on the education attainment for individuals who were born in 1967 (1974 - 
7) and later. The year of 1974 refers to the year when the primary school buildings 
were completely constructed by the INPRES program and 7 is the official age to start 
primary education. Hence, the variable for the INPRES program is 1 if individuals 
were born after 1967 and zero for all other individuals. 
Table 6.8 (Table 6.9) presents the estimates of the earnings equation using the 
INPRES program as an instrument based on the standard (augmented) Mincerian 
model. Instrumenting schooling using the INPRES program leads to some 
inconsistent results. The specifications employing experience have reasonable R 
squareds in the first stage estimation, which are 0.3076 (0.3824), 0.2912 (0.3720), 
and 0.3391 (0.4116) for the pooled, male, and female samples. However, the INPRES 
program variable has an unexpected sign in each of these three samples. In the case of 
the specification using age in place of experience, the dummy variable for the 
INPRES program has the expected positive sign, nevertheless the R squareds of the 
first stage in the standard Mincerian model are very low, being 0.0277, 0.0228, and 
0.0481 for the pooled, male, and female samples, respectively. Hence the correlations 
between this instrument and schooling are questionable, and we therefore do not 
discuss these results further.  
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Table 6.8: Instrumenting Schooling with a Dummy Variable for the INPRES Program (Standard Mincerian Model) 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) 
  age proxying experience 
 All Males Females All Males Females 
Variable 
 
 
Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
Constant 
 
18.45375 
(0.24665)*** 
4.98875 
(0.06142)*** 
18.53952 
(0.30896)*** 
5.01570 
(0.07088)*** 
18.22468 
(0.41805)*** 
4.87494 
(0.11275)*** 
6.08515 
(0.71198)*** 
5.44098 
(0.28401)*** 
5.21815 
(0.89176)*** 
6.38918 
(0.76421)*** 
6.47860 
(1.20090)*** 
4.81773 
(0.27670)*** 
Years of Schooling 
 
 0.06713 
(0.00454)*** 
 0.07175 
(0.00524)*** 
 0.06821 
(0.00837)*** 
 -0.03429 
(0.03863) 
 -0.18304 
(0.12547) 
 0.03828 
(0.03166) 
Experience 
 
-0.17090 
(0.01529)*** 
 -0.18529 
(0.01932)*** 
0.01408 
(0.00237)*** 
-0.13755 
(0.02565)*** 
0.01564 
(0.00317)*** 
      
Experience2 
 
-0.00309 
(0.00034)*** 
 -0.00259 
(0.00042)*** 
-0.00013 
(0.00005)*** 
-0.00416 
(0.00058) 
-0.00022 
(0.00007)*** 
      
Age 
 
      0.24021 
(0.03635)*** 
0.04517 
(0.01083)*** 
0.28533 
(0.04481)*** 
0.08574 
(0.03813)** 
0.21499 
(0.06315)*** 
0.02790 
(0.01002)*** 
Age2 
 
      -0.00331 
(0.00049)*** 
-0.00056 
(0.00016)*** 
-0.00379 
(0.00059)*** 
-0.00112 
(0.00054)** 
-0.00311 
(0.00088)*** 
-0.00031 
(0.00015)** 
INPRES Program 
 
-4.64872 
(0.16796)*** 
 -4.70941 
(0.20167)*** 
 -4.49362 
(0.30243)*** 
 0.76871 
(0.21878)*** 
 0.52434 
(0.26107)** 
 1.32520 
(0.39682)*** 
 
 R2 
 
0.3076  
 
0.2912  0.3391  
 
0.0277  
 
0.0228  
 
0.0481  
 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.3072  0.2905  0.3378  0.0271  0.0219  0.0462  
Observations 
 
 
4596 
 
4596 
 
3065 
 
3065 
 
1531 
 
1531 
 
3065 
 
3065 
 
3065 
 
3065 
 
1531 
 
1531 
Test Results             
 
Quality 
            
F  
  
766.077 
  
545.341 
  
220.771 
  
12.3451 
  
4.03372 
  
11.1525 
 
P-Value 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0004*** 
  
0.0447** 
  
0.0009*** 
 
Relevance 
(Hausman test) 
            
F 
  
6.29776 
  
15.9523 
  
0.21343 
  
8.00219 
  
20.3375 
  
0.43927 
P-Value 
  
0.0121** 
  
0.0001*** 
  
0.6442 
  
0.0047*** 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.5076 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 6.9: Instrumenting Schooling with a Dummy Variable for the INPRES Program (Augmented Mincerian Model) 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) 
  age proxying experience 
 All Males Females All Males Females 
             
Variable 
 
 
Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings Reduced-
Form 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
Constant 
 
15.91274 
(0.26619)*** 
5.07360 
(0.05845)*** 
15.88886 
(0.32347)*** 
5.01554 
(0.06622)*** 
15.71235 
(0.45230)*** 
5.02911 
(0.12511)*** 
4.47174 
(0.72532)*** 
5.53319 
(0.21557)*** 
3.66807 
(0.88932)*** 
6.10877 
(0.58450)*** 
5.46893 
(1.24147)*** 
4.68936 
(0.22086)*** 
Years of Schooling 
 
 0.06225 
(0.00497)*** 
 0.06743 
(0.00567)*** 
 0.04747 
(0.01048)*** 
 -0.04255 
(0.03560) 
 -0.19488 
(0.12597) 
 0.06396 
(0.02566)** 
Experience 
 
-0.23415 
(0.01652)*** 
0.00972 
(0.00221)*** 
-0.23898 
(0.02070)*** 
0.01050 
(0.00273)*** 
-0.22954 
(0.02776)*** 
0.00672 
(0.00399)* 
      
Experience2 
 
-0.00198 
(0.00036)*** 
-0.00012 
(0.00005)*** 
-0.00172 
(0.00044)*** 
-0.00011 
(0.00006)* 
-0.00231 
(0.00062)*** 
-0.00016 
(0.00008)** 
      
Age 
 
      0.23056 
(0.03976)*** 
0.03492 
(0.01010)*** 
0.29479 
(0.04841)*** 
0.08384 
(0.03950)** 
0.14427 
(0.07019)** 
0.01236 
(0.00854) 
Age2 
 
      -0.00311 
(0.00053)*** 
-0.00048 
(0.00015)*** 
-0.00369 
(0.00063)*** 
-0.00109 
(0.00053)** 
-0.00237 
(0.00096)** 
-0.00013 
(0.00013) 
Tenure 
 
0.11126 
(0.01570)*** 
0.01409 
(0.00211)*** 
0.07992 
(0.01865)*** 
0.00929 
(0.00245)*** 
0.17921 
(0.02858)*** 
0.02578 
(0.00427)*** 
0.04597 
(0.01890)** 
0.01985 
(0.00304)*** 
0.00961 
(0.02206)) 
0.01344 
(0.00585)** 
0.12734 
(0.03534)*** 
0.02320 
(0.00480)*** 
Tenure2 
 
-0.00104 
(0.00051)** 
-0.00027 
(0.00007)*** 
-0.00066 
(0.00061) 
-0.00015 
(0.00008)* 
-0.00206 
(0.00093)** 
-0.00054 
(0.00012)*** 
-0.00149 
(0.00062)** 
-0.00041 
(0.00010)*** 
-0.00124 
(0.00073)* 
-0.00045 
(0.00024)* 
-0.00219 
(0.00116)* 
-0.00049 
(0.00013)*** 
Marital Status 
 
1.10092 
(0.14028)*** 
-0.01540 
(0.01829) 
1.38934 
(0.18913)*** 
0.01089 
(0.02482)*** 
0.69160 
(0.21325)*** 
-0.04651 
(0.02778)* 
-0.15077 
(0.16960) 
-0.01273 
(0.02369) 
-0.40062 
(0.22608)* 
-0.05129 
(0.07354) 
0.00884 
(0.26219)** 
-0.05012 
(0.02758)* 
Urban 
 
1.69167 
(0.09481)*** 
0.08308 
(0.01541)*** 
1.82836 
(0.11029)*** 
0.05490 
(0.01838)*** 
1.35575 
(0.18061)*** 
0.14532 
(0.02830)*** 
2.33019 
(0.11217)*** 
0.31789 
(0.08456)*** 
2.34846 
(0.12897)*** 
0.66157 
(0.29853)** 
2.20114 
(0.21740)*** 
0.10970 
(0.06066)* 
Female 
 
-0.04242 
(0.09343) 
-0.19430 
(0.01189)*** 
    0.08223 
(0.11175) 
-0.18948 
(0.01564)*** 
    
INPRES Program 
 
-4.14861 
(0.16173)*** 
 -4.35347 
(0.19251)*** 
 -3.60358 
(0.29535)*** 
 0.81929 
(0.21015)*** 
 0.51532 
(0.24856)** 
 1.57306 
(0.38385)*** 
 
R2 
 
0.3824  
 
0.3720  
 
0.4116  
 
0.1152  
 
0.1259  
 
0.1225  
 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.3813  0.3706  0.4089  0.1137  0.1239  0.1185  
Observations 
 
4596 4596 3065 3065 1531 1531 4596 4596 3065 3065 1531 1531 
Test Results 
 
            
Quality             
F  
  
657.986 
  
511.431 
  
148.862 
  
15.1989 
  
4.29825 
  
16.7947 
P-Value 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.0001*** 
  
0.0382** 
  
0.0000*** 
 
Relevance (Hausman 
test) 
            
F 
  
7.86419 
  
17.5227 
  
0.46422  
  
10.9754 
  
21.5211 
  
0.19955  
P-Value 
  
0.0051*** 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.4958 
  
0.0009*** 
  
0.0000*** 
  
0.6552 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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6.4.5 Instruments Quality, Validity, and Relevance 
To evaluate whether the instruments used in this analysis are appropriate the quality, 
validity, and relevance criteria of the instruments are introduced. Table 6.10 collates 
the information on the quality, validity, and relevance of the instruments that has been 
presented in the lower panel of each table (Tables 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 6.7, 6.8, and 
6.9). The first test is for the quality of the instruments. This can be assessed by 
examining the correlation between the instruments and schooling. The F-test of the 
joint significant of the respective instrument sets in their first stage equation has been 
undertaken. The results show that parental education as well as pre-school attendance 
and delayed primary school enrolment prove to be satisfactorily correlated with 
schooling for all specifications and samples. Furthermore the R squareds from the 
first stage equations are at a reasonable level, which ranges from 11 percent (the 
lowest) to 41 percent (the highest). With INPRES programs, although the F-tests 
show that these instruments seem correlated with schooling, some of the R squareds 
from the first stage equations are very low, specifically they are around 2 percent.  
The compulsory school attendance laws appear well correlated with schooling for all 
samples using experience, but only two of the six estimations using age are 
characterised by a significant correlation between these instruments and schooling.  
The second criterion is the validity of the instruments. An instrument is categorised as 
a valid instrument if it affects earnings through schooling only. This can be assessed 
using the over-identification restriction test (Sargan or Basmann test). The results 
suggest that there is no over-identification problem in any of the specifications that 
employ parents’ years of schooling and pre-school attendance and delayed primary 
school enrolment as instruments. These test results therefore confirm that these 
instruments are valid. An over-identification problem is found in the standard 
Mincerian model using age for the pooled sample and in the augmented Mincerian 
model using either experience or age for the pooled sample when compulsory 
schooling attendance laws are employed as instruments. These results, that support a 
direct influence of compulsory school attendance laws on earnings, thus suggest these 
instruments are of dubious value. 
The final criterion is relevance. The relevance of the instrument is to answer the most 
essential question, whether instrumenting the schooling variable is necessary or not? 
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To answer this question, the Hausman test can be applied (Hausman, 1978). This 
study finds that when using parents’ education as instruments, the results for all 
samples and specifications show that the endogeneity of schooling significantly 
affects the estimated return to schooling, meaning that the IV approach is necessary. 
When pre-school attendance and delayed primary school enrolment are used as 
instruments, the results suggest that adopting the IV approach is necessary for almost 
all specifications and samples, except for the standard Mincerian model based on 
experience for the pooled sample. When instrumenting schooling using the 
compulsory school attendance laws, the Hausman test confirms the necessity to use 
an IV approach for the female sample in the standard and the augmented Mincerian 
models based on experience, and in the pooled and male samples when using the 
standard and the augmented Mincerian models based on age. When using the 
INPRES program as an instrument, the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of 
equality of the OLS and IV estimates for the pooled and male samples.  
The CSAL-1, the CSAL-2, and the INPRES program variables apparently do not 
perform well as instruments in this study. The following reason may explain this. 
When instrumenting schooling, the CSAL-1, the CSAL-2, and the INPRES program 
variable are formed into dummy variables based on the birth year of the individuals. 
This form for these variables appears to create a correlation between these 
instruments and the age and potential work experience variables, so that what is 
captured in the estimations is simply a shift in the age-schooling or experience-
schooling relationships rather than the independent effect of the particular laws and 
program. 
Based on these quality, validity, and relevance criteria, it can be summarised that the 
variables that vary across individuals in a given age category perform better as 
instruments for schooling than the variables that are the same for all individuals in a 
given age category. More specifically, it can be concluded that among all the 
instruments utilised in this analysis, parents’ levels of education perform the best and 
appear to be the most consistent instruments. This result is in line with research by 
Levin and Plug (1999), Li and Luo (2004), and Lemke and Rischall (2003). 
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Table 6.10: Quality, Validity, and Relevance of the Instruments 
 
 Standard Mincerian Augmented Mincerian 
  age proxying experience  age proxying experience 
 All Males Females All Males Females All Males Females All Males Females 
Parents’ years of schooling as instruments 
Quality             
  R2 0.3547 0.3126 0.4328 0.2611 0.2344 .0.3185 0.4140 0.3697 0.1689 0.2948 0.2751 0.3538 
 F  578.197 328.687 254.635 733.108 425.292 310.516 470.416 249.088 228.044 593.348 317.171 283.715 
 P-Value 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
Validity             
 Chi2 1.09176 1.50852 0.02328 0.79617 1.28249 2.5e-06 0.79358 1.31205 0.00021 0.57412 1.17452 0.01054 
 P-Value 0.2961 0.2194 0.8787 0.3722 0.2574 0.9987 0.3730 0.2520 0.9884 0.4486 0.2785 0.9182 
Relevance             
 F 45.9312 35.9206 22.9775 41.4677 34.5832 20.4052 55.4416 29.4551 25.9323 52.3454 28.3995 23.9579 
 P-Value 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
              
Pre-School Attendance and Delayed Primary School Enrolment as instruments 
Quality             
  R2 0.2390 0.2076 0.2983 0.1265 0.1142 0.1571 0.3249 0.2935 0.3946 0.1859 0.1879 0.2909 
 F  141.582 82.5818 59.49 266.409 159.971 104.996 105.784 57.3667 50.9191 207.286 118.962 90.3308 
 P-Value 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
Validity             
 Chi2 0.00894 0.26696 0.02182 0.76064 .89377 0.31342 0.53469 0.43996 0.28999 1.04707 0.69927 0.56629 
 P-Value 0.9247 0.6054 0.8826 0.3831 0.3445 0.5756 0.4646 0.5071 0.5902 0.3062 0.4030 0.4517 
Relevance             
 F 2.63995 7.65251 2.9972 3.52364 9.77395 3.37684 8.08242 5.21976 2.95308 8.61055 5.9099 2.8631 
 P-Value 0.1043 0.0057*** 0.00836*** 0.0606* 0.0018*** 0.0663* 0.0045*** 0.0222** 0.0859* 0.0034*** 0.0151** 0.0908* 
              
Compulsory School Attendance Laws as instruments 
Quality             
  R2 0.4709 0.4610 0.4920 0.0259 0.0219 0.0443 0.5243 0.5134 0.5507 0.1132 0.1251 0.1162 
 F  1209.63 840.804 373.041 1.87207 0.57893 2.48784 1111.42 773.934 333.027 2.28047 0.68834  2.85966 
 P-Value 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.1539 0.5606 0.0834* 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.1024 0.5025 0.0576* 
Validity             
 Chi2 2.46881 1.85955 2.99415 2.04907 0.02973 4.87454 3.45884 2.4318 1.29281 5.34534 0.22819 1.8485 
 P-Value 0.1161 0.1727 0.0836* 0.1523 0.8631 0.0273** 0.0629* 0.1189 0.2555 0.0208** 0.6329 0.1740 
Relevance             
 F 0.00784 1.38727 11.319 0.59447 4.36491 6.51706 0.76210 1.01695 7.85956 0.09063 3.81439 7.19283 
 P-Value 0.9294 0.2389 0.0008*** 0.4407 0.0368** 0.0108** 0.3827 0.3133 0.0051*** 0.7634 0.0509* 0.0074*** 
              
INPRES Program as an instrument             
Quality             
  R2 0.3076 0.2912 0.3391 0.0277 0.0228 0.0481 0.3824 0.3720 0.4116 0.1152 0.1259 0.1225 
 F  766.077 545.341 220.771 12.3451 4.03372 11.1525 657.986 511.431 148.862 15.1989 4.29825 16.7947 
 P-Value 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0004*** 0.0447** 0.0009*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0001*** 0.0382** 0.0000*** 
Relevance             
 F 6.29776 15.9523 0.21343 8.00219 20.3375 0.43927 7.86419 17.5227 0.46422  10.9754 21.5211 0.19955  
 P-Value 0.0121** 0.0001*** 0.6442 0.0047*** 0.0000*** 0.5076 0.0051*** 0.0000*** 0.4958 0.0009*** 0.0000*** 0.6552 
Sources: Tables 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 6.7, and 6.8. 
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6.4.6 All Estimates Compared: OLS versus IV 
Figure 6.9 provides an overview of the estimated return to schooling obtained using the 
OLS and IV approaches.  Panels A, B, and C present the comparison of the return to 
schooling obtained using the OLS and IV approaches based on the standard and 
augmented Mincerian models for the combined, male, and female samples, respectively. 
Based on Figure 6.9, three characteristics of the estimated return to schooling in 
Indonesia can be readily identified. 
Figure 6.9: Return to Schooling: OLS versus IV 
 
A B 
  
C 
 
 
Notes: IV-1 is the IV approach using parental education as instruments; IV-2 is the IV approach using pre-school 
attendance and delayed primary school enrolment as instruments. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Tables 5.4, 5.5, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5. 
 
Firstly, in general the return to schooling based on the augmented Mincerian model is 
higher than that based on the standard Mincerian model. There are three modest 
exceptions to this general finding, namely the estimate obtained using the IV approach 
based on age with parental education as instruments and the IV approach based on 
experience and age with pre-school attendance and delayed primary school enrolment as 
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instruments for the pooled sample. On average the return to schooling based on the 
augmented Mincerian model is 0.42, 0.45, and 0.67 percentage points lower than that 
obtained from the standard Mincerian model for the pooled, male and female samples, 
respectively.   
Secondly, adopting the IV approach leads to a higher return to schooling than that 
obtained using the OLS approach. The return to schooling obtained from applying OLS 
to the standard Mincerian model based on experience (age) is 5.66 (5.07), 5.28 (4.70), 
and 6.46 (5.38) percent for the combined, male, and female samples, respectively. 
Applying the IV approach with parental education as instruments, the return to schooling 
increases by around 2.30 (1.77), 2.58 (2.06), and 2.45 (1.87) percentage points to 7.96 
(6.84), 7.86 (6.76), and 8.91 (7.75) percent for the pooled, male, and female samples, 
respectively. When the parental schooling instruments are replaced by pre-school 
attendance and delayed primary school enrolment the return to schooling appears to be 
6.78 (5.93), 7.67 (6.50), and 8.30 (7.19) percent for the combined, male and female 
samples, respectively.  That is, the return to schooling increases by about 1.12 (0.86), 
2.39 (1.80), and 1.84 (1.31) percentage points, respectively, for the combined, male, and 
female samples.   
For the augmented Mincerian model based on experience (age) the return to schooling 
obtained using the OLS approach is 4.93 (4.72), 4.59 (4.36), and 5.43 (5.26) percent, 
respectively for the full, male, and female samples. Using the IV approach with parental 
education as instruments the return to schooling increases by approximately 2.86 (2.21), 
2.83 (2.25), and 2.89 (2.12) percentage points to 7.79 (6.93), 7.42 (6.61), and 8.32 (7.38) 
percent, respectively, for the full, male, and female samples. Utilising pre-school 
attendance and delayed primary school enrolment as instruments for the IV approach 
with this augmented model, the return to schooling for the combined, male and female 
samples increases to 7.24 (6.24), 7.08 (6.04), and 7.51 (6.57) percent, respectively. All of 
the above patterns confirm the existence of downward bias on the OLS estimate of the 
return to schooling. In other words, this finding is in line with a stylised fact in the 
mainstream literature that the return to schooling derived using OLS may be biased 
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downward (Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Levin and Plug, 1999; Plug, 2002; Li and Luo, 
2004; Lemke and Rischall, 2003). 
Thirdly, all of the estimations based on age lead to a somewhat lower return to schooling 
compare to that of the comparable estimations based on experience. This result is 
consistent with Blinder’s (1976) finding. On average the estimated return to schooling 
based on age obtained using the OLS method is about 0.39 percentage point lower than 
that based on experience. The IV estimations based on age are also associated with a 
smaller estimated return to schooling than the estimations based on experience, by 
approximately 1.01 percentage points.  
Figure 6.10: Return to Schooling by Gender 
 
A B 
  
 
Notes: IV-1 is the IV approach using parental education as instruments; IV-2 is the IV approach using pre-school 
attendance and delayed primary school enrolment as instruments. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Tables 5.4, 5.5, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5. 
 
Figure 6.10 compares the estimated return to schooling across the specifications and 
methods of estimation by gender. Panel A (B) of Figure 6.10 compares the estimated 
return to schooling across the specifications and methods of estimation based on the 
standard (augmented) Mincerian model for the pooled, male, and female samples. It is 
clearly seen from these two figures that the estimated returns to schooling for females are 
higher than those of males for all the specifications and methods of estimation. The 
differences in returns to schooling between males and females are not very large, 
however. They range from 0.43 to 1.18 percentage points. This result reinforces the 
result in Chapter 5 and it is akin to the results of the study by Behrman and Deolalikar 
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(1993, 1995) in Indonesia, Miller et al. (1997) in Australia, Flanagan (1998) in the Czech 
Republic, Brunello et al. (2000) in Italy, Lopez-Avecedo (2001) in Mexico, and 
Asadullah (2006) in Bangladesh.  
6.4.7 Financial Gain from an Extra Year at School 
So far the discussion on the rate of return to schooling in this chapter has focused only on 
the benefits of an additional year of schooling, ignoring, other than to the extent that it is 
implicitly recognised in the theoretical development of the Mincerian model, the costs of 
schooling. To explore an alternative framework for assessing the present value of the 
financial gains from an extra year of schooling, this study follows Oreopolous (2003) and 
Leigh and Ryan (2005, 2008).  
First, we need to derive the age-earnings profiles for two individuals with one year 
difference in their years of schooling over their entire working period.29  Figure 6.11 
presents the projected earnings of individuals with, respectively, 9 and 10 years of 
schooling using “the IV augmented Mincerian model” with parental education as 
instruments.30 Panels A, B, and C present projected lifetime earnings for such individuals 
across the three samples used in this study. The monthly earnings used in the regression 
analysis are converted to annual equivalents for this analysis.31 Based on the projected 
earnings, it can be estimated that individuals who left school at age 16 with 9 years of 
schooling and who work until the age of 65 could expect lifetime earnings of 
Rp329,085,491 for the combined sample, Rp318,375,620 for the male sample, and 
Rp204,879,267 for the female sample. Individuals who left school at age 17 with 10 
years of schooling and who work until the age of 65 could expect lifetime earnings of 
Rp379,558,948, Rp364,231,840, and Rp239,032,514  for the full, male, and female 
                                                
29 Any years of schooling can be chosen, however, this study uses individuals with 9 years of schooling as 
a baseline and individuals with 10 years of schooling as the comparison group. 
 
30a) The IV approach using parents’ years of schooling is chosen to derive the projected yearly earnings in 
this analysis as these variables perform best as instruments. b) Since the official age to start primary school 
is 7 years, to derive the projected earnings profile for workers with 9 years of schooling we start at an age 
of 16 years (7 + 9 = 16). The projected earnings profiles start at 17 years (7 + 10 = 17) for workers with 10 
years of schooling. 
 
31 The earnings data used in this study are monthly earnings, so that to obtain projected yearly earnings we 
need to multiply each of the projected monthly earnings by 12.  
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samples, respectively. The difference between the lifetime incomes for those with 10 and 
9 years of schooling represents the monetary gains from the extra year of schooling.  
All these amount are in 2007/2008 IDR. Moreover, they place equal value on amounts 
received in each year. However, as money received in the future is worth less than 
money received today, the future benefits need to be discounted. Table 6.11 converts the 
annual earnings differences for each sample (all, males, and females) using discount rates 
of 3, 5, and 7 percent. This table also uses eight different rates of return that have been 
estimated earlier in this chapter to compute the future income gains associated with the 
extra year of schooling.32 For example, at the lowest returns in the table, and using a zero 
discount rate, the monetary gains from the extra year of schooling are Rp21,049,140,  
Rp20,635,591, Rp14,625,104 for the combined, male and female samples, respectively 
(see the first row of each panel for column (b)). With the highest annual earnings gains in 
the table, of 7.96 percent (all), 7.86 percent (males), and 7.51 percent (females), the 
average present value gain from leaving school a year later is Rp28,254,832, 
Rp26,853,600, and Rp16,717,584 under a 0 percent discount rate, for the pooled, male, 
and female samples, respectively (see column (i)). These monetary benefits decline as 
higher discount rates are applied. For example, applying a 5 percent discount rate to the 
highest returns in panel (i), the present value of the monetary benefit of the extra year of 
schooling falls to Rp10,043,753, Rp9,636,825, Rp5,849,722 for the combined, male and 
female samples, respectively. 
                                                
32 The eight rates of return to schooling used to calculate the financial gain from continuing at school for 
one extra year are the rates of return to schooling obtained by the IV approach based on the standard and 
augmented Mincerian models with parental education as well as pre-school attendance and delayed 
primary school enrolment as instruments.   
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Figure 6.11: Projected Yearly Earnings Profiles for Individuals Leaving School at Grades 9 and 10 (2007/2008 IDR)33 
 
(A) (B) 
  
(C) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Table 6.2. 
                                                
33 Unlike the studies by Oreopolous (2003) and Leigh and Ryan (2005, 2008) that projected the income profiles using a quartic age function, this study 
utilises the quadratic in age form from the previous regression equations. 
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Table 6.11: Discounted Present Value of an Additional Year of Schooling (in 2007/2008 IDR) 
 
All 
 Rate of Return to Schooling  
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) 
Discount 
Rate 5.93% 6.24% 6.78% 6.84% 6.93% 7.24% 7.79% 7.96% 
Baseline 
Foregone 
Earnings 
0% 
          
Rp21,049,140  
          
Rp22,149,517  
        
Rp24,066,302  
          
Rp24,279,278  
          
Rp24,598,742  
          
Rp25,699,119  
          
Rp27,651,400  
          
Rp28,254,832  
                 
Rp5,499,855  
3% 
          
Rp10,680,702  
          
Rp11,239,053  
        
Rp12,211,663  
          
Rp12,319,731  
          
Rp12,481,833  
          
Rp13,040,183  
          
Rp14,030,805  
          
Rp14,373,019  
                 
Rp5,499,855  
5% 
             
Rp7,482,344  
             
Rp7,873,495  
          
Rp8,554,855  
             
Rp8,630,562  
             
Rp8,744,122  
             
Rp9,135,273  
             
Rp9,829,251  
          
Rp10,043,753  
                 
Rp5,499,855  
7% 
             
Rp5,583,024  
             
Rp5,874,885  
          
Rp6,383,288  
             
Rp6,439,778  
             
Rp6,524,512  
             
Rp6,816,373  
             
Rp7,334,191  
             
Rp7,494,244  
                 
Rp5,499,855  
          
Males 
 Rate of Return to Schooling  
Discount 
Rate 6.04% 6.50% 6.61% 6.76% 7.08% 7.42% 7.67% 7.86% 
Baseline 
Foregone 
Earnings 
0% 
           
Rp20,635,591  
             
Rp22,207,175  
       
Rp22,582,989  
          
Rp23,095,462  
              
Rp24,188,739  
               
Rp25,350,345  
              
Rp26,511,951  
                          
Rp26,853,600  
           
Rp5,553,174 
3% 
           
Rp10,530,177  
             
Rp11,332,145  
       
Rp11,523,919  
          
Rp11,785,430  
              
Rp12,343,321  
               
Rp12,936,079  
              
Rp13,528,837  
                          
Rp13,703,178  
           
Rp5,553,174 
5% 
              
Rp7,405,398  
                
Rp7,969,385  
         
Rp8,104,251  
            
Rp8,288,160  
                
Rp8,680,499  
                  
Rp9,097,359  
                 
Rp9,514,220  
                            
Rp9,636,825  
           
Rp5,553,174 
7% 
              
Rp5,545,425  
                
Rp5,967,759  
         
Rp6,068,752  
            
Rp6,206,469  
                
Rp6,500,267  
                  
Rp6,812,426  
                 
Rp7,124,586  
                            
Rp7,216,398  
           
Rp5,553,174 
          
Females 
 Rate of Return to Schooling  
Discount 
Rate 6.57% 7.38% 7.74% 8.30% 8.32% 8.91% 7.19% 7.51% 
Baseline 
Foregone 
Earnings 
0% 
               
Rp14,625,104  
                  
Rp16,428,199  
                 
Rp17,229,574  
                   
Rp18,476,158  
                  
Rp18,520,679  
              
Rp19,834,045  
           
Rp16,005,250  
         
Rp16,717,584      Rp3,220,559 
3% 
                 
Rp7,350,284  
                     
Rp8,256,484  
                    
Rp8,659,239  
                     
Rp9,285,747  
                    
Rp9,308,123  
                
Rp9,968,194  
             
Rp8,043,918  
            
Rp8,401,923      Rp3,220,559 
5% 
                 
Rp5,117,533  
                     
Rp5,748,462  
                    
Rp6,028,875  
                     
Rp6,465,072  
                    
Rp6,480,651  
                
Rp6,940,216  
             
Rp5,600,466  
            
Rp5,849,722      Rp3,220,559 
7% 
                 
Rp3,797,433  
                     
Rp4,265,609  
                    
Rp4,473,688  
                     
Rp4,797,366  
                    
Rp4,808,925  
                
Rp5,149,943  
             
Rp4,155,790  
            
Rp4,340,749      Rp3,220,559 
Notes: Projected earnings profile for adults with 9 and 10 years of schooling are shown in Figure 6.16. Foregone earnings are obtained from the initial    (age of 16 
years) projected annual earnings for workers who have 9 years of schooling.  
Source: Author’s calculation.      
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Second, we need to find the foregone earnings from staying on at school for an extra 
year. This study obtains foregone earnings from the initial projected yearly earnings 
for individuals with 9 years of schooling. Based on the projected yearly earnings the 
foregone earnings from continuing at school for the extra year are Rp5,499,855, 
Rp5,553,174, and Rp3,220,559, for the pooled, male, and female samples, 
respectively. Table 6.11 includes these figures in the last column. To calculate the 
financial gain from an additional year of schooling, these foregone earnings should be 
compared with the discounted increase in future earnings.  
The profitability of continuing at school into year 10 can be assessed by comparing 
the discounted future gains with the foregone earnings. At the lowest rate of return in 
the table, recorded in the first column, and using a zero discount rate, the present 
value of the gain is 3.83, 3.72, and 4.54 times as high as expected foregone earnings 
for the combined, male and female samples, respectively. At a 5 percent discount rate 
with these low returns to schooling the benefit-cost ratios for the three samples are 
1.36, 1.33, and 1.59 respectively. At the highest rates of return in the Table (in the 
second last column) the present value of the gain is 5.14, 4.84, and 5.19 times as large 
as expected foregone earnings for the combined, male, and female samples, 
respectively when a zero discount rate is used. Even with a higher discount rate (5 
percent), the present value of the lifetime gain from continuing at school for the extra 
year is Rp10,043,753  for the pooled sample, Rp9,636,825 for the male sample, and 
Rp5,849,722 for the female sample. These amounts remain considerably higher than 
the estimated foregone earnings.  
One of the advantages of the framework provided by Table 6.11 is that it permits 
costs of schooling other than foregone earnings to be incorporated into the analysis. 
Examples of such cost would be the cost of books or private tuition. Consider males 
with a rate of return to schooling of 6.04 percent, and a discount rate of 5 percent. 
These other cost would need to be as high as (Rp7,405,398 - Rp5,553,174 = 
Rp1,852,224) during the extra year of schooling to drive to benefit-cost ratio less than 
one. This magnitude of extra cost seems unlikely.    
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Table 6.12: Benefits to Education with Growth of the Real Lifetime Earnings 
 
Discount 
Rate 
All Males Females 
 
 Zero growth 
rate 
3.82% growth 
rate 
Zero growth 
rate 
3.82% growth 
rate 
Zero growth 
rate 
3.82% growth 
rate 
 
0% Rp24,598,742 Rp229,168,957 Rp22,582,989 Rp203,725,432 Rp17,229,574 Rp159,179,899 
 
3% Rp12,481,833 Rp70,019,109 Rp11,523,919 Rp63,387,945 Rp8,659,239 Rp47,586,296 
 
5% Rp8,744,122 Rp31,490,220 Rp8,104,251 Rp28,736,240 Rp6,028,875 Rp21,191,820 
 
7% Rp6,524,512 Rp14,159,632 Rp6,068,752 Rp12,999,782 Rp4,473,688 Rp9,456,913 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
The framework provided by Table 6.11 is based on the cross-sectional analysis of 
earnings. It therefore makes no allowance for growth in real earnings over time due to 
productivity improvements. The addition of such growth enhances the profitability of 
the investment in education. Table 6.12 presents the calculation for 3.82 percent 
growth in real earnings overtime.34  At this 3.82 percent growth in real earnings over 
time and a 3 percent discount rate, the monetary benefit of the extra year of schooling 
is Rp70,019,109, Rp63,387,945, and Rp47,586,296 for the combined, male and 
female samples, respectively. When a higher discount rate is considered, for example 
a 5 percent discount rate, the lifetime gain in earnings is Rp31,490,220, 
Rp28,736,240, and Rp21,191,820 for the pooled, male, and female sample, 
respectively. 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter presents evidence on the returns to schooling in Indonesia and highlights 
some important points. In this study we have compared four sets of instruments when 
using twelve different estimating equations (3 (3) IV standard Mincerian models 
using experience (age) and 3 (3) IV augmented Mincerian models using experience 
(age)), separating the causal effect of education on earnings from any ability bias. In 
conventional IV, the corrected estimates of the return to schooling indicate the 
presence of some downward bias in the OLS estimates, in line with a number of 
recent studies. This study finds evidence that instruments that vary across individuals 
                                               
34 We assume 3.82 percent growth based on the average growth of 2000-2008 real GDP per capita. To 
calculate the benefit of the extra year of schooling with growth of real lifetime earnings we use the 
following formula: 
 ∑ ௒భబ(ଵା௚)೟(ଵା௥)೟ଷ଼௧ୀଵ −  ∑ ௒వ(ଵା௚)೟(ଵା௥)೟ଷଽ௧ୀଵ  .  
The calculations in Table 6.12 are for the returns to schooling in columns (f), (d), and (c) of Table 6.11 
for the combined, male and female samples, respectively. 
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in a given age category perform better, in that they provide more reliable, and more 
consistent, findings than instruments that do not vary across individuals in a given 
age category. The estimated coefficients for the preferred equations are precisely 
estimated, and the differences are statistically significant. In line with Ashenfelter and 
Zimmerman (1997) and Lemke and Rischall (2003), this study finds that considering 
endogeneity bias via the IV method is important, and draws attention to family 
background factors being useful instruments. 
When the returns to schooling are estimated through applying OLS to the standard 
Mincerian model, the estimated results are lower than the estimates of the returns to 
schooling in other Asian countries. After taking into account the endogeneity problem 
by employing the IV approach, the return to schooling increases by a moderate 
amount, which is by about 0.86 percentage point to about 2.89 percentage points. 
Using OLS, the returns to schooling range from 4.36 percent to 6.45 percent across 
the different samples and estimating equations. When the IV approach is applied, the 
returns to schooling vary from 4.59 percent to 8.92 percent across the different 
sample groups and estimating equations. Although adopting the IV approach has 
increased the return to schooling for Indonesia, the estimated returns remain low 
compared to other Asian countries and less developed countries. This result supports 
the finding in the previous chapter that the return to schooling in Indonesia is quite 
low, and even lower than the return to schooling obtained using older data (see Duflo, 
2001). 
Controlling for tenure and its square shows that labour market experience is more 
important than job tenure. This result is in contrast with the finding in Chapter 5. 
Comparing the marginal effect of age and the marginal effect of tenure on earnings, it 
is seen that over the early period of the worker’s career, the effects of tenure on 
earnings for the three different samples considered are greater than the effects of age 
on earnings.  During the later periods in the labour market, the marginal effect of age 
exceeds the marginal effect of tenure on earnings. This pattern is also contrary to the 
finding in Chapter 5 where the OLS approach was applied. Marital status has a 
negative impact on earnings for females. In relation to urban area of residence, the 
results reinforce the finding in Chapter 5, where workers from urban areas were 
shown to have higher earnings than their counterparts from rural areas of residence. 
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Another finding from this study that needs to be highlighted is that the benefit of 
continuing at school for an extra year is quite high. Based on the alternative scenarios 
in Table 6.11, the lifetime gain to staying on at school for an extra year typically 
exceeds the estimated foregone earnings, even when a high discount rate is used. This 
result is in agreement with the finding from the study by Oreopolous (2003) for the 
United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, and the study by Leigh and Ryan 
(2005, 2008) for Australia. The results provide a sound basis for evaluating school 
leaving decisions. Recognising a foregone benefit from dropping out will assist to 
quantify a cost-benefit analysis of the dropout decision.  
The private return to schooling is the focus for the study in this chapter and Chapter  
5. However, it is widely perceived that education not only has private economic 
effects but also externalities for individuals and society at large.  It would be a 
valuable contribution to the literature if we estimate the externalities of human capital 
in Indonesia. For this reason, the following chapter investigates the human capital 
externalities in Indonesia.  
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Chapter 7 
Estimating Human Capital Externalities: An Empirical 
Study for Indonesia 
7.1 Introduction 
Evidence in relation to the private return to schooling in Indonesia is documented in 
Chapters 5 and 6. Given that evidence, which shows that the return to schooling in 
Indonesia is low in comparison with other Asian countries, it is important to evaluate 
the effect of education in terms of externalities for individuals and society at large.  
Therefore, this chapter sheds light on the human capital externalities in Indonesia. In 
particular, we attempt to evaluate the existence and the magnitude of local human 
capital externalities in Indonesia, taking the province as the territorial unit of analysis. 
Such study has broader relevance, as research for a less developed country will 
complement the empirical studies on this topic that are dominated by case studies of 
developed countries, the US in particular. 
This chapter develops a framework for estimating the external returns by 
investigating the effect of  the average level of human capital in a province on the  
individual earnings of workers residing in that province. That effect is evaluated 
while controlling for the effect of the individual’s schooling. Rudd (2000) considers 
this phenomenon as a “human capital spillover.” Chapter 3 has noted that there are 
two types of these human capital spillovers, namely pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
spillovers. This study focuses on the first type of spillover - pecuniary spillover.  
This study attempts to estimate the external effect of human capital at the individual 
level employing a variety of data and combinations of variables, as well as different  
methods of estimation. The framework adopted can be viewed as an extension of the 
research of Chapters 5 and 6, whereby the Mincerian earnings equation is augmented   
with the average levels of education in the provinces.  
Four alternative measures of the aggregate-level human capital are proposed here: the 
average years of schooling, the average years of schooling based on the industrial 
sector within each province, the percentage of workers who graduated with higher 
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education qualifications, and the percentage of workers who graduated with higher 
education qualifications based on the industrial sector within each province. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section discusses the 
empirical models and estimation methods. Section 3 briefly introduces the data set 
used in the empirical work. Results and interpretations are reported in Section 4.  This 
section is divided into five sub-sections. First, we examine the human capital 
externalities using the OLS method. This is followed by an evaluation of the human 
capital externalities using the IV method. Next the impact of the aggregate-level 
human capital on individual earnings is considered separately for male and female 
workers. In this sub-section the OLS and IV approaches are both employed. The 
existence of human capital externalities can also be examined by testing the imperfect 
substitutability between low-skilled and high-skilled workers. Thus the next sub-
section is devoted to discuss this issue. All results are collated in the last sub-section 
of Section 4. The final section summarises the main results and conclusions. 
7.2 Empirical Models and Estimation Methods 
Similar to the analysis in the two previous chapters (Chapters 5 and 6), the model 
adopted here is a Mincerian wage equation that includes an aggregate-level human 
capital measure. The external effect of human capital can be internalised within a 
small group, such as a firm, or a bigger group, such as a city, province, or state. 
However, it seems reasonable to have a different kind of interaction depending on 
whether or not people work in the same industry or occupation. It can be assumed 
that the closer the interaction the stronger the effect. Also the effect of the aggregate-
level human capital may be greater within the same industrial sector than it is in the 
remaining industrial sectors in the economy. For example, a higher level of human 
capital in the manufacturing sector may have an effect on productivity in this sector 
but is likely to have only a very small effect on productivity in other sectors.35  
Based on the above rationale, two approximations for the aggregate-level human 
capital measure are used in this study. The first aggregate-level human capital 
                                               
35 It is important to be noted that this study employs individual-level survey data and provincial-level 
data. However, given the small number of provinces this study does not address the issue of clustering 
observations (Primo et al., 2007) 
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measure is based only on administrative and geographical boundaries, or more 
specifically it is based only on the province of residence. The second aggregate-level 
human capital measure is based on industrial sector within the province. In particular, 
it is measured as the average level of human capital in the province in the worker’s 
particular industry of employment. Within each of these aggregate-level human 
capital measures two types of variables are constructed, based on the average years of 
schooling of the workers and on the percentage of workers with higher education 
qualifications. Thus, the aggregate-level human capital measures for each province 
can be defined as follows: The first variable records the average years of schooling 
among all the workers in province j (AveSchool); the second records the average 
years of schooling among all the workers in industrial sector n in province j 
(AveSchool-Ind); the third variable is for the percentage of college or higher-degree 
holders among all the workers in province j (PerHE); and the fourth variable is for 
the percentage of college or higher-degree holders among all the workers in industrial 
sector n in province j (PerHE-Ind).36 Referring to Fu’s (2007) definition for the depth 
or quality of the human capital stock, AveSchool and PerHE are proxies for the 
quality of human capital stock in province j, while AVeSchool-Ind and PerHE-Ind are 
proxies for the quality of human capital stock of the industrial sector in province j.  
The OLS and IV approaches are utilised to analyse the effects on the earnings of 
individual workers of human capital externalities. Equation (7.1) below represents a 
general form of the model estimated in this chapter. 
ln൫݁ܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ௜௡௝൯ = ߚ଴ + ߚ ௜ܺ௡௝ + ߛ ௝ܲ + ߤ௜௡௝                                                     (7.1) 
where earningsinj is the monthly earnings of individual i who worked in industrial 
sector n in province j, Xinj is the vector of characteristics for this individual i, Pj is a 
measure of aggregate-level human capital, and µinj is an error term. 
The variables for individual characteristics employed in equation (7.1) in this chapter 
are the same as those utilised in Chapters 5 and 6. Hence, X for the Mincerian model 
                                               
36 Since the data available on workers’ education based on the province and industrial sector within 
province provided by BPS - Statistics Indonesia and the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration 
(MoMT) are only based on the highest education level completed, and there is no information on 
highest grade completed, to calculate the average years of schooling and the average years of schooling 
based on the industrial sector within the province this study only considers the highest education level 
completed.  
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without additional variables for individual characteristics represents years of 
schooling, experience and its square (or age and its square). In the case of the 
Mincerian model with additional variables for individual characteristics the X vector 
consists of years of schooling, experience and its square (or age and its square), 
tenure and its square, marital status, urban area of residence, and gender status. As 
noted above, the measures of the aggregate-level human capital considered below are 
the average years of schooling (or percentage of workers with higher education) and 
average years of schooling for each industrial sector in province j (percentage of 
workers with higher education for each industrial sector in province j).37  
Similar to the analysis in Chapters 5 and 6, in this chapter age is also utilised as a 
proxy for potential work experience in order to check the robustness of the 
estimations. Additionally, in order to ascertain whether there are any non-linear 
effects of education on earnings, this study measures individual education by dummy 
variables for the level of education in addition to the conventional continuous years of 
schooling variable. This may be important because Rudd (2000) found that allowing 
for a non-linear relationship between earnings and education changes noticeably the 
aggregate-level education effect on an individual’s labour productivity.  
Estimating external returns to schooling using the OLS approach invites the question 
of whether the estimation results will suffer from omitted variables bias. The 
unobserved characteristics of individuals and provinces could be correlated with the 
average years of schooling or the percentage of higher education graduates and thus 
could raise individuals’ earnings, biasing the coefficient on the aggregate human 
capital measure. To address the problem of potential endogeneity bias, this study 
adopts an IV approach. The following two equations model, describing the natural 
logarithm of monthly earnings (ln(earningsinj)), and the generation of the aggregate-
level human capital variable (Pj), is applied to handle this potential endogeneity 
problem: ln൫݁ܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ௜௡௝൯ = ߚ଴ + ߜ ௜ܺ௡௝ + ߛ ௝ܲ + ߤ௜௡௝                                                       (7.2) 
௝ܲ = ܼ߮௜௡௝ + ߝ௜௡௝                                                                          (7.3) 
                                               
37 There are 9 industrial sector categories used in this study: (1) agriculture, forestry, fishing, and 
hunting, (2) mining and quarrying, (3) manufacturing, (4) electricity, gas, and water, (5) construction, 
(6) wholesale, retail, restaurant and hotel, (7) transportation, storage, and communications, (8) finance, 
insurance, real estate and business services, and (9) social services. 
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where X and Z are vectors of observed variables, Pj is either the average years of 
schooling (AveSchoolj) or the percentage of workers with higher education 
qualifications (PerHEj), and E(Xinj µinj) = E(Zinj εinj ) = 0. The explanatory variables 
employed in equation (7.2) are the same as those utilised in (7.1).   
The key to the IV approach is to identify instruments that are highly correlated with 
the educational attainment at the provincial level but uncorrelated with the error term. 
Based on this principle, this study proposes the following instruments for the average 
years of schooling and the percentage of workers with higher education: the 
percentage of the population below the poverty line (PerPoverty) and the number of 
senior secondary schools per 1000 people (SSS-Population).  
It is assumed that these two instruments indirectly impact the individuals’ earnings 
only through the average years of schooling or the percentage of workers with higher 
education, which seems reasonable. Poverty has an important effect on education, 
since to invest in education someone needs to provide appropriate resources. For  
poor families, investing their resources in education probably is not a priority since 
they need to spend their resources to fulfill the basic needs that are more urgent. It 
follows that an area with a high number of poor families will tend to have a low 
average years of schooling and also a low percentage of workers with higher 
education. 
In order to check the robustness of the estimations using the percentage of the 
population below the poverty line as an instrument, the analysis in this chapter 
employs the number of senior secondary schools per 1000 people as a second 
instrument. This second instrument used is inspired by Heuermann (2008), who 
employed the number of public schools in a region as an instrument for the share of 
highly qualified workers.  Instead of using the number of public schools, this study 
utilises the ratio of the number of senior secondary schools per 1000 people as an 
instrument. Senior secondary schools are not evenly available in every area in terms 
of quality and quantity. Some areas have relatively more and some areas have fewer 
schools. This means that for an area that has fewer senior secondary schools, people 
need to move to other areas to be able to attend this type of school. Many such 
individuals may have to move to another province. Some of these students may 
remain in this new province at the completion of their senior secondary school, either 
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to work or to continue their study at college or university. Based on this intuition we 
believe that the ratio of the number of senior secondary schools to the population is a 
relevant instrument for the aggregate human capital measure in terms of the average 
years of schooling and the percentage of workers with higher education. 
7.3 Data 
The data used in this chapter are taken from four sources.  Individual-level data are 
taken from the IFLS4. Average provincial-level data are taken from the BPS-
Statistics Indonesia and the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration (MoMT). The 
variables to instrument the average years of schooling and the percentage of workers 
with higher education variables are based on data from the BPS - Statistics Indonesia 
and the Ministry of National Education (MoNE).  
Compared to Chapters 5 and 6, the number of observations here is 68 fewer. These 68 
individuals are dropped from the samples because these individuals have missing data 
on their industry of employment which prevents a match of their individual data with 
the aggregate-level data based on industrial sector.  
To construct all the variables for individual’s characteristics, such as years of 
schooling, potential work experience, tenure, marital status, urban areas of residence, 
and gender status, the same approach as in Chapters 5 and 6 is applied in this chapter.  
Table 7.1 shows the summary statistics for the variables used in this chapter. The 
mean total monthly earnings in log form is 5.908 across the workers. The mean years 
of schooling is relatively low, specifically 10.669 years, or just one year higher than 
the 9 years of compulsory study. The workers in the sample have mean work 
experience and age of approximately 17.869 years and 35.262 years, respectively. 
The mean length of job tenure is 7.890 years.  
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Table 7.1: Summary Statistics of Variables 
 
Variables Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
 
Variables Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Monthly earnings 
(Log) 
 
5.908 0.437 Tenure 7.890 8.142 
Years of 
schooling 
 
10.669 3.751 Tenure2 128.525 248.365 
Primary school 
 
0.181 0.386 Married 0.868 0.339 
Junior secondary 
school 
 
0.165 0.371 Urban 0.674 0.469 
Vocational senior 
secondary school 
 
0.157 0.364 Female 0.334 0.472 
General senior 
secondary school 
0.237 0.426 Average years of 
schooling  
 
8.744 0.770 
College 0.068 0.251 Average years of 
schooling based 
on industrial 
sector38 
 
9.370 1.493 
Master 
 
0.006 0.080 Percentage of 
workers with 
higher education 
 
7.731 3.139 
Experience 17.869 10.604 Percentage of 
workers with 
higher education 
based on 
industrial sector 
 
12.348 12.406 
Experience2 431.715 480.584 Percentage of 
population under 
the poverty line 
 
13.524 5.357 
Age  35.262 9.741 Ratio of the 
number of senior 
secondary schools 
to population (per 
1000 people) 
 
0.072 0.037 
Age2 1338.281 752.392    
Source: Author’s calculation based on IFLS4, BPS’s, MoMT’s, and MoNE’s databases. 
 
Table 7.2 presents some characteristics of the provincial-level data. It shows a 
substantial variation in the number of people - between 1,114.60 thousand and 
40,623.70 thousand - across the provinces. There are four provinces in the sample 
with a population of over 10 million. Three of these provinces are located in Java 
Island, namely Jawa Barat, Jawa Tengah, and Jawa Timur. Jawa Barat is the most 
populated province among these (population of 40,623.70 thousand), followed by 
Jawa Timur, Jawa Tengah, and Sumatera Utara, which have populations of 36,995.20 
thousand, 32,503.35 thousand, and 12,938.35 thousand, respectively. The province 
                                               
38 To construct this variable we calculate total years of schooling of workers for each industrial sector 
within each province, and then this amount is divided by the number of workers in that particular 
industrial sector.  
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with the smallest population is Kepulauan Bangka Belitung, with 1,114.60 thousand 
inhabitants.  
In terms of the average years of schooling for workers in each province, Daerah 
Istimewa Yogyakarta (DIY) has the highest average years of schooling, with 12.22 
years of schooling. However, this figure is not impressive, because it is just equal to 
an individual who completed senior high school (grade 12). The province with the 
lowest average years of schooling for its workers is Riau, which is 9.42 years of 
schooling, and this is just equal to an individual who completed basic education 
(grade 9).  
Table 7.2: Characteristics of Provincial-Level Data 
 
Province 2007/2008 
population 
(thousands) 
Average 
years of 
schooling 
Percentage 
of workers 
with higher 
education 
Average 
monthly 
earnings (IDR) 
2007/2008 
percentage of 
population 
below the 
poverty line 
 
Ratio of the 
number of 
senior 
secondary 
schools to 
population 
(per 1000 
people) 
 
Sumatera Utara 
 
12,938.35 
 
10.11 
 
6.38 1,177,003 6.00 
 
0.118 
 
Sumatera Barat 
 
4,730.45 
 
9.85 
 
8.46 1,414,498 6.50 
 
0.089 
 
Kepulauan Bangka Belitung 
 
1,114.60 
 
10.85 
 
5.83 1,390,355 7.00 
 
0.096 
 
Kepulauan Riau 
 
1,423.00 
 
9.56 
 
10.71 1,464,333 8.00 
 
0.088 
Riau 
 
5,130.10 
 
9.42 
 
7.75 813,473 9.00 
 
0.073 
DKI 
 
9,105.40 
 
11.12 
 
16.20 1,782,441 15.50 
 
0.121 
Jawa Barat 
 
40,623.70 
 
11.01 
 
7.31 1,455,023 16.00 
 
0.053 
Jawa Tengah 
 
32,503.35 
 
9.98 
 
5.68 916,528 
 
16.50 
 
0.011 
DIY 
 
3,451.50 
 
12.22 
 
10.43 1,317,787 17.00 
 
0.099 
Jawa Timur 
 
36,995.20 
 
10.72 
 
5.49 1,110,402 17.50 
 
0.059 
Banten 
 
9,512.90 
 
11.06 
 
7.89 1,419,919 18.00 
 
0.058 
Bali 
 
3,497.90 
 
11.14 
 
8.64 1,458,574 25.50 
 
0.077 
NTB 
 
4,328.15 
 
11.46 
 
5.04 1,137,382 26.00 
 
0.066 
Kalimantan Selatan 
 
3,421.65 
 
10.05 
 
5.50 1,665,274 6.75 
 
0.061 
Sulawesi Selatan 
 
3,421.65 
 
11.09 
 
7.80 1,400,063 17.88 
 
0.191 
Source: Author’s calculation based on IFLS4, BPS’s, MoMT’s, and MoNE’s databases. 
 
The percentage of the workers with higher education is low. Only three provinces in 
the sample have a percentage of their workers with higher education of more than 10 
percent, namely Daerah Khusus Ibukota (DKI), Kepulauan Riau, and DIY, with 
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16.20, 10.71, and 10.43 percent, respectively. Nusa Tenggara Barat (NTB) is the 
province with the lowest percentage of workers with higher education, with only 5.04 
percent. 
Turning to the average monthly earnings, DKI is the province that has the highest 
average monthly earnings, with Rp1,782,441. Apparently Riau not only has the 
lowest average years of schooling of its workers, but also has the lowest average 
monthly earnings for its workers, with an average of just Rp813,473.  
Among the 15 provinces in the sample, there are 6 provinces that have a percentage 
of their population below the poverty line in 2007/2008 of less than 10 percent. These 
provinces are Sumatera Utara (6 percent), Sumatera Barat (6.5 percent), Kalimantan 
Selatan (6.75 percent), Kepulauan Bangka Belitung (7 percent), Kepualauan Riau (8 
percent), and Riau (9 percent). None of these provinces is situated in Java Island. 
There are 2 provinces that have a percentage of population below the poverty line in 
2007/2008 of more than 25 percent, which are Bali (25.50 percent) and its nearest 
neighbour province, Nusa Tenggara Barat or NTB (26.00 percent).  
The largest ratio of the number of senior secondary schools (vocational senior 
secondary schools and general senior secondary schools) per 1,000 people is for the 
province of Sulawesi Selatan, with a ratio of 0.191.  On the other hand, the province 
with the lowest ratio is Jawa Tengah, with a ratio of 0.011.  
7.4 Results and Discussions 
This section reports results from the estimation of equations (7.1), (7.2) and (7.3).39 
The discussion commences with the analysis based on the OLS approach. This part 
first examines the results from the estimation of the importance of human capital 
externalities using the Mincerian model with average years of schooling as the 
aggregate-level human capital measure. Then the importance of human capital 
externalities based on the Mincerian model with the percentage of workers with 
higher education as the aggregate-level human capital measure is canvassed.  
The second part of this section discusses the estimation results based on the IV 
approach. Firstly we discuss the estimation results based on the IV approach with the 
                                               
39 The terms of human capital externalities, external returns to schooling, and external returns to 
education are used interchangeably in this chapter. 
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share of the population below the poverty line as an instrument. Then the estimations 
based on the IV approach with the ratio of the number of senior secondary schools to 
the population are analysed. Similar to the discussion based on the OLS approach, in 
this sub-section the analysis is divided into two categories, which are for the 
Mincerian model with the average years of schooling as the aggregate-level human 
capital measure, and for the Mincerian model with the percentage of workers with 
higher education as the aggregate-level human capital measure. 
This study also analyses differences in the magnitude of the external return to 
schooling for male and female workers. This issue is discussed in the third part of this 
section. These analyses are followed by discussion on imperfect substitutability 
between low-skilled and high-skilled workers to assess the existence of human capital 
externalities.  
7.4.1 OLS Approach 
7.4.1.1 OLS Estimates Using the Average Years of Schooling of Workers as the 
Aggregate-Level Human Capital Measure 
Table 7.3 shows the results from the estimation of equation (7.1) for the Mincerian 
model with the average years of schooling and the average years of schooling based 
on the industrial sector within each province as the aggregate-level human capital 
measures. In these estimates the variables for individual characteristics are years of 
schooling (level of education), potential work experience and its quadratic term (age 
and its quadratic term).  
The results reported in Table 7.3 can be considered satisfactory, as more than 20 
percent of the variance in earnings is explained. The estimates of the private returns 
to education are very comparable for the two specifications (experience-based and 
age-based) in columns (a) and (c).  The estimated coefficient for the years of 
schooling variables are 0.05057 (based on experience) and 0.04455 (based on age), 
indicating that one extra year of schooling is expected to increase individual earnings 
by around 5.06 and 4.46 percent, respectively. These estimated effects are similar to 
those reported in Chapter 5. The similarity between the estimates based on the work 
experience and age variable carries over to the estimates of the private return to 
schooling using levels of education. The returns to schooling from the model based 
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on potential work experience are 1.43, 4.06, 5.15, 5.25, 4.80, 6.36, and 13.87 percent 
for primary school, junior secondary school, vocational senior secondary school, 
general senior secondary school, college, undergraduate, and master, respectively. 
When the age variable is utilised the returns to schooling are 1.56, 3.68, 4.46, 4.48, 
4.05, 5.76, and 13.52 percent for primary school, junior secondary school, vocational 
senior secondary school, general senior secondary school, college, undergraduate, and 
master, respectively.  Again, these results are comparable to the findings in Chapter 5. 
The estimated coefficients on potential work experience (age) and their squared terms 
conform to theoretical expectation and are also in line with those reported in Chapter 
5.  
Table 7.3: OLS Estimates Using the Average Years of Schooling of Workers 
(without Additional Individual Characteristics) 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
   age proxying experience 
Constant 
 
4.37517 
(0.07374)*** 
4.60501 
(0.07691)*** 
4.08941 
(0.09710)*** 
4.30296 
(0.10149)*** 
Years of schooling 0.05057 
(0.00183)*** 
 0.04455 
(0.00169)*** 
 
Primary school  0.08563 
(0.02591)*** 
 0.09381 
(0.02540)*** 
Junior secondary school  0.20730 
(0.02725)*** 
 0.20407 
(0.02611)*** 
Vocational senior secondary school  0.36181 
(0.02813)*** 
 0.33782 
(0.02656)*** 
General senior secondary school  0.36466 
(0.02687)*** 
 0.33840 
(0.02521)*** 
College  0.50876 
(0.03346)*** 
 0.45991 
(0.03183)*** 
Undergraduate  0.61913 
(0.03054)*** 
 0.56883 
(0.02882)*** 
Master  0.89662 
(0.07569)*** 
 0.83918 
(0.07508)*** 
Experience 0.01617 
(0.00187)*** 
0.01615 
(0.00189)*** 
  
Experience2 -0.00024 
(0.00004)*** 
-0.00026 
(0.00004)*** 
  
Age   0.02444 
(0.00005)*** 
0.02256 
(0.00385)*** 
Age2   -0.00024 
(0.00005)*** 
-0.00023 
(0.00005)*** 
AveSchool 0.05669 
(0.00747)*** 
0.05863 
(0.00749)*** 
0.05691 
(0.00748)*** 
0.05905 
(0.00750)*** 
AveSchool-Ind 
 
0.03340 
(0.00422)*** 
0.03309 
(0.00424)*** 
0.03328 
(0.00422)*** 
0.03330 
(0.00425)*** 
Adj-R2 0.2299 0.2290 0.2282 0.2270 
 
Observations 4528 4528 4528 4528 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
The estimates of the human capital externalities are all positive and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level of significance. The effects of human capital depth 
are decomposed into two components: the depth of the overall human capital stock 
and the depth of the same industrial sector human capital stock. The estimated effect 
of each of these variables is very much the same across the four estimations presented 
in Table 7.3.  
200 
 
Using AveSchool as the aggregate-level human capital measure, the coefficient of the 
average years of schooling is 0.05669 and 0.05863 in the estimation based on 
experience, and 0.05691 and 0.05905 in the estimation based on age, implying that an 
increase by one in the average years of schooling in the province is expected to 
increase the individual’s monthly earnings by 5.67 to 5.91 percent. These results are 
in line with those estimated by Liu (2007) in China, where an increase in the average 
years of schooling by one year led to an increase in individual earnings by 4.90 to 
6.67 percent.   
The similarity of the results using years of schooling and the dummy variables for the 
level of education in the estimations contrasts with Rudd’s (2000) finding.  Rudd 
(2000) reported that there was no evidence of human capital spillovers when a years 
of schooling variable was used in the estimation, while such spillovers were evident 
when dummy variables for educational attainment were utilised in the model.  
The results discussed above show that there is evidence of human capital externalities 
based on the depth of the overall human capital stock. Now we examine the human 
capital externalities based on the depth of human capital stock in the worker’s 
specific industrial sector. The AveSchool-Ind variable has coefficients that vary from 
0.03309 to 0.03340, suggesting that an increase by one in the average years of 
schooling in each worker’s industrial sector tends to increase the worker’s monthly 
earnings by between 3.31 percent and 3.34 percent. Based on the above results it can 
be seen that the effects of human capital depth within the worker’s industrial sector of 
employment are significantly smaller than the effects of the overall human capital 
depth. This is in agreement with Fu’s (2007) finding using Boston metropolitan data. 
A potential reason behind this fact is measurement error. The survey data involved a 
massive number of respondents containing measurement error. According to Fu 
(2007), data obtained from a smaller area tend to have greater measurement error 
problems. Measurement errors in explanatory variables tend to be associated with 
underestimated coefficients.  
Rauch (1993) argued that a difference between the social and private returns to 
schooling follows from the presence of positive externalities from formal education. 
In other words, the social return to schooling consists of both the private and external 
returns to schooling. Then, based on the results in columns (a) and (c) of Table 7.3, it 
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can be seen that the social return exceeds the private return by a factor of between 
(0.05057 + 0.05669 + 0.03340)/0.05057 and (0.04455 + 0.05691 + 0.03328)/0.04455, 
or by between about 2.78 and 3.02. These figures are higher than the finding of 
Rauch (1993), based on US data. Rauch (1993) found that the social return exceeds 
the private return by a factor of 1.7. The social return to schooling based on education 
levels tends to increase by level of schooling. The specification based on experience 
(age) generates a social return to schooling of 10.60 (10.80), 13.23 (12.91), 14.32 
(13.69), 14.32 (13.71), 13.98 (13.29), 15.53 (15.00) and 23.05 (22.75) percent for 
primary school, junior secondary school, vocational senior secondary school, general 
senior secondary school, college, undergraduate and master degree, respectively. The 
social return to schooling for workers with general senior secondary school is larger 
than for workers with vocational senior secondary school. Using a cost benefit 
analysis method, McMahon and Boediono (1992) reported a similar finding, whereby 
workers who graduated from general senior secondary school possess a greater social 
return to schooling than that of workers who graduated from vocational senior 
secondary schools. In particular, the magnitude of the social return to schooling for 
workers with general secondary school (vocational senior secondary school) is 22 
(16), 16 (15), 13 (10), and 11 (6) percent in 1982, 1986, 1988, 1989, respectively.     
Now we expand the estimation by including the tenure, marital status, urban area of 
residence, and gender status variables. The results are reported in Table 7.4.  While 
the adjusted-R squareds rise moderately relative to the previous results in Table 7.3, 
the coefficients of interest decrease slightly. This pattern also occurs in Chapter 5 
when comparing estimates based on the standard and augmented Mincerian models. 
The estimated earnings effect associated with the individual characteristics (years of 
schooling, dummies for level of education, experience and its square, and age and its 
square) in the estimations based on this expanded Mincerian model are comparable 
with the results reported for the augmented Mincerian model in Chapter 5. 
The results suggest that an extra year of schooling leads to an increase in the monthly 
earnings by about 4.39 percent for the estimation based on experience, and by 4.18   
percent for the estimation based on age. In terms of the level of educational 
attainment, the return to schooling for the estimation based on potential work 
experience (age) is 0.92 (1.12) percent, 3.33 (3.31) percent, 3.77 (3.55) percent, 4.03 
202 
 
(3.81) percent, 5.50 (5.25) percent, 6.46 (6.31) percent, and 12.91 (12.92) percent for 
primary school, junior secondary school, vocational secondary school, general senior 
secondary school, college, undergraduate, and master, respectively. 
Table 7.4: OLS Estimates Using the Average Years of Schooling of Workers 
(with Additional Individual Characteristics) 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
Variable   age proxying experience 
Constant 4.49422 
(0.07156)*** 
4.72749 
(0.07436)*** 
4.32482 
(0.09573)*** 
4.57470 
(0.09959)*** 
Years of schooling 0.04389 
(0.00183)*** 
 0.04182 
(0.00165)*** 
 
Primary school  0.05518 
(0.02484)** 
 0.06707 
(0.02423)*** 
Junior secondary school  0.15504 
(0.02625)*** 
 0.16650 
(0.02498)*** 
Vocational senior secondary school  0.26804 
(0.02744)*** 
 0.27313 
(0.02565)*** 
General senior secondary school  0.27600 
(0.02617)*** 
 0.28066 
(0.02429)*** 
College  0.44090 
(0.03250)*** 
 0.43822 
(0.03047)*** 
Undergraduate  0.53435 
(0.02977)*** 
 0.53296 
(0.02764)*** 
Master  0.79302 
(0.07258)*** 
 0.79145 
(0.07169)*** 
Experience 0.00739 
(0.00205)*** 
0.00750 
(0.00207)*** 
  
Experience2 -0.00013 
(0.00004)*** 
-0.00016 
(0.00005)*** 
  
Age   0.01346 
(0.00417)*** 
0.01063 
(0.00420)** 
Age2   -0.00016 
(0.00005)*** 
-0.00013 
(0.00005)** 
Tenure 0.01611 
(0.00197)*** 
0.01573 
(0.00197)*** 
0.01618 
(0.00197)*** 
0.01063 
(0.00197)*** 
Tenure2 -0.00028 
(0.00006)*** 
-0.00026 
(0.00006) 
-0.00028 
(0.00006)*** 
-0.00028 
(0.00006) 
Marital status -0.00177  
(0.01767) 
-0.00282 
(0.01762) 
-0.00209 
(0.01777) 
0.00121 
 (0.01775) 
Urban  0.07602 
(0.01258)*** 
0.08271 
(0.01264)*** 
0.07605 
(0.01258)*** 
0.08223 
(0.01265)*** 
Female -0.20078 
(0.01176)*** 
-0.20967 
(0.01181)*** 
-0.20188 
(0.01175)*** 
-0.21072 
(0.01181)*** 
AveSchool 0.05235 
(0.00719)*** 
0.05470 
(0.00718)*** 
0.05234 
(0.00719)*** 
0.05498 
(0.00719)*** 
AveSchool-Ind 0.03610 
(0.00413)*** 
0.03460 
(0.00413)*** 
0.03616 
(0.00413)*** 
0.03490 
(0.00414)*** 
Adj-R2 0.2965 0.3005 0.2963 0.2995 
 
Observations 4528 4528 4528 4528 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 
1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
In the case of the depth of overall effects of the human capital stock, the AveSchool 
variable has a statistically significant effect on monthly earnings in each of the 
estimations. The effect of the average years of schooling on monthly earnings ranges 
from 5.23 percent to 5.50 percent. These numbers are slightly lower than the results 
obtained using the OLS approach without the additional control variables, where the 
numbers ranged from 5.67 to 5.91 percent. 
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When using the industrial sector level variable the results suggest that an increase by 
one in the average years of schooling in each industrial sector will generate an 
increase in monthly earnings from about 3.46 to 3.62 percent. These results support 
the earlier findings in Table 7.3, that the average years of schooling based on the 
industrial sector has a positive impact on an individual’s monthly earnings.  
A comparison between the social return and the private return reveals a pattern 
similar to the results reported in Table 7.3. Here, the social return exceeds the private 
return by a factor of between 3.02 and 3.12 for the specification based on years of 
schooling. The social return to schooling based on education level ranges from the 
lowest of 9.85 to the highest of 21.86 percent, and it increases with the level of 
education (details on the social return to schooling for each level of education and 
each specification can be found in Tables A7.25 and A7.26). Supporting the earlier 
results, workers with vocational secondary school have a lower social return to 
schooling than workers with general senior secondary school 
The results from Tables 7.3 and 7.4 provide strong evidence of human capital 
externalities in Indonesia. This is in line with the findings from the previous studies 
conducted by Rakova and Vaillancourt (2005) in Canada, Liu (2007) in China, 
Sanroma and Ramos (2007) in Spain, and Muravyev (2008) in Russia. However, the 
results from Tables 7.3 and 7.4 should be considered with caution due to the potential 
endogeneity of the average years of schooling.  
7.4.1.2 OLS Estimates Using the Percentage of Workers with Higher Education 
as the Human Capital Measure 
To check the robustness of the OLS estimates considered above, the models of Tables 
7.3 and 7.4 are re-estimated using an alternative measure for the provincial level 
education, namely the percentage of workers with higher education. The results are 
reported in Tables 7.5 and 7.6.  
Including an aggregate-level human capital measure based on the percentage of 
workers with higher education leads to lower coefficients compared to those obtained 
using the average years of schooling. Using this new variable, the coefficients vary 
from 0.011670 to 0.01225, implying that an increase in the percentage of workers 
with higher education by one percentage point can be expected to increase an 
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individual’s monthly earnings by between about 1.17 percent and 1.23 percent.40  
These results are very similar to the OLS estimates of 1.02 percent to 1.42 percent 
reported by Morreti (2004) based on US data, and the 1.10 percent to 1.45 percent 
reported by Liu (2007) based on Chinese data. 
Table 7.5: OLS Estimates Using the Percentage of Workers with Higher 
Education (without Additional Individual Characteristics) 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
Variable   age proxying experience 
Constant 
 
5.04382 
(0.03105)*** 
5.29995 
(0.03340)*** 
4.75888 
(0.07198)*** 
5.00343 
(0.07570)*** 
Years of schooling 0.05277 
(0.00185)*** 
 0.04680 
(0.00170)*** 
 
Primary school  0.08421 
(0.02612)*** 
 0.09290 
(0.02560)*** 
Junior secondary school  0.21248 
(0.02743)*** 
 0.21015 
(0.02628)*** 
Vocational senior secondary school  0.37307 
(0.02828)*** 
 0.35020 
(0.02667)*** 
General senior secondary school  0.38167 
(0.02698)*** 
 0.35657 
(0.02528)*** 
College  0.52996 
(0.03375)*** 
 0.48228 
(0.03205)*** 
Undergraduate  0.64297 
(0.03087)*** 
 0.59391 
(0.02907)*** 
Master  0.92069 
(0.07637)*** 
 0.86463 
(0.07574)*** 
Experience 0.01600 
(0.00188)*** 
0.01605 
(0.00191)*** 
  
Experience2 -0.00024 
(0.00004)*** 
-0.00026 
(0.00004)*** 
  
Age   0.02437 
(0.00385)*** 
0.02241 
(0.00388)*** 
Age2   -0.00025 
(0.00005)*** 
-0.00023 
(0.00005)*** 
PerHE 
 
0.01167 
(0.00184)*** 
0.01212 
(0.00185)*** 
0.01176 
(0.00184)*** 
0.01225 
(0.00185)*** 
PerHE-Ind 
 
0.00224 
(0.00050)*** 
0.00207 
(0.00051)*** 
0.00225 
(0.00051)*** 
0.00212 
(0.00051)*** 
Adj-R2 0.2176 0.2161 0.2160 0.2142 
 
Observations 4528 4528 4528 4528 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 
1 percent levels, respectively. 
Consider now the estimates based on the variables constructed using the percentage 
of workers with higher education based on the industrial sector within each province. 
These results show that an increase in the percentage of workers with higher 
education in each industrial sector by one percentage point leads to an increase in an 
individual’s monthly earnings by approximately 0.21 to 0.23 percent. Similar to the 
results reported earlier in Tables 7.3 and 7.4, the external returns to schooling from 
                                               
40 Note that the PerHE and PerHE-Ind variables are measured as a percent whereas AveSchool, 
AveSchool-Ind and years of schooling are in years. Comparisons of estimated impacts might be more 
useful if undertaken using an elasticity measure. In the semi-logarithmic specification of the earnings 
equation, the elasticity is found by multiplying the regression coefficient by the mean of the variable of 
interest. However, as the means are comparable (for example, the mean of AveSchool is 8.74 and the 
mean of PerHE is 7.73, the regression coefficients provide a good basis for comparisons from this 
respective. 
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aggregate-level human capital in the same industrial sector within the province are 
lower than those from the overall-level of human capital within the province. 
The social returns to schooling associated with the percentage of workers with higher 
education exceed the private returns by a factor between 1.26 and 1.30 for the 
specification based on years of schooling.  The social return to schooling based on 
education levels varies from 2.82 to 15.31 percent, and it also increases with the level 
of education, which is consistent with the earlier results. These are lower than those 
reported in Tables 7.3 and 7.4. The results in Table 7.5, however, confirm the main 
finding in Tables 7.3 and 7.4, that there are sizeable human capital externalities in 
Indonesia.  
Comparing the social return to schooling for workers with general and vocational 
senior secondary school, the results obtained using OLS based on experience are 
consistent with the findings presented in Tables 7.3 and 7.4, where the social return 
for the former level of schooling exceeds that for the latter level. Nevertheless, the 
opposite pattern is found in the results obtained using OLS based on age, where 
workers with vocational secondary school have a smaller social return to schooling 
than those with general senior secondary school.  
Table 7.6 shows the results from the estimation of equation (7.1) for the Mincerian 
model with the additional variables for individual characteristics. These estimations 
again utilise the percentage of workers with higher education and the percentage of 
workers with higher education based on the industrial sector within each province as 
the aggregate-level human capital measures.  
Most of the individual characteristics variables are statistically significant and have 
the expected signs in each model. In particular, the results for the variables related to 
the individual’s schooling and potential work experience conform to the conventional 
wisdom. Marital status is the sole variable that is not statistically significant. 
In the case of the depth of the overall level of the human capital stock, the PerHE 
variable significantly affects the monthly earnings across the estimations. The 
coefficients of this variable are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The 
contribution of the stock of higher educated workers to monthly earnings varies from 
3.46 to 5.50 percent. These numbers are slightly lower than the results obtained using 
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the OLS approach without the additional control variables reported in Table 7.4, 
where the figures range from 5.67 to 5.91 percent.  
Table 7.6: OLS Estimates Using the Percentage of Workers with Higher 
Education (with Additional Individual Characteristics) 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
Variable   age proxying experience 
Constant 5.15447 
(0.03150)*** 
5.40690 
(0.03400)*** 
4.97610 
(0.07320)*** 
5.24954 
(0.07662)*** 
Years of schooling 0.04602 
(0.00186)*** 
 0.04387 
(0.00167)*** 
 
Primary school  0.05443 
(0.02508)** 
 0.06717 
(0.02446)*** 
Junior secondary school  0.15953 
(0.02647)*** 
 0.17198 
(0.02519)*** 
Vocational senior secondary school  0.27904 
(0.02765)*** 
 0.28484 
(0.02583)*** 
General senior secondary school  0.29273 
(0.02635)*** 
 0.29805 
(0.02445)*** 
College  0.46266 
(0.03285)*** 
 0.46018 
(0.03080)*** 
Undergraduate  0.55885 
(0.03016)*** 
 0.55767 
(0.02802)*** 
Master  0.81715 
(0.07336)*** 
 0.81580 
(0.07247)*** 
Experience 0.00770 
(0.00207)*** 
0.00787 
(0.00209)*** 
  
Experience2 -0.00013 
(0.00004)*** 
-0.00017 
(0.00005)*** 
  
Age   0.01415 
(0.00421)*** 
0.01122 
(0.00424)*** 
Age2   -0.00016 
(0.00005)*** 
-0.00014  
(0.00005)** 
Tenure 0.01578 
(0.00199)*** 
0.01539 
(0.00199)*** 
0.01584 
(0.00199)*** 
0.01605 
(0.00199)*** 
Tenure2 -0.00028 
(0.00006)*** 
-0.00015 
(0.00007)*** 
-0.00028 
(0.00007)*** 
-0.00028 
(0.00007)*** 
Marital status -0.00525 
(0.01783) 
-0.00641 
(0.01779) 
-0.00576 
(0.01794) 
-0.00227 
(0.00007) 
Urban  0.09039 
(0.01268)*** 
0.09691 
(0.01274)*** 
0.09040 
(0.01268)*** 
0.09643 
(0.01275)*** 
Female -0.19609 
(0.01185)*** 
-0.20496 
(0.01190)*** 
-0.19609 
(0.01185)*** 
-0.20605 
(0.01191)*** 
PerHE 
 
0.00959 
(0.00180)*** 
0.01017 
(0.00180)*** 
0.00961 
(0.00180)*** 
0.01025 
(0.00180)*** 
PerHE-Ind 
 
0.00242 
(0.00049)*** 
0.00201 
(0.00049)*** 
0.00243 
(0.00049)*** 
0.00206 
(0.00049)*** 
Adj-R2 0.2829 0.2864 0.2843 0.2854 
 
Observations 4528 4528 4528 4528 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 
percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
For the industrial sector level, the results suggest that a one percentage point increase 
in the percentage of workers with higher education in each industrial sector tends to 
increase an individual’s monthly earnings by around 0.96 to 1.03 percent. These 
figures are also slightly lower than those obtained using the OLS approach without 
the additional controls considered here, which are from about 1.17 to 1.23 percent. 
Compared to the results in Table 7.5, the findings in terms of how large the social 
return exceeds the private return suggest a comparable pattern, where the social return 
associated with the percentage of workers with higher education and the percentage 
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of workers with higher education based on the industrial sector within each province 
exceeds the private return by a factor of 1.26 and 1.27. Again, these are lower than 
those reported in Tables 7.3 and 7.4. The results from the specification based on the 
level of education also have a similar pattern, where the social returns to schooling 
are slightly lower than those reported in Tables 7.3 and 7.4. The pattern of the social 
return to schooling for workers with vocational and general senior secondary school 
qualifications is consistent with the result presented in Table 7.5. 
Summing up, these OLS estimates reveal six points of interest. First, the estimates of 
the private returns to schooling are stable across all specifications. Second, all 
estimates of the external returns to schooling are positive and statistically significant, 
both for the overall level and for the industrial sector level. Third, using either years 
of schooling or the level of education for the individual’s education, and either 
potential work experience or age, generates the same results, where the coefficients 
for each of the aggregate-level human capital measures is positive and statistically 
significant. Fourth, adding variables for tenure and its square, marital status, urban 
area of residence, and gender status leads to a slight increase in the coefficient of the 
average years of schooling measure and a slight decrease in the coefficient of the 
variable for the percentage of workers with higher education. Fifth, the social return 
to schooling increases with the level of education. Sixth, six of the eight 
specifications discussed in this sub-section show that the social return to schooling 
for workers with general senior secondary schooling is greater than that of workers 
with vocational senior secondary schooling. The other two specifications provide a 
contrary pattern. 
7.4.2 IV Approach 
In this sub-section the IV approach is adopted to address the issue of omitted variable 
bias that may arise because of unobserved factors being correlated with the provincial 
level human capital. The first part of this sub-section will discuss the results from the 
IV estimates using the percentage of the population below the poverty line as an 
instrument (PerPoverty). The second part will discuss the results from the IV 
estimates using the number of senior secondary schools per 1000 people as an 
instrument (SSS-Population).  
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Ideally the omitted variable bias that may arise because of unobserved factors being 
correlated with the human capital measure based on the industrial sector within each 
province should also be evaluated. Unfortunately there is no suitable instrument for 
this disaggregated measure of the human capital stock within each province.   
7.4.2.1 Using the Percentage of the Population below the Poverty Line as an 
Instrument 
Equations 7.2 and 7.3 portray the relationship between individual productivity and the 
provincial level of human capital using the IV approach. The results obtained using 
PerPoverty as an instrument are presented in Tables 7.7 (Mincerian model without 
additional variables for individual characteristics and using AveSchool as an 
aggregate-level human capital measure), 7.8 (Mincerian model with additional 
variables for individual characteristics and using AveSchool as an aggregate-level 
human capital measure), 7.9 (Mincerian model without additional variables for 
individual characteristics and using PerHE as an aggregate-level human capital 
measure), and 7.10 (Mincerian model with additional variables for individual 
characteristics and using PerHE as an aggregate-level human capital measure). 
We begin with the discussion of the IV estimates reported in Table 7.7. Columns (a), 
(c), (e), and (g) report findings for the first-stage regression that includes the 
instrument and all the exogenous variables contained in the earnings equation. 
Conforming to expectation, the estimate associated with the instrument is negative 
and statistically significant at 1 percent level in all four specifications. The Hausman 
test of the endogeneity of AveSchool indicates that the null hypothesis of exogeneity 
is rejected at the 1 percent level for all four specifications. This result suggests that it 
is necessary to adopt an IV approach. Moreover, the R squareds for the first stage 
equation are all moderate in size, being around the 0.20 mark.41  
The results presented in columns (b), (d), (f), and (h) of Table 7.7 show that all the 
individual variables (years of schooling or level of education, potential work 
experience or age and its square) included to control for individual effects on earnings 
                                               
41 The R2 from the second stage regression has no statistical meaning in the context of 2SLS/IV (see 
Sribney et al., 2011 at http://www.stata.com/support/faqs/stat/2sls.html). Accordingly, we do not 
discuss the R2 from the earnings function in the IV approach. 
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are significant and have the expected sign and magnitude, except for the variable of 
age in column (h) that is not significant.  
Similar to the results obtained using the OLS approach, estimating human capital 
externalities, whether using years of schooling or level of education, and whether 
using potential work experience or age to control for individual’s characteristics, 
generate results that show evidence of a highly significant and positive relationship at 
the 1 percent level of significance between the average years of schooling in the 
worker’s province and their monthly earnings. The magnitudes of the effect of the 
average years of schooling in the worker’s province on their monthly earnings are 
almost equal across the four estimations. Applying the IV approach leads to higher 
estimated external returns to schooling compared to those obtained using the OLS 
approach. An increase by one in the average years of schooling in the province 
increases the individual’s monthly earnings by from 22.62 to 23.33 percent. These 
results are very similar to the study using 1990 Canadian data conducted by Rakova 
and Vaillancourt (2005). They found that an increase by a year in their average 
education variable has an effect on labour productivity of 23 percent. Our results 
indicate that human capital externalities are sizeable and much higher than the return 
to own schooling. The magnitude of the externalities suggests that fostering education 
should be a priority of the government’s policy agenda.  
To put these results into perspective, an increase of one year in the average level of 
schooling in the province would be the equivalent of a move from Jawa Tengah 
province (mean years of schooling of 9.98) to Jawa Timur province (mean years of 
schooling of 10.72), or from Sumatera Utara province (mean years of schooling of 
10.11) to Bali province (mean years of schooling of 11.14). The first two of these 
provinces differ in terms of mean monthly earnings by 21.15 percent. The final two 
provinces differ in terms of mean monthly earnings by 23.92 percent. 
For the industrial sector level variable, the coefficients of AveSchool-Ind are 0.02272, 
0.02174, 0.02273, and 0.02189, implying that a one percent increase in the 
percentage of workers with higher education in each industrial sector leads to an 
increase in an individual’s monthly earnings by around 2.27, 2.17, 2.27, and 2.19 
percent. These externalities are lower than those obtained using the OLS approach 
(which range from 3.46 to 3.62).  
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Table 7.7: Instrumenting Average Years of Schooling with Population below the Poverty Line (Mincerian Model without 
Additional Individual Characteristics) 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
     age proxying experience 
         
Variable 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average Schooling 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Constant 9.24960 
(0.08502)*** 
3.00532 
(0.15403)*** 
9.32230 
(0.09310)*** 
3.18970 
(0.15872)*** 
8.80868 
(0.14399)*** 
2.78071 
(0.16354)*** 
8.83327 
(0.15354)*** 
2.95986 
(0.16844)*** 
Years of schooling 0.01511 
(0.00332)*** 
0.05029 
(0.00194)*** 
  0.01159 
(0.00305)*** 
0.04439 
(0.00178)*** 
  
Primary school   -0.02021  
(0.04662) 
0.10540 
(0.02746)*** 
  -0.00105 
(0.04563) 
0.10979 
(0.02687)*** 
Junior secondary school   0.00315  
(0.04904) 
0.22465 
(0.02885)*** 
  0.01875 
(0.04692)*** 
0.21718 
(0.02761)*** 
Vocational senior secondary school   0.10402 
(0.05065)** 
0.36213 
(0.02974)*** 
  0.10177 
(0.04772)*** 
0.33558 
(0.02806)*** 
General senior secondary school   0.11503 
(0.04839)** 
0.36375 
(0.02840)*** 
  0.11012 
(0.04531)** 
0.33519 
(0.02663)*** 
College   0.09318 
 (0.06038) 
0.52483 
(0.03540)*** 
  0.07075  
(0.05731) 
0.47523 
(0.03366)*** 
Undergraduate   0.10176  
(0.05541)* 
0.64590 
(0.03238)*** 
  0.07661 
 (0.05215) 
0.59486 
(0.03055)*** 
Master   0.24040 
 (0.13604)* 
0.88122 
(0.08001)*** 
  0.21195  
(0.13473) 
0.82309 
(0.07933)*** 
Experience 0.01598 
(0.00336)*** 
0.01444 
(0.00198)*** 
0.01639 
(0.00340)*** 
0.01416 
(0.00201)*** 
    
Experience2 -0.00031 
(0.00031)*** 
-0.00020 
(0.00004)*** 
-0.00032 
(0.00008)*** 
-0.00021 
(0.00004)*** 
    
Age     0.03303 
(0.00686)*** 
0.02042 
(0.00405)*** 
0.03331 
(0.00691)*** 
0.01815  
(0.00409) 
Age2     -0.00040 
(0.00009)*** 
-0.00019 
(0.00005)*** 
-0.00040 
(0.00009)*** 
-0.00017 
(0.00005)*** 
AveSchool  0.22661 
(0.01827)*** 
 0.23328 
(0.01859)*** 
 0.22619 
(0.01828)*** 
 0.23300 
(0.01860)*** 
AveSchool-Ind 0.00392 
 (0.00775) 
0.02272 
(0.00457)*** 
0.00610 
 (0.00779) 
0.02174 
(0.00461)*** 
0.00402 
(0.00775) 
0.02273 
(0.00457)*** 
0.000675 
(0.00779) 
0.02189 
(0.00462)*** 
PerPoverty -0.06340 
(0.00197)*** 
 -0.00610 
(0.00198)*** 
 -0.06341 
(0.00197)*** 
 -0.06283 
(0.00198)*** 
 
 R2 
 
0.1999  0.2008  0.2003  0.2012  
Adjusted R2 
 
0.1990  0.1988  01994  0.1992  
Observations 4528 4528 4528 4528 4528 4528 4528 4528 
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 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
     age proxying experience 
         
Variable 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average Schooling 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
  
 
Test Results 
        
 
Quality 
 
        
F  
 
 1031.86  1001.42  1032.65  1002.64 
 
P-Value 
 0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
 
 
Relevance (Hausman test) 
 
        
F 
 
 121.335  123.705  120.176  122.497 
 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 7.8: Instrumenting Average Years of Schooling with Population below the Poverty Line (Mincerian Model with Additional 
Individual Characteristics) 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
     age proxying experience 
         
Variable Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Constant 9.21033 
(0.08685)*** 
3.22751 
(0.14923)*** 
9.26738 
(0.09506)*** 
3.41666 
(0.15273)*** 
8.85396 
(0.15011)*** 
3.10855 
(0.15955)*** 
8.87019 
(0.15957)*** 
3.32568 
(0.16328)*** 
Years of schooling 0.01123 
(0.00345)*** 
0.04426 
(0.00193)*** 
  0.00790 
(0.00312)** 
0.04250 
(0.00174)*** 
  
Primary school   -0.01301 
(0.04675) 
0.07265 
(0.02622)*** 
  0.00178 
 (0.04556) 
0.08179 
(0.02555)*** 
Junior secondary school   -0.01300 
(0.04940) 
0.17465 
(0.02770)*** 
  -0.00167 
(0.04699) 
0.18345 
(0.02635)*** 
Vocational senior secondary school   0.07010 
 (0.05170) 
0.27598 
(0.02891)*** 
  0.06609  
(0.04828) 
0.28038 
(0.02702)*** 
General senior secondary school   0.08625 
(0.04932)* 
0.28141 
(0.02757)*** 
  0.07999 
(0.04574)* 
0.28566 
(0.02558)*** 
College   0.05878  
(0.06130) 
0.46009 
(0.03428)*** 
  0.03737  
(0.05742) 
0.45893 
(0.03215)*** 
Undergraduate   0.06706 
 (0.05645) 
0.56432 
(0.03149)*** 
  0.04344  
(0.05238) 
0.56460 
(0.02927)*** 
Master   0.18087 
 (0.13645) 
0.78893 
(0.07642)*** 
  0.15417  
(0.13465) 
0.78929 
(0.07547)*** 
Experience 0.01346 
(0.00385)*** 
0.00566 
(0.00217)*** 
0.01370 
(0.00389)*** 
0.00554 
 (0.00219)** 
    
Experience2 -0.00256 
(0.00008)*** 
-0.00009 
(0.00005)** 
-0.00026 
(0.00008)*** 
-0.00012 
 (0.00005)** 
    
Age     0.02731 
(0.00781)*** 
0.00973 
(0.00440)** 
0.02742 
(0.00787)*** 
0.00656 
 (0.00444) 
Age2     -0.00033 
(0.00010)*** 
-0.00011 
(0.00006)* 
-0.00033 
(0.00010)*** 
-0.00008 
(0.00006) 
Tenure 0.00256  
(0.00370) 
0.01660 
(0.00207)*** 
0.00236 
 (0.00371) 
0.01629 
(0.00208)*** 
0.00235 
 (0.00370) 
0.01670 
(0.00207)*** 
0.00224 
 (0.00370) 
0.01695 
(0.00207)*** 
Tenure2 -0.00013 
 (0.00012) 
-0.00028 
(0.00007)*** 
-0.00011 
(0.00012) 
-0.00026 
(0.00007)*** 
-0.00011 
(0.00012) 
-0.00028 
(0.00007)*** 
-0.00010 
(0.00012) 
-0.00028 
(0.00007)*** 
Marital status 0.07606 
(0.03311)** 
-0.00778 
(0.01857) 
0.07756 
(0.03313)** 
-0.00926 
 (0.01857) 
0.07237 
(0.03330)** 
-0.00753 
(0.01868) 
0.07372 
(0.03333)** 
-0.00467 
(0.01869) 
Urban  0.13466 
(0.02349)*** 
0.04558 
(0.01357)*** 
0.13277 
(0.02368)*** 
0.05277 
(0.01365)*** 
0.13472 
(0.02349)*** 
0.04562 
(0.01357)*** 
0.13238 
(0.02368)*** 
0.05240 
(0.01365)*** 
Female 0.03404 
(0.02212)*** 
-0.19565 
(0.01236)*** 
0.03680 
(0.02227)* 
-0.20551 
(0.01244)*** 
0.03194  
(0.02209) 
-0.19644 
(0.01235)*** 
0.03561 
 (0.02226) 
-0.20635 
(0.01244)*** 
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 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
     age proxying experience 
         
Variable Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
AveSchool  0.20962 
(0.01770)*** 
 0.21680 
(0.01789)*** 
 0.20951 
(0.01770)*** 
 0.21683 
(0.01790)*** 
AveSchool-Ind -0.00440 
 (0.00790) 
0.02794 
(0.00441)*** 
-0.00244 
(0.00794) 
0.02578 
(0.00444)*** 
-0.00431 
(0.00790) 
0.02800 
(0.00441)*** 
-0.00192 
(0.00794) 
0.02601 
(0.00444)*** 
PerPoverty -0.06293 
(0.00199)*** 
 -0.06248 
(0.00199)*** 
 -0.06292 
(0.00199)*** 
 -0.06249 
(0.00199)*** 
 
 R2 
 
0.2070  0.2077  0.2071  0.2079 
 
 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.2053  0.2049  0.2054  0.2051 
 
 
 Observations 
 
4528 4528 4528 4528 4528 4528 4528 
 
4528 
Test Results         
 
Quality 
 
        
F  
 
 1004.37  981.124  1004.4  981.627 
 
P-Value 
 
 0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
 
Relevance (Hausman test)         
F 
 
 
 
 
 
109.071 
  
113.564 
  
108.898 
  
113.073 
 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
           Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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The social return to schooling associated with the AveSchool and AveSchool-Ind 
variables is 4.96 and 5.61 times as high as the private return (see columns (b) and (f) 
of Table 7.7).  Consistent with the results obtained using OLS, the social returns to 
schooling tend to increase with the level of education. For example, the social return 
to schooling based on experience is 27.26, 29.48, 30.08, 30.14, 30.87, 32.56, and 
37.27 percent for primary school, junior secondary school, vocational senior 
secondary school, general senior secondary school, college, undergraduate, and 
master degree, respectively. These social returns to schooling obtained using the IV 
approach are much greater than those obtained using OLS. When the age variable is 
utilised, the results show similar patterns. 
Table 7.8 presents the results following the addition of the extra controls for 
individual characteristics (tenure and its square, marital status, urban area of 
residence, and gender status) to the equations. Similar to the earlier results reported in 
Table 7.7, here all of the F-statistics in the first stage regressions suggest a good 
correlation between the instrument and the average years of schooling. Moreover, the 
Hausman test confirms the endogeneity of AveSchool. Typical of the pattern 
established above, PerPoverty has a significant negative effect on the average years 
of schooling.  
Most the individual characteristic variables are significant, in particular, the variables 
related to individual schooling and potential work experience fall into this category. 
In line with the earlier results reported in Table 7.7, the results presented in Table 7.8 
show that all the individual variables (years of schooling or level of education, 
potential work experience or age and its square) included to control for individual 
effects on earnings are significant and have the expected sign and magnitude, except 
for the variable of age in column (h) that is not significant.  
Estimating the numerical importance of the average years of schooling externalities at 
the level of the province using the IV approach with this extended specification, and 
adopting PerPoverty as instrument, also yields statistically significant externalities. 
The estimates of the external effect from an increase by one in the average years of 
schooling in the province on an individual’s monthly earnings range from around 
20.95 to 21.68 percent (statistically significant at the 1 percent level). These results 
are, on average, around 7.23 percent lower than the results reported in Table 7.7. 
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However these figures are 3.69 times as high as those obtained using the OLS 
approach reported in Table 7.4. These external returns associated with average years 
of schooling are comparable with Rakova and Vaillancourt’s (2005) finding for 
Canada, where an increase by one year in the average level of education was 
associated with an 18.7 percent increase in private sector labour productivity.  
The measure of the aggregate-level human capital given by the average years of 
schooling based on the industrial sector is statistically significant in all four 
specifications at the 1 percent level. The values of the coefficient on this variable 
indicate that an increase of one year in the average schooling increases the 
individual’s monthly earnings by approximately 2.58 to 2.80 percent. On average 
these external returns from the average years of schooling based on the industrial 
sector are 0.46 percentage points higher than those obtained using the IV approach 
without the additional variables for individual characteristics. However these figures 
remain lower, by around 1.70 percentage points, compared to those obtained using 
the OLS approach. It has been discussed in Chapter 4 that in the study of human 
capital externalities, the direction of bias in the OLS estimate could go either way 
(upward or downward bias). The direction of bias in the OLS estimates, or the effect 
of endogeneity, is influenced by the relative importance of unobserved heterogeneity 
in the demand and supply for labour.  The OLS estimate will be upward biased if 
average education variation across regions is pushed by unobserved demand shocks. 
On the other hand, if variation in average education across regions is driven by 
unobserved supply shocks, the OLS estimate is biased down (Moretti, 1998). 
The comparison between the social return and the private return is similar to the 
earlier result presented in Table 7.7. The social return to schooling is 5.37 and 5.59 
times as high as the private return (see columns (b) and (f) of Table 7.8). This type of 
similarity in the finding across specifications is also found for the models based on 
education levels. The results support the earlier results reported in Tables 7.3 to 7.7, 
that generally the higher the education level the higher is the social return. 
Next the variables of AveSchool and AveSchool-Ind are replaced by PerHE and 
PerHE-Ind. The estimated results of the Mincerian model without (with) additional 
variables for individual characteristics are presented in Table 7.9 (7.10). Columns (a), 
(c), (e), and (g) of Table 7.9 report that the estimate associated with the instrument in 
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the reduced form first-stage regression is negative and statistically significant at the 1 
percent level in all four specifications. The Hausman test rejects at the 1 percent level 
the null hypothesis of equality of the OLS and IV estimates for all four specifications.  
All variables for individual characteristics - years of schooling or level of education 
and potential work experience or age and its square - are statistically significant at the 
1 percent level and are associated with sensible estimated impacts. More experience 
in terms of potential work experience or age implies greater earnings. Moreover, the 
private return to schooling is between 4.84 and 4.28 percent (see columns (b) and (f) 
of Table 7.9)).  
Replacing AveSchool with PerHE as the aggregate-level human capital measure 
results in much lower estimates of the human capital externalities, of 7.04 to 7.27 
percent (also statistically significant at the 1 percent level). However, the external 
return to schooling remains positive and significant, and also remains higher than the 
private return to schooling.  
Using the PerHE-Ind variable instead of AveSchool-Ind is similarly associated with a 
lower estimate of the external return to schooling. A one percentage point increase in 
the share of workers with higher education at the industrial sector level can be 
expected to increase a worker’s monthly earnings by approximately 0.13 to 0.37 
percent. The social return associated with the PerHE and PerHE-Ind variables is 
12.06 and 11.49 percent for the models based on years of schooling. In the models 
based on levels of education the social return varies from 9.05 to 17.04 percent for the 
models based on experience, and from 9.14 to 16.71 percent for the models based on 
age. 
Based on the results in Tables 7.7, 7.8, 7.9, and 7.10, it can be seen that PerPoverty 
performs very well as the sole instrument in the first-stage regressions, being 
significant and having the expected sign. 
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Table 7.9: Instrumenting the Percentage of Workers with Higher Education with Population below the Poverty Line (Mincerian 
Model without Additional Individual Characteristics) 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) f) (g) (h) 
     age proxying experience 
 
Variable 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
Constant 9.09992 
(0.23388)*** 
4.65898 
(0.04761)*** 
9.43190 
 (0.24877)*** 
4.88027 
(0.05154)*** 
7.70906 
(0.53848)*** 
4.43161 
(0.08439)*** 
7.81058 
(0.56417)*** 
4.65711 
(0.08907)*** 
Years of schooling 0.09697 
(0.01384)*** 
0.04844 
(0.00208)*** 
  0.08274 
(0.01265)*** 
0.04275 
(0.00191)*** 
  
Primary school   0.07184 
 (0.19533) 
0.09838 
(0.02904)*** 
  0.12336 
 (0.19121) 
0.10347 
(0.02843)*** 
Junior secondary school   0.31390 
 (0.20506) 
0.21056 
(0.03047)*** 
  0.34028  
(0.19621)* 
0.20483 
(0.02918)*** 
Vocational senior secondary school   1.13425  
(0.21095)*** 
0.31780 
(0.03177)*** 
  1.08983 
(0.19858)*** 
0.29404 
(0.03000)*** 
General senior secondary school   0.79807  
(0.20146)*** 
0.34689 
(0.03012)*** 
  0.74385 
(0.18843)*** 
0.32114 
(0.02823)*** 
College   0.89716  
(0.25236)*** 
0.50048 
(0.03758)*** 
  0.77178 
(0.23926)*** 
0.45461 
(0.03566)*** 
Undergraduate   0.80711 
 (0.23167)*** 
0.63227 
(0.03431)*** 
  0.67133 
(0.21770)*** 
0.58502 
(0.03229)*** 
Master   1.83796  
(0.56995)*** 
0.82483 
(0.08525)*** 
  1.68682 
(0.56443)*** 
0.77088 
(0.08446)*** 
Experience 0.05600 
(0.01412)*** 
0.01399 
(0.00209)*** 
0.05983  
(0.01425) 
0.01355 
(0.00213)*** 
    
Experience2 -0.00102 
(0.00031)*** 
-0.00019 
(0.00005)*** 
-0.00110 
(0.00031)*** 
-0.00021 
(0.00005)*** 
    
Age     0.10795 
(0.02879)*** 
0.02014 
(0.00427)*** 
0.11447 
(0.02896)*** 
0.01739 
(0.00433)*** 
Age2     -0.00128 
(0.00037)*** 
-0.00019 
(0.00006)*** 
-0.00134 
(0.00037)*** 
-0.00016 
(0.00006)*** 
PerHE 
 
 0.07045 
(0.00543)*** 
 0.07278 
(0.00557)*** 
 0.07037 
(0.00544)*** 
 0.07275 
(0.00557)*** 
PerHE-Ind 
 
0.00079 
 (0.00379) 
0.00173 
(0.00056)*** 
0.00328 
 (0.00384) 
0.00133 
(0.00057)** 
0.00092 
 (0.00379) 
0.00174 
(0.00056)*** 
0.00369 
 (0.00384) 
0.00137 
 (0.00057)** 
PerPoverty -0.21976 
(0.00808)*** 
 -0.21677 
(0.00811)*** 
 -0.21967 
(0.00808)*** 
 -0.21680 
(0.00811)*** 
 
 R2 
 
0.1510  0.1549  0.1509  0.1550  
Adjusted R2 0.1501  0.1529  0.1500  0.1529  
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 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) f) (g) (h) 
     age proxying experience 
 
Variable 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
  
Observations 4528 4528 4528 4528 4528 4528 4528 4528 
 
Test Results 
        
 
Quality 
 
        
F  
 
 739.867  714.848 
 
 739.078  714.989 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
 
Relevance (Hausman test) 
 
        
F 
 
 173.092  176.5  171.437  175.1 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
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Table 7.10: Instrumenting the Percentage of Workers with Higher Education with Population below the Poverty Line 
(Mincerian Model with Additional Individual Characteristics) 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
     age proxying experience 
 
Variable 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
Constant 8.41277 
(0.24681)*** 
4.80594 
(0.04637)*** 
8.59189 
(0.26510)*** 
5.03601 
(0.04965)*** 
7.35563 
(0.56674)*** 
4.68227 
(0.08520)*** 
7.34386 
(0.59358)*** 
4.94799 
(0.08930)*** 
Years of schooling 0.05547 
(0.01434)*** 
0.04438 
(0.00207)*** 
  0.04494 
(0.01291)*** 
0.04261 
(0.00186)*** 
  
Primary school   0.07937 
(0.19387)*** 
0.06782 
 (0.02799)** 
  0.12324 
 (0.18893) 
0.07733 
(0.02728)*** 
Junior secondary school   0.11533 
 (0.20461) 
0.17131 
(0.12953)*** 
  0.14256 
 (0.19459) 
0.18090 
(0.02809)*** 
Vocational senior secondary school   0.76117 
(0.21354)*** 
0.25097 
(0.03092)*** 
  0.73441 
(0.19934)*** 
0.25653 
(0.02890)*** 
General senior secondary school   0.46423 
(0.20364)** 
0.28181 
(0.02940)*** 
  0.43066 
(0.18874)** 
0.28718 
(0.02726)*** 
College   0.51110 
(0.25398)** 
0.45683 
(0.03663)*** 
  0.42264 
(0.23794)** 
0.45709 
(0.03433)*** 
Undergraduate   0.40469 
(0.23402)* 
0.57324 
(0.03365)*** 
  0.31118 
 (0.21728) 
0.57482 
(0.03127)*** 
Master   1.23479 
(0.56611)** 
0.76225 
(0.08193)*** 
  1.13113 
(0.55879)** 
0.76391 
(0.08090)*** 
Experience 0.04463 
(0.01598)*** 
0.00552 
(0.00231)** 
0.04732 
(0.01613)*** 
0.00529 
 (0.00234)** 
    
Experience2 -0.00083 
(0.00034)** 
-0.00009 
(0.00005)* 
-0.00089 
(0.00035)** 
-0.00011 
 (0.00005)** 
    
Age     0.04463 
(0.01598)*** 
0.00552 
(0.00231)** 
0.04732 
(0.01613)*** 
0.00529 
(0.00234)** 
Age2     0.08335 
(0.03245)*** 
0.00991 
(0.00469)** 
0.08896 
(0.03265)*** 
0.00633 
 (0.00474) 
Tenure 0.01827  
(0.01536) 
0.01585 
(0.00221)*** 
0.01770  
(0.01538) 
0.01554 
(0.00222)*** 
-0.00100 
(0.00042)** 
-0.00011 
(0.00006)* 
-0.00106 
(0.00042)** 
-0.00008 
(0.00006) 
Tenure2 -0.00060  
(0.00050) 
-0.00027 
(0.00007)*** 
-0.00057 
(0.00050) 
-0.00024 
(0.00007)*** 
0.01899 
 (0.01537) 
0.01587 
(0.00221)*** 
0.01829  
(0.01537) 
0.01615 
(0.00222)*** 
Marital status 0.35645 
(0.13750)*** 
-0.01744 
(0.01982) 
0.35912 
(0.13740)*** 
-0.01914 
 (0.01987) 
-0.00057 
(0.00050) 
-0.00026 
(0.00007)*** 
-0.00056 
(0.00050) 
-0.00027 
(0.00007)*** 
Urban  1.10749 
(0.09643)*** 
0.00849 
 (0.01579) 
1.07928 
(0.09704)*** 
0.01577 
 (0.01584) 
0.35677 
(0.13831)*** 
-0.01800 
(0.01579) 
0.35541 
(0.13828)*** 
-0.01500 
(0.02001) 
Female 0.14858 -0.19389 0.17128 -0.20471 1.10789 0.00852  1.07889 -0.20549 
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 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
     age proxying experience 
 
Variable 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.09157)*** (0.01315)*** (0.09210)* (0.01327)*** (0.09643)*** (0.01579) (0.09704)*** (0.01327)*** 
PerHE 
 
 0.06815 
(0.00549)*** 
 0.07033 
(0.00558)*** 
 0.06814 
(0.00550)*** 
 0.07039 
(0.00558)*** 
PerHE-Ind -0.00224  
(0.00376) 
0.00211 
(0.00054)*** 
-0.00029 
(0.00381) 
0.00153 
(0.00055)*** 
-0.00216 
(0.00376) 
0.00212 
(0.00054)*** 
0.00002 
 (0.00381) 
0.00157 
(0.00055)*** 
PerPoverty 0.21129 
(0.00806)*** 
 -0.20945 
(0.00808)*** 
 -0.21122 
(0.00806)*** 
 -0.20949 
(0.00808)*** 
 
 R2 
 
0.1767  0.1794  0.1766  0.1793  
Adjusted R2 
 
0.1749  0.1765 
 
 0.1748  0.1764  
Observations 
 
4528 4528 4528 4528 4528 4528 4528 4528 
Test Results         
 
Quality 
 
        
F  
 
 687.359  671.388 
 
 686.814  671.559 
 
P-Value 
 
 0.0000***  0.0000*** 
 
 0.0000***  0.0000*** 
 
Relevance (Hausman test)         
F 
 
  
167.105 
  
172.564 
  
166.78 
  
172.216 
 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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7.4.2.2 Using the Ratio of the Number of Senior Secondary Schools to Population 
as an Instrument. 
In this sub-section the human capital externalities are investigated by utilising SSS-
Population as the sole instrument. The analysis is divided into the same four parts as 
in the earlier sub-section. In the first two parts we discuss the IV analysis of human 
capital externalities using the AveSchool and AveSchool-Ind variables as aggregate-
level human capital measures in the Mincerian model, with and without the tenure, 
marital status, area of residence and gender variables. The results of these analyses 
are presented in Tables 7.11 and 7.12. The remaining parts of this sub-section 
elaborate the IV analysis of human capital externalities using the PerHE and PerHE-
Ind variables as aggregate-level human capital measures for the Mincerian model 
with and without the additional variables for individual characteristics. The results of 
these analyses are reported in Tables 7.13 and 7.14.   All the results for the IV 
estimations using SSS-Population as an instrument are consistent with the findings 
from the IV estimations using PerPoverty as an instrument. The results point to the 
existence of sizeable human capital externalities. 
The results presented in columns (a), (c), (e), and (g) of Table 7.11 show that the 
estimate associated with the instrument is statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level in all four specifications. This suggests that SSS-Population is an acceptable 
instrument. The SSS-Population variable impacts positively on the average years of 
schooling, which is the expected direction of effect. The Hausman test rejects at the 1 
percent level the null hypothesis of the equality between the OLS and IV estimates 
for all four specifications. The R squareds for the first-stage equation are all moderate 
in size, being around the 0.13 mark. These goodness of fit measures are, however, 
around six percentage points lower than those obtained with the alternative 
instrument in the earlier analyses.  
All of the variables in the earnings equation are statistically significant and have the 
expected signs. The effect of a one year increase in the average years of schooling 
ranges from around an 11.22 to 12.41 percent increase in labour productivity. These 
are 11.44 and 10.89 percentage points lower than those of the IV estimates using 
PerPoverty as an instrument reported in Table 7.7. Nevertheless, these figures remain 
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greater than both the private return and the external return associated with the average 
years of schooling obtained by using OLS that were reported in Table 7.3.  
Supporting the earlier OLS and IV results obtained using the PerPoverty variable as 
an instrument, the effect from a one year increase on the average years of schooling at 
the industrial sector level is substantially weaker than that from the overall average 
years of schooling.  
Compared to the results obtained using IV with PerPoverty as an instrument, the 
social return to schooling derived from Table 7.11 is substantially smaller for all 
specifications, based both on years of schooling and levels of education. Using years 
of schooling in the model, the social return to schooling is 19.26 and 18.79 percent. 
Based on education level, the social return to schooling varies from 16.78 to 28.33 
percent.  
Including additional control variables for individual characteristics into the estimating 
equation (see Table 7.12) decreases the effect of the provincial level average years of 
schooling on individual earnings, but it increases the estimated size of the human 
capital externalities associated with the average years of schooling based on the 
industrial sector within each province. Compared to the results reported in Table 7.11, 
the spillover effect from the average years of schooling to earnings is estimated at 
approximately 9.46, 10.71, 9.51, and 10.79 percent for the estimation based on years 
of schooling and potential work experience, the estimation based on the education 
levels and potential work experience, the estimation based on years of schooling and 
age, and the estimation based on the education levels and age, respectively. These 
effects are 1.76, 1.64, 1.85, and 1.62 percentage points less than those reported in 
Table 7.11.  
The effect that comes from a one year increase in the average years of schooling 
based on the industrial sector within each province ranges from about 3.18 to 3.39 
percent, and shows a pattern similar to the earlier results whereby these effects are 
significantly smaller than those associated with the average years of schooling for the 
province as a whole. However, these effects are slightly higher than those obtained 
using the specification that does not include the additional individual characteristics. 
The differences range from the lowest of 0.29 to the highest of 0.42 percentage 
points.  
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Including tenure, marital status, urban area of residence, and gender variables lowers 
the social return to schooling by 2.22 (based on experience) and 1.95 (based on age) 
percentage points in the models using years of schooling. On average, the social 
return to schooling based on the level of education is 1.72 percentage points smaller 
than the results from the model that excluded the tenure, marital status, urban area of 
residence, and gender variables. 
Table 7.13 presents the IV estimates using the SSS-Population variable as the sole 
instrument and PerHE and PerHE-Ind as the aggregate-level human capital measures 
for the Mincerian model without additional individual characteristics. The first-stage 
regression for all estimations show that the estimate associated with the instrument is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, indicating that SSS-
Population is acceptable instrument. Moreover, the Hausman test rejects, at the 1 
percent level, the null hypothesis of the equality between the OLS and IV estimates 
for all four specifications.  
The results from the earnings equation estimations show that all the individual 
variables are highly significant and have the expected sign. The external return 
produced by PerHE-Ind is positive and highly significant for all specifications. More 
importantly, the external return to schooling associated with the PerHE variable is 
also positive and significant, and it is even greater than the private return to schooling 
(see columns (b) and (f)).  
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Table 7.11: Instrumenting Average Years of Schooling with the Ratio of the Number of Senior Secondary School to Population 
(Mincerian Model without Additional Individual Characteristics) 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
     age proxying experience 
 
Variable 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
Constant 8.00577 
(0.08002)*** 
3.92637 
(0.18639)*** 
8.08542 
(0.08843)*** 
4.07966 
(0.19102)*** 
7.65945 
(0.14632)*** 
3.65106 
(0.19089)*** 
7.70308 
(0.15593)*** 
3.80059 
(0.19535)*** 
Years of schooling 0.01087 
(0.00347)*** 
0.05048 
(0.02250)*** 
  0.00849 
(0.00319)*** 
0.04450 
(0.00170)*** 
  
Primary school   -0.04939 
(0.04861) 
0.09297 
(0.02621)*** 
  -0.03448 
 (0.04757) 
0.09979 
(0.02565)*** 
Junior secondary school   -0.05602 
(0.05108) 
0.21374 
(0.02752)*** 
  -0.04308 
 (0.04887) 
0.20898 
(0.02634)*** 
Vocational senior secondary school   0.07366 
 (0.05282) 
0.36193 
(0.02833)*** 
  0.07374 
 (0.04976) 
0.33698 
(0.02674)*** 
General senior secondary school   0.07924 
 (0.05045) 
0.36432 
(0.02705)*** 
  0.07732 
 (0.04724) 
0.33720 
(0.02539)*** 
College   0.07129 
 (0.06307) 
0.51473 
(0.03375)*** 
  0.05711 
 (0.05987) 
0.46564 
(0.03211)*** 
Undergraduate   0.00559 
 (0.05759) 
0.62907 
(0.03093)*** 
  -0.01077 
 (0.05421) 
0.57856 
(0.02920)*** 
Master   0.23895 
(0.14198)* 
0.89090 
(0.07623)*** 
  0.22069 
 (0.14060) 
0.83316 
(0.07563)*** 
Experience 0.01092 
(0.00351)*** 
0.01560 
(0.00189)*** 
0.01206 
(0.00354)*** 
0.01541 
(0.00192)*** 
    
Experience2 -0.00021 
(0.00008)*** 
-0.00023 
(0.00004)*** 
-0.00024 
(0.00008)*** 
-0.00024 
(0.00004)*** 
    
Ag     0.02518 
(0.00716)*** 
0.02309 
(0.00387)*** 
0.02582 
(0.00720)*** 
0.02091 
(0.00392)*** 
Age2     -0.00031 
(0.00009)*** 
-0.00023 
(0.00005)*** 
-0.00032 
(0.00009)*** 
-0.00021 
(0.00005)*** 
AveSchool  0.11224 
(0.02250)*** 
 0.12346 
(0.02283)*** 
 0.11361 
(0.02251)*** 
 0.12412 
(0.02285)*** 
AveSchool-Ind -0.00025 
(0.00830) 
0.02983 
(0.00444)*** 
0.001176 
(0.00834) 
0.02888 
(0.00449)*** 
-0.00017 
(0.00830) 
0.02974 
(0.00445)*** 
0.00171 
 (0.00835) 
0.02903 
(0.00450)*** 
SSS-Population 
 
7.19665 
(0.30240)*** 
 7.14797 
(0.30374)*** 
 7.20308 
(0.30227)*** 
 7.15042 
(0.30361)*** 
 
 R2 
 
0.1267  0.1302  0.1273  0.1306  
Adjusted R2 
 
0.1257  0.1281  0.1263  0.1285 
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 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
     age proxying experience 
 
Variable 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
Observations 4528 4528 4528 4528 4528 4528 4528 4528 
 
Test Results 
        
 
Quality 
 
        
F  
 
 566.349  553.816  567.853  554.659 
 
P-Value 
 
 0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
 
Relevance (Hausman test) 
 
        
F 
 
 6.9722  7.23381  7.23381  9.24936 
P-Value  0.0083***  0.0024***  0.0072***  0.0024*** 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
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Table 7.12: Instrumenting Average Years of Schooling with the Ratio of the Number of Senior Secondary School to Population 
(Mincerian Model with Additional Individual Characteristics) 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
     age proxying experience 
 
Variable 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
Constant 7.98919 
(0.08230)*** 
4.15385 
(0.18061)*** 
8.05422 
(0.09096)*** 
4.30373 
(0.18364)*** 
7.68630 
(0.15227)*** 
3.99360 
(0.18585)*** 
7.72033 
(0.16183)*** 
4.16615 
(0.18884)*** 
Years of schooling 0.00684 
(0.00360)* 
0.04399 
(0.00184)*** 
  0.00381 
 (0.00325) 
0.04201 
(0.00166)*** 
  
Primary school   -0.04264 
(0.04871) 
0.06083 
(0.02504)** 
  -0.03240 
(0.04745) 
0.07188 
(0.02440)*** 
Junior secondary school   -0.07478 
(0.05140) 
0.16138 
(0.02647)*** 
  -0.06840 
 (0.04888) 
0.17205 
(0.02518)*** 
Vocational senior secondary school   0.03262 
 (0.05385) 
0.27061 
(0.02757)*** 
  0.02561 
 (0.05028) 
0.27550 
(0.02578)*** 
General senior secondary school   0.04518 
 (0.05136) 
0.27775 
(0.02629)*** 
  0.03620 
 (0.04762) 
0.28229 
(0.02440)*** 
College   0.04042 
 (0.06398) 
0.44711 
(0.03272)*** 
  0.01846 
 (0.05992) 
0.44499 
(0.03071)*** 
Undergraduate   -0.02793 
(0.05862) 
0.54404 
(0.03013)*** 
  -0.05219 
(0.05436) 
0.54331 
(0.02805)*** 
Master   0.17662 
 (0.14227) 
0.79169 
(0.07287)*** 
  0.14934 
 (0.14038) 
0.79074 
(0.07198)*** 
Experience 0.01023 
(0.00401)** 
0.00693 
(0.00207)*** 
0.01129 
(0.00405)*** 
0.00687 
(0.00209)*** 
    
Experience2 -0.00009 
(0.00013)** 
-0.00012 
(0.00004)*** 
-0.00021 
(0.00009) 
-0.00015 
(0.00005)*** 
    
Age     -0.02295 
(0.00815)*** 
0.01245 
(0.00421)*** 
0.02317 
(0.00820)*** 
0.00930 
(0.00425)** 
Age2     -0.00027 
(0.00011)*** 
-0.00014 
(0.00005)*** 
-0.00027 
(0.00011)*** 
-0.00011 
(0.00005)** 
Tenure -0.00002 
(0.00386) 
0.01624 
(0.00198)*** 
-0.00040 
(0.00386) 
0.01591 
(0.00198)*** 
-0.00055 
(0.00386) 
0.01632 
(0.00198)*** 
-0.00060 
(0.00386) 
 (0.01656 
(0.00198)*** 
Tenure2 -0.00009 
(0.00013) 
-0.00028 
(0.00006)*** 
-0.00007 
(0.00013) 
-0.00026 
(0.00006) 
-0.00005 
(0.00013) 
-0.00028 
(0.00006) 
-0.00005 
(0.00005) 
-0.00028 
(0.00007)*** 
Marital status 0.05331  
(0.03453) 
-0.00338 
(0.01773) 
0.05372 
 (0.03451) 
-0.00490 
(0.01771)*** 
0.04734  
(0.03473) 
-0.00357 
(0.01784) 
0.04978 
 (0.03472) 
-0.00071 
(0.01783) 
Urban  0.16829 
(0.02446)*** 
0.06784 
(0.01323)*** 
0.16352 
(0.02464)*** 
0.07303 
(0.01326)*** 
0.16848 
(0.02445)*** 
0.06776 
(0.01323)*** 
0.16331 
(0.02463)*** 
0.07248 
(0.01327)*** 
Female 0.00264  
(0.02303) 
-0.19940 
(0.01181)*** 
0.00602 
 (0.02316) 
-0.20833 
(0.01187)*** 
0.00130 
 (0.02300) 
-0.20040 
(0.01180)*** 
0.00512  
(0.02315) 
-0.20929 
(0.01187)*** 
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 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
     age proxying experience 
 
Variable 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
AveSchool  0.09461 
(0.02180)*** 
 0.10710 
(0.02196)*** 
 0.09514 
(0.02179)*** 
 0.10792 
(0.02198)*** 
AveSchool-Ind -0.00945 
(0.00844) 
0.03391 
(0.00427)*** 
-0.00831 
(0.00849) 
0.03175 
(0.00430)*** 
-0.00943 
(0.00844) 
0.03393 
(0.00427)*** 
-0.00791 
(0.00849) 
0.03199 
(0.00431)*** 
SSS-Population 
 
7.10672 
(0.30205)*** 
 7.07910 
(0.30327)*** 
 7.11077 
(0.30194)*** 
 7.08011 
(0.30318)*** 
 
 R2 
 
0.1365  0.1394  0.1369  0.1395  
Adjusted R2 
 
0.1346  0.1363  0.1350  0.1365  
Observations 4258 4258 4258 4258 4258 4258 4258 4258 
 
Test Results 
        
 
Quality 
 
        
F  
 
 553.566  544.872  554.621  545.355 
 
P-Value 
 
 0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
 
Relevance (Hausman test) 
 
        
F 
 
 4.24192  6.43835  4.3586  6.56637 
P-Value  0.0395**  0.0112**  0.0369**  0.0104** 
  Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 7.13: Instrumenting Percentage of Workers with Higher Education with the Ratio of the Number of Senior Secondary 
School to Population (Mincerian Model without Additional Individual Characteristics) 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
     age proxying experience 
 
Variable 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage  of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage  of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage  of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage  of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
Constant 5.13662 
(0.24323)*** 
4.74228 
(0.06525)*** 
5.49965 
(0.25931)*** 
4.95074 
(0.07104)*** 
4.09868 
(0.56847)*** 
4.49994 
(0.09057)*** 
4.25825 
(0.59454)*** 
4.71373 
(0.09605)*** 
Years of schooling 0.08011 
(0.01453)*** 
0.05773 
(0.00881)*** 
  0.07119 
(0.01329)*** 
0.04360 
(0.00190)*** 
  
Primary school   -0.08041  
(0.20497) 
0.09600 
(0.02822)*** 
  -0.03804  
(0.20061) 
0.10174 
(0.02764)***  
Junior secondary school   0.08781  
(0.21504) 
0.21088 
(0.02956)*** 
  0.11467  
(0.20576) 
0.20570 
(0.02834)*** 
Vocational senior secondary school   0.99552 
(0.22137)*** 
0.32708 
(0.03153)*** 
  0.97218 
(0.20841)*** 
0.30322 
(0.02990)*** 
General senior secondary school   0.64534 
(0.21138)*** 
0.35273 
(0.02951)*** 
  0.61519 
(0.19774)*** 
0.32693 
(0.02774)*** 
College   0.73519 
(0.26497)*** 
0.50543 
(0.03662)*** 
  0.65508 
(0.25123)*** 
0.45914 
(0.03479)*** 
Undergraduate   0.39851  
(0.24240) 
0.63406 
(0.03330)*** 
  0.31191  
(0.22789) 
0.58648 
(0.03137)*** 
Master   1.76684 
(0.59843)*** 
0.84092 
(0.08349)*** 
  1.67188 
(0.59262)*** 
0.78621 
(0.08278)*** 
Experience 0.03753 
(0.01483)** 
0.01443 
(0.00203)*** 
0.04408 
(0.01495)*** 
0.01397 
(0.00209)*** 
    
Experience2 -0.00071 
(0.00033)** 
-0.00020 
(0.00004)*** 
-0.00084 
(0.00033)** 
-0.00021 
(0.00005)*** 
    
Age     0.07881 
(0.03024)*** 
0.02102 
(0.00414)*** 
0.08732 
(0.03038)*** 
0.01821 
(0.00425)*** 
Age2     -0.00096 
(0.00039)** 
-0.00020 
(0.00005)*** 
-0.00105 
(0.00039)*** 
-0.00017 
(0.00005)*** 
PerHE 
 
 0.08011 
(0.01453)*** 
 0.06260 
(0.00908)*** 
 0.05813 
(0.00882)*** 
 0.06285 
(0.00908)*** 
PerHE-Ind 0.00184 
(0.00054)*** 
0.00144 
(0.00400)* 
0.00413 
 (0.00405) 
0.00146 
(0.00056)*** 
0.00156 
 (0.00400) 
0.00185 
(0.00054)*** 
0.00446 
 (0.00405) 
0.00149 
(0.00056)*** 
SSS-Population 
 
18.76461 
(1.22072)*** 
 18.51046 
(1.22197)*** 
 18.77488 
(1.22066)*** 
 18.51670 
(1.22168)*** 
 
 R2 
 
0.0611  0.0685  0.0613  0.0685  
Adjusted R2 0.0601  0.0662  0.0602  0.0663  
229 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
     age proxying experience 
 
Variable 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage  of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage  of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage  of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage  of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Observations 4528 4528 4528 4528 4528 4528 4528 4528 
 
Test Results 
        
 
Quality 
 
        
F   236.291  229.465  236.573  229.729 
         
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
 
Relevance (Hausman test) 
 
        
F 
 
 32.9254  38.0705  33.3415  38.2182 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
  Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 7.14: Instrumenting Percentage of Workers with Higher Education with the Ratio of the Number of Senior Secondary 
School to Population (Mincerian Model with Additional Individual Characteristics) 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
     age proxying experience 
 
Variable 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage  of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage  of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage  of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage  of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
Constant 
 
4.66068 
(0.25581)*** 
4.88228 
(0.06306)*** 
4.85728 
(0.27560)*** 
5.09730 
(0.06727)*** 
3.76783 
(0.59375)*** 
4.74567 
(0.09021)*** 
3.78874 
(0.62103)*** 
4.99615 
(0.09473)*** 
Years of schooling 0.03689 
(0.01503)** 
0.04474 
(0.00200)*** 
  0.02814 
(0.01353)** 
0.04288 
(0.00180)*** 
  
Primary school   -0.07579 
(0.20313) 
0.06561 
(0.02718)** 
  -0.04041 
(0.19791) 
0.07570 
(0.02650)*** 
Junior secondary school   -0.12264 
(0.21419) 
0.16936 
(0.02718)*** 
  -0.10217 
(0.20368) 
0.17948 
(0.02729)*** 
Vocational senior secondary school   0.58455 
(0.22370)*** 
0.25561 
(0.03018)*** 
  0.55879 
(0.20879)*** 
0.26105 
(0.02827)*** 
General senior secondary school   0.28201 
 (0.21329) 
0.28361 
(0.02853)*** 
  0.25063  
(0.19766) 
0.28891 
(0.02649)*** 
College   0.34830 
 (0.26632) 
0.45779 
(0.03551)*** 
  0.27023  
(0.24946) 
0.45759 
(0.03332)*** 
Undergraduate   -0.00773 
(0.24448) 
0.57086 
(0.03267)*** 
  -0.08974 
(0.22691) 
0.57208 
(0.03042)*** 
Master   1.13122 
(0.59354)* 
0.77133 
(0.07973)*** 
  1.04097 
(0.58583)* 
0.77219 
(0.07879)*** 
Experience 0.03470 
(0.01676)** 
0.00600 
(0.00224)*** 
0.04024 
(0.01691)** 
0.00572 
(0.00229)** 
    
Experience2 -0.00064 
(0.00036)* 
-0.00010 
(0.00005)** 
-0.00076 
(0.00037)** 
-0.00012 
(0.00005)** 
    
Age     0.06966 
(0.03405)** 
0.01083 
(0.00455)** 
0.07643 
(0.03423)** 
0.00711 
 (0.00464) 
Age2     -0.00084 
(0.00044)* 
-0.00012 
(0.00006)** 
-0.00092 
(0.00044)** 
-0.00009 
(0.00007) 
Tenure 0.00678 
 (0.01611) 
0.01584 
(0.00213)*** 
0.00556 
 (0.01612) 
0.01552 
(0.00215)*** 
0.00673 
 (0.01612) 
0.01586 
(0.00213)*** 
0.00608 
 (0.01610) 
0.01613 
(0.00215)*** 
Tenure2 -0.00040 
(0.00052) 
-0.00027 
(0.00007)*** 
-0.00035 
(0.00053) 
-0.00024 
(0.00007)*** 
-0.00034 
(0.00053) 
-0.00027 
(0.00007)*** 
-0.00033 
(0.00053) 
-0.00027 
(0.00007)*** 
Marital status 0.26144 
(0.14423)* 
-0.01477 
(0.01913) 
0.26184 
(0.14396)* 
-0.01704 
(0.01933) 
0.25643 
(0.14507)* 
-0.01536 
(0.01926) 
0.25893 
(0.14488)* 
-0.01297 
(0.01948) 
Urban  1.26347 
(0.10098)*** 
0.02643 
 (0.01845) 
1.22154 
(0.10154)*** 
0.02918 
 (0.01848) 
1.26405 
(0.10096)*** 
0.02619 
 (0.01846) 
1.22147 
(0.10153)*** 
0.02830 
 (0.01850) 
Female 0.01992 -0.19437 0.04673 -0.20475 0.01427 -0.19518 0.04276 -0.20558 
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 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
     age proxying experience 
 
Variable 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage  of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage  of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage  of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage  of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
 (0.09590) (0.01266)***  (0.09636) (0.01287)***  (0.09579) (0.01265)***  (0.09632) (0.01288)*** 
PerHE 
 
 0.05532 
(0.00916)*** 
 0.06039 
(0.00935)*** 
 0.05551 
(0.00916)*** 
 0.06078 
(0.00935)*** 
PerHE-Ind -0.00129 
(0.00396) 
0.00218 
(0.00052)*** 
0.00071 
 (0.00402) 
0.00161 
(0.00054)*** 
-0.00123 
(0.00396) 
0.00218 
(0.00052)*** 
0.00096 
 (0.00402) 
0.00165 
(0.00054)*** 
SSS-Population 
 
17.40880 
(1.20811)*** 
 17.29611 
(0.00402)*** 
 17.42172 
(1.20791)*** 
 17.30547 
(1.20958)*** 
 
 R2 
 
0.0932  0.0981  0.0932  0.0981  
Adjusted R2 
 
0.0911  0.0949  0.0911  0.0949  
Observations 
 
4258 4258 4258 4258 4258 4258 4258 4258 
Test Results         
 
Quality 
 
        
F  
 
 207.646  204.371  208.022  204.691 
P-Value 
 
 0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
Relevance (Hausman test) 
 
        
F 
 
 29.8863  35.5313  30.1608  35.9853 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
  Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 7.14 presents the IV estimates using SSS-Population as the sole instrument and 
PerHE and PerHE-Ind as the aggregate-level human capital measures for the 
Mincerian model with the additional individual characteristics. The estimates of the 
external returns to schooling created by PerHE and PerHE-Ind are both positive and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Quantitatively, the estimates of the 
external returns to schooling based on the PerHE variable are comparable with their 
counterparts report in Table 7.13, except for the estimate based on potential work 
experience and years of schooling (see column b). When compared to the results 
obtained from the IV estimatation using PerPoverty as an instrument (reported in 
Tables 7.8 and 7.9), the external returns reported in Table 7.14 are somewhat smaller.  
The SSS-Population variable performs well as an instrument, as shown in the first-
stage regression reported in Tables 7.11, 7.12, 7.13, and 7.14. The results consistently 
show that the coefficient on the SSS-Population variable is positive, as it is expected, 
and significant at the 1 percent level of significance. Moreover, the Hausman test of 
the endogeneity of AveSchool or PerHE indicates that the null hypothesis of 
exogeneity is rejected for all specifications. This result confirms that adopting an IV 
approach is necessary.  
Summing up the patterns of the IV estimates results, there are eight points that need 
to be highlighted. First, all estimates of the external returns to schooling are positive 
and statistically significant, both for the overall level of the variable designed to 
capture them and for the industrial sector levels variant of the same variable. Second, 
using years of schooling or level of education for the individual’s education, and 
using potential work experience or age, generates the same results, where the 
coefficients for the aggregate-level human capital measures are positive and 
statistically significant. Third, the magnitude of the estimated external return to 
schooling is comparable across the specifications. Fourth, adding variables for tenure 
and its square, marital status, urban area of residence, and gender status to the 
estimating equation leads to a decrease in the coefficients of the variables of 
AveSchool and PerHE, but is associated with an increase in the coefficients of the 
variables of AveSchool-Ind and PerHE-ind. Fifth, the external return to schooling 
created by the average years of schooling and the percentage of workers with higher 
education obtained using the IV approach is  much larger than that obtained using 
OLS. Sixth, the magnitude of the social return to schooling tends to increase with the 
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level of education. Seventh, most of the specifications show that workers with general 
senior secondary school are associated with a larger social return to school than 
workers with vocational senior secondary school. Eighth, the PerPoverty and SSS-
Population variables apparently perform well as instruments. 
7.4.3 Comparing the Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and 
Female Workers 
The results discussed in sub-sections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2 provide strong evidence of the 
presence of sizeable human capital externalities in Indonesia. Now, we evaluate the 
impact of the aggregate-level human capital on the earnings of male and female 
workers separately. The results from the OLS estimations are presented in Tables 
7.15, 7.16, 7.17, and 7.18. Table 7.15 (7.16) reports the OLS estimates separately for 
males and females based on years of schooling (education levels) without additional 
individual characteristics.  Table 7.17 (7.18) reports the OLS estimates separately for 
males and females based on years of schooling (education levels) with additional 
individual characteristics. Note that in these estimations the aggregate-level human 
capital variable is for all workers, without a gender distinction. This type of 
measurement is consistent with idea behind the externalities concept. 
All variables reported in Table 7.15 are significant and have the expected sign. It can 
be seen that the private return for females exceeds that for males for all four 
specifications.  The coefficient of AveSchool is 0.05422 (0.05753) and 0.05401 
(0.05836) for males (females), indicating that an extra year of provincial average 
years of schooling tends to increase earnings by around 5.42 (5.75) and 5.40 (5.84) 
percent for males (females). Using the human capital for the industrial sector within 
each province as the variable to capture the externalities shows that an extra year of 
schooling based on the industrial sector within each province tends to raise individual 
earnings by about 3.68 (5.26) and 3.69 (5.26) percent for males (females). To put 
these figures in perspective, note that the return to own schooling is approximately 
4.59 (5.60) and 4.01 (5.02) percent for male and female workers, respectively in these 
estimation. Thus both the private return and the externality effect for females exceed 
the comparable magnitudes for males. Consequently, female workers receive a social 
return to education greater than male workers. The social return to education ranges 
234 
 
from 13.10 to 13.69 percent for male workers and from 16.11 percent to 16.59 
percent for female workers. 
Replacing the variable of AveSchool with PerHE (see the right-hand side Table 7.15) 
results in a lower externality effect for all specifications, which is 0.01041 for males 
and 0.0159 and 0.01613 for females, suggesting that a one percentage point increase 
in the share of workers with higher education leads to an increase in individual 
earnings by approximately 1.04 percent for males and about 1.59 and 1.61 percent for 
females. These results are different from the earlier finding (when AveSchool is used 
as aggregate-level human capital measure), as here the external return to schooling is 
smaller than the private return to schooling.42  
Similarly, utilising the PerHE-Ind variable instead of AveSchool-Ind produces 
substantially lower figures, where a one percentage point increase in the 
representation of workers with higher education based on the industrial sector within 
each province increases an individual’s earnings by around 0.20 (0.45) and 0.21 
(0.45) percent for male (female) workers.  
Supporting the results presented in columns (a), (b), (c), and (d) of Table 7.15 where 
the years of schooling variable was used, when the percentage of workers with higher 
education qualifications is used for the aggregate-level variable the social return to 
education for female workers exceeds for male workers. These social returns to 
education range from 5.60 to 6.17 percent for male workers and from 7.23 to 7.78 
percent for female workers. 
The results reported in Table 7.16 which are based on education levels, suggest that 
the human capitals externalities associated with average years of schooling and 
average years of schooling based on the industrial sector within each province are 
slightly larger for female workers than they are for male workers. Analysing the 
human capital externalities using the PerHE and PerHE-Ind variables as aggregate-
level human capital measures provides a similar result.  
Male and female workers have social returns to schooling that increase with the level 
of education. The magnitude of the social return to schooling for male workers with 
                                               
42 Note that this conclusion also holds when the estimated partial effects in this semi-logarithmic 
earnings equation are multiplied by mean of the respective variable to give an elasticity measure. 
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primary schooling and master degree qualifications is larger than that of female 
workers with those education levels, except for the specification based on age where 
the AveSchool and AveSchol-Ind variables are used as the aggregate-level human 
capital measures. The results from this specification show that only male workers 
with a master degree are associated with a social return to schooling that exceeds that 
of female workers with master degree.  
The results of all the specifications suggest that the social return to schooling for male 
workers with general senior secondary school is larger than that of male workers with 
vocational senior secondary school. Female workers are characterised by the opposite 
pattern, where the social return to schooling is larger for female workers who 
graduated from vocational senior secondary school than it is for female workers who 
graduated from general senior secondary school. 
Following the approach used in the study of the data pooled across male and female 
workers in the previous section, the earnings equation was augmented with the 
additional individual characteristics for tenure, marital status, and area of residence. 
The results are reported in Tables 7.17 and 7.18. Even after including these additional 
variables for individual characteristics, all four aggregate-level human capital 
measures enter the earnings function with a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient. Moreover, the results in these specifications reveal the same patterns as 
the earlier results reported in Tables 7.15 and 7.16.  
Thus, based on the results reported in Tables 7.15, 7.16, 7.17, and 7.18, the following 
patterns are established. First, for both males and females, estimating the external 
return to schooling using the average years of schooling as an aggregate-level human 
capital measure yields a greater external return than that obtained using the 
percentage of workers with higher education as an aggregate-level human capital 
measure, both at the provincial level and when based on the industrial sector within 
each province. For example, on average the external return to schooling created from 
the average years of schooling is 4.37 and 4.20 percentage points greater than that 
associated with the share of workers with higher education for male and female 
workers, respectively. When the industrial sector within each province is used as the 
basis for constructing the aggregate-level human capital measure, on average the 
external return to schooling associated with the average years of schooling based on 
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the industrial sector within each province is 3.48 and 4.81 percentage points greater 
than that associated with the share of workers with higher education based on the 
industrial sector for male and female workers, respectively.   
Second, the effect of the aggregate-level education on individual earnings associated 
with the average provincial-level education without a sectoral distinction is greater 
than that induced by the average human capital with an industrial sector distinction. 
Thus the external return to schooling from the average years of schooling (the 
percentage of workers with higher education) is 1.73 (0.84) percentage points higher 
than that from the average years of schooling based on the province’s industrial sector 
(the percentage of workers with higher education based on the industrial sector within 
the province) for male workers. Similarly, the external return to schooling from the 
average years of schooling (the percentage of workers with higher education) is 0.54 
(1.15) percentage points higher than that from the average years of schooling based 
on the province’s industrial sector (the percentage of workers with higher education 
based on the province’s industrial sector) for female workers.  
Third, similar to the private return, the external return for females also exceeds that 
for males for all four aggregate-level human capital measures. On average, an extra 
year of average schooling (average years of schooling based on the industrial sector 
within the province) increases female workers’ earnings by around 0.39 (1.58) 
percentage points more than the comparable increase for male workers. Likewise, on 
average, a one percentage point addition to the share of workers with higher 
education (share of worker with higher education based on the industrial sector within 
the province) increases female workers’ earnings by approximately 0.56 (0.25) 
percentage points more than the comparable increase for male workers. These three 
patterns remain when education levels are used in place of years of schooling in the 
earnings equation (see Tables 7.16 and 7.18).   
Fourth, the social return to schooling also has the same pattern as the private and 
external returns to schooling. Female workers are associated with a higher social 
return to schooling compared with male workers for the specifications based on years 
of schooling. For example, the results in Table 7.15 (7.17) suggest that, on average, 
the social return to schooling for female workers is 2.29 (1.88) percentage points 
higher than that for male workers.  For the specifications based on education levels, 
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most estimations suggests that the social return to schooling for male workers is 
larger than that of female workers only for workers with primary school or a master 
degree. 
Fifth, comparing general and vocational senior secondary school, the following 
conclusion can be drawn. Male workers with general senior secondary school have a 
larger social return to schooling than male workers with vocational senior secondary 
school. On the other hand, the social return to schooling for female workers with 
vocational senior secondary school exceeds that of female workers with general 
senior secondary school. 
The IV approach is also utilised to separately evaluate the impact of aggregate-level 
human capital on earnings for male and female workers. The results based on the IV 
approach are presented as appendixes in Tables A7.1 to A7.16. The results from the 
first-stage regressions provided in Tables A7.1 to A7.8 confirm the endogeneity of 
AveSchool and PerHE. Furthermore, it appears that the PerPoverty variable is an 
acceptable instrument for all specifications. The results obtained based on the IV 
approach using PerPoverty as an instrument for males and females separately suggest 
that the impact of the average years of schooling is greater for male workers than it is 
for female workers for most specifications, though the specification based on 
education levels and age with the additional individual characteristics is an exception 
in this regard (see Tables A7.1 to A7.4). This pattern is contrary to the results 
obtained using the OLS method, where the average years of schooling was associated 
with a greater impact for female workers than for male workers. However, the results 
for the average years of schooling based on the industrial sector within the province 
have a pattern similar to the OLS results, where that impact is greater for female 
workers than it is for male workers. In terms of the social return to schooling, the 
results from Tables A7.1 and A.7.3 suggest that male workers have a slightly smaller 
social return to schooling. Thus, the social return to schooling for male workers 
ranges from 27.41 to 28.07 percent, whereas for female workers the social return to 
schooling ranges from 28.86 to 29.32 percent.  
As shown in Tables A7.2 and A7.4 the social return to schooling for male workers 
exceeds that for female workers only for workers with primary school or a master 
degree qualification. The size of the social return to schooling for both male and 
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female workers increases with the level of education. The results reported in Table 
A.7.2 show that male and female workers with general senior secondary schooling 
are associated with a larger social return to schooling compared to male and female 
workers with vocational senior secondary schooling. The results presented in Table 
A7.4 have the same pattern for male workers. However, the opposite pattern occurs 
for female workers. 
In Tables A7.5 to A7.8 it can be seen that the external returns to schooling from the 
percentage of the workers with higher education for female workers are smaller than 
those for their male counterparts. This pattern is also different from the results 
obtained using the OLS approach. However, the results where the aggregate-level 
variable refers to the percentage of workers with higher education based on the 
industrial sector within the province are in line with the results presented using the 
OLS approach. In contrast to the results presented in Tables A7.1 and A7.3, the social 
return to schooling based on years of schooling for female workers is greater than that 
for male workers. It ranges from the lowest of 10.76 percent to the highest of 11.29 
percent for male workers and from the lowest of 11.74 percent to the highest of 12.31 
percent for female workers. The male workers with primary school or master degree 
education qualification have a greater social return to schooling than comparable 
female workers. This pattern is also found in the earlier results discussed above. 
However, for the specification of the IV approach using PerPover as an instrument, 
based on experience and without the additional variables for individual 
characteristics, the results suggest a different pattern, where in addition to male 
workers with primary schooling or a master degree, male workers with vocational and 
general senior secondary schooling have a higher social return to schooling than 
female workers. 
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Table 7.15: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female Workers (OLS Estimation based on Years of 
Schooling - Mincerian Model without Additional Individual Characteristics) 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
Variable Males 
 
Females 
 
Males 
 
Females 
 
Males 
 
Females 
 
Males 
 
Females 
 
Constant 4.51249 
(0.08416)*** 
4.00040 
(0.13444)*** 
4.29647 
(0.11350)*** 
3.69586 
(0.17057)*** 
5.19038 
(0.03676)*** 
4.80864 
(0.05352)*** 
4.97285 
(0.08708)*** 
4.51363 
(0.11952)*** 
Years of schooling 0.04590 
(0.00215)*** 
0.05598 
(0.00317)*** 
0.04006 
(0.00201)*** 
0.05016 
(0.00287)*** 
0.04925 
(0.00216)*** 
0.05740 
(0.00323)*** 
0.04351 
(0.00200)*** 
0.05166 
(0.00291)*** 
Experience 0.01214 
(0.00227)*** 
0.01601 
(0.00310)*** 
  0.01194 
(0.00230)*** 
0.01589 
(0.00311)*** 
  
Experience2 -0.00015 
(0.00005)*** 
-0.00024 
(0.00007)*** 
  -0.00015 
(0.00005)*** 
-0.00024 
(0.00007)*** 
  
Age   0.01885 
(0.00458)*** 
0.02512 
(0.00646)*** 
  0.01880 
(0.00463)*** 
0.02480 
(0.00649)*** 
Age2   -0.00017 
(0.00006)*** 
-0.00026 
(0.00009)*** 
  -0.00018 
(0.00006)*** 
-0.00025 
(0.00009)*** 
AveSchool 0.05422 
(0.00853)*** 
0.05753 
(0.01349)*** 
0.05401 
(0.00854)*** 
0.05836 
(0.05256)*** 
    
AveSchool-Ind 0.03675 
(0.00476)*** 
0.05256 
(0.00800)*** 
0.03691 
(0.00476)*** 
0.05256 
(0.00801)*** 
    
PerHE 
 
    0.01041 
(0.00213)*** 
0.01590 
(0.00327)*** 
0.01041 
(0.00214)*** 
0.01613 
(0.00327)*** 
PerHE-Ind     0.00203 
(0.00059)*** 
0.00450 
(0.00089)*** 
0.00207 
(0.00059)*** 
0.00449 
(0.00089)*** 
 R2 
 
0.2224 0.2914 0.2218 0.2897 0.2033 0.2827 0.2028 0.2810 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.2211 0.2891 0.2205 0.2874 0.2020 0.2803 0.2014 0.2786 
 
Observations 3017 1511 3017 1511 3017 1511 3017 1511 
            Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 7.16: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female Workers (OLS Estimation based on Education 
Level - Mincerian Model without Additional Individual Characteristics) 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
Variable 
 
Males 
 
Females 
 
Males 
 
Females 
 
Males 
 
Females 
 
Males 
 
Females 
 
Constant 
 
4.70948 
(0.08783)*** 
4.34518 
(0.13954)*** 
4.49121 
(0.11832)*** 
4.01916  
(0.17850)*** 
5.42514 
(0.03965)*** 
5.13137 
(0.05730)*** 
5.20847 
(0.09113)*** 
4.82042 
(0.12678)*** 
Primary school 0.09820 
(0.03058)*** 
0.00186 
 (0.04419) 
0.09685 
(0.03002)*** 
0.01747 
 (0.04318) 
0.10093 
(0.03094)*** 
0.00038 
 (0.04450) 
0.10028 
(0.03038)*** 
0.01620  
(0.04347) 
Junior secondary school 0.19224 
(0.03202)*** 
0.19388 
(0.04698)*** 
0.17830 
(0.03088)*** 
0.20149 
 (0.04445)*** 
0.20166 
(0.03235)*** 
0.20390 
(0.04726)*** 
0.18899 
(0.03119)*** 
0.21184 
(0.04471)*** 
Vocational senior secondary school 0.31549 
(0.03288)*** 
0.36488 
(0.04945)*** 
0.28430 
(0.03121)*** 
0.35130 
 (0.04626)*** 
0.33584 
(0.03310)*** 
0.37430 
(0.04974)*** 
0.30640 
(0.03138)*** 
0.36081 
(0.04652)*** 
General senior secondary school 0.33033 
(0.03155)*** 
0.34706 
(0.04674)*** 
0.29713 
(0.02989)*** 
0.33078 
 (0.04303)*** 
0.35729 
(0.03178)*** 
0.36500 
(0.04693)*** 
0.32586 
(0.03005)*** 
0.34903 
(0.04315)*** 
College 0.49205 
(0.04176)*** 
0.53461 
(0.05304)*** 
0.44011 
(0.04013)*** 
0.49632 
 (0.04945)*** 
0.52648 
(0.04219)*** 
0.55127 
(0.05367)*** 
0.47670 
(0.04047)*** 
0.51273 
(0.05000)*** 
Undergraduate 0.57333 
(0.03642)*** 
0.65301 
(0.05116)*** 
0.51913 
(0.03477)*** 
0.61254 
 (0.04723)*** 
0.61200 
(0.03685)*** 
0.67161 
(0.05189)*** 
0.56007 
(0.03510)*** 
0.63085 
(0.04784)*** 
Master 0.87066 
(0.09250)*** 
0.90151 
(0.12115)*** 
0.80719 
(0.09182)*** 
0.86119 
 (0.11983)*** 
0.91081 
(0.09374)*** 
0.91690 
(0.12212)*** 
0.84989 
(0.09300)*** 
0.87610 
(0.12075)*** 
Experience 0.01178 
(0.00229)*** 
0.01711 
(0.00312)*** 
  0.01161 
(0.00232)*** 
0.01710 
(0.00313)*** 
  
Experience2 -0.00016 
(0.00005)*** 
-0.00029 
(0.00007)*** 
  -0.00016 
(0.00005)*** 
-0.00029 
(0.00007)*** 
  
Age   0.01678 
(0.00461)*** 
0.02337 
 (0.00652)*** 
  0.01658 
(0.00467)*** 
0.02319 
(0.00656)*** 
Age2   -0.00015 
(0.00006)*** 
-0.00026 
 (0.00009)*** 
  -0.00015 
(0.00006)*** 
-0.00024 
(0.00009)*** 
AveSchool 0.05632 
(0.00855)*** 
0.05874 
(0.01353)*** 
0.05623 
(0.00856)*** 
0.05990 
 (0.01357)*** 
    
AveSchool-Ind 0.03743 
(0.00477)*** 
0.04756 
(0.00806)*** 
0.03753 
(0.00477)*** 
0.04824 
 (0.00810)*** 
    
PerHE 
 
    0.01116 
(0.00214)*** 
0.01559 
(0.00328)*** 
0.01117 
(0.00214)*** 
0.01594 
(0.00329)*** 
PerHE-Ind     0.00192 
(0.00059)*** 
0.00378 
(0.00092)*** 
0.00195 
(0.00059)*** 
0.00388 
(0.00092)*** 
 R2 
 
0.2226 0.3029 0.2225 0.2990 0.2025 0.2937 0.2024 0.2898 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.2198 0.2978 0.2197 0.2939 0.1996 0.2885 0.1995 0.2846 
 
Observations 3017 1511 3017 1511 3017 1511 3017 1511 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 7.17: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female Workers (OLS Estimation based on Years of 
Schooling - Mincerian Model with Additional Individual Characteristics) 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
Variable 
 
Males 
 
Females 
 
Males 
 
Females 
 
Males 
 
Females 
 
Males 
 
Females 
 
Constant 4.56348 
(0.08440)*** 
4.11880  
(0.13248)*** 
4.41015  
(0.11566)*** 
3.91429 
 (0.17142)*** 
5.19346 
(0.03792)*** 
4.86313 
(0.05504)*** 
5.02803 
(0.09044)*** 
4.65826 
(0.12499)*** 
Years of  schooling 0.04101 
(0.00221)*** 
0.04749  
(0.00327)*** 
0.03867  
(0.00204)*** 
0.04585 
 (0.00285)*** 
0.04367 
(0.00224)*** 
0.04917 
(0.00332)*** 
0.04132 
(0.00205)*** 
0.04734 
(0.00290)*** 
Experience 0.00697 
(0.00255)*** 
0.00798 
 (0.00352)** 
  0.00718 
(0.00258)*** 
0.00849 
(0.00354)** 
  
Experience2 -0.00011 
(0.00005)** 
-0.00015 
 (0.00008)** 
  -0.00012 
(0.00006)** 
-0.00016 
(0.00008)** 
  
Age   0.01245 
 (0.00515)** 
0.01549  
(0.00725)** 
  0.01321 
(0.00521)** 
0.01596 
(0.00290)** 
Age2   -0.00014 
 (0.00007)** 
-0.00019  
(0.00010)** 
  -0.00015 
(0.00007)** 
-0.00019 
(0.00010)** 
Tenure  0.01163 
(0.00233)*** 
0.02453  
(0.00364)*** 
0.01167  
(0.00233)*** 
0.02461  
(0.00365)*** 
0.01142 
(0.00236)*** 
0.02393 
(0.00367)*** 
0.01143 
(0.00235)*** 
0.02406 
(0.00368)*** 
Tenure2 -0.00017 
(0.00008)** 
-0.00052  
(0.00012)*** 
-0.00017 
 (0.00008)** 
-0.00051  
(0.00012)*** 
-0.00017 
(0.00008)** 
-0.00052 
(0.00012)*** 
-0.00016 
(0.00008)** 
-0.00051 
(0.00012)*** 
Marital Status 0.03293 
 (0.23778) 
-0.04520 
 (0.02702)* 
0.03223 
 (0.02396) 
-0.04568  
(0.02717)*** 
0.02974  
(0.02402) 
-0.04897 
 (0.02720)* 
0.02861 
 (0.02420) 
-0.04908 
(0.02736)*** 
Urban 0.06717 
(0.01474)*** 
0.10325  
(0.02369)*** 
0.06728  
(0.01474)*** 
0.10305  
(0.02369)*** 
0.08412 
(0.01484)*** 
0.11064 
(0.02398)*** 
0.08424 
(0.01483)*** 
0.11040 
(0.02398)*** 
AveSchool 0.05063 
(0.00848)*** 
0.05577  
(0.01331)*** 
0.05044  
(0.00848)*** 
0.05630  
(0.01329)*** 
    
AveSchool-Ind 0.03308 
(0.00480)*** 
0.04519  
(0.00787)*** 
0.03313  
(0.00480)*** 
0.04528  
(0.00788)*** 
    
PerHE 
 
    0.00807 
(0.00215)*** 
0.01337 
(0.00326)*** 
0.00804 
(0.00215)*** 
0.01352 
(0.00326)*** 
PerHE-Ind     0.00174 
(0.00058)*** 
0.00368 
(0.00088)*** 
0.00175 
(0.00058)*** 
0.00367 
(0.00088)*** 
 R2 
 
0.2418 0.3291 0.2417 0.3290 0.2249 0.3198 0.2248 0.3196 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.2396 0.3251 0.2394 0.3249 0.2226 0.3157 0.2225 0.3155 
 
Observations 3017 1511 3017 1511 3017 1511 3017 1511 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 7.18: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female Workers (OLS Estimation based on Education 
Levels - Mincerian Model with Additional Individual Characteristics. 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
Variable Males 
 
Females 
 
Males 
 
Females 
 
Males 
 
Females 
 
Males 
 
Females 
 
Constant 4.75623 
(0.08790)*** 
4.42909 
(0.13746)*** 
4.62126  
(0.12026)*** 
4.22430 
(0.17862)*** 
5.41233 
(0.04094)*** 
5.16319 
(0.05946)*** 
5.26957 
(0.09431)*** 
4.96297 
(0.13188)*** 
Primary school 0.08332 
(0.03032)*** 
-0.00858  
(0.04353) 
0.09041 
(0.02965)*** 
0.01207 
 (0.04224) 
0.08403 
(0.03064)*** 
-0.00958 
(0.04387) 
0.09215 
(0.02997)*** 
0.01147 
 (0.04256) 
Junior secondary school 0.15747 
(0.03192)*** 
0.14754 
(0.04637)*** 
0.16210 
(0.03063)*** 
0.17231 
(0.04341)*** 
0.16225 
(0.03223)*** 
0.15640 
(0.04671)*** 
0.16826 
(0.03092)*** 
0.18125 
(0.04372)*** 
Vocational senior secondary school 0.26166 
(0.03319)*** 
0.27970 
(0.04945)*** 
0.25994 
(0.03131)*** 
0.29761 
(0.04544)*** 
0.27420 
(0.03343)*** 
0.29088 
(0.04976)*** 
0.27388 
(0.03152)*** 
0.30798 
(0.04573)*** 
General senior secondary school 0.27826 
(0.03177)*** 
0.27161 
(0.04662)*** 
0.27599 
(0.02987)*** 
0.28889 
(0.04219)*** 
0.29771 
(0.03203)*** 
0.28950 
(0.04685)*** 
0.29681 
(0.03010)*** 
0.30599 
(0.04238)*** 
College 0.42769 
(0.04192)*** 
0.44445 
(0.05328)*** 
0.41796 
 (0.03994)*** 
0.45383 
(0.04842)*** 
0.45403 
(0.04236)*** 
0.46482 
(0.05382)*** 
0.44554 
(0.04035)*** 
0.47225 
(0.04897)*** 
Undergraduate 0.51196 
(0.03665)*** 
0.55556 
(0.05139)*** 
0.50313 
(0.03462)*** 
0.56623 
(0.04630)*** 
0.54217 
(0.03713)*** 
0.57750 
(0.05204)*** 
0.53468 
(0.03507)*** 
0.58600 
(0.04698)** 
Master 0.80130 
(0.09176)*** 
0.75141 
(0.11944)*** 
0.78971 
(0.09094)*** 
0.76702 
(0.11711)*** 
0.83183 
(0.09290)*** 
0.7198 
(0.12040)*** 
0.82167 
(0.09206)*** 
0.78519 
(0.11809)*** 
Experience 0.00649 
(0.00258)** 
0.00933 
(0.00354)*** 
  0.00675 
(0.00261)*** 
0.00990 
(0.00356)*** 
  
Experience2 -0.00012 
(0.00006)** 
-0.00022 
(0.00008)*** 
  -0.00013 
(0.00008)** 
-0.00023 
(0.00008)*** 
  
Age   0.00965 
 (0.00519)* 
0.01330 
 (0.00730)* 
  0.01024 
(0.00007)* 
0.01385 
(0.00734)* 
Age2   -0.00011 
 (0.00007)* 
-0.00018 
 (0.00010)* 
  -0.00012 
(0.00007)* 
-0.00018 
(0.00010)* 
Tenure  0.01170 
(0.00234)*** 
0.02333 
(0.00363)*** 
0.01207 
(0.00233)*** 
0.02444 
(0.00364)*** 
0.01145 
(0.00236)*** 
0.02283 
(0.00366)*** 
0.01183 
(0.00236)*** 
0.02397 
(0.00367)*** 
Tenure2 -0.00016 
(0.00008)** 
-0.00046 
(0.00012)*** 
-0.00018 
(0.00008)** 
-0.00049 
(0.00012)*** 
-0.00016 
(0.00008)** 
-0.00046 
(0.00012)*** 
-0.00017 
(0.00008)** 
-0.00049 
(0.00012)*** 
Marital Status 0.03483 
 (0.02379) 
-0.05006 
 (0.02690)* 
0.03615 
 (0.02399) 
-0.04265 
 (0.02706) 
0.03170 
 (0.02404) 
-0.05394 
(0.02709)** 
0.03288 
 (0.02424) 
-0.04614 
(0.02725)* 
Urban 0.07574 
(0.01484)*** 
0.09922 
(0.02383)*** 
0.07525 
(0.01484)*** 
0.09919 
(0.02387)*** 
0.09326 
(0.01492)*** 
0.10559 
(0.02417)*** 
0.09275 
(0.01493)*** 
0.10558 
(0.02416)*** 
AveSchool 0.05214 
(0.00849)*** 
0.05880 
(0.01332)*** 
0.05219  
(0.00849)*** 
0.04042 
(0.00797)*** 
    
AveSchool-Ind 0.03298 
(0.00481)*** 
0.03973 
(0.00795)*** 
0.03315 
(0.00481)*** 
0.05976 
(0.01333)*** 
    
PerHE 
 
    0.00862 
(0.00215)*** 
0.01363 
(0.00327)*** 
0.00864 
(0.00215)*** 
0.01388 
(0.00327)*** 
PerHE-Ind     0.00153 
(0.00059)*** 
0.00283 
(0.00090)*** 
0.00156 
(0.00059)*** 
0.00292 
(0.00090)*** 
 R2 
 
0.2444 0.3401 0.2440 0.3381 0.2269 0.3304 0.2265 0.3282 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.2406 0.3334 0.2402 0.3314 0.2231 0.3237 0.2226 0.3215 
 
Observations 3017 1511 3017 1511 3017 1511 3017 1511 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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The IV estimates using SSS-Population as an instrument are reported in Tables A7.9 
to A7.16.  Similar to the results reported in Tables A7.1 to A7.4, the impact of the 
average years of schooling is greater for male workers than it is for female workers, 
except for the specification based on education levels and age with additional 
individual characteristics (see Tables A7.9 to A7.12). However, the Hausman test 
suggests that there is no difference between the IV and OLS approaches for all 
estimations for the female sample.  
The results reported in Tables A7.13 to A7.16 support the earlier findings presented 
in Tables A7.5 to A7.8. The impact of the percentage of workers with higher 
education on the earnings of male workers exceeds the impact for female workers for 
all specifications. In contrast, when the industrial sector within the province is used in 
the construction of the aggregate-level human capital measure, the effect of the 
percentage of the workers with higher education is stronger for female workers than it 
is for male workers for all specifications. Again, the results concerning the social 
return to schooling for both the specification based on years of schooling and that 
based on levels of education are very consistent with the earlier findings. The 
Hausman test confirms that adopting an IV approach is necessary for all 
specifications in Tables A7.13 to A7.16. 
Comparing the impact of aggregate-level human capital on male and female workers 
using the OLS and IV approaches, there are three issues worth noting. Firstly, using 
the OLS method, the aggregate-level human capital measured by the average years of 
schooling in each province has a larger impact on female workers’ earnings than it 
has on the earnings of male workers for most specifications. The only specification 
that shows the opposite pattern is that based on age with additional variables for 
individual characteristics. Secondly, applying the OLS approach, the results suggest 
that female workers are associated with a larger impact on their earnings than is the 
case for males from the aggregate-level human capital measured by the percentage of 
workers with higher education in each province. Thirdly, adopting the IV approach, 
all the estimations suggest that aggregate-level human capital measured by the 
average years of schooling and the percentage of workers with higher education in 
each province is associated with a bigger effect on male workers’ earnings than it has 
on the earnings of female workers.  Fourthly, using either the OLS or IV approach 
leads to a similar conclusion, that aggregate-level human capital measured either by 
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the average years of schooling based on the industrial sector within each province or 
the percentage of workers with higher education consistently has a larger effect on 
female workers’ earnings than it has on the earnings of male workers. Fifthly, 
adopting either the OLS or IV approach for the estimations based on the years of 
schooling results in a consistent conclusion, that the social return to schooling for 
female workers exceeds that for male workers. On the other hand, the estimations 
based on education levels generally are characterised by a pattern where male 
workers with primary schooling or a master degree have a higher social return to 
schooling than their female counterparts, whereas female workers with junior 
secondary school, vocational senior secondary school, general senior secondary 
school, college, or undergraduate qualifications are associated with a greater social 
return to schooling than male workers with these education levels. Sixthly, comparing 
vocational and general senior secondary school, in general the results indicate that 
male workers with general senior secondary school tend to have a larger social return 
to schooling, while female workers with vocational senior secondary school tend to 
have a greater social return to schooling. 
7.4.4 Human Capital Spillovers vs. Substitutability of Workers with Different 
Levels of Education  
Moretti (2003, 2004) stressed that the correlation between aggregate-level human 
capital and earnings is not always associated with human capital externalities. In this 
last sub-section, we attempt to verify whether the external effect of education rather 
than imperfect substitution between low-skilled and high-skilled workers explains the 
correlation of average-level education and an individual’s earnings. To do this we 
follow Moretti (2003, 2004) and Muravyev (2008), and estimate the education 
spillover effect in each province separately by the two main education levels 
represented by low-skilled and high-skilled workers.43  
Moretti (2003) and Muravyev (2008) explained that an increase in the aggregate level 
of human capital may have two different effects on an individual’s earnings. First, a 
conventional demand and supply model with imperfect substitution between high-
skilled and low-skilled workers suggest that an increase in the number of high-skilled 
                                               
43 Low-skilled workers are defined as workers with education lower than higher education. High-
skilled workers are defined as workers with higher education. 
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workers tends to decrease the earnings of the high-skilled workers and, at the same 
time, the earnings of low-skilled workers will tend to increase in this situation. In 
other words, although there are no human capital externalities, low-skilled workers 
receive benefit from an increase in the number of high-skilled workers under 
imperfect substitution between high- and low-skilled workers. Second, human capital 
externalities may increase the earnings of both low- and high-skilled workers. In 
other words, the externalities will be present as long as an increase in the average-
level of education translates into an increase in the earnings of high-skilled workers.  
Moretti (2004) emphasised that the external return to schooling associated with an 
increase in the ratio of workers with higher education should be positive for low-
skilled workers. The coefficient for high-skilled workers should also be positive as 
long as the spillover is sufficient to offset the supply effect. Thus the coefficient for 
high-skilled workers should be negative if the spillover effect is weaker than the 
supply effect. In order to differentiate these spillover and imperfect substitution 
channels, we need to evaluate the effect of an increase in the supply of workers with 
higher education on their own earnings. Based on this rationale, this study estimates 
the external return to schooling separately for workers with an education level lower 
than higher education and for workers with higher education.  
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Table 7.19: Test for Imperfect Substitutability of Workers with and without Higher Education (OLS Estimation - Mincerian 
Model without Additional Individual Characteristics) 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
Variable Workers without Higher Education Workers with Higher Education 
Constant 4.51291 
(0.08303)*** 
4.27871 
(0.10681)*** 
5.15703 
(0.03667)*** 
4.92244 
(0.07858)*** 
3.26900 
(0.32272)*** 
2.58096 
(0.35334)*** 
4.05283 
(0.28960)*** 
3.39352 
(0.32161)*** 
Years of schooling 0.04345 
(0.00237)*** 
0.03892 
(0.00217)*** 
0.04608 
(0.00237)*** 
0.04159 
(0.00216)*** 
0.10659 
(0.01876)*** 
0.09640 
(0.01906)*** 
0.10782 
(0.01881)*** 
0.09768 
(0.01909)*** 
Experience 0.01269 
(0.00213)*** 
 0.01264 
(0.00215)*** 
 0.03047 
(0.00521)*** 
 0.02937 
(0.00522)*** 
 
Experience2 -0.00018 
(0.00005)*** 
 -0.00018 
(0.00005)*** 
 -0.00058 
(0.00015)*** 
 -0.00055 
(0.00015)*** 
 
Age  0.01985 
(0.00408)*** 
 0.01996 
(0.00411)*** 
 0.05096 
(0.01150)*** 
 0.04871 
(0.01151)*** 
Age2  -0.00020 
(0.00005)*** 
 -0.00021 
(0.00005)*** 
 -0.00052 
(0.00015)*** 
 -0.00049 
(0.00015)*** 
AveSchool 0.05031 
(0.00847)*** 
0.05048 
(0.00848)*** 
  0.09072 
(0.01548)*** 
0.09018 
(0.01552)*** 
  
AveSchool-Ind 0.03527 
(0.00478)*** 
0.03541 
(0.00478)*** 
  0.01918 
(0.00896)** 
0.01908 
(0.00898)** 
  
PerHE 
 
  0.00915 
(0.00212)*** 
0.00922 
(0.00212)*** 
  0.02249 
(0.00367)*** 
0.02247 
(0.00368)*** 
PerHE-Ind   0.00234 
(0.00059)*** 
0.00238 
(0.00060)*** 
  0.00091 
(0.00098) 
-0.00089 
(0.00098) 
 R2 
 
0.1425 0.1421 0.1271 0.1266 0.1667 0.1626 0.1653 0.1615 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.1413 0.1409 0.1259 0.1255 0.1618 0.1576 0.1603 0.1565 
 
Observations 
 
3680 3680 3680 3680 848 848 848 848 
        Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 7.20: Test for Imperfect Substitutability of Workers with and without Higher Education (OLS Estimation - Mincerian 
Model with Additional Individual Characteristics) 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
Variable Workers without Higher Education Workers with Higher Education 
Constant 4.61950 
(0.08031)*** 
4.50818 
(0.10438)*** 
5.28434 
(0.03662)*** 
5.16038  
(0.07906)*** 
3.55946 
(0.31486)*** 
3.06158 
(0.36149)*** 
4.22160 
(0.28318)*** 
3.71519 
(0.33262)*** 
Years of schooling 0.03381 
(0.00235)*** 
0.03319 
(0.00212)*** 
0.03646 
(0.00237)*** 
0.03567  
(0.00213)*** 
0.09673 
(0.01827)*** 
0.09137 
(0.01860)*** 
0.09828 
(0.01837)*** 
0.09314 
(0.01869)*** 
Experience 0.00429 
 (0.00233)* 
 0.00488 
(0.00235)** 
 0.02097 
(0.00610)*** 
 0.02063 
(0.00612)*** 
 
Experience2 -0.00009  
(0.00005)* 
 -0.00010  
(0.00005)* 
 -0.00044 
(0.00018)** 
 -0.00044 
(0.00018)** 
 
Age  0.00857 
 (0.00443)* 
 0.00963 
 (0.00448)** 
 0.03603 
(0.01345)*** 
 0.03596 
(0.01349)*** 
Age2  -0.00011 
 (0.00006)* 
 -0.00012 
 (0.00006)** 
 -0.00039 
(0.00017)** 
 -0.00040 
(0.00017)** 
Tenure  0.01595 
(0.00214)*** 
0.01587 
(0.00214)*** 
0.01551 
(0.00216)*** 
0.01543  
(0.00217)*** 
0.01481 
(0.00539)*** 
0.01554 
(0.00540)*** 
0.01366 
(0.00542)** 
0.01436 
(0.00543)*** 
Tenure2 -0.00028 
(0.00007)*** 
-0.00027 
(0.00007)*** 
-0.00028 
(0.00007)*** 
-0.00027 
 (0.00007)*** 
-0.00027  
(0.00020) 
-0.00028 
 (0.00020) 
-0.00021 
 (0.00020) 
-0.00022 
 (0.00020) 
Marital Status 0.00562 
 (0.01990) 
0.00523 
 (0.01990) 
0.00013 
 (0.02012) 
-0.00027 
 (0.02012) 
-0.03427  
(0.03786) 
-0.03300 
 (0.03804) 
-0.03205  
(0.03795) 
-0.03094 
 (0.03813) 
Urban 0.07027 
(0.01382)*** 
0.07019 
(0.01381)*** 
0.08984 
(0.01386)*** 
0.08974  
(0.01386)*** 
0.14397 
(0.03110)*** 
0.14499 
(0.03116)*** 
0.13747 
(0.03153)*** 
0.01384 
(0.03158)*** 
Female -0.22461 
(0.01337)*** 
-0.22507 
(0.01337)*** 
-0.21849 
(0.01350)*** 
-0.21899  
(0.01349)*** 
-0.13431 
(0.02463)*** 
-0.13469 
(0.02472)*** 
-0.13233 
(0.02479)*** 
-0.13266 
(0.02488)*** 
AveSchool 0.05004 
(0.00809)*** 
0.05004 
(0.00808)*** 
  0.07353 
(0.01527)*** 
0.07288 
(0.01530)*** 
  
AveSchool-Ind 0.03854 
(0.00469)*** 
0.03863 
(0.00469)*** 
  0.01854 
(0.00888)** 
0.01816 
(0.00890)** 
  
PerHE 
 
  0.00830 
(0.00205)*** 
0.00831  
(0.00205)*** 
  0.01737 
(0.00366)*** 
0.01724 
(0.00367)*** 
PerHE-Ind   0.00222 
(0.03662)*** 
0.00224  
(0.00057)*** 
  0.00101  
(0.00098) 
0.00097  
(0.00098) 
 R2 
 
0.2274 0.2275 0.2095 0.2096 0.2240 0.2214 0.2195 0.2171 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.2253 0.2254 0.2074 0.2075 0.2147 0.2121 0.2101 0.2078 
 
Observations 3680 3680 3680 3680 848 848 848 848 
           Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Tables 7.19 and 7.20 show the results for the OLS estimations, with and without the 
tenure, marital status, urban area of residence and gender variables, separately for 
workers who obtained higher education and for all other (less-skilled) workers. These 
equations were also estimated using an IV approach. The IV results are presented in 
the appendix (Tables A7.17 to A7.24). 
The results reported in Table 7.19 show that the coefficient of the AveSchool 
(AveSchool-Ind) variable for workers without higher education is 0.05031 (0.03527) 
and 0.05048 (0.03541) for the specifications based on potential work experience and 
age, respectively. The coefficient of the AveSchool (AveSchool-Ind) variable for 
workers with higher education is 0.09072 (0.01918) and 0.09018 (0.01908) for the 
specifications based on potential work experience and age, respectively. All these 
four coefficients are statistically significant. These results show that the average years 
of schooling in each province has a larger effect on the earnings of high-skilled 
workers than it has on the earnings of low-skilled workers. More importantly, these 
results confirm the presence of human capital externalities since the average-level of 
schooling in each province increases the earnings of both low-skilled and high-skilled 
workers. 
In terms of the AveSchool-Ind variable, the results show that the average years of 
schooling based on the industrial sector within each province has a larger effect on 
earnings for low-skilled workers.  However, the coefficients of AveSchool-Ind for the 
high-skilled workers remain positive. Based on Moretti’s (2003) and Muravyev’s 
(2008) argument, this implies that the positive effect of human capital externalities is 
larger than, and so offsets, the negative effect of the increase in their relative supply. 
This result is similar to Moretti (2004), who found evidence of a human capital 
spillover in the US, where an increase in the proportion of high-skilled workers had a 
larger positive effect on the wages of low-skilled workers, and a smaller, though still 
positive, effect on the wages of the high-skilled workers. 
The coefficient of the PerHE (PerHE-Ind) variable for workers without higher 
education is 0.00915 (0.00234) and 0.00922 (0.00238) for the specifications based on 
potential work experience and age, respectively. The coefficient of the PerHE 
(PerHE-Ind) variable for workers with higher education is 0.02249 (0.00091) and 
0.02247 (-0.00089) for the specifications based on potential work experience and age, 
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respectively. These estimates for the PerHE variable indicate that a one percentage 
point increase in the percentage of workers with higher education in each province 
increases the earnings of low-skilled workers by 0.92 and 0.23 percent, and increases 
the earnings of high-skilled workers by 2.25 percent. This result supports the finding 
discussed earlier in this sub-section. The coefficients of the PerHE-Ind variable imply 
that a one percentage point increase in the percentage of workers with higher 
education based on the industrial sector within each province increases the earnings 
of low-skilled workers by 0.23 and 0.24 percent. However, the coefficients of the 
PerHE-Ind variable for workers with higher education are not statistically significant. 
This suggests that the supply effect approximately off-sets the human capital 
spillovers. 
The results from the specifications with the additional individual characteristics 
reported in Table 7.20 reveal similar patterns to those discussed in relation to Table 
7.19, and as such give further assurance in relation to the existence of human capital 
externalities.  
Repeating the above estimations for separate samples (workers with and without 
higher education) with the IV approach confirms the conclusion drawn based on the 
OLS estimates, namely that human capital spillover exists in Indonesia. The results 
from the IV estimates using the PerPoverty variable as the sole instrument are 
presented in the appendix (see Tables A7.17 to A7.20), and these again reveal a 
positive relationship between the aggregate-level human capital measures and an 
individual’s earnings. The results from the first-stage regressions provided in these 
tables suggest that the PerPoverty variable is an acceptable instrument. The statistical 
tests conducted indicate that the AveSchool and PerHE variables are endogenous. 
Utilising SSS-population as an instrument (see Tables A7.21 and A7.22) leads to the 
same conclusion, that there is a major human capital spillover in Indonesia. However, 
the Hausman test for workers with higher education presented in these sets of 
analyses cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality of the OLS and IV estimates.  
7.4.5 All Estimates Compared 
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 provide an overview of the estimated external return to schooling 
obtained using the OLS and IV approaches. Figure 7.1 presents a comparison of the 
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external return to schooling generated by the aggregate-level human capital in the 
province obtained using the OLS and IV approaches. The comparison of the human 
capital externalities estimated using the average years of schooling with the 
Mincerian model without (with) additional individual characteristics is presented in 
Panel A (B). The comparison of the human capital externalities estimated using the 
percentage of workers with higher education with the Mincerian model without (with) 
additional individual characteristics is presented in Panel C (D). 
Using Figure 7.1, six features of the estimated external return to schooling in 
Indonesia can be readily identified. First, the external return to schooling obtained 
using the IV approach is greater than that obtained using OLS. Second, when the 
years of schooling variable is replaced by education levels there is a slightly higher 
estimate of the external return to schooling. Third, estimating the model with 
additional individual characteristics leads to a lower estimate of the external return to 
schooling.  Fourth, the external return to schooling obtained using AveSchool as an 
aggregate-level human capital measure is substantially higher than that obtained 
using PerHE. Fifth, using OLS, the external return to schooling for female workers 
exceeds the external return for male workers. However, when the IV approach is 
adopted the results exhibit the opposite pattern, where male workers’ external return 
to schooling exceeds that of female workers. Sixth, utilising PerPoverty as an 
instrument is associated with greater external returns to schooling compared to the 
results obtained using SSS-Population as an instrument. 
Figure 7.2 presents the comparison of the external return to schooling generated by 
the measure of the aggregate-level human capital based on the industrial sector within 
the province obtained using the OLS and IV approaches. The comparison of the 
human capital externalities estimated using the average years of schooling based on 
the industrial sector for the Mincerian model without (with) additional individual 
characteristics is presented in Panel A (B). The comparison of the human capital 
externalities estimated using the percentage of workers with higher education based 
on the industrial sector for the Mincerian model without (with) additional individual 
characteristics is presented in Panel C (D). 
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Figure 7.1: External Return to Schooling (Provincial Level) 
 
A B 
  
C D 
 
 
Notes: OLS-1: OLS based on years of schooling and experience; OLS-2: OLS based on education levels and experience; OLS-3: OLS based on years of schooling and age; OLS-2: OLS based on education 
levels and age; IV-A-1: IV using PerPoverty as an instrument and based on years of schooling and experience; IV-A-2: IV using PerPoverty as an instrument and based on education levels and experience; 
IV-A-3: IV using PerPoverty as an instrument and based on years of schooling and age; IV-A-4: IV using PerPoverty as an instrument and based on education levels and age; IV-B-1: IV using SSS-
Population as an instrument and based on years of schooling and experience; IV-B-2: IV using SSS-Population as an instrument and based on education levels and experience; IV-B-3: IV using SSS-
Population as an instrument and based on years of schooling and age; IV-B-4: IV using SSS-Population as an instrument and based on education levels and age. 
Sources: Tables 7.3 to 7.18 and Tables A.7.1 to A7.16. 
252 
 
Figure 7.2: External Return to Schooling (Industrial Sector within Province) 
 
A B 
  
C D 
  
Notes: OLS-1: OLS based on years of schooling and experience; OLS-2: OLS based on education levels and experience; OLS-3: OLS based on years of schooling and age; OLS-2: OLS based on 
education levels and age; IV-A-1: IV using PerPoverty as an instrument and based on years of schooling and experience; IV-A-2: IV using PerPoverty as an instrument and based on education levels 
and experience; IV-A-3: IV using PerPoverty as an instrument and based on years of schooling and age; IV-A-4: IV using PerPoverty as an instrument and based on education levels and age; IV-B-1: 
IV using SSS-Population as an instrument and based on years of schooling and experience; IV-B-2: IV using SSS-Population as an instrument and based on education levels and experience; IV-B-3: IV 
using SSS-Population as an instrument and based on years of schooling and age; IV-B-4: IV using SSS-Population as an instrument and based on education levels and age. 
Sources: Tables 7.3 to 7.18 and Tables A.7.1 to A7.16. 
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Based on Figure 7.2, there are four features worth noting. First, the external returns to 
schooling associated with the aggregate-level human capital based on the industrial 
sector within the province are significantly smaller than those associated with the 
aggregate-level human capital in the province (displayed in Figure 7.1). In other words, 
the overall effect is substantially greater than the industrial sector level effect. Second, 
including additional individual characteristics in the estimating equation is associated 
with smaller external returns to schooling. Third, the external return to schooling for 
female workers is consistently higher than that for male workers. Fourth, utilising 
AveSchool-Ind as an aggregate-level human capital measure results in a much higher 
external return to schooling than using PerHE-Ind. This pattern is similar to the pattern 
in the external returns that was established when comparing the AveSchool and PerHE 
variables. 
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 show that the strongest effect on the productivity of workers is 
produced by an increase in the average years of schooling. This is followed by an 
increase in the share of workers with higher education, then by an increase in the average 
years of schooling based on the industrial sector, and finally by an increase in the share 
of workers with higher education based on the industrial sector in each province. 
Figures 7.3 and 7.4 present an overview of the estimated social return to schooling 
obtained using the OLS and IV approaches for the estimations based on years of 
schooling. Figure 7.3 provide a comparison of the social return to schooling generated by 
the aggregate-level human capital in the province and the aggregate-level human capital 
based on the industrial sector within each province obtained using the OLS and IV 
approaches, without the tenure, marital status, urban area of residence and gender status 
(where relevant) variables.  
The estimates of the social return to schooling using average years of schooling and 
average years of schooling based on the industrial sector within each province cluster 
between 14.47 percent and 19.96 percent for the combined sample, between 13.47 
percent and 27.41 percent for the male sample, and between 16.36 percent and 29.32 
percent for the female sample. The estimates of the social return to schooling using the 
percentage of workers with higher education and the percentage of workers with higher 
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education based on the industrial sector within each province are typically smaller. 
Hence, the estimates of the social return to schooling cluster between 6.08 percent and 
13.93 percent, 5.60 percent and 11.29 percent, and 7.23 percent and 12.31 percent for the 
full, male, and female samples, respectively. Most of these estimates suggest that 
schooling is a very attractive investment opportunity in Indonesia. Figure 7.3 shows an 
interesting result where most estimations indicate a larger social return to schooling for 
female workers than for male workers. 
Figure 7.3: Social Return to Schooling (Models based on Years of Schooling without 
Additional Variables for Individual Characteristics) 
 
OLS-1-a: OLS based on experience and average years of schooling; OLS-2-a: OLS based on age and average years of 
schooling; OLS-1-b: OLS based on experience and percentage of workers with higher education; OLS-2-b: OLS based 
on age and percentage of workers with higher education; IV-1A-a: IV using PerPoverty as an instrument and based on 
experience and average years of schooling; IV-2A-a: IV using PerPoverty as an instrument and based on age and 
average years of schooling; IV-1A-b: IV using PerPoverty as an instrument and based on experience and percentage of 
workers with higher education; IV-2A-b: IV using PerPoverty as an instrument and based on age and percentage of 
workers with higher education; IV-1B-a: IV using SSS-Population as an instrument and based on experience and 
average years of schooling ; IV-2B-a: IV using SSS-Population as an instrument and based on age and average years of 
schooling; IV-1B-b: IV using SSS-Population as an instrument and based on experience and percentage of workers 
with higher education; IV-2B-b: IV using SSS-Population as an instrument and based on experience and percentage of 
workers with higher education. 
Sources: Tables 7.3, 7.5, 7.9, 7.11, 7.13, 7.15, A7.1, A7.5, A7.13. 
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Figure 7.4: Social Return to Schooling (Models based on Years of Schooling with 
Additional Variables for Individual Characteristics) 
 
 
OLS-1-a: OLS based on experience and average years of schooling; OLS-2-a: OLS based on age and average years of 
schooling; OLS-1-b: OLS based on experience and percentage of workers with higher education; OLS-2-b: OLS based 
on age and percentage of workers with higher education; IV-1A-a: IV using PerPoverty as an instrument and based on 
experience and average years of schooling; IV-2A-a: IV using PerPoverty as an instrument and based on age and 
average years of schooling; IV-1A-b: IV using PerPoverty as an instrument and based on experience and percentage of 
workers with higher education; IV-2A-b: IV using PerPoverty as an instrument and based on age and percentage of 
workers with higher education; IV-1B-a: IV using SSS-Population as an instrument and based on experience and 
average years of schooling; IV-2B-a: IV using SSS-Population as an instrument and based on age and average years of 
schooling; IV-1B-b: IV using SSS-Population as an instrument and based on experience and percentage of workers 
with higher education;  IV-2B-b: IV using SSS-Population as an instrument and based on experience and percentage of 
workers with higher education.  
Sources: Tables 7.4, 7.6, 7.8, 7.10, 7.12, 7.14, 7.17, A7.3, A7.7, A7.9, A7.11, A7.15. 
 
Figure 7.4 provides a comparison of the social return to schooling generated by the 
aggregate-level human capital in the province and the aggregate-level human capital 
based on the industrial sector within each province obtained using the OLS and IV 
approaches following the inclusion in the estimating equation of the variables for tenure, 
marital status, urban area of residence and gender status (where appropriate). The range 
of the estimates of the social return to human capital extends from 13.03 percent to 28.18 
percent (combined sample),  from 11.01 percent to 27.78 percent (male sample), and 
from 14.74 percent to 29.11 percent (female sample) for the estimations using average 
years of schooling and average years of schooling based on the industrial sector within 
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each province. Adopting the percentage of workers with higher education in each 
province and the percentage of workers with higher education based on the industrial 
sector within each province lowers the span of the social return to schooling for the 
combined, male, female samples, respectively from  5.59 percent to 11.49 percent, 5.11 
percent to 11.22 percent, and 6.45 percent to 11.88 percent. Most estimations imply a 
larger social return to schooling for female workers than for male workers. 
The estimates of the social return to schooling based on education levels are reported in 
Tables A7.25 and A7.26. The former presents the social return to schooling obtained 
using the OLS and IV methods without additional variables for individual characteristics. 
The later reports the social return to schooling obtained using the OLS and IV methods 
with tenure, marital status, urban area of residence, and gender status variables. When 
average years of schooling and average years of schooling based on the industrial sector 
within each province are used as aggregate-level human capital measures, the estimates 
of the social return obtained using the OLS approach for the workers with primary 
schooling cluster from 9.85 to 10.80 percent for the full sample, from 10.76 to 11.01 
percent for the male sample, and from 10.49 to 11.11 percent for the female sample.  
These results are substantialy smaller than the social return to schooling for primary 
schooling reported by Psacharopoulos (1981) for less developed countries and 
Psacharopoulos (2004) for non-OECD Asian countries. He found that the social return to 
schooling for primary schooling in less developed countries was 27.00 percent and 16.20 
percent for non-OECD Asian countries. 
The estimates of the social return to schooling for workers with junior secondary 
schooling range from the smallest of 12.26 percent to the largest of 13.23 percent for the 
combined sample, from the smallest of 11.77 percent to the largest of 12.51 percent for 
the male sample, and from the smallest of 15.83 percent to the largest of 17.03 percent 
for the female sample. The range in the social return to schooling for junior secondary 
schooling is very comparable with McMahon and Boediono’s (1992) finding. Using a 
cost benefit analysis technique, they found the social return to schooling at the junior 
secondary school level in Indonesia was 22.00,  16.00, 13.00, and 11.00 percent in 1982, 
1986, 1988, and 1989, respectively.  
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The range of the estimated social return to schooling for vocational senior secondary 
schooling  is on par with the previous findings reported by McMahon and Boediono 
(1992) for 1982 and 1986 - 16.00  and 15.00 percent  -  but it is higher than their findings 
for 1988 and 1989 - 10.00 and 6.00 percent. Furthermore, our results  are on par with 
Bennell’s (1996) finding. He reported that the social return to schooling for vocational 
senior secondary school in Indonesia was 14.00 percent,  whereas our results for the 
social return to this level of schooling varies from 12.54 to 14.32 percent for the full 
sample, from 12.64 to 13.48 percent for the male sample, and from 14.99 to 16.33 
percent for the female sample. 
The estimated social return to schooling for general senior secondary school ranges from 
12.79 to 14.42 percent, from 13.17 to 13.98 percent, and from 14.70 to 15.74 percent for 
the full, male, and female samples, respectively. These magnitudes are broadly 
equivalent to the previous findings reported by McMahon and Boediono (1992), which 
are 16.00, 13.00, and 11.00 percent for the years of 1986, 1988, and 1989.  
The estimated social return to schooling for college and undergraduate qualifications is 
larger than McMahon and Boediono’s (1992) finding. McMahon and Boediono (1992) 
reported that the social returns for college (undergraduate) qualifications  were 13.00 
(11.00), 10.00 (7.00), 12.00 (6.00), and 5.00 (5.00) percent for the years of 1982, 1986, 
1988, and 1989, respectively. Our results imply that the social return to schooling for 
college (undergraduate) level education varies from 13.29 (15.00) to 16.31 (17.73) 
percent for the combined sample, from 14.11 (14.93) to 14.77 (15.45) percent for the 
male sample, and from 16.31 (17.73) to 16.88 (18.28) for the female sample. Compared 
to the finding reported by Psacharopoulos (2004) for non-OECD Asian countries, our 
results for the social return to schooling for an undergraduate qualification are greater by 
about 4.00 to 6.73 percentage points. 
 Compared to the social return to schooling for the other six education levels (primary 
school, junior secondary school, vocational senior secondary school, general senior 
secondary school, college, and undergraduate), the social return to schooling for a master 
degree is subtantially larger. It ranges from 21.86 to 23.05 percent,  from 23.71 to 24.24 
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percent, and from 20.42 to 23.25 percent for the full, male, and female samples, 
respectively. 
Utilising the percentage of workers with higher education and the percentage of workers 
with higher education based on the industrial sector within each province as aggregate-
level human capital measures lowers the estimates of the social return to schooling for all 
education levels and for each of the three samples. Adopting the IV approach raises the 
estimate of the social return to schooling compared to the results obtained using the OLS 
approach. The complete set of calculations of the social returns to schooling based on the 
level of education obtained using the OLS and IV approaches is reported in Tables A7.25 
and A7.26. 
7.5 Conclusion 
Using IFLS4 data, this study analyses whether a relationship exists between the 
aggregate-level of human capital and individual earnings in Indonesian provinces, and 
also whether this relationship reflects the presence of human capital externalities. The 
estimation framework in this study is the Mincerian earnings regression augmented with 
measures of the aggregate-level human capital in each province and in the industrial 
sector within each province. The existence of human capital externalities is thus 
evaluated at two different levels: within a province and in the same industrial sector 
within each province. We control for individual characteristics, address a potential 
endogeneity problem, compare between male and female workers, and check for the 
imperfect substitutability between low-skilled and high-skilled workers.  
Four alternative measures of aggregate-level human capital are proposed in this study: 
the average years of schooling, the percentage of workers with higher education, the 
average years of schooling based on the industrial sector within each province, and the 
percentage of workers with higher education based on the industrial sector within each 
province. The estimations of the impact of the aggregate-level human capital at the level 
of the province and in the industrial sector within each province on the individual 
worker’s earnings over different samples and specifications generate consistent results 
that indicate the presence of human capital externalities. In particular it is found that an 
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increase of the average years of schooling by one year tends to increase the earnings of 
workers by from 5.60 (5.23) to 5.91 (5.50) percent for the pooled sample, from 5.40 
(5.04) to 5.63 (5.22) percent for the male sample, and from 5.75 (4.04) to 5.99 (5.88) 
percent for the female sample if it is estimated using OLS without (with) additional 
individual characteristics. A one percentage point increase in the percentage of workers 
with higher education is associated with a 1.17 (0.96) to 1.23 (1.03) percent, 1.04 (0.80) 
to 1.12 (0.86) percent, and 1.56 (1.34) to 1.61 (1.39) percent increase in individual 
earnings when using OLS without (with) additional individual characteristics for the 
combined, male, and female samples, respectively. It appears that the inclusion of 
additional individual characteristics reduces the size of the externalities slightly. 
Using the aggregate-level human capital measure with smaller scope - based on the 
industrial sector within each province - the following results were established. The 
external return to schooling associated with a one year increase in the average years of 
schooling based on the industrial sector within each province estimated using OLS 
without (with) additional control variables for individual characteristics is 3.31 (3.49) to 
3.34 (3.62) percent, 3.68 (3.30) to 5.63 (3.32) percent, and 5.26 (3.97) to 5.99 (5.98) 
percent for the pooled, male and female samples, respectively. The percentage of the 
workers with higher education based on the industrial sector within each province is 
associated with an external return to schooling of 0.21 (0.20) to 0.23 (0.24) percent, 0.19 
(0.15) to 0.21 (0.18) percent, and 0.38 (0.28) to 0.45 (0.37) percent for the combined, 
male and female samples, respectively when it is estimated using OLS without (with) 
additional control variables for individual characteristics. Therefore, using this smaller 
scope for the aggregate-level human capital measure does not support the existence of 
human capital externalities to the same extent as the province-level measure. 
Nevertheless, these results reveal the presence of human capital externalities of a more 
moderate magnitude.  
This study exploits variation in the percentage of the population below the poverty line 
and in the number of senior secondary schools per 1000 persons across provinces to 
identify the causal relationship between earnings and the average levels of education or 
the share of workers with higher education. The IV estimates of the specifications 
 260
without (with) additional individual characteristics using the percentage of the population 
below the poverty line as an instrument indicate that a one year increase in the provincial 
average schooling is associated with 22.62 (20.95) to 23.33 (21.68) percent, 20.74 
(21.14) to 21.39 (21.73) percent, and 19.28 (20.61) to 20.21 (21.75) percent increases in 
individual earnings for the combined, male and female samples, respectively. Using the 
number of senior secondary schools per 1000 persons as the instrument, the increase in 
individual earnings associated with a one percentage point increase in the percentage of 
workers with higher education changes to 11.22 to 12.41 percent for the pooled sample, 
10.38 to 11.29 percent for the male sample, and 5.90 to 7.64 percent for the female 
sample based on the models without additional control variables for individual 
characteristics. It seems that adopting an IV approach results in much larger estimates of 
the external return to schooling. The above results indicate that human capital 
externalities are huge, and are significantly greater than the private return to schooling. 
When the percentage of workers with higher education is used as the aggregate-level 
human capital measure instead of the average years of schooling within the IV 
framework the estimates of the external return to schooling are much lower. In particular, 
for the IV model using the population below the poverty line as an instrument, a one 
percentage point increase in the percentage of workers with higher education can be 
expected to increase the earnings of individual workers by approximately 7.04 (6.81) to 
7.28 (7.04) percent for the combined sample, 6.81 (7.02) to 7.07 (7.25) percent for the 
male sample, and 6.23 (6.57) to 6.40 (6.79) percent for the female sample for the 
specification without (with) additional control variables for individual characteristics.  
This result holds for the specification using the number of senior secondary schools per 
1000 persons as an instrument. The external return to schooling associated with the 
percentage of workers with higher education is about 5.81 (5.53) to 8.01 (6.08) percent 
for the combined sample, 5.75 (5.67) to 6.20 (6.09) percent for the male sample, and 4.76 
(5.71) to 5.26 (6.37) percent for the female sample for the specification without (with) 
additional control variables for individual characteristics. These estimates support the 
earlier result that shows the existence of human capital externalities in Indonesia.  
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It is important to note that using the aggregate-level human capital measure based on the 
industrial sector within each province results in much smaller estimates of the external 
return than those obtained when using an aggregate-level human capital measure based 
on the province as a whole. This pattern is consistent with the results obtained using the 
OLS method. It seems that the provincial concentration of human capital is more 
important than a concentration based on the industrial sector within each province. 
However, this result should be considered with caution due to the potential measurement 
error attached to the aggregate-level human capital measures at the industry level within 
each province.  
When using OLS the impact of aggregate-level human capital measured for the province 
as a whole for female workers is greater than that for male workers. However when the 
IV approach is adopted it appears that the impact of this aggregate-level human capital 
measure for male workers exceeds that for female workers. Regardless of whether the 
OLS or IV approach is used, the impact of the aggregate-level human capital based on 
the industrial sector within each province for female workers is consistently greater than 
that for male workers. One possible reason for this finding is that the female workers are 
more concentrated in a few industrial sectors than male workers. 
The estimated social return to schooling obtained from the estimations based on years of 
schooling for female workers exceeds that of male workers. The estimated social return 
tends to increase with the level of education. In general, the social return to schooling for 
male workers with primary schooling or a master degree is larger than that for female 
workers. Furthermore, using the full sample, most results suggest that the social return to 
schooling for general senior secondary school is higher than that for vocational senior 
secondary school. This pattern is also found for the male sample. However, when 
estimated using the female sample, most results indicate that the social return to 
schooling for general senior secondary school is smaller than that for vocational senior 
secondary school. It is also important to mention that this study shows that the estimated 
social returns to schooling are much higher than the estimated private returns to 
schooling. According to Liu (2007), that kind of fact indicates that there is 
underinvestment in human capital.  
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The results of the study of imperfect substitutability between low-skilled and high-skilled 
workers strengthen the earlier conclusion in this chapter that human capital spillovers 
exist in Indonesia. Furthermore, the results of this study support the view that investing 
in education is even more important for aggregate economic performance than it is for 
the individuals who do so. This study also provides evidence of the existence of human 
capital externalities as high as, or even much higher than, the private return to schooling. 
Thus, there is clear role for the public sector fostering education and human capital 
development in order to seize the benefit of those externalities.  
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion and Policy Implications 
8.1 Introduction 
This concluding chapter brings together the major findings of each chapter and the policy 
implications of the thesis. The chapter is divided into three sections. The next section 
provides a summary of the major empirical findings of this study. Then policy 
implications are briefly discussed. The last section of this chapter presents suggestions 
for future research.  
8.2 Findings of the Study 
This study provides an empirical analysis of the return to schooling and human capital 
externalities in Indonesia. There are several findings worth noting from this study. These 
findings are summarised below. 
8.2.1. Private Return to Schooling 
In this study we have examined the labour market returns to schooling in Indonesia using 
recent nationwide household survey data. We allow these returns to schooling to differ 
by level of education and by gender. We find that using either the OLS or an IV approach 
there is evidence of a positive relationship between years of schooling and the earnings 
of workers (Chapters 5 and 6). Using the OLS method we find that an additional year of 
schooling increases individual’s earnings from 4.72 to 5.66 percent for the pooled 
sample, from 4.36 to 5.28 percent for the male sample, and from 5.26 to 6.46 percent for 
the female sample. Using an IV approach the return to schooling ranges from 6.24 to 
7.96 percent for the combined sample, from 6.04 to 7.86 percent for the male sample, and 
from 6.57 to 8.91 percent for the female sample. 
A notable finding of our study is the substantial non-linearity in the returns to schooling 
in Indonesia: returns increase with the level of education. The return to schooling for the 
pooled sample ranges from 0.97 to 1.63 percent, 3.44 to 4.35 percent, 4.23 to 5.96 
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percent, 4.80 to 6.34 percent, 4.70 to 6.14 percent, 6.19 to 6.87 percent, and from 13.50 
to 14.80 percent for primary schooling, junior secondary schooling, vocational senior 
secondary schooling, general senior secondary schooling, college, undergraduate, and 
master degree, respectively. The return to schooling for the male (female) sample ranges 
between 1.40   (-0.18) and 1.80 (0.19) percent, 2.42 (5.22) and 3.35 (6.90) percent, 3.80 
(5.18) and 4.98 (6.90) percent, 4.82 (4.81)  and 5.92 (6.16) percent, 5.18 (6.49) and 6.02 
(7.36)  percent, 6.08 (7.50) and 6.59 (8.40) percent, and 14.80 (10.82) and 15.80 (13.52) 
percent for primary schooling, junior secondary schooling, vocational senior secondary 
schooling, general senior secondary schooling, college, undergraduate, and master 
degree, respectively. These magnitudes of return to schooling are lower compared to 
those for other Asian countries as well as those reported for other developing countries. 
Additionally, it is clear that the returns to schooling for females are higher than those for 
males. The other determinants of earnings are in line with the empirical literature from 
both developed and developing countries. Thus workers who live in urban areas 
consistently earn more than those in rural areas. Potential work experience and job tenure 
have positive effects on earnings for both male and female workers over much of the 
early part of the career path. Marital status has a negative effect on females’ earnings.  
8.2.2 Human Capital Externalities 
In this study we provide empirical evidence on the magnitude and the pattern of the 
private return to schooling in Indonesia. However, private returns may be only part of the 
story. If there is a positive human capital externality, then the private return will 
underestimate the economic value of schooling. Using individual-level data this study 
presents empirical evidence that supports the existence of externalities. Using the OLS 
method, the human capital externalities associated with the average years of schooling in 
each province (the average years of schooling based on the industrial sector within each 
province) range between 5.23 (3.31) and 5.99 (3.62) percent, between 5.04 (3.30) and 
5.63 (5.63) percent, and between 5.75 (3.97) and 5.88 (5.99) percent for the pooled, 
male, and female samples, respectively. Utilising an IV approach, the human capital 
externalities associated with the average years of schooling in each province (the average 
years of schooling based on the industrial sector within each province) range between 
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9.46 (2.17) and 23.30 (3.39) percent, between 10.03 (2.40) and 21.69 (3.38) percent, and 
between 5.90 (3.02) and 21.75 (5.25) percent for the combined, male, and female 
samples, respectively. Furthermore, utilising the OLS approach, the external return to 
schooling associated with the percentage of workers with higher education in each 
province (the percentage of workers with higher education based on industrial sector 
within each province) varies from 0.96 (0.20) to 1.23 (0.24) percent, from 0.80 (0.15) to 
1.34 (0.28) percent, and from 1.34 (0.28) to 1.61 (0.45) percent, for the combined, male, 
and female samples, respectively. Adopting an IV method, the external return to 
schooling associated with the percentage of workers with higher education in each 
province (the percentage of workers with higher education based on the industrial sector 
within each province) varies from 5.53 (0.24) to 7.28 (0.22) percent, from 5.67 (0.07) to 
7.25 (0.96) percent, and from 4.76 (0.28) to 6.79 (3.69) percent, for the pooled, male, and 
female samples, respectively. 
In terms of the social return to schooling, the results show the following patterns. Using 
the OLS (IV) approach, the estimates of the social return to schooling using the average 
years of schooling and the average years of schooling based on the industrial sector 
within each province cluster between 13.03 (16.84) percent and 14.07 (29.96) percent for 
the pooled sample, between 12.22 (16.96) percent and 14.81 (28.07) percent for the male 
sample, and between 14.74 (16.36) percent and 17.10 (29.32) percent for the female 
sample. Utilising the OLS (IV) method, the estimates of the social return to schooling 
using the percentage of workers with higher education and the percentage of workers 
with higher education based on the industrial sector within each province cluster between 
5.59 (10.33) percent and 6.67 (28.80) percent, between 5.11 (9.73) percent and 6.17 
(11.22) percent, and between 6.45 (10.34) percent and 7.78 (12.31) percent for the full, 
male, and female samples, respectively. Comparing between males’ and females’ social 
return to schooling, our results suggest that the estimated social return to schooling 
obtained from the estimations based on years of schooling for female workers exceeds 
that of male workers.  
The results obtained based on the level of education show that the estimated social return 
tends to increase with the level of education. In general, the social return to schooling for 
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male workers with primary schooling or a master degree is larger than that for female 
workers. It is also important to mention that this study shows that the estimated social 
returns to schooling are much higher than that the estimated private returns to schooling. 
According to Liu (2007), that kind of fact indicates that there is underinvestment in 
human capital.  
The results of the study of imperfect substitutability between low-skilled and high-skilled 
workers confirm that human capital spillovers exist in Indonesia. Furthermore, the results 
of this study support the thought that investing in education is even more important for 
aggregate economic performance than it is for the individuals who do so. This study also 
provides evidence of the existence of human capital externalities as high as, or even 
much higher than, the private return to schooling.  
8.3 Policy Implications 
In concluding this thesis, we need to consider the implications of the results. This is not a 
simple task due to the fact that establishing a link between research results and policy 
implications is not always straightforward. However, we believe that the implications of 
the results warrant some detailed considerations by policy-makers.  
Estimates of the returns to schooling are a useful indicator of the productivity of 
education and of the incentive for individuals to invest in their own human capital. Public 
policy needs to heed this evidence in the design of policies and crafting of incentives that 
promote investment in education.  
The educational attainment of the Indonesian population has increased substantially over 
the past three decades. However, the return to schooling is low compared to other 
developing countries and Asian countries. To address this it may be important to 
establish a unified labour market with fair competition. It is also essential to pay attention 
on the interaction between supply and demand of the educated workers. Especially, the 
focus should be on which levels and types of education are in high demand and hence 
should be prioritised in the allocation of public resources. 
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The fact that primary education has a lower return to schooling compared to the 
secondary and tertiary education should not be taken to suggest that the overall rationale 
for investment in primary schooling is weakened. There are several reasons for this. First, 
primary schooling is a necessary input into further levels of education which have higher 
economic returns. Second, whatever its economic return, primary education continues to 
be important for its intrinsic value from a rights-based perspective.  
This study found that the higher the level of education, the higher the returns to 
schooling to individuals. Accordingly, a further increase in post-compulsory education 
(senior secondary and higher education) is considered desirable. However, there may be 
individuals who cannot afford to invest in education at these levels. Hence, it is 
important that any implicit barriers to access to these levels of education, i.e. liquidity 
constrains, be eliminated. More attention should be given to the various methods of cost 
recovery. A well designed student loan programme and mean-tested grants may reduce 
the problem of liquidity constrains and be an efficient way to provide additional 
resources to increase the quality of post-secondary education.  
Our results indicate that, holding other variables constant, females face an earnings 
disadvantage in the Indonesian labour market. Accordingly, the issue of gender equity 
needs to be addressed by policy makers.  
With the existence of sizeable social returns to human capital, individuals are likely to 
under-invest in their education. This is because individuals who do invest in their 
education are not compensated for the productivity or amenity effects that spillover to 
others. To the extent that education creates beneficial externalities and other human 
capital effects, the importance of continuous investment in schooling by government is 
emphasised.  
8.4 Limitations and the Focus of Further Research 
This study explores the economic return to schooling and human capital externalities in 
Indonesia. However, the research has some limitations which may need to be taken into 
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account in interpreting the results and in carrying out further empirical research. The 
limitations and further research directions may be described as follows: 
(i) Due to data unavailability, this study cannot take into account the factors of 
individuals’ innate ability and school quality.  The IV analyses suggest that the 
ability as an omitted variable factor is quite important. Therefore further research 
including these variables is warranted. 
(ii) The private returns to schooling and  human capital externalities that are the focus of 
this research are categorised as a market effect of education. However, it is widely 
perceived that the total effect of education covers not only market effects, but also 
non-market efects, such as child quality, own health, consumer choice efficiency, 
labour market search efficiency, marital choice efficiency, and attainment of desired 
family size. It would be a valuable contribution to estimate these non-market effects 
of education in further research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 269
References 
Acemoglu, D. 1996. A Microfoundation for Social Increasing Returns in Human Capital 
Accumulation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 111: 779-804. 
 
Acemoglu, D., and J. Angrist. 2000. How Large Are Human-Capital Externalities? 
Evidence from Compulsory Schooling Laws. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 15: 
9-59. 
 
Ananta, A., and E.N. Arifin. 2008. Demographic Change and International Labor 
Mobility in the Asia Pacific Region: Implications for Business and Cooperation. 
Paper presented at the PECC-ABAC Conference, Seoul, on 25-26 March. 
 
Andini, C., and P. T. Pereira. 2007. Full-time Schooling, Part-time Schooling, and 
Wages: Returns and Risks in Portugal. IZA Discussion Paper No. 2651. 
 
Angrist, J. D., and A. B. Krueger. 1991. Does Compulsory School Attendance Affect 
Schooling and Earnings? The Quarterly Journal of Economics 106: 979-1014. 
 
Aromolaran, A. B. 2006. Estimates of Mincerian Returns to Schooling in Nigeria. Oxford 
Development Studies 34 (2): 265-292. 
 
Asadullah, M. N. 2006. Returns to Education in Bangladesh. Education Economics 14 
(4): 453-468. 
 
Ashenfelter, O., and A. Krueger. 1994. Estimates of the Economic Return to Schooling 
from a New Sample of Twins. The American Economic Review 84 (5): 1157-
1173. 
 
Ashenfelter, O., and D. J. Zimmerman. 1997. Estimates of the Returns to Schooling from 
Sibling data: Fathers, Sons, and Brothers. The Review of Economics and Statistics 
79 (1): 1-9. 
 
Ashenfelter, O., C. Harmon, and H. Oosterbeek. 1999. A Review of Estimates of the 
Schooling/Earnings Relationship with Tests for Publication Bias. Labour 
Economics 6: 453-470. 
 
Asian Development Bank. 2006. From Poverty to Prosperity: A Country Poverty 
Analysis for Indonesia. Asian Development Bank.  
 
Aslam, M., F. Bari, and G. Kingdon. 2010. Returns to Schooling, Ability and Cognitive 
Skiils in Pakistan. Education Economics, DOI:10.1080/09645292.2010.488470 
 
Basmann, R. L. 1967. A Generalized Classical Method of Linear Estimation of 
Coefficients in a Structural Equation. Econometrica. 25: 77-83. 
 
 270
Becker, G. S. 1962. Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis. Journal of 
Political Economy 70 (5, Part 2: Investment in Human Beings): 9-49. 
 
Becker, G. S. 1964. Human Capital. NBER. New York. 
  
Becker, S. O., F. Cinnirella, and L. Woessmann. 2009. The Trade-off between Fertility 
and Education: Evidence from before the Demographic Transition. Journal of 
Economic Growth 15: 177-204. 
 
Bedi, A. S., and N. Gaston. 1999. Using Variation in Schooling Availability to Estimate 
Educational Returns for Honduras. Economics of Education Review 18: 107-116. 
 
Behrman, J. R. 1990. The Action of Human Resources and Poverty on One Another: 
What We Have Yet to Learn. World Bank Living Standards Measurement Studies 
Working Paper No. 74. 
 
Behrman, J.R., and A.B. Deolalikar. 1993. Unobserved Household and Community 
Heterogeneity and the Labor Market Impact of Schooling: A Case Study for 
Indonesia. Economic Development and Cultural Change 41 (3): 461-488. 
 
Benjamin, D., M.K. Gunderson, T. Lemieux, and W.C. Riddell. 2007. Labour Market 
Economics. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Companies. 
 
Blackburn, M. L., and D. Neumark. 1991. Omitted-Ability Bias and the Increase in the 
Return to Schooling. NBER Working Paper No. 3693.  
 
Blinder, A.S. 1976. On Dogmatism in Human Capital Theory. The Journal of Human 
Resources 11 (1): 8-22. 
 
BPS (Badan Pusat Statistik). 2010. Perkembangan Beberapa Indikator Utama Sosial-
Ekonomi Indonesia (Trends of the Selected Socio-Economic Indicators of 
Indonesia). Jakarta: BPS. 
 
BPS (Badan Pusat Statistik). 2010. Welfare Indicators 2009 (Indikator Kesejahteraan 
Rakyat 2009). Jakarta: BPS. 
 
Bronars, S. G., and G. S. Oetinger. 2006. Estimates of the Return to Schooling and 
Ability: Evidence from Sibling Data. Labour Economics 13 (1): 19-34. 
 
Brunello, G., S. Comi, and C. Lucifora. 2000. The Returns to Education in Italy: A New 
Look at the Evidence. IZA Discussion Paper No. 130.  
 
Brunello, G., and R. Miniaci. 1999. The Economic Returns to Schooling for Italian Men. 
An Evaluation Based on Instrumental variables, Labour Economics 6: 509-519. 
 
 271
Byron, R.P., and H. Takahashi. 1989. An Analysis of the Effect of Schooling, Experience 
and Sex on Earnings in the Government and Private Sectors of Urban Java. 
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 25 (1): 105-117. 
 
Callan, T., and C. Harmon. 1999. The Economic Return to Schooling in Ireland. Labour 
Economics 6: 543-550. 
 
Cameron, A. C., and P. K. Trivedi. 2008. Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Cameron, A. C., and P. K. Trivedi. 2010. Microeconometrics Using Stata.Texas: Stata 
Press. 
 
Canton, E. 2009. Human Capital Externalities and Proximity: Evidence from Repeated 
Cross-Sectional Data. De Economicst 157 (1): 79-105. 
 
Card, D. 1993. Using Geographic Variation in College Proximity to Estimate the Return 
to Schooling. NBER Working Paper No. 4483. 
  
Cheidvasser, S., and H. B. Silva. 2007. The Educated Russian’s Curse: Returns to 
Education in the Russian Federation during the 1990s. Labour 21 (1): 1-41. 
 
Chen, G., and S. Hamori. 2009. Economic Returns to Schooling in Urban China: OLS 
and the Instrumental Variables Approach. China Economic Review 20: 143-152. 
 
Chiswick B.R. 2000. Jacob Mincer, Experience and the Distribution of Earnings. Paper 
presented at the Conference in Honor of Jacob Mincer’s 80th Birthday. New 
York July 15, 2002.  
 
Ciccone, A., and G. Peri. 2006. Identifying Human-Capital Externalities: Theory with 
Applications. The Review of Economic Studies 73: 381-412. 
 
Cohen, B., and W. J. House. 1994. Education, Experience and Earnings in the Labor 
Market of a Developing Economy: The Case of Urban Khartoum. World 
Development 22 (10): 1549-1565. 
 
Comola, M., and L. d. Mello. 2010. Educational Attainment and Selection into the 
Labour Market: The Determinants of Employment and Earnings in Indonesia. 
Paris School of Economics Working Paper No. 2010-06.  
 
Dalmazzo, A., and G. d. Blasio. 2007. Production and Consumption Externalities of 
Human Capital: An Empirical Study for Italy. Journal of Population Economics 
20: 359-382. 
 
Daouli, J., M. Demoussis, and N. Giannakopoulos. 2010. Mothers, Fathers and 
Daughters: Intergenerational Transmission of Education in Greece. Economics of 
Education Review 29: 83-93. 
 272
 
Dee, T. S. 2004. Are There Civic Returns to Education? Journal of Public Economics 88: 
1697-1720. 
 
Deolalikar, A. B. 1993. Gender Differences in the Returns to Schooling and in School 
Enrollment Rates in Indonesia. The Journal of Human Resources 28 (4, Special 
Issue: Symposium on Investments in Women’s Human Capital and 
Development): 899-932. 
 
Donald, S. G., and W. K. Newey. 2001. Choosing the Number of Instruments. 
Econometrica  69: 1161-1191. 
 
Duflo, E. 2001. Schooling and Labor Market Consequences of School Construction in 
Indonesia: Evidence from an Unusual Policy Experiment. The American 
Economic Review 91(4): 795-813.  
 
Durbin, J. 1954. Errors in Variables. Review of the International Statistical Institute 22 
(1/3): 23-32. 
 
El-Hamidi, F. 2005. General or Vocational? Evidence on School Choice, Returns, and 
“Sheep Skin” Effects from Egypt 1998. Paper presented at the Twenty-fifth 
Annual Meeting of The Middle East Economic Association (MEEA) Allied. 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 7-9 January. 
 
ESCAP. 2008. Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific 2008. United Nations 
Publication. 
 
ESCAP. 2009. Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific 2009. United Nations 
Publication. 
 
Fahmi, M. 2007. Indonesian Higher Education: The Chronicle, Recent Development and 
The New Legal Entity Universities. Working Paper in Economics and 
Development Studies No. 200710.  
 
Flanagan, R. J. 1998. Were Communists Good Human Capitalist? The Case of the Czech 
Republic. Labour Economics 5: 295-312. 
 
Fu, S. 2007. Smart Café Cities: Testing Human Capital Externalities in the Boston 
Metropolitan Area. Journal of Urban Economics 61: 86-111. 
 
Garcia-Fontes, W., and M. Hildago. 2009. Estimating Human Capital Externalities: The 
Case of Spanish Regions. Working Paper Econ No. 09.17. 
 
Glewwe, P., and H. Jacoby. 1995. Delayed Primary School Enrollment and Childhood 
Malnutrition in Ghana An Economic Analysis. LSMS Working Paper No. 98. 
 
 273
Government of Indonesia and United Nations System. 2004. Indonesia Progress Report 
on the Millenium Development Goals. Jakarta: Government of Indonesia and 
United Nations System. 
 
Granado, F. J. A. d., W. Fengler, A. Ragatz, and E. Yavuz. 2007. Investing in 
Indonesia’s Education: Allocation, Equity, and Efficiency of Public Expenditures. 
MRPA Paper No. 4372. 
 
Gray, J. S. 1997. The Fall in Men’s Return to Marriage: Declining Productivity Effects 
or Changing Selection? The Journal of Human Resources 32 (3): 481-504. 
 
Griffin, P., and A. C. Edwards. 1993. Rates of Return to Education in Brazil: Do Labor 
Market Conditions Matter? Economics of Education Review 12 (3): 245-255. 
 
Griliches, Z., and W. M. Mason. 1972. Education, Income, and Ability. Jounal of 
Political Economy 80 (3, Part 2: Investment in Education: the Equity-Efficiency 
Quandary): S74-S103. 
 
Gujarati, D. N. 2004. Basic Econometrics Fourth edition: McGraw-Hill Companies. 
 
Halfdanarson, B., D. F. Heuermann, and J. Sudekum. 2008. Human Capital Externalities 
and the Urban Wage Premium: Two Literatures and their Interrelations. IZA 
Discussion Paper No. 3493. 
 
Halvorsen, R. and R. Palmquist. 1980. The Interpretation of Dummy Variables in 
Semilogarithmic Equations. American Economic Review 7 (3): 474-475.  
 
Harmon, C., and I. Walker. 1995. Estimates of the Economic Return to Schooling for the 
United Kingdom. The American Economic Review 85 (5): 1278-1286. 
 
Hartog, J., S. Bajdechi, and H. v. Ophem. 2004. Investment in Education in Nine Nations 
- Return and Risk. University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute. 
 
Hausman, J. A. 1978. Specification Tests in Econometrics. Econometrica 46: 1251-1271. 
 
Heckman, J. J. 1979. Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error. Econometrica 47 
(1): 153-161. 
 
Heuermann, D.F. 2008. Human Capital Externalities in Western Germany. Institute for 
Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Community. 
 
Heuermann, D., B. Halfdanarson, and J. Suedekum. 2010. Human Capital Externalities 
and the Urban Wage Premium: Two Literatures and their Interrelations. Urban 
Studies 47 (4): 749-767. 
 
 274
Hill, M. A. 1983. Female Labor Force Participation in Developing and Developed 
Countries - Consideration of the Informal Sector. The Review of Economics and 
Statistics 65 (3): 459-468. 
 
Howes, C. 1988. Relations between Early Child Care and Schooling. Developmental 
Psychology 24 (1): 53-57. 
 
Hudson, J., and J. G. Sessions. 2009. The Impact of Parental Education on Earnings: 
New Wine in an Old Bottle? Bath Economics Research Papers. 
 
IFLS, http://www.rand.org/labor/FLS/IFLS.html. 
 
Isacsson, G. 2005. External Effects of Education on Earnings: Swedish Evidence Using 
Matched Employee-Establishment Data. IFAU Working Paper. 
 
Jamison, D. T. 1986. Child Malnutrition and School Performance in China. Journal of 
Development Economics 20: 299-309. 
 
Jamison, D. T., and J. V. D. Gaag. 1987. Education and Earnings in the People’s 
Republic of China. Economics of Education Review 6 (2): 161-166. 
 
Wooldridge, J.M. 2008. Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach, 4th Edition, 
South-Western. 
 
Kazianga, H. 2004. Schooling Returns for Wage Earners in Burkina Faso: Evidence from 
the 1994 and 1998 National Surveys. Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper 
No. 892. 
 
Kifle, T. 2007. The Private Rate of Return to Schooling: Evidence from Eritrea. Essays 
in Education 21: 77-99. 
 
Kimenyi, M. S., G. Mwabu, and D. K. Manda. 2006. Human Capital Externalities and 
Private Returns to Education in Kenya. Eastern Economic Journal 32 (3): 493-
513. 
 
Kirby, S., and R. Riley. 2008. The External Returns to Education: UK Evidence Using 
Repeated Cross-Sections. Labour Economics 15: 619-630. 
 
Lam, D., and R. F. Schoeni. 1993. Effect of Family Background on Earnings and Returns 
to Schooling: Evidence from Brazil. Journal of Political Economy 101 (4): 710-
740. 
 
Lauer, C., and V. Steiner. 2000. Returns to Education in West Germany: An Empirical 
Assesment. Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 00-
04. 
 
 275
Lee, M. N. N., and S. Healy. 2006. Higher Education in South-East Asia: An Overview. 
In Higher Education in South-East Asia. Asia-Pacific Programme of Educational 
Innovation for Development, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization, UNESCO. 
 
Leigh, A., and C. Ryan. 2005. Estimating Returns to Education: Three Natural 
Experiment Techniques Compared. Centre for Economic Policy Research 
Discussion Paper No. 493. 
 
Leigh, A., and C. Ryan. 2008. Estimating Returns to Education Using Different Natural 
Experiment Techniques. Economics of Education Review 27: 149-160. 
 
Lemke, R. J., and I. C. Rischall. 2003. Skill, Parental Income, and IV Estimation of the 
Returns to Schooling. Applied Economics Letters 10 (5): 281-286. 
 
Levin, J., and E. J. S. Plug. 1999. Instrumenting Education and the Returns to Schooling 
in the Netherlands. Labour Economics 6: 521-534. 
 
Li, H., and Y. Luo. 2004. Reporting Errors, Ability Heterogeneity, and Returns to 
Schooling in China. Pacific Economic Review 9 (3): 191-207. 
 
Liu, J. T., J. K. Hammitt, and C. J. Lin. 2000. Family Background and Returns to 
Schooling in Taiwan. Economics of Education Review 19: 113-125. 
 
Liu, Zhiqiang. 2007. The External Returns to Education: Evidence from Chinese Cities. 
Journal of Urban Economics 61: 542-564. 
 
Lopez-Avecedo, G. 2001. Evolution of Earnings and Rates of Returns to Education in 
Mexico. Policy Research Working Paper No. 2691.  
 
Lucas, R. E. 1988. On the Mechanics of Economic Development. Journal of Monetary 
Economics 22: 3-42. 
 
Lundborg, P. 2008. The Health Returns to Education: What Can We Learn from Twins? 
IZA Discussion Paper No. 3399. 
 
Maani, S. A. 1996. Private and Social Rates of Return to Secondary and Higher 
Education in New Zealand: Evidence from the 1991 Census. The Australian 
Economic Review 29 (1): 82-100. 
 
Maurer-Fazio, M., and N. Dinh. 2004. Differential Rewards to, and Contributions of, 
Education in Urban China’s Segmented Labor Markets. Pacific Economic Review 
9 (3): 173-189. 
 
McMahon, W. W. 2004. The Social and External Benefits of Education. In International 
Handbook on the Economics of Education. Edward Elgar Publisher. 
 
 276
McMahon, W. W. 2007. An Analysis of Education Externalities with Applications to 
Development in the Deep South. Contemporary Economic Policy 25 (3): 459-
482. 
 
McMahon, W. W., and Boediono. 1992. Universal Basic Education: An Overall Strategy 
of Investment Priorities for Economic Growth. Economics of Education Review 
11 (2): 137-151. 
 
Miller, P., C. Mulvey, and N. Martin. 1995. What Do Twins Studies Reveal About the 
Economic Returns to Education?: A Comparison of Australian and US Finding. 
American Economic Review 85 (3): 586-599. 
 
Miller, P., C. Mulvey, and N. Martin. 1997. Family Characteristics and the Returns to 
Schooling: Evidence on Gender Differences from a Sample of Australian Twins. 
Economica 64: 137-154. 
 
Miller, P., C. Mulvey, and N. Martin. 2006. The Return to Schooling: Estimates from a 
Sample of Young Australian Twins. Labour Economics 13: 571-587. 
 
Mincer, J. 1974.  Schooling, Experience and Earnings. NBER, New York. 
 
Minsitry of National Education. 2003. Act of The Republic of Indonesia Number 20, year 
2003 on National Education System. Jakarta. 
 
Ministry of National Education. 2005. Strategic Plan Ministry of National Education the 
Republic of Indonesia 2005-2009. Jakarta: Ministry of National Education. 
 
Ministry of National Education. 2007. EFA Mid Decade Assessment Indonesia. Jakarta: 
Ministry of National Education. 
 
Moock, P. R., and J. Leslie. 1986. Childhood Malnutrition and Schooling in the Terai 
Region of Nepal. Journal of Development Economics 20: 33-52. 
 
Moretti, E. 1998. Social Returns to Education and Human Capital Externalities: 
Evidence from Cities. Department of Economics, UC Berkeley. 
 
Moretti, E. 2003. Human Capital Externalities in Cities. NBER Working Paper No. 9641:  
 
Moretti, E. 2004. Estimating the Social Return to Higher Education: Evidence from 
Longitudinal and Repeated Cross-Sectional Data. Journal of Econometrics 121: 
175-212. 
 
Moretti, E. 2006. Private and Social Returns to Education.  Rivisita Di Politica 
Economica 96 (3): 3-46. 
 
 277
Muralidharan, R., and U. Banerji. 1975. Effect of Preschool Education on the School 
Readiness of Under-Priveleged Children of Delhi. International Journal of Early 
Childhood 7 (2): 188-193. 
 
Muravyev, A. 2008. Human Capital Externalities Evidence from the Transition Economy 
of Russia. Economics of Transition 16: 415-443. 
 
Naderi, A., and J. Mace. 2003. Education and Earnings: A Multilevel Analysis A Case 
Study of the Manufacturing Sector in Iran. Economics of Education Review 22: 
143-156. 
 
National Coordination Forum Education for All. 2003. National Plan Action Indonesia’s 
Education for All 2003 - 2015. Jakarta: National Coordination Forum Education 
for All. 
 
National Development Planning Agency. 2010. Report on the Achievement of the 
Millennium Development Goals Indonesia. Ministry of National Development 
Planning /National Development Planning Agency. 
 
Nizam. 2006. The Need for Higher Education Reforms. In Higher Education in South-
East Asia. Asia-Pacific Programme of Educational Innovation for Development, 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, UNESCO. 
 
O'Donoghue, C. 1999. Estimating the Rate of Return to Education Using 
Microsimulation. The Economic and Social Review 30 (3): 249-265. 
 
Oreopoulos, P. 2003. Do Dropouts Drop Out Too Soon? International Evidence from 
Changes in School-Leaving Laws. NBER Working Paper No. 10155. 
 
Permana, V. 2006. Earnings Differential between Male-Female in Indonesia: Evidence 
from Sakernas Data. Working Paper in Economics and Development Studies No. 
200608.  
 
Plug, E. J. 2001. Season of Birth, Schooling and Earnings. Journal of Economic 
Psychology 22: 641-660. 
 
Primo, D. M., M. L. Jacosmeier, and J. Milvo. 2007. Estimating the Impact of State 
Policies and Institutions with Mixed-Level Data. State Politics and Policy 
Quarterly 7 (4): 446-459. 
 
Psacharopoulos, G. 1977. Schooling, Experience and Earnings: The Case of an LDC. 
Journal of Development Economics 4 (1): 39-48. 
 
Psacharopoulos, G. 1981. Returns to Education: An Updated International Comparison. 
Comparative Education 17 (3): 321-341. 
 
 278
Psacharopoulos, G. 1985. Returns to Education: A Further International Update and 
Implications. The Journal of Human Resources 20 (4): 583-604. 
 
Psacharopoulos, G. 1994. Returns to Investment in Education: A Global Update. World 
Development 22 (9): 1325-1343. 
 
Psacharopoulos, G., and H. A. Patrinos. 2004. Returns to Investment in Education: A 
Further Update. Education Economics 12 (2): 111-134. 
 
Pusat Statistik Pendidikan. 2006a. Statistik Perguruan Tinggi. Kementerian Pendidikan 
Nasional. http://www.psp.kemdiknas.go.id/uploads/Statistik%20Pendidikan/0506 
/index_pt_0506.pdf. 
 
Pusat Statistik Pendidikan. 2006b. Statistik Sekolah Dasar. Kementerian Pendidikan 
Nasional. http://www.psp.kemdiknas.go.id/uploads/Statistik%20Pendidikan/0506 
/Index_sd_0506.pdf.   
 
Pusat Statistik Pendidikan. 2006c. Statistik Sekolah Menengah Atas. Kementerian 
Pendidikan   Nasional. http://www.psp.kemdiknas.go.id/uploads/Statistik%20 
Pendidikan/0506/Index_sma_0809.pdf.   
 
Pusat Statistik Pendidikan. 2006d. Statistik Sekolah Memengah Kejuruan. Kementerian 
Pendidikan Nasional. http://www.psp.kemdiknas.go.id/uploads/Statistik%20 
Pendidikan/0506/index_smk_0506.pdf. 
 
Pusat Statistik Pendidikan. 2006e. Statistik Sekolah Menengah Pertama. Kementerian 
Pendidikan Nasional. http://www.psp.kemdiknas.go.id/uploads/Statistik%20 
Pendidikan/0506/index_smp_0506.pdf. 
 
Pusat Statistik Pendidikan. 2006f. Ikhtisar Data Pendidikan Nasional Tahun 2005/2006. 
Jakarta: Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan. Departemen Pendidikan Nasional. 
Jakarta. 
 
Pusat Statistik Pendidikan. 2007a. Statistik Perguruan Tinggi. Kementerian Pendidikan 
Nasional. http://www.psp.kemdiknas.go.id/uploads/Statistik%20Pendidikan/0607 
/index_pt_0607.pdf. 
 
Pusat Statistik Pendidikan. 2007b. Statistik Sekolah Dasar. Kementerian Pendidikan 
Nasional. http://www.psp.kemdiknas.go.id/uploads/Statistik%20Pendidikan/0607 
/index_sd_0607.pdf. 
 
Pusat Statistik Pendidikan. 2007c. Statistik Sekolah Menengah Atas. Kementerian 
Pendidikan Nasional. http://www.psp.kemdiknas.go.id/uploads/Statistik%20 
Pendidikan/0607/index_sma_0809.pdf. 
 
 279
Pusat Statistik Pendidikan. 2007d. Statistik Sekolah Memengah Kejuruan. Kementerian 
Pendidikan Nasional. http://www.psp.kemdiknas.go.id/uploads/Statistik%20 
Pendidikan/0607/index_smk_0607.pdf. 
 
Pusat Statistik Pendidikan. 2007e. Statistik Sekolah Menengah Pertama. Kementerian 
Pendidikan Nasional. http://www.psp.kemdiknas.go.id/uploads/Statistik%20 
Pendidikan/0607/index_smp_0607.pdf. 
 
Pusat Statistik Pendidikan. 2007f. Ikhtisar Data Pendidikan Nasional Tahun 2006/2007. 
Jakarta: Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan. Departemen Pendidikan Nasional.  
 
Pusat Statistik Pendidikan. 2008a. Statistik Perguruan Tinggi. Kementerian Pendidikan 
Nasional. http://www.psp.kemdiknas.go.id/uploads/Statistik%20Pendidikan/0708 
/index_pt_0708.pdf. 
 
Pusat Statistik Pendidikan. 2008b. Statistik Sekolah Dasar. Kementerian Pendidikan 
Nasional. http://www.psp.kemdiknas.go.id/uploads/Statistik%20Pendidikan/0708 
/index_sd_0708.pdf. 
 
Pusat Statistik Pendidikan. 2008c. Statistik Sekolah Menengah Atas. Kementerian 
Pendidikan Nasional. http://www.psp.kemdiknas.go.id/uploads/Statistik%20 
Pendidikan/0708/index_sma_0809.pdf. 
 
Pusat Statistik Pendidikan. 2008d. Statistik Sekolah Memengah Kejuruan. Kementerian 
Pendidikan Nasional. http://www.psp.kemdiknas.go.id/uploads/Statistik%20 
Pendidikan/0708/index_smk_0708.pdf. 
 
Pusat Statistik Pendidikan. 2008e. Statistik Sekolah Menengah Pertama. Kementerian 
Pendidikan Nasional. http://www.psp.kemdiknas.go.id/uploads/Statistik%20 
Pendidikan/0708/index_smp_0708.pdf. 
 
Pusat Statistik Pendidikan. 2008f. Ikhtisar Data Pendidikan Nasional Tahun 2007/2008. 
Jakarta: Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan. Departemen Pendidikan Nasional.  
 
Pusat Statistik Pendidikan. 2009a. Statistik Perguruan Tinggi. Kementerian Pendidikan 
Nasional. http://www.psp.kemdiknas.go.id/uploads/Statistik%20Pendidikan/0809 
/index_pt_0809.pdf. 
 
Pusat Statistik Pendidikan. 2009b. Statistik Sekolah Dasar. Kementerian Pendidikan 
Nasional. http://www.psp.kemdiknas.go.id/uploads/Statistik%20Pendidikan/0809 
/index_sd_0809.pdf. 
 
Pusat Statistik Pendidikan. 2009c. Statistik Sekolah Menengah Atas. Kementerian 
Pendidikan Nasional. http://www.psp.kemdiknas.go.id/uploads/Statistik%20 
Pendidikan/0809/index_sma_0809.pdf. 
 
 280
Pusat Statistik Pendidikan. 2009d. Statistik Sekolah Memengah Kejuruan. Kementerian 
Pendidikan Nasional. http://www.psp.kemdiknas.go.id/uploads/Statistik%20 
Pendidikan/0809/index_smk_0809.pdf. 
 
Pusat Statistik Pendidikan. 2009e. Statistik Sekolah Menengah Pertama. Kementerian 
Pendidikan Nasional. http://www.psp.kemdiknas.go.id/uploads/Statistik%20 
Pendidikan/0809/index_smp_0809.pdf. 
 
Qian, X., and R. Smyth. 2008. Private Returns to Investment in Education: an Empirical 
Study of Urban China. Post-Communist Economies 20 (4): 483-501. 
 
Rakova, V., and F. Vaillancourt. 2005. Human Capital Externalities in the Canadian 
Metropolitan Areas: How Do We Measure Human Capital? Rapport de 
Rechersche - ECN 6008. https://papyrus.bib.umontreal.ca/jspui/bitstream/ 
1866/295/1/a1.1g1000.pdf. 
 
Ranis, G., F. Stewart, and A. Ramirez. 2000. Economic Growth and Human 
Development. World Development 28 (2): 197-219. 
 
Rauch, J. E. 1993. Productivity Gains from Geographic Concentration of Human Capital: 
Evidence from the Cities. Journal of Urban Economics 34: 380-400. 
 
Riddell, W.C. 2006. The Impact of Education on Economic and Social Outcomes: An 
Overview of Recent Advances in Economics. Canadian Policy Research Networks. 
Ottawa. 
 
Romer, P. M. 1986. Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth. Journal of Political 
Economy 94 (5): 1002-1037. 
 
Rudd, J. 2000. Empirical Evidence on Human Capital Spillovers. Federal Reserve 
Board, Finance and Economics Discussion Paper No. 2000-46. 
 
Rummery, S., F. Vella, and M. Verbeek. 1999. Estimating the Returns to Education for 
Australian Youth via Rank-order Instrumental Variables. Labour Economics 6: 
491-507. 
 
Ryoo, J.K., Y.S. Nam, and M. Carnot. 1993. Changing Rates of Return to Education over 
Time: A Korean Case Study. Economics of Education Review 12 (1): 71-80. 
 
Sakellariou, C. 2003. Rates of Return to Investments in Formal and Technical/Vocational 
Education in Singapore. Education Economics 11 (1): 73-87. 
 
Sanroma, E. and R. Ramos. 2007. Local Human Capital and Productivity: An Analysis 
for the Spanish Regions. Regional Studies 41 (3): 349-359. 
 
Schultz, T. W. 1961. Investment in Human Capital. The American Economic Review 51 
(1): 1-17. 
 281
Schultz, T.P. (2003) Evidence of Returns to Schooling in Africa from Household 
Surveys: Monitoring and Restructuring the Market for Education. Yale University 
Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 875. 
  
Schultz, T.P. 2004. Evidence of Returns to Schooling in Africa from Household Surveys: 
Monitoring and Restructuring the Market for Education. Journal of African 
Economies 13 (Supplement 2): ii95-ii48.  
 
Schutz, G. 2009. Does the Quality of Pre-primary Education Pay Off in Secondary 
School? An International Comparison Using PISA 2003. IFO Working Paper No. 
68. 
  
Sen, A., and A. Clemente. 2010. Intergenerational Correlations in Educational 
Attainment: Birth Order and Family Size Effects Using Canadian Data. 
Economics of Education Review 29: 147-155. 
 
Siedler, T. 2007. Schooling and Citizenship: Evidence from Compulsory Schooling 
Reforms. IZA Discussion Paper No. 2573. 
 
Silles, M. A. 2009. The Causal Effect of Education on Health: Evidence from the United 
Kingdom. Economics of Education Review 28: 122-128. 
 
Souri, D. 2004. Theoretical and Applied Essays on the Instrumental Variable Method. 
PhD Thesis. the Faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. 
Blacksburg, Virginia. The United State. 
 
Sribney, W., V. Wiggins,. and D. Drukker. 2011. Negative and missing R-squared for 
2SLS/IV. http://www.stata.com/support/faqs/stat/2sls.html. 
 
Stalker, P. 2007. Let's Speak Out for MDGs Achieving the Millennium Development 
Goals in Indonesia. Jakarta: National Development Planning Agency and United 
Nations. 
 
Stock, J.H. and Watson, M.W. 2007. Introduction to Econometrics. Second Edition. 
Boston: Pearson/Addison Wesley. 
 
Tansel, A. 1997. Schooling Attainment, Parental Education, and Gender in Cote d'Iviore 
and Ghana. Economic Development and Cultural Change 45 (4): 825-856. 
 
Theil, H. 1953. Repeated Least Squares Applied to Complete Equation Systems. The 
Hague Central Planning Bureau. 
 
Trostel, P., I. Walker, and P. Wooley. 2002. Estimates of the Economic Return to 
Schooling for 28 Countries. Labour Economics 9: 1-16. 
 
 
 282
Tsakloglou, P., and I. Cholezas. 2000. Private Returns to Education in Greece. Research 
Report "Public Funding and Private Returns to Education". Department of 
International and European Economic Studies. Athens University of Economics 
and Business. 
 
UNESCO Institute for Statistics. http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/ table 
View.aspx?ReportId=179. 
 
UNESCO. 2005. Policy Review Report: Early Childhood Care and Education in 
Indonesia. Paris: The Section for Early Childhood and Inclusive Education 
Division of Basic Education. UNESCO Education Sector. 
 
Uusitalo, R. 1999. Return to Education in Finland. Labour Economics 6: 569-580. 
 
Wei, X., M. C. Tsang, W. Xu, and L.-K. Chen. 1999. Education and Earnings in Rural 
China. Education Economics 7 (2): 167-187. 
 
Weir, S., and J. Knight. 2004. Externality Effects of Education: Dynamics of the 
Adoption and Diffusion of an Innovation in Rural Ethiopia. Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 53 (1): 93-113. 
 
Wirz, A. M. 2008. Private Returns to Education Versus Education Spill-Over Effects: Or 
what Co-workers Account for! Empirical Economics 34: 315-342. 
 
Wolfe, B.L. and Haveman, R.H. 2002. Social and Non-market Benefits from Education 
in an Advanced Economy in Education in the 21st Century: Meeting the 
Challenges of a Changing World, Social and Non-Market Benefits from 
Education in an Advanced Economy: Proceedings of the 47th Economic 
Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Held in Boston, the United 
State, June 2002, edited by Y.K. Kodrzycki. Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston. 
 
Wooldridge, J.M. 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
 
Wooldridge. J.M. 2008.  Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach, 4th Edition, 
South-Western. 
 
World Bank. 2006. World Development Indicators 2006. Washington DC: World Bank. 
 
Wu, D. 1973. Alternative Tests of Independence between Stochastic Regressors and 
Disturbances. Econometrica, 41, 733-775. 
 
 
Every reasonable effort has been made to acknowledge the owners of copyright material. 
I would be pleased to hear from any copyright owner who has been omitted or 
incorrectly acknowledged. 
i 
 
School of Economics and Finance 
Curtin Business School 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Returns to Education and Human Capital Externalities: Empirical 
Evidence from Indonesia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Losina Purnastuti 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis is presented for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
of 
Curtin University  
 
 
 
 
 
 
October 2011 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
List of Appendices 
Page 
 
Appendix for Chapter 5 ......................................................................................... 1 
Appendix A5.1: Heckman Two-step Method ........................................................ 1 
Appendix A5.2: Summary Statistics for the Participation Rate Component of      
the Selectivity Bias Correction Model ........................................... 4 
Appendix for Chapter 7 ......................................................................................... 5 
Table A7.1: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female 
Workers (IV Estimations Based on Years of Schooling Using 
PerPoverty as an Instrument and AveSchool as the Aggregate-Level 
Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model without Additional 
Individual Characteristics) ................................................................... 5 
Table A7.2: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female 
Workers (IV Estimations Based on Education Level Using    
PerPoverty as an Instrument and AveSchool as the Aggregate-Level 
Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model without Additional 
Individual Characteristics) ................................................................... 6 
Table A7.3: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female 
Workers (IV Estimations Based on Years of Schooling Using 
PerPoverty as an Instrument and AveSchool as the Aggregate-Level 
Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model with Additional   
Individual Characteristics) ................................................................... 8 
Table A7.4: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female 
Workers (IV Estimations Based on Education Level Using    
PerPoverty as an Instrument and AveSchool as the Aggregate-Level 
Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model with Additional   
Individual Characteristics) ..................................................................10 
Table A7.5: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female 
Workers (IV Estimations Based on Years of Schooling Using 
PerPoverty as an Instrument and PerHE as the Aggregate-Level  
Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model without Additional 
Individual Characteristics) ..................................................................12 
Table A7.6: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female 
Workers (IV Estimations Based on Education Levels Using   
PerPoverty as an Instrument and PerHE as the Aggregate-Level  
Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model without Additional 
Individual Characteristics) ..................................................................13 
 
 
iv 
 
Table A7.7: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female 
Workers (IV Estimations Based on Years of Schooling Using 
PerPoverty as an Instrument and PerHE as the Aggregate-Level  
Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model with Additional   
Individual Characteristics) ..................................................................15 
Table A7.8: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female 
Workers (IV Estimations Based on Education Levels Using   
PerPoverty as an Instrument and PerHE as the Aggregate-Level  
Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model with Additional   
Individual Characteristics) ..................................................................17 
Table A7.9: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female 
Workers (IV Estimations Based on Years of Schooling Using          
SSS-Population as an Instrument and AveSchool as the Aggregate- 
Level Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model without     
Additional Individual Characteristics) ................................................19 
Table A7.10: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female 
Workers (IV Estimations Based on Education Levels Using             
SSS-Population as an Instrument and AveSchool as the Aggregate- 
Level Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model without      
Additional Individual Characteristics) ................................................20 
Table A7.11: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female 
Workers (IV Estimations Based on Years of Schooling Using          
SSS-Population as an Instrument and AveSchool as the Aggregate- 
Level Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model with Additional 
Individual Characteristics) ..................................................................22 
Table A7.12: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female 
Workers (IV Estimations Based on Education Levels Using             
SSS-Population as an Instrument and AveSchool as the Aggregate- 
Level Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model with Additional    
Individual Characteristics) ..................................................................24 
Table A7.13: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female 
Workers (IV Estimations Based on Years of Schooling Using          
SSS-Population as an Instrument and PerHE as the Aggregate-Level 
Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model without Additional 
Individual Characteristics) ..................................................................26 
Table A7.14: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female 
Workers (IV Estimations Based on Education Levels Using              
SSS-Population as an Instrument and PerHE as the Aggregate-       
Level  Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model without     
Additional Individual Characteristics) ................................................27 
v 
 
Table A7.15: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female 
Workers (IV Estimations Based on Years of Schooling Using          
SSS-Population as an Instrument and PerHE as the Aggregate-Level 
Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model with Additional   
Individual Characteristics) ..................................................................29 
Table A7.16: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female 
Workers (IV Estimations Based on Education Levels Using             
SSS-Population as an Instrument and PerHE as the Aggregate-Level 
Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model with Additional    
Individual Characteristics) ..................................................................31 
Table A7.17: Test for Imperfect Substitutability for the Workers with and   
without Higher Education (IV Estimations Using PerPoverty as          
an Instrument and AveSchool as Aggregate-Level Human Capital 
Measure - Mincerian Model without Additional Individual 
Characteristics) ...................................................................................33 
Table A7.18: Test for Imperfect Substitutability for the Workers with and   
without Higher Education (IV Estimations Using PerPoverty as          
an Instrument and AveSchool as Aggregate-Level Human Capital 
Measure - Mincerian Model with Additional Individual  
Characteristics) ...................................................................................34 
Table A7.19: Test for Imperfect Substitutability for the Workers with and    
without Higher Education (IV Estimations Using PerPoverty as          
an Instrument and PerHE as Aggregate-Level Human Capital    
Measure - Mincerian Model without Additional Individual 
Characteristics) ...................................................................................36 
Table A7.20: Test for Imperfect Substitutability for the Workers with and   
without Higher Education (IV Estimations Using PerPoverty as          
an Instrument and PerHE as Aggregate-Level Human Capital     
Measure - Mincerian Model with Additional Individual  
Characteristics) ...................................................................................37 
Table A7.21: Test for Imperfect Substitutability for the Workers with and   
without Higher Education (IV Estimations Using SSS-Population        
as an Instrument and AveSchool as Aggregate-Level Human Capital 
Measure - Mincerian Model without Additional Individual 
Characteristics) ...................................................................................39 
Table A7.22: Test for Imperfect Substitutability for the Workers with and   
without Higher Education (IV Estimations Using SSS-Population as   
an Instrument and AveSchool as Aggregate-Level Human Capital 
Measure - Mincerian Model with Additional Individual  
Characteristics) ...................................................................................40 
vi 
 
Table A7.23: Test for Imperfect Substitutability for the Workers with and   
without Higher Education (IV Estimations Using SSS-Population as    
an Instrument and PerHE as Aggregate-Level Human Capital    
Measure - Mincerian Model without Additional Individual 
Characteristics) ...................................................................................42 
Table A7.24: Test for Imperfect Substitutability for the Workers with and   
without Higher Education (IV Estimations Using SSS-Population as   
an Instrument and PerHE as Aggregate-Level Human Capital    
Measure - Mincerian Model with Additional Individual  
Characteristics) ...................................................................................43 
Table A7.25: Social Return to Schooling (Models Based on Education Levels 
without Additional Variables for Individual Characteristics) ...............45 
Table A7.26: Social Return to Schooling (Models Based on Education Levels 
with Additional Variables for Individual Characteristics)....................46 
 
 
1 
 
Appendix for Chapter 5 
Appendix A5.1: Heckman Two-step Method 
Supposed we have an earnings equation: 
Wi = β Xi + εi          (A5.1) 
where Wi  is earnings, Xi are the observed variables related to individual productivity 
and ε is an error term. W is observed only for workers. 
A reduced form employment equation (participation equation) is given by: 
ܧ௜
∗ =  ߛܼ௜ +  ߤ௜         (A5.2) 
where ܧ௜∗ is the difference between the observed earnings and the reservation 
earnings. The reservation earnings is the minimum earnings at which the individual 
is willing to accept employment. ܧ௜∗cannot, however, be observed. Rather we observe 
only an indicator variable for employment, defined as Ei = 1 if ܧ௜∗ > 0 and E = 0 
otherwise. Variation in this indicator variable can be examined using a probit model. 
The Heckman model uses the following assumptions: 
1. (ߝ, ߤ) ~ ܰ(0, 0,ߪகଶ,ߪµଶ, ߩகμ) 
This first assumption assumes joint normality of the distribution of the error 
terms in the participation (A5.2) and outcome (A.5.1) equation. 
2. (ε,µ) is independent of X and Z 
This second assumption assumes that both error terms are independent of 
both sets of observables. 
3. ݒܽݎ (ߤ) =  ߪఓଶ = 1 
The last assumption is the normalisation for the probit regression. 
Taking expectation of the earnings equation conditional on working yields: 
ܧ( ௜ܹ|ܧ௜ = 1, ௜ܺ) = ܧ( ௜ܹ| ௜ܺ ,ܼ௜, ߤ௜) = ߚ ௜ܺ + ܧ(ߝ௜| ௜ܺ ,ܼ௜, ߤ௜)                           (A5.3) 
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In equation A5.3 there are two equalities. The first equality comes from the fact that 
variables determining employment in this model are Z and µ. The second equality 
comes from the fact that the expected value of X given X is just X. 
The final term in A5.3 {ܧ(ߝ௜| ௜ܺ ,ܼ௜,ߤ௜)} can be simplified by noting that selection 
into employment depends just on Zi and µi not upon Xi. Specifically  
ܧ( ௜ܹ|ܧ௜ = 1, ௜ܺ) =  ߚ ௜ܺ + ܧ(ߝ௜|ܧ௜ = 1) =  ߚ ௜ܺ + ܧ(ߝ௜|ߤ௜ >  −ܼ௜ߛ )             (A5.4) 
Thus, if we estimate the model using only data on workers, the returns to schooling 
will be estimated on them alone and not the whole of the population. As a result of 
this term, OLS estimation on a sample of workers generally provides inconsistent 
estimates of the parameters of the population wage equation. 
According to Heckman (1979), this problem can be approached as an omitted 
variable problem. (ߝ௜|ߤ௜ >  −ܼ௜ߛ ) in A5.4 is the variable that is typically ignored in 
the estimation of earnings equations on selected samples. An estimate of the omitted 
variable would solve this problem and hence the problem of sample selection bias. 
Specifically we can solve the omitted variable by:  
ܧ[(ߝ௜|ߤ௜ >  − ܼ௜ߛ )] =  ߩఌఓߪఌλ௜(−ܼ௜ߛ) =  ߠλ௜  ( −ܼ௜ߛ)                                    (A5.5) 
where λ௜  ( −ܼ௜ߛ) is just the inverse Mills ratio evaluated at the indicated value and  θ 
is unknown parameter  ߩఌఓߪఌ. 
The first method for estimating this bivariate normal selection model is that due to 
Heckman (1979). It is sometimes called the “Heckman two-step” method. 
Under Heckman’s (1975) two-step procedure, the first step is to run a probit model 
of participation (E on Z) using all the observations. The estimates of γ from this 
probit are then used to construct consistent estimates of the inverse Mills ratio term 
λ෠௜(−ܼ௜ߛො) =  ∅(ܼ௜ߛො)ߔ(ܼ௜ߛො) 
In the second stage, the outcome equation is estimated by ordinary least squares 
where the outcome equation includes both the original X whose coefficients are the 
3 
 
parameters of the population earnings equation and the constructed value of the 
inverse Mills ratio, which is 
௜ܹ =  ߚ ௜ܺ + ߠλ෠௜  (−ܼ௜ߛො) + ݁௜ 
This step is carried out only for the uncensored observation and provides consistent 
and asymptotically normal estimators for β and θ.                 
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Appendix A5.2 
Summary Statistics for the Participation Rate Component of the Selectivity Bias Correction 
Model 
Variables Females 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Years of schooling 10.502 3.495 
Primary School 0.241 0.428 
Dummy for Junior Secondary School 0.200 0.428 
Dummy for Vocational Senior Secondary School 0.103 0.303 
Dummy for General Senior Secondary School 0.164 0.370 
Dummy for College 0.043 0.200 
Dummy for Undergraduate 0.044 0.205 
Dummy for Master 0.002 0.044 
Experience 17.970 13.012 
Experience squared 492.231 644.978 
Age 35.219 11.950 
Age squared 1383.193 949.783 
Tenure 1.505 4.763 
Tenure squared 24.954 120.287 
Marital status dummy 0.851 0.356 
Dummy for urban area 0.571 0.495 
Household size 6.011 3.197 
Child under 5 0.531 0.499 
Muslim 0.907 0.290 
Father/mother  lives in the same house 0.158 0.499 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the IFLS4 data set. 
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Appendix for Chapter 7 
Table A7.1: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female Workers (IV Estimations Based on Years of Schooling Using 
PerPoverty as an Instrument and AveSchool as the Aggregate-Level Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model without Additional 
Individual Characteristics) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Males Females Males Females 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Average Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
Constant 
 
9.20613  
(0.10482)*** 
3.26982 
(0.18176)*** 
9.39706 
(0.14898)*** 
2.90984 
(0.25467)*** 
8.75737 
(0.18401)*** 
3.11024 
(0.19350)*** 
2.64461 
(0.27045)*** 
8.96438 
(0.23522)*** 
Years of schooling 
 
0.01624 
 (0.00421)*** 
0.04526 
(0.00226)*** 
0.01442 
(0.00543)*** 
0.05635 
(0.00327)*** 
0.01318 
(0.00391)*** 
0.03948 
(0.00211)*** 
0.05066 
(0.00296)*** 
0.05066 
(0.00296)*** 
Experience 0.01537 
 (0.00442)*** 
0.01096 
(0.00239)*** 
0.01766 
(0.00523)*** 
0.01428 
(0.00321)*** 
    
Experience2 -0.00030 
 (0.00010)*** 
-0.00012 
(0.00005)** 
-0.00032 
(0.00012)*** 
-0.00020 
(0.00007)*** 
    
Age     0.03291 
(0.00889)*** 
0.01543 
(0.00483)*** 
0.03361 
(0.01091)*** 
0.02193 
(0.00669)*** 
Age2     -0.00040 
(0.00011)*** 
-0.00013 
(0.00006)** 
-0.00040 
(0.00014)*** 
-0.00022 
(0.00009)** 
AveSchool  0.20834 
(0.02163)*** 
 0.19284 
(0.02994)*** 
 0.20740 
(0.02165)*** 
 0.19396 
(0.02994)*** 
AveSchool-Ind 0.00600 
 (0.00948) 
0.02705 
(0.00516)*** 
-0.00718  
(0.01389) 
0.04401 
(0.00841)*** 
0.00615 
 (0.00948) 
0.02725 
(0.00516)*** 
-0.00695  
(0.01389) 
0.04397 
(0.00843)*** 
PerPoverty -0.06258  
(0.00250)*** 
 -0.06573 
(0.00323)*** 
 -0.06250 
(0.18401)*** 
 -0.06585  
(0.00323)*** 
 
 R2 
 
0.1878  0.2279  0.1884  0.2277  
Adjusted R2 
 
0.1864  0.2253  0.1870  0.2251  
Observations 3017 3017 1511 1511 3017 3017 1511 1511 
 
Test Results 
        
 
Quality 
 
        
F  
 
625.139  414.279   624.749  415.195 
P-Value 0.0000***  0.0000***   0.0000***  0.0000*** 
 
Relevance (Hausman test) 
 
        
F 
 
69.3273  28.1838   68.5067  28.3231 
P-Value 0.0000***  0.0000***   0.0000***  0.0000*** 
 Notes: Sandard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table A7.2: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female Workers (IV Estimations Based on Education Level Using 
PerPoverty as an Instrument and AveSchool as the Aggregate-Level Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model without Additional 
Individual Characteristics) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Males Females Males Females 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Constant 9.32534 
(0.11355)*** 
3.42275 
(0.18740)*** 
9.36463 
(0.16611)*** 
3.21097 
(0.25930)*** 
8.84486 
(0.19445)*** 
3.26745 
(0.19933)*** 
8.82348 
(0.25538)*** 
2.94572 
(0.02752)*** 
Primary school -0.12671 
(0.05953) 
0.11801 
(0.03229)*** 
-0.00319 
(0.07510) 
0.01586  
(0.04569) 
-0.00667 
(0.05844) 
0.11340 
(0.03166)*** 
0.01306 
(0.07317) 
0.02871 
(0.04461) 
Junior secondary school -0.02705 
(0.06236) 
0.21357 
(0.03382)*** 
0.07550 
(0.07987) 
0.19791 
(0.04849)*** 
-0.01008 
(0.06012) 
0.19582 
(0.03258)*** 
0.08599 
(0.07534) 
0.20285 
(0.04587)*** 
Vocational senior secondary school 0.03561 
(0.06405) 
0.32784 
(0.03465)*** 
0.28776 
(0.08403)*** 
0.34085 
(0.05125)*** 
0.03853 
(0.06077) 
0.29364 
(0.03229)*** 
0.27312 
(0.07832)*** 
0.32684 
(0.04796)*** 
General senior secondary school 0.10487 
(0.06155)* 
0.33438 
(0.03322)*** 
0.14681 
(0.07942)* 
0.33853 
(0.04827)*** 
0.10600 
(0.05826)* 
0.29837 
(0.03146)*** 
0.12612 
(0.07285) 
0.32233 
(0.04443)*** 
College 0.08272 
(0.08139) 
0.50303 
(0.04399)*** 
0.13263 
(0.09066) 
0.54749 
(0.05480)*** 
0.06775 
(0.07813) 
0.44921 
(0.04224)*** 
0.9149 
(0.08419) 
0.51114 
(0.05111)*** 
Undergraduate 0.10486 
(0.07149) 
0.59557 
(0.03845)*** 
0.11194 
(0.08781) 
0.67613 
(0.05299)*** 
0.09793 
(0.06813) 
0.53928 
(0.03667)*** 
0.06154 
(0.08069) 
0.63821 
(0.04898)*** 
Master 0.23652 
(0.17980) 
0.84594 
(0.09744)*** 
0.26934 
(0.20602 ) 
0.90236 
(0.12505)*** 
0.21726 
(0.17840) 
0.78061 
(0.09668)*** 
0.21744 
(0.20306) 
0.86408 
(0.12365)*** 
Experience 0.01556 
(0.00446)*** 
0.01036 
(0.00242) 
0.01843 
(0.00529)*** 
0.01511 
(0.00324)*** 
    
Experience2 -0.00032 
(0.00010)*** 
-0.00012 
(0.00005)** 
-0.00032 
(0.00012)*** 
-0.00025 
(0.00007)*** 
    
Age     0.03247 
(0.00895)*** 
0.01309 
(0.00487)* 
0.03700 
(0.01103)*** 
0.01938 
(0.00677)*** 
Age2     -0.00040 
(0.00011)*** 
-0.00011 
(0.00006)*** 
-0.00021 
(0.01406) 
-0.00020 
(0.00009)** 
AveSchool  0.21388 
(0.02190)*** 
 0.20120 
(0.03047)*** 
 0.21311 
(0.02189)*** 
 0.20210 
(0.03050)*** 
AveSchool-Ind 0.00748 
(0.00949) 
0.02724 
(0.00518)*** 
-0.00169 
(0.01405) 
0.03758 
(0.00853)*** 
0.00790 
(0.00949) 
0.02733 
(0.00518)*** 
-0.00021 
(0.01406)*** 
0.03809 
(0.00857)*** 
PerPoverty -0.06227 
(0.00252)*** 
 -0.06475 
(0.00324)*** 
 -0.06223 
(0.00252)*** 
 -0.06488 
(0.00324)*** 
 
 R2 
 
0.1887  0.2359  0.1890  0.2363  
Adjusted R2 
 
0.1857  0.2303  0.1860  0.2307  
Observations 3017 3017 1511 1511 3017 3017 1511 1511 
 
Test Results 
        
 
Quality 
 
        
F   611.99  398.591  611.999  399.945 
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 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Males Females Males Females 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
 
Relevance (Hausman test) 
 
        
F 
 
 70.6812  30.0531  70.0198  29.876 
P-Value 
 
 0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table A7.3: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female Workers (IV Estimations Based on Years of Schooling Using 
PerPoverty as an Instrument and AveSchool as the Aggregate-Level Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model with Additional Individual 
Characteristics) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Males Females Males Females 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Constant 9.14376 
(0.10754)*** 
3.26712 
(0.18266)*** 
9.30953 
(0.15226)*** 
2.91971 
(0.25520)*** 
8.85256 
(0.19088)*** 
3.15576 
(0.19715)*** 
8.89899 
(0.24875)*** 
2.77530 
(0.27018)*** 
Years of Schooling 0.01086 
(0.00437)** 
0.04133 
(0.00234)*** 
0.01326 
(0.00569)** 
0.04773 
(0.00339)*** 
0.00982 
(0.00402)** 
0.03893 
(0.00215)*** 
0.00652 
(0.00496) 
0.04695 
(0.00296)*** 
Experience 0.00875 
(0.00501)* 
0.00631 
(0.00270)** 
0.02005 
(0.00606)*** 
0.00467 
 (0.00370) 
    
Experience2 -0.00019 
(0.00011)* 
-0.00009 
(0.00006) 
-0.00032 
(0.00013)** 
-0.00010 
(0.00008) 
    
Age     0.02105 
(0.01010)** 
0.00986 
(0.00545)* 
0.03405 
(0.01249)*** 
0.01036 
(0.00758) 
Age2     -0.00027 
(0.00013)** 
-0.00010 
(0.00007) 
-0.00038 
(0.00016)** 
-0.00013 
(0.00010) 
Tenure  0.00414 
(0.00457) 
0.01161 
(0.00246)*** 
-0.00098 
(0.00630) 
0.02607 
(0.00379)*** 
0.00378 
(0.00457) 
0.01178 
(0.00246)*** 
-0.00060 
(0.00631) 
0.02597 
(0.00380)*** 
Tenure2 -0.00012 
(0.00015) 
-0.00016 
(0.00008)** 
-0.00012 
(0.00020) 
-0.00054 
(0.00012)*** 
-0.00011 
(0.00015) 
-0.00016 
(0.00008)** 
-0.00010 
(0.00021) 
-0.00052 
(0.00012)*** 
Marital Status 0.15312 
(0.04659)*** 
0.01282  
(0.02525) 
-0.00039 
(0.04670) 
-0.03723 
(0.02809) 
0.14720 
(0.04694)*** 
0.01372 
(0.02541) 
0.00039 
(0.04697) 
-0.03874 
(0.02824) 
Urban 0.11639 
(0.02885)*** 
0.03878 
(0.01596)*** 
0.17478 
(0.04064)*** 
0.06841 
(0.02538)*** 
0.11641 
(0.02884)*** 
0.03895 
(0.01596)** 
0.17445 
(0.04066)*** 
0.06818 
(0.02538)*** 
AveSchool  0.21200 
(0.02177)*** 
 0.20605 
(0.03028)*** 
 0.21138 
(0.02178)*** 
 0.20677 
(0.03019)*** 
AveSchool-Ind 0.00098 
(0.00961) 
0.02451 
(0.00518)*** 
-0.01400 
(0.01394) 
0.03731 
(0.00829)*** 
0.00097 
(0.00961) 
0.02461 
(0.00518)*** 
-0.01404 
(0.01395) 
0.03739 
(0.00830)*** 
PerPoverty -0.06206 
(0.00251)*** 
 -0.06434 
(0.00324)*** 
 -0.06201 
(0.00251)*** 
 -0.06451 
(0.00324)*** 
 
 R2 
 
0.1948  0.2391  0.1951  0.2383 
 
 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.1924  0.2345  0.1927  0.2337  
 Observations 3017 3017 1511 1511 3017 3017 1511 1511 
 
Test Results 
        
 
Quality 
 
        
F  
 
 612.934  394.69  612.479  396.677 
P-Value 
 
 0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
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 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Males Females Males Females 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Relevance (Hausman test) 
 
F 
 
 75.6942  34.2767  75.171  34.6147 
P-Value 
 
 0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table A7.4: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female Workers (IV Estimations Based on Education Level Using 
PerPoverty as an Instrument and AveSchool as the Aggregate-Level Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model with Additional Individual 
Characteristics) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Males Females Males Females 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Constant 9.24895 
(0.11632)*** 
3.41448 
(0.18761)*** 
9.25848 
(0.16954)*** 
3.18885 
(0.25877)*** 
8.95059 
(0.20111)*** 
3.32602 
(0.20267)*** 
8.73587 
(0.26831)*** 
3.06726 
(0.27341)*** 
Primary school -0.03561 
(0.05959) 
0.10589 
(0.03221)*** 
0.03306 
(0.07552) 
-0.00076 
(0.04530) 
-0.01777 
(0.05828) 
0.10995 
(0.03146)*** 
0.04027 
(0.07317) 
0.01776 
(0.04395) 
Junior secondary school -0.05923 
(0.06274) 
0.18601 
(0.03396)*** 
0.08025 
(0.08048) 
0.15022 
(0.04823)*** 
-0.03902 
(0.06020) 
0.18662 
(0.03254)*** 
0.07455 
(0.07524) 
0.17469 
(0.04516)*** 
Vocational senior secondary school 0.02486 
(0.06528) 
0.28662 
(0.03526)*** 
0.28941 
(0.08573)*** 
0.25039 
(0.05169)*** 
-0.00985 
(0.06157) 
0.28097 
(0.03322)*** 
0.25204 
(0.07869)*** 
0.27298 
(0.04746)*** 
General senior secondary school 0.05402 
(0.06257 
0.29238 
(0.03366)*** 
0.14776 
(0.08083)* 
0.25963 
(0.04854)*** 
0.06820 
(0.05883) 
0.28630 
(0.03163)*** 
0.10453 
(0.07306) 
0.28245 
(0.04390)*** 
College 0.01642 
(0.08247) 
0.45120 
(0.04445)*** 
0.15663 
(0.09283)* 
0.44989 
(0.05543)*** 
0.02408 
(0.07855) 
0.43785 
(0.04233)*** 
0.08579 
(0.08427) 
0.46945 
(0.05044)*** 
Undergraduate 0.05426 
(0.07260) 
0.54549 
(0.03900)*** 
0.11772 
(0.08984) 
0.57521 
(0.05356)*** 
0.06335 
(0.06857) 
0.53281 
(0.03681)*** 
0.03764 
(0.08086) 
0.59724 
(0.04847)*** 
Master 0.14931 
(0.18010) 
0.79275 
(0.09712)*** 
0.26498 
(0.20728) 
0.74681 
(0.012424)*** 
0.15768 
(0.17842) 
0.77717 
(0.09623)*** 
0.17824 
(0.20293) 
0.77434 
(0.12183)*** 
Experience 0.00861 
(0.00507)* 
0.00563 
(0.00273)** 
0.02053 
(0.20728)*** 
0.00574 
 (0.00374) 
    
Experience2 -0.00021 
(0.00011)* 
-0.00010 
(0.00006)*** 
-0.00011 
(0.00014)** 
-0.00016 
(0.00012)** 
    
Age     0.01982 
(0.01017)* 
0.00693 
(0.00550) 
0.03748 
(0.01259)** 
0.00722 
(0.00766) 
Age2     -0.00026 
(0.00013)** 
-0.00007 
(0.00007) 
-0.00041 
(0.00017) 
-0.00011 
(0.00010) 
Tenure  0.00390 
(0.00459) 
0.01174 
(0.00247)*** 
-0.00142 
(0.00630) 
0.02502 
(0.00379)*** 
0.00374 
(0.00457) 
0.01220 
(0.00247)*** 
-0.00151 
(0.00630) 
0.02602 
(0.00379)*** 
Tenure2 -0.00011 
(0.00015) 
-0.00016 
(0.00008)* 
-0.00011 
(0.00020) 
-0.00048 
(0.00012)*** 
-0.00011 
(0.00457) 
-0.00018 
(0.00008)** 
-0.00009 
(0.00021) 
-0.00051 
(0.00012)*** 
Marital Status 0.15906 
(0.04664)*** 
0.01363 
(0.02530)*** 
0.00592 
(0.04667) 
-0.04295 
(0.02801) 
0.15341 
(0.04703)*** 
0.01643 
(0.02549) 
0.00278 
(0.04686) 
-0.03583 
(0.02817)*** 
Urban 0.12262 
(0.02906)*** 
0.04653 
(0.01611)*** 
0.16348 
(0.04107)*** 
0.06619 
(0.02545)*** 
0.12199 
(0.02906)*** 
0.04621 
(0.01610)*** 
0.16317 
(0.04108)*** 
0.06613 
(0.02548)*** 
AveSchool  0.21730 
(0.02197)*** 
 0.21637 
(0.03071)*** 
 0.21689 
(0.02198)*** 
 0.21753 
(0.03067)*** 
AveSchool-Ind 0.00179 
(0.00963) 
0.02399 
(0.00520)*** 
-0.00782 
(0.01414) 
0.03018 
(0.00843)*** 
0.00203 
(0.00963) 
0.02415 
(0.00520)*** 
-0.00679 
(0.01415) 
0.03065 
(0.27341)*** 
PerPoverty -0.06183 
(0.00252)*** 
 -0.06359 
(0.00325)*** 
 -0.06180 
(0.00252)*** 
 -0.00679 
(0.00325)*** 
 
 
 R2 
 
0.1962  0.2459  0.1963  0.2457  
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 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Males Females Males Females 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.1922  0.2383  0.1923  0.2381  
Observations 3017 3017 1511 1511 3017 3017 1511 1511 
 
Test Results 
        
 
Quality 
 
        
F  
 
 602.475  382.344  602.133  384.448 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
 
Relevance (Hausman test) 
 
        
F 
 
 77.9235  36.6314  77.3812  36.8721 
P-Value 
 
 0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
Table A7.5: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female Workers (IV Estimations Based on Years of Schooling Using 
PerPoverty as an Instrument and PerHE as the Aggregate-Level Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model without Additional Individual 
Characteristics) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Males Females Males Females 
Variable Reduced-Form Percentage 
of Workers 
 with Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form Percentage 
of Workers 
 with Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form Percentage 
of Workers 
 with Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of Workers 
 with Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Constant 8.52748 
 (0.29740)*** 
4.83756 
(0.05578)*** 
10.11094 
 (0.37853)*** 
4.46644 
(0.08049)*** 
6.86423 
 (0.69559)*** 
4.69288 
(0.10153)*** 
8.92931 
 (0.85468)*** 
4.20042 
(0.13731)*** 
Years of schooling 0.12032 
 (0.01720)*** 
0.04339 
(0.00249)*** 
0.05795 
 (0.02336)** 
0.05625 
(0.00344)*** 
0.10105 
 (0.01590)*** 
0.03825 
(0.00230)*** 
0.05244 
 (0.02093)** 
0.05020 
(0.00310)*** 
Experience 0.06521  
(0.01833)*** 
0.00973 
(0.00257)*** 
0.04933 
 (0.02242)** 
0.01450 
(0.00332)*** 
    
Experience2 -0.00113 
 (0.00040)*** 
-0.00011 
(0.00006)* 
-0.00106 
 (0.00051)** 
-0.00020 
(0.00008)*** 
    
Age     0.12803 
 (0.03692)*** 
0.01357 
(0.00519)*** 
0.09151 
 (0.04673)** 
0.02250 
(0.00691)*** 
Age2     -0.00148 
 (0.00047)*** 
-0.00011 
(0.00066)* 
-0.00117 
 (0.00062)* 
-0.00022 
(0.00009)** 
PerHE 
 
 0.06825 
(0.00665)*** 
 0.06234 
(0.00847)*** 
 0.06805 
(0.00665)*** 
 0.06269 
(0.00848)*** 
PerHE-Ind 0.00484 
 (0.00470) 
0.00123 
(0.00066)* 
-0.00827 
 (0.00644) 
0.00453 
(0.00095)*** 
0.00506 
 (0.00470) 
0.00126 
(0.00007)* 
-0.00823 
 (0.00645) 
0.00453 
(0.00095)*** 
PerPoverty -0.21285  
(0.01013)*** 
 -0.23395  
(0.01343)*** 
 -0.21248  
(0.01012)*** 
 -0.23417  
(0.01344)*** 
 
 R2 
 
0.1460  0.1714  0.1462  0.1709  
Adjusted R2 
 
0.1446  0.1686  0.1448  0.1681  
Observation 3017 3017 1511 1511 3017 3017 1511 1511 
 
Test Results 
        
 
Quality 
 
        
F  
 
 441.884  303.614  440.851  303.618 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
 
Relevance (Hausman test) 
 
        
F 
 
 111.722  41.9196  110.507  42.069 
P-Value 
 
 0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
 Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table A7.6: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female Workers (IV Estimations Based on Education Levels Using 
PerPoverty as an Instrument and PerHE as the Aggregate-Level Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model without Additional Individual 
Characteristics) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Males Females Males Females 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
Constant 8.94309 
(0.31645)*** 
5.03333 
(0.06098)*** 
10.30272 
(0.40502)*** 
 4.76928 
(0.08502)*** 
7.02541 
(0.72642)*** 
4.90739 
(0.10688)*** 
8.83254 
(0.90533)*** 
4.50082 
(0.14475)*** 
Primary school 0.22400 
(0.24675) 
0.10495 
(0.03462)*** 
-0.15864 
(0.32073) 
0.02612  
(0.04757) 
0.26553 
(0.24222) 
0.10174 
(0.03397)*** 
-0.07294 
(0.31263) 
0.03719 
(0.04641) 
Junior secondary school 0.42011 
(0.25791) 
0.19316 
(0.03621)*** 
0.11616 
(0.34064) 
0.21392  
(0.05036)*** 
0.41906 
(0.24858)* 
0.17915 
(0.03489)*** 
0.20750 
(0.32140) 
0.21586 
(0.04761)*** 
Vocational senior secondary school 1.16067 
(0.26328)*** 
0.27964 
(0.03752)*** 
1.29361 
(0.35767)*** 
0.32735 
 (0.05352)*** 
1.07742 
(0.24945)*** 
0.25198 
(0.03557)*** 
1.33111 
(0.33325)*** 
0.30854 
(0.05026)*** 
General senior secondary school 1.05337 
(0.25298)*** 
0.31026 
(0.03591)*** 
0.30872 
(0.33790) 
0.35929 
 (0.04998)*** 
0.95986 
(0.23908)*** 
0.28101 
(0.03394)*** 
0.33342 
(0.30975) 
0.33816 
(0.04597)*** 
College 1.30822 
(0.33572)*** 
0.46503 
(0.04766)*** 
0.35280 
(0.38763) 
0.56164 
 (0.05718)*** 
1.12492 
(0.32184)*** 
0.42073 
(0.04564)*** 
0.32685 
(0.35984) 
0.51910 
(0.05323)*** 
Undergraduate 1.08661 
(0.29477)*** 
0.58349 
(0.04134)*** 
0.36576 
(0.37561) 
0.68777 
 (0.05532)*** 
0.89603 
(0.28041)*** 
0.53723 
(0.03932)*** 
0.32788 
(0.34497) 
0.64251 
(0.05097)*** 
Master 2.19778 
(0.74544)*** 
0.78002 
(0.10581)*** 
1.34177 
(0.87961) 
0.88543 
 (0.13014)*** 
1.97320 
(0.73947)*** 
0.72617 
(0.10483)*** 
1.32399 
(0.86715) 
.83809 
(0.12870)*** 
Experience 0.06983 
(0.01852)*** 
0.00880 
(0.00262)*** 
0.05307 
(0.02257)** 
0.01536 
 (0.00335)*** 
    
Experience2 -0.00123 
(0.00041)*** 
-0.00011 
(0.00006)* 
-0.00113 
(0.00052)** 
-0.00025 
 (0.00008)*** 
    
Age     0.13492 
(0.03713)*** 
0.01047 
(0.00526)** 
0.10290 
(0.04711)** 
0.02015 
(0.00700)*** 
Age2     -0.00155 
(0.00047)*** 
-0.00008 
(0.00007) 
-0.00130 
(0.00062)** 
-0.00020 
(0.00009)** 
PerHE 
 
 0.07072 
(0.00680)*** 
 0.06360 
 (0.00859)*** 
 0.07054 
(0.00680)*** 
 0.06398 
(0.00861)*** 
PerHE-Ind 0.00673 
(0.00474) 
0.00094 
(0.00067) 
-0.0055 
(0.01343)*** 
0.00361 
 (0.00098)*** 
0.00708 
(0.00474)*** 
0.00096 
(0.00067) 
-0.00474 
(0.00662) 
0.00369 
(0.00098)*** 
PerPoverty -0.21044 
(0.01018)*** 
 -0.23125 
(0.01343)*** 
 -0.21022 
(0.01017)*** 
 -0.23162 
(0.01344)*** 
 
 R2 
 
0.1475  0.1852  0.1478  0.1848  
Adjusted R2 
 
0.1443  0.1792  0.1447  0.1789  
Observations 
 
3017 3017 1511 1511 3017 3017 1511 1511 
 
Test Results 
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 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Males Females Males Females 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
 
Quality 
 
F  
 
 427.489  296.582  427.067  297.003 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
 
Relevance (Hausman test) 
 
        
F 
 
 113.934  43.6111  113.015  43.5247 
P-Value 
 
 0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
 Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table A7.7: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female Workers (IV Estimations Based on Years of Schooling Using 
PerPoverty as an Instrument and PerHE as the Aggregate-Level Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model with Additional Individual 
Characteristics) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Males Females Males Females 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Percentage of Workers 
 with Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of Workers 
 with Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of Workers 
 with Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of Workers 
 with Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Constant 7.95697  
(0.30987)*** 
4.84502 
(0.05649)*** 
9.22505 
 (0.40576)*** 
4.52718 
(0.07900)*** 
6.76162 
 (0.72550)*** 
4.74654 
(0.10639)*** 
8.40042  
(0.91215)*** 
4.36037 
(0.14253)*** 
Years of Schooling 0.07258 
 (0.01788)*** 
0.04076 
(0.00255)*** 
0.02882 
 (0.02419) 
0.04919 
(0.00358)*** 
0.06318 
 (0.01640)*** 
0.03873 
(0.00234)*** 
0.01963 
 (0.02109) 
0.04766 
(0.00313)*** 
Experience 0.04237 
 (0.02060)** 
0.00541 
(0.00292)* 
0.04526  
(0.02567)* 
0.00584 
 (0.00384) 
    
Experience2 -0.00081 
 (0.00044)* 
-0.00008 
(0.00006) 
-0.00087  
(0.00056) 
-0.00011 
(0.00008) 
    
Age     0.09031 
 (0.04155)** 
0.00842 
 (0.00591) 
0.06927 
 (0.05291) 
0.01261 
(0.00788) 
Age2     -0.00110 
 (0.00053)** 
-0.00009 
 (0.00008) 
-0.00084 
 (0.00070) 
-0.00015 
(0.00010) 
Tenure  0.02259 
 (0.01880) 
0.01087 
(0.00266)*** 
0.01461 
 (0.02668) 
0.02480 
(0.00396)*** 
0.02189 
 (0.01879) 
0.01102 
(0.00266)*** 
0.01842 
 (0.02675) 
0.02457 
(0.00397)*** 
Tenure2 -0.00055 
 (0.00062) 
-0.00015 
(0.00009)* 
-0.00073 
 (0.00086) 
-0.00051 
(0.00013)*** 
-0.00048 
 (0.00062) 
-0.00015  
(0.00009)* 
-0.00077 
 (0.00087) 
-0.00050 
(0.00013)*** 
Marital Status 0.53882 
 (0.19156)*** 
0.00393  
(0.02728) 
0.17653 
 (0.19779) 
-0.04840 
(0.02935)* 
0.52444  
(0.19300)*** 
0.00454 
 (0.02745) 
0.19687 
 (0.19889) 
-0.05084 
(0.02953)* 
Urban 1.02022 
 (0.11704)*** 
0.00273 
 (0.01884) 
1.26793  
(0.17099)*** 
0.02902  
(0.02880) 
1.02117 
 (0.11700)*** 
0.00294 
 (0.01883) 
1.26720  
(0.17106)*** 
0.02860 
(0.02880) 
PerHE 
 
 0.07039 
(0.00702)*** 
 0.06574 
(0.00885)*** 
 0.07024 
(0.00702)*** 
 0.06601 
(0.00884)*** 
PerHE-Ind 0.00286 
 (0.00466) 
0.00108  
(0.00066) 
-0.01079  
(0.00637)* 
0.00387 
(0.00095)*** 
0.00296 
 (0.00466) 
0.00109  
(0.00066)* 
-0.01092 
 (0.00638)* 
0.00387 
(0.00095)*** 
PerPoverty -0.20375 
 (0.01009)*** 
 -0.22405 
 (0.01335)*** 
 -0.20346  
(0.01009)*** 
 -0.22448 
 (0.01335)*** 
 
 R2 
 
0.1687  0.2030  0.1688  0.2008  
Adjusted R2 
 
0.1662  0.1966  0.1664  0.1960  
Observations 
 
3017 3017 1511 1511 3017 3017 1511 1511 
 
Test Results 
        
 
Quality 
 
        
F  
 
 407.385  281.836  406.508  282.794 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
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 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Males Females Males Females 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Percentage of Workers 
 with Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of Workers 
 with Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of Workers 
 with Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of Workers 
 with Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Relevance (Hausman 
test) 
 
F 
 
 118.715  49.9735  117.928  50.4376 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
Table A7.8: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female Workers (IV Estimations Based on Education Levels Using 
PerPoverty as an Instrument and PerHE as the Aggregate-Level Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model with Additional Individual 
Characteristics) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Males Females Males Females 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Constant 8.25941 
(0.33144)*** 
5.03246 
(0.06121)*** 
9.23837 
(0.43785)*** 
4.81755 
(0.08305)*** 
6.90157 
(0.75645)*** 
4.97096 
(0.11149)*** 
8.16104 
(0.96238)*** 
4.67084 
(0.14933)*** 
Primary school 0.11924 
(0.24501) 
0.09565 
(0.03479)*** 
0.03572 
(0.31920) 
0.00545  
(0.04748) 
0.16691 
 (0.23956) 
0.10050 
(0.03401)*** 
0.07986 
 (0.30929) 
0.02271 
(0.04607) 
Junior secondary school 0.13855 
(0.25769) 
0.17344 
(0.03659)*** 
0.03520 
(0.33981) 
0.17126 
(0.05054)*** 
0.17185 
 (0.24716) 
0.17635 
(0.03509)*** 
0.06411 
 (0.31765) 
0.19281 
(0.04732)*** 
Vocational senior secondary school 0.65136 
(0.26722)** 
0.25193 
(0.03801)*** 
1.11451 
(0.36137)*** 
0.24623 
(0.05422)*** 
0.63949 
(0.25181)** 
0.25050 
(0.03584)*** 
1.08453 
(0.33152)*** 
0.26279 
(0.04992)*** 
General senior secondary school 0.60172 
(0.25615)** 
0.28057 
(0.03639)*** 
0.13578 
(0.34054) 
0.29087 
(0.05065)*** 
0.58407 
(0.24059)** 
0.27887 
(0.03420)*** 
0.09638 
 (0.30762) 
0.30733 
(0.04584)*** 
College 0.76006 
(0.33845)** 
0.42753 
(0.04815)*** 
0.26863 
(0.39204) 
0.47612 
(0.05821)*** 
0.69182 
(0.32221)** 
0.42047 
(0.04584)*** 
0.17285 
 (0.35623) 
0.48683 
(0.05300)*** 
Undergraduate 0.57798 
(0.29817)* 
0.54710 
(0.04214)*** 
0.15294 
(0.37976) 
0.60262 
(0.05639)*** 
0.50997 
(0.28145)* 
0.54099 
(0.03978)*** 
0.04820 
 (0.34238) 
0.61441 
(0.05099) 
Master 1.48494 
(0.74115) 
0.74564 
(0.10580)*** 
0.96943 
(0.87545) 
0.75177 
(0.13019)*** 
1.40211 
(0.73418)* 
0.73748 
(0.10480)*** 
0.86652 
 (0.85746) 
0.76731 
(0.12775)*** 
Experience 0.04552 
(0.02085)** 
0.00446 
 (0.00297) 
0.04791 
(0.02584)* 
0.00693 
(0.00388)* 
    
Experience2 -0.00091 
(0.00062) 
-0.00008 
(0.00006) 
-0.00089 
(0.00057) 
-0.00017 
(0.00009)** 
    
Age     0.09465 
(0.04183)** 
0.00474 
(0.00598) 
0.07952 
 (0.05323) 
0.00974 
(0.00796) 
Age2     -0.00115 
(0.00053)** 
-0.00005 
(0.00008) 
-0.00095 
 (0.00070) 
-0.00013 
(0.00010) 
Tenure  -0.02235 
(0.01887) 
0.01095 
(0.00268)*** 
0.01097 
(0.02664) 
0.02398 
(0.00396)*** 
0.02190  
(0.01882) 
0.01142 
(0.00267)*** 
0.01380 
 (0.02666) 
0.02477 
(0.00397)*** 
Tenure2 -0.00051 
(0.00062) 
-0.00014 
(0.00009) 
-0.00069 
(0.00086) 
-0.00017 
(0.00013)*** 
-0.00048 
 (0.00062) 
-0.00016 
(0.00009)* 
-0.00070 
 (0.00087) 
-0.00048 
(0.00013)*** 
Marital Status 0.54088 
(0.19184)*** 
0.00544  
(0.02742) 
0.20267 
(0.19716) 
-0.05479 
(0.02929)* 
0.52214 
(0.19344)*** 
0.00845 
(0.02762) 
0.21481 
 (0.19797) 
-0.04905 
(0.02948) 
Urban 1.01013 
(0.11786)*** 
0.01150  
(0.01899) 
1.22606 
(0.17233)*** 
0.02592  
(0.02875) 
1.00930 
(0.11783)*** 
0.01116 
(0.01898) 
1.22609 
(0.17239)*** 
0.02554 
(0.02880) 
PerHE 
 
 0.07252 
(0.00714)*** 
 0.06741 
(0.00891)*** 
 0.07245 
(0.00714)*** 
 0.06786 
(0.00891)*** 
PerHE-Ind 0.00411 
(0.00470) 
0.00073  
(0.00067) 
-0.00810 
(0.00656) 
0.00281 
(0.00097)*** 
0.00435 
 (0.00470) 
0.00076 
(0.00067) 
-0.00777 
 (0.00657) 
0.00288 
(0.00098)*** 
PerPoverty -0.20211 
(0.01014)*** 
 -.022287 
(0.01335)*** 
 -0.20192 
(0.01014)*** 
 -0.22338 
(0.01335)*** 
 
 
 R2 0.1695  0.2127  0.1697  0.2122  
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 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Males Females Males Females 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.1654  0.2048  0.1655  0.2043  
Observations 3017 3017 1511 1511 3017 3017 1511 1511 
 
Test Results 
        
 
Quality 
 
        
F  
 
 397.028  278.717  396.486  279.947 
P-Value 
 
 0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
 
Relevance (Hausman test) 
 
        
F 
 
 121.639  52.2238  121.008  52.7707 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table A7.9: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female Workers (IV Estimations Based on Years of Schooling Using 
SSS-Population as an Instrument and AveSchool as the Aggregate-Level Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model without Additional 
Individual Characteristics) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Males Females Males Females 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Constant 7.94770 
(0.09820)*** 
4.11245 
(0.21771)*** 
8.16281 
(0.14163)*** 
3.98833 
(0.32005)*** 
7.56787 
(0.18656)*** 
3.90916 
(0.22357)*** 
7.87656 
(0.24091)*** 
3.67477 
(0.32705)*** 
Years of schooling 0.01260 
(0.00437)*** 
0.04569 
(0.00216)*** 
0.00865 
(0.00573) 
0.05599 
(0.00317)*** 
0.01028 
(0.00406)** 
0.03987 
(0.00202)*** 
0.00626 
(0.00517) 
0.05017 
(0.00286) 
Experience 0.01030 
(0.00458)** 
0.01176 
(0.00228)*** 
0.01166 
(0.00553)** 
0.01599 
(0.00317)*** 
    
Experience2 -0.00020 
(0.00010)** 
-0.00014 
(0.00005)*** 
-0.00023 
(0.00013)* 
-0.00024 
(0.00007)*** 
    
Age     0.02665 
(0.00923)*** 
0.01773 
(0.00463)*** 
0.02218 
(0.01153)* 
0.02506 
(0.00650)*** 
Age2     -0.00033 
(0.00012)*** 
-0.00016 
(0.00006)*** 
-0.00027 
(0.00015)* 
-0.00026 
(0.00009)*** 
AveSchool  0.10383 
(0.02632)*** 
 0.05903  
(0.03848) 
 0.10409 
(0.02630)*** 
 0.06108 
(0.03846) 
AveSchol-Ind 0.00543 
(0.01003) 
0.03363 
(0.00503)*** 
-0.01647 
(0.01525) 
0.05247 
(0.00830)*** 
0.00546 
(0.01003) 
0.03375 
(0.00504)*** 
-0.01633 
(0.01526) 
0.05239 
(0.00831)*** 
SSS-Population 7.08053 
(0.37471)*** 
 7.48671 
(0.51668)*** 
 7.08780 
(0.37454)*** 
 7.49744 
(0.51654)*** 
 
 R2 
 
0.1231  0.1359  0.1242  0.1356  
Adjusted R2 
 
0.1217  0.1330  0.1227  0.1328  
Observations 3017 3017 1511 1511 3017 3017 1511 1511 
 
Test Results 
        
 
Quality 
 
        
F  
 
 357.958  209.962  358.125  210.676 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
 
Relevance (Hausman test) 
 
        
F 
 
 4.01639  0.00172   4.09877  0.00568 
P-Value 
 
 0.0451**  0.09669  0.0430**  0.9400 
 Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table A7.10: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female Workers (IV Estimations Based on Education Levels Using 
SSS-Population as an Instrument and AveSchool as the Aggregate-Level Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model without Additional 
Individual Characteristics) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Males Females Males Females 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Constant 8.06637 
(0.10751)*** 
4.24776 
(0.22347)*** 
8.16245 
(0.15967)*** 
4.20917 
(0.32477)*** 
7.65718 
(0.19715)*** 
4.04879 
(0.22910)*** 
7.80907 
(0.26209)*** 
3.89492 
(0.33115)*** 
Primary school -0.05547 
(0.06177) 
0.10531 
(0.03090)*** 
-0.04300 
(0.07930) 
0.00354 
 (0.04419) 
-0.04058 
(0.06061) 
0.10283 
(0.03030)*** 
-0.02946 
(0.07728) 
0.01877 
(0.04313) 
Junior secondary school -0.07443 
(0.06465) 
0.19989 
(0.03237)*** 
-0.02186 
(0.08422) 
0.19436 
(0.04682)*** 
-0.06177 
(0.06231) 
0.18463 
(0.03117)*** 
-0.01194 
(0.07949) 
0.20165 
(0.04430)*** 
Vocational senior secondary school 0.01112 
(0.06649) 
0.31993 
(0.03311)*** 
0.22447 
(0.08866)** 
0.36200 
(0.04967)*** 
0.01342 
(0.06395) 
0.28767 
(0.03141)*** 
0.21896 
(0.08269)*** 
0.34847 
(0.04654)*** 
General senior secondary school 0.06753 
(0.06385) 
0.33178 
(0.03172)*** 
0.09621 
(0.08383) 
0.34604 
(0.04663)*** 
0.06807 
(0.06042) 
0.29758 
(0.03005)*** 
0.08715 
(0.07696) 
0.32980 
(0.04294)*** 
College 0.08262 
(0.08464) 
0.49599 
(0.04202)*** 
0.07749 
(0.09580) 
0.53616 
(0.05296)*** 
0.07159 
(0.08120) 
0.44340 
(0.04036)*** 
0.05487 
(0.08911) 
0.49804 
(0.04943)*** 
Undergraduate 0.01907 
(0.07394) 
0.58131 
(0.03678)*** 
-0.00269 
(0.09233) 
0.65578 
(0.05133)*** 
0.00700 
(0.07044) 
0.52642 
(0.03510)*** 
-0.02959 
(0.08502) 
0.61551 
(0.04753)*** 
Master 0.01141 
(0.18671) 
0.86179 
(0.09307)*** 
0.20956 
(0.21774) 
0.90161 
(0.12073)** 
0.25330 
(0.18519) 
0.79758 
(0.09240)*** 
0.18491 
(0.21479) 
0.86152 
(0.11942)*** 
Experience 0.01141 
(0.00462)** 
0.01127 
(0.00232)*** 
0.01292 
(0.00558)** 
0.01687 
(0.00315)*** 
    
Experience2 -0.00024 
(0.00010)** 
-0.00015 
(0.00005)*** 
-0.00024 
(0.00013)* 
-0.00029 
(0.00007)*** 
    
Age     0.02700 
(0.00928)*** 
0.01545 
(0.00467)*** 
0.02459 
(0.01165)** 
0.02291 
(0.00658)*** 
Age2     -0.00034 
(0.00012)*** 
-0.00014 
(0.00006)** 
-0.00030 
(0.00015)* 
-0.00024 
(0.00009)*** 
AveSchool  0.11286 
(0.02657)*** 
 0.07583 
(0.03925)* 
 0.11294 
(0.02654)*** 
 0.07636 
(0.03939)* 
AveSchool-Ind 0.00638 
(0.01005) 
0.03377 
(0.00506)*** 
-0.01226 
(0.01548)*** 
0.04636 
(0.00844)*** 
0.00664 
(0.01004)*** 
0.03384 
(0.00506)*** 
-0.01107 
(0.01551)*** 
0.04707 
(0.00849)*** 
SSS-Population 7.04929 
(0.37590)*** 
 7.37884 
(0.52109)*** 
 7.05780 
(0.37568)*** 
 7.37284 
(0.52120)*** 
 
 R2 
 
0.1257  0.1468  0.1264  0.1465  
Adjusted R2 
 
0.1225  0.1406  0.1233  0.1403  
Observations 3017 3017 1511 1511 3017 3017 1511 1511 
 
Test Results 
        
 
Quality 
 
        
F   351.683  200.517  352.933  200.11 
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 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Males Females Males Females 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
 
Relevance (Hausman test) 
 
        
F 
 
 5.11833  0.21318  5.16633  0.19633 
P-Value  0.0237**  0.6444  0.0231**  0.6578 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table A7.11: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female Workers (IV Estimations Based on Years of Schooling Using 
SSS-Population as an Instrument and AveSchool as the Aggregate-Level Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model with Additional 
Individual Characteristics) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Males Females Males Females 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Constant 7.90163 
(0.10167)*** 
4.16513 
(0.21647)*** 
8.11892 
(0.14481)*** 
3.86892 
(0.32091)*** 
7.63857 
(0.19321)*** 
4.02126 
(0.22523)*** 
7.79821 
(0.25367)*** 
3.66677 
(0.32460)*** 
Years of Schooling 0.00701 
(0.00453) 
0.04110 
(0.00222)*** 
0.00710 
(0.00599) 
0.04754 
(0.00326)*** 
0.00559 
(0.00416) 
0.03875 
(0.00205)*** 
0.00223 
(0.00523) 
0.04609 
(0.00286)*** 
Experience 0.00571 
(0.00519) 
0.00677 
(0.00256)*** 
0.01599 
(0.00642) 
0.00729 
(0.00361)** 
    
Experience2 -0.00011 
(0.00011) 
-0.00017 
(0.00005)* 
-0.00027 
(0.00014) 
-0.00014 
(0.00012)* 
    
Age     0.01856 
(0.01048)* 
0.01165 
(0.00519)** 
0.02658 
(0.01321)** 
0.01438 
(0.00735)** 
Age2     -0.00023 
(0.00013)* 
-0.00013 
(0.00007)* 
-0.00030 
(0.00017)* 
-0.00018 
(0.00010)* 
Tenure  0.00041 
(0.00474) 
0.01162 
(0.00234)*** 
-0.00067 
(0.00667) 
0.02485 
(0.00365)*** 
-0.00057 
(0.00474) 
0.01171 
(0.00234)*** 
-0.00007 
(0.00668) 
0.02491 
(0.00366)*** 
Tenure2 -0.00007 
(0.00016) 
-0.00017 
(0.00008)** 
-0.00011 
(0.00021) 
-0.00053 
(0.00012)*** 
-0.00003 
(0.00016) 
-0.00016 
(0.00008)** 
-0.00011 
(0.00022) 
-0.00051 
(0.00012)*** 
Marital Status 0.14460 
(0.04835)*** 
0.02675  
(0.02407) 
0.04205 
(0.04927) 
-0.04354 
(0.02705) 
0.13328 
(0.04869)*** 
0.02650 
(0.02422) 
-0.03989 
(0.04956) 
-0.04417 
(0.02719) 
Urban 0.15251 
(0.02986)*** 
0.05844 
(0.01543)*** 
0.20009 
(0.04289)*** 
0.09599 
(0.02513)*** 
0.15285 
(0.02984)*** 
0.05850 
(0.01543)*** 
0.19980 
(0.04291)*** 
0.09547 
(0.02512)*** 
AveSchool  0.10022 
(0.02622)*** 
 0.08709 
(0.03898)** 
 0.10033 
(0.02621)*** 
 0.08900 
(0.03878)** 
AveSchool-Ind -0.00216 
(0.01016) 
0.03044 
(0.00500)*** 
-0.02412 
(0.01530) 
0.04355 
(0.00809)*** 
-0.00232 
(0.01016)*** 
0.03049 
(0.00450)*** 
-0.02434 
(0.01531) 
0.04357 
(0.00809)*** 
SSS-Population 7.02705 
(0.37332)*** 
 7.27635 
(0.51792)*** 
 7.02968 
(0.37322)*** 
 7.30669 
(0.51753)*** 
 
 R2 
 
0.1329  0.1507  0.1334  0.1499  
Adjusted R2 
 
0.1303  0.1457  0.1308  0.1448  
Observations 3017 3017 1511 1511 3017 3017 1511 1511 
 
Test Results 
        
 
Quality 
 
        
F  
 
 354.302  197.383  354.774  199.33 
P-Value 
 
 0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
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 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Males Females Males Females 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Relevance (Hausman test) 
 
F 
 
 4.03536  0.72816  4.08847  0.80334 
P-Value  0.0446  0.3936  0.0433**  (0.3702) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table A7.12: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female Workers (IV Estimations Based on Education Levels Using 
SSS-Population as an Instrument and AveSchool as the Aggregate-Level Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model with Additional 
Individual Characteristics) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Males Females Males Females 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Constant 8.00703 
(0.11105)*** 
4.29719 
(0.22141)*** 
8.09655 
(0.16332)*** 
4.04532 
(0.32397)*** 
7.73403 
(0.20353)*** 
4.17328 
(0.23059)*** 
7.70267 
(0.27434)*** 
3.85804 
(0.32652)*** 
Primary school -0.06433 
(0.06177) 
0.09104 
(0.03065)*** 
-0.00566 
(0.07964) 
-0.00616 
(0.04353) 
-0.05317 
(0.06038) 
0.09717 
(0.02994)***  
0.00246 
(0.07719) 
0.01387 
(0.04223) 
Junior secondary school -0.10750 
(0.06499)* 
0.16723 
(0.03236)*** 
-0.02103 
(0.08477) 
0.14837 
(0.04633)*** 
-0.09582 
(0.06231) 
0.17058 
(0.03100)*** 
-0.02329 
(0.07930) 
0.17307 
(0.04339)*** 
Vocational senior secondary school -0.05427 
(0.06768) 
0.27020 
(0.03356)*** 
0.21959 
(0.09034)** 
0.27063 
(0.04990)*** 
-0.04772 
(0.06378) 
0.26721 
(0.03162)*** 
0.19307 
(0.08296)** 
0.28981 
(0.04578)*** 
General senior secondary school 0.01442 
(0.06485) 
0.28309 
(0.03199)*** 
0.09251 
(0.08522) 
0.26790 
(0.04666)*** 
0.01967 
(0.06091) 
0.27956 
(0.03006)*** 
0.06200 
(0.07708) 
0.28686 
(0.04220)*** 
College 0.01579 
(0.08568) 
0.43573 
(0.04226)*** 
0.09913 
(0.09790) 
0.44613 
(0.05325)*** 
0.01528 
(0.08154) 
0.42484 
(0.03508)*** 
0.04635 
(0.08904) 
0.45877 
(0.04853)*** 
Undergraduate -0.03752 
(0.07503) 
0.52343 
(0.03717)*** 
0.00162 
(0.09435) 
0.56164 
(0.05155)*** 
-0.03893 
(0.07075) 
0.51340 
(0.03508)*** 
-0.05656 
(0.08505) 
0.57604 
(0.04685)*** 
Master 0.17317 
(0.18684) 
0.79838 
(0.09220)*** 
0.19842 
(0.21872) 
0.74999 
(0.11934)*** 
0.17034 
(0.18504) 
0.78538 
(0.09140)*** 
0.13726 
(0.21433) 
0.76934 
(0.11705)*** 
Experience 0.00656 
(0.00525) 
0.00619 
(0.00260)** 
0.01719 
(0.00647)*** 
0.00822 
(0.00364)** 
    
Experience2 -0.00015 
(0.00011) 
-0.00012 
(0.00006)** 
-0.00028 
(0.00014)** 
-0.00020 
(0.00008)** 
    
Age     0.01804 
(0.01054)* 
0.00871 
(0.00523)* 
0.02872 
(0.01332)** 
0.01137 
(0.00743) 
Age2     -0.00023 
(0.00013)* 
-0.00010 
(0.00007) 
-0.00032 
(0.00017)* 
-0.00016 
(0.00010) 
Tenure  0.00004 
(0.00475) 
0.01171 
(0.00235)*** 
-0.00159 
(0.00667) 
0.02386 
(0.00365)*** 
-0.00056 
(0.00474) 
0.01212 
(0.00234)*** 
-0.00093 
(0.00667) 
0.02494 
(0.00365)*** 
Tenure2 -0.00005 
(0.00016) 
-0.00016 
(0.00008)** 
-0.00010 
(0.00021) 
-0.00047 
(0.00012)*** 
-0.00003 
(0.00016) 
-0.00018 
(0.00008)** 
-0.00010 
(0.00022) 
-0.00050 
(0.00012)*** 
Marital Status 0.14799 
(0.04836)*** 
0.02758  
(0.02411) 
-0.03740 
(0.04918) 
-0.04786 
(0.02693)* 
0.13884 
(0.04876)** 
0.02933 
(0.02429) 
-0.03560 
(0.04942) 
-0.04049 
(0.02709) 
Urban 0.15496 
(0.03007)*** 
0.06575 
(0.01556)*** 
0.18818 
(0.04330)*** 
0.08900 
(0.02506)*** 
0.15459 
(0.03006)*** 
0.06521 
(0.01555)*** 
0.18807 
(0.04333)*** 
0.88723 
(0.02510)*** 
AveSchool  0.10864 
(0.02641)*** 
 0.10756 
(0.03958)*** 
 0.10915 
(0.02639)*** 
 0.10970 
(0.03959)*** 
AveSchool-Ind -0.00170 
(0.01019) 
0.02991 
(0.00502)*** 
-0.01945 
(0.01557) 
0.03677 
(0.00825)*** 
-0.00164 
(0.01019)*** 
0.03004 
(0.00502)*** 
-0.01864 
(0.01560) 
0.03733 
(0.00829)*** 
SSS-Population 7.00075 
(0.01019)*** 
 7.20736 
(0.52206)*** 
 7.00632 
(0.37429)*** 
 7.21787 
(0.52232)*** 
 
 
 R2 
 
0.1356  0.1601  0.1359  0.1591  
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 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Males Females Males Females 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.1312  0.1516  0.1316  0.1507  
Observations 3017 3017 1511 1511 3017 3017 1511 1511 
 
Test Results 
  0.1516      
 
Quality 
 
        
F  
 
 349.562  190.597  350.406  190.961 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
 
Relevance (Hausman test) 
 
        
F 
 
 5.16683  1.70853   5.26055  1.79314 
P-Value  0.0231**  0.1914  0.0219**  0.1807 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table A7.13: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female Workers (IV Estimations Based on Years of Schooling Using 
SSS-Population as an Instrument and PerHE as the Aggregate-Level Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model without Additional 
Individual Characteristics) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Males Females Males Females 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with Higher 
Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Constant 4.67214 
 (0.30931)*** 
4.90326 
(0.07429)*** 
5.96040 
(0.39674)*** 
4.57532 
(0.11671)*** 
3.28636 
(0.73135)*** 
4.74367 
(0.10631)*** 
5.29790 
(0.91370)*** 
4.29776 
(0.15477)*** 
Years of schooling 0.10698 
 (0.01796)*** 
0.04448 
(0.00255)*** 
0.03291  
(0.02483) 
0.05662 
(0.00334)*** 
0.09178 
(0.01661)*** 
0.03920 
(0.00235)*** 
0.03592  
(0.04973) 
0.05065 
(0.00302)*** 
Experience 0.04570 
 (0.01912)** 
0.01014 
(0.00250)*** 
0.02867 
 (0.02387) 
0.01494 
(0.00323)*** 
    
Experience2 -0.00077 
 (0.00041)* 
-0.00011 
(0.00005)** 
-0.00077 
 (0.00055) 
-0.00021 
(0.00007)*** 
    
Age     0.10299 
(0.03855)*** 
0.01452 
(0.00507)*** 
0.05091 
 (0.04973) 
0.02321 
(0.00302)*** 
Age2     -0.00120 
(0.00049)** 
-0.00012 
(0.00006)* 
-0.00074 
(0.00066) 
-0.00023 
(0.00009)*** 
PerHE 
 
 0.05747 
(0.01056)*** 
 0.04756 
(0.01436)*** 
 0.05759 
(0.01056)*** 
 0.04822 
(0.01436)*** 
PerHE-Ind 0.00632 
 (0.00493) 
0.00138 
(0.00065)** 
-0.00802 
 (0.00690) 
0.00452 
(0.00092)*** 
0.00647 
 (0.00493) 
0.00141 
(0.00065)** 
-0.00800 
(0.00690) 
0.00452 
(0.00092)*** 
SSS-Population 18.38104 
(1.50241)*** 
 19.52913 
(2.09305)*** 
 18.39147 
(1.50219)*** 
 19.57032 
(2.09287)*** 
 
 R2 
 
0.0670  0.0587  0.0676  0.0583  
 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.655  0.0555  0.0660  0.0552  
Observations 3017 3017 1511 1511 3017 3017 1511 1511 
 
Test Results 
        
 
Quality 
 
        
F  
 
 149.68  87.0578  149.893  87.4407 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
 
Relevance (Hausman test) 
 
        
F 
 
 24.3598  5.45577  24.4833  5.6192 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0196**  0.0000***  0.0179** 
  Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
27 
 
Table A7.14: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female Workers (IV Estimations Based on Education Levels Using 
SSS-Population as an Instrument and PerHE as the Aggregate-Level Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model without Additional 
Individual Characteristics) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Males Females Males Females 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Constant 5.10966 
(0.33087)*** 
5.09093 
(0.08162)*** 
6.19769 
(0.42272)*** 
4.85535 
(0.12388)*** 
3.47085 
(0.76296)*** 
4.95074 
(0.11255)*** 
5.35993 
(0.96538)*** 
4.57661 
(0.16272)*** 
Primary school 0.08177 
(0.25737) 
0.10436 
(0.03365)*** 
-0.36318 
(0.34139) 
0.02000 
 (0.04677) 
0.11026 
(0.25255) 
0.10153 
(0.03303)*** 
-0.28071 
(0.33271) 
0.03221 
(0.04550) 
Junior secondary school 0.23317 
(0.26887) 
0.19441 
(0.03521)*** 
-0.22976 
(0.36231) 
0.21154 
(0.04909)*** 
0.22649 
(0.25910) 
0.18057 
(0.03396)*** 
-0.13135 
(0.34195) 
0.21490 
(0.04636)*** 
Vocational senior secondary school 1.04731 
(0.27465)*** 
0.28791 
(0.03734)*** 
1.03575 
(0.38056)*** 
0.33851 
(0.05345)*** 
0.97537 
(0.26019)*** 
0.25982 
(0.03546)*** 
1.11603 
(0.35470)*** 
0.32093 
(0.05071)*** 
General senior secondary school 0.89669 
(0.26380)*** 
0.31718 
(0.03554)*** 
0.11745 
(0.35976) 
0.36064 
(0.03868)*** 
0.81532 
(0.24929)*** 
0.28747 
(0.03363)*** 
0.19382 
(0.32993) 
0.34074 
(0.04484)*** 
College 1.24666 
(0.35050)*** 
0.47407 
(0.04714)*** 
0.04611 
(0.41242) 
0.55918 
(0.05572)*** 
1.09538 
(0.33591)*** 
0.42879 
(0.04510)*** 
0.09825 
(0.38311) 
0.51759 
(0.05185)*** 
Undergraduate 0.70711 
(0.30664)** 
0.58768 
(0.04038)*** 
-0.13370 
(0.39837) 
0.68393 
(0.05401)*** 
0.54539 
(0.77155)* 
0.54052 
(0.03838)*** 
-0.07466 
(0.36626) 
0.63975 
(0.04971)*** 
Master 2.28512 
(0.77792)*** 
0.79925 
(0.10452)*** 
0.98751 
(0.93675) 
0.89291 
(0.12694)*** 
2.09637 
(0.77155)*** 
0.74398 
(0.10347)*** 
1.08233 
(0.92373) 
0.84710 
(0.12568)*** 
Experience 0.05384 
(0.01930)*** 
0.00922 
(0.00257)*** 
0.03431 
(0.02402) 
0.01577 
(0.00329)*** 
    
Experience2 -0.00094 
(0.00042)** 
-0.00011 
(0.00006)** 
-0.00088 
(0.00055) 
-0.00026  
(0.00008)*** 
    
Age     0.11328 
(0.03871)*** 
0.01135 
(0.00519)** 
0.06025 
(0.05012) 
0.02087 
(0.00686)*** 
Age2     -0.00131 
(0.00049)*** 
-0.00009 
(0.00007) 
-0.00085 
(0.00066) 
-0.00021 
(0.00009)** 
PerHE 
 
 0.06197 
(0.01079)*** 
 0.05219 
(0.01481)*** 
 0.06199 
(0.01078)*** 
 0.05259 
(0.01482)*** 
PerHE-Ind 0.00837 
(0.00497)* 
0.00109 
(0.00067) 
-0.00519 
(0.00708) 
0.00365 
(0.00096)*** 
0.00864 
(1.50345)*** 
0.00110 
(0.00067)* 
-0.00467 
(0.00710) 
0.00374 
(0.00096)*** 
SSS-Population 18.24462 
(1.50416)*** 
 19.15300 
(2.09766)*** 
 18.25801 
(1.50345)*** 
 19.17948 
(2.09770)*** 
 
 R2 
 
0.0716  0.0754  0.07222  0.0749  
Adjusted R2 
 
0.0682  0.0686  0.0688  0.0681  
Observations 
 
3017 3017 1511 1511 3017 3017 1511 1511 
 
Test Results 
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 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Males Females Males Females 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Quality 
 
F  
 
 147.123  83.369  147.478  83.5963 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
 
Relevance (Hausman test) 
 
        
F 
 
 27.7398  6.95398  27.8153  6.96053 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0084***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
  Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table A7.15: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female Workers (IV Estimations Based on Years of Schooling Using 
SSS-Population as an Instrument and PerHE as the Aggregate-Level Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model with Additional 
Individual Characteristics) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Males Females Males Females 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with Higher 
Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Constant 4.25805 
(0.32064)*** 
4.92164 
(0.07394)*** 
5.27627 
(0.41507)*** 
4.58283 
(0.11533)*** 
3.16413 
(0.75676)*** 
4.80763 
(0.10969)*** 
4.68816 
(0.96191)*** 
4.40801 
(0.15838*** 
Years of Schooling 0.05633 
(0.01862)*** 
0.04140 
(0.00247)*** 
0.00398 
(0.02567) 
0.04919 
(0.00350)*** 
0.04710 
(0,01707)*** 
0.03929 
(0.00227)*** 
0.00040 
(0.02240) 
0.04761 
(0.00306)*** 
Experience 0.03139 
(0.02147) 
0.00580 
(0.00281)** 
0.03690 
(0.02736) 
0.00628 
 (0.00381) 
    
Experience2 -0.00056 
(0.00046) 
-0.00009 
(0.00006) 
-0.00080 
(0.00060) 
-0.00012 
(0.00008) 
    
Age     0.08080 
(0.04331)* 
0.00946 
(0.00570)* 
0.04966 
(0.05631) 
0.01315 
(0.00776)* 
Age2     -0.00098 
(0.00055)* 
-0.00010 
(0.00007) 
-0.00066 
(0.00074) 
-0.00016 
(0.00010) 
Tenure  0.00998 
(0.01960) 
0.01099 
(0.00255)*** 
0.00618 
(0.02845) 
0.02466 
(0.00388)*** 
0.00738 
(0.01958) 
0.01111 
(0.00255)*** 
0.01156 
(0.02851) 
0.02448 
(0.00388)*** 
Tenure2 -0.00036 
(0.00064) 
-0.00015 
(0.00008)* 
-0.00053 
(0.00091) 
-0.00051 
(0.00012)*** 
-0.00021 
(0.00064) 
-0.00015 
(0.00008)* 
-0.00062 
(0.00093) 
-0.00050 
(0.00013)*** 
Marital Status 0.48680 
(0.19974)** 
0.00960 
 (0.02635) 
0.01941 
(0.21016) 
-0.04850 
(0.02869)* 
0.45606 
(0.20119)** 
0.00977 
(0.02650) 
0.05003 
(0.21138) 
-0.05056 
(0.02888)* 
Urban 1.17818 
(0.12165)*** 
0.02063 
 (0.02153) 
1.40791 
(0.18186)*** 
0.04254  
(0.03501) 
1.17978 
(0.12158)*** 
0.02058 
(0.02154) 
1.40681 
(0.18193)*** 
0.04168 
(0.03492) 
PerHE 
 
 0.05668 
(0.01125)*** 
 0.05707 
(0.01591)*** 
 0.05675 
(0.01126)*** 
 0.05761 
(0.01582)*** 
PerHE-Ind 0.00407 
(0.00488) 
0.00122 
(0.00064)* 
-0.01042 
(0.00681) 
0.00383 
(0.00093)*** 
0.00411 
(0.00487) 
0.00123 
(0.00064)* 
-01060 
(0.00681) 
0.00384 
(0.00093)*** 
SSS-Population 17.17021 
(1.48717)*** 
 17.83386 
(2.07872)*** 
 17.16580 
(1.48690)*** 
 17.94501 
(2.07738)*** 
 
 R2 
 
0.0961  0.0958  0.0965  0.0952  
Adjusted R2 
 
0.0934  0.0904  0.0938  0.0897  
Observations 3017 3017 1511 1511 3017 3017 1511 1511 
 
Test Results 
        
 
Quality 
 
        
F  
 
 133.3  73.6036  133.281  74.6203 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
         
30 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Males Females Males Females 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with Higher 
Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Relevance (Hausman test) 
 
F 
 
 22.9146  8.84412  22.9841  9.14201 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0030***  0.0000***  0.0025*** 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table A7.16: Impact of Aggregate-Level Human Capital on Male and Female Workers (IV Estimations Based on Education Levels Using 
SSS-Population as an Instrument and PerHE as the Aggregate-Level Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model with Additional 
Individual Characteristics) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Males Females Males Females 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Constant 4.57618 
(0.34464)*** 
5.10277 
(0.08015)*** 
5.30859 
(0.44960)*** 
4.84663 
(0.12009)*** 
3.30265 
(0.78834)*** 
5.02481 
(0.11550)*** 
4.55522 
(1.01380)*** 
4.69316 
(0.16494)*** 
Primary school -0.02793 
(0.25505) 
0.09350 
(0.03348)*** 
-0.15306 
(0.33930) 
0.00418  
(0.04704) 
0.00423 
(0.24927) 
0.09899 
(0.03274)*** 
-0.09842 
(0.32880) 
0.02185 
(0.04563) 
Junior secondary school -0.06039 
(0.26807) 
0.17137 
(0.03520)*** 
0.31106 
(0.36096) 
0.17001 
(0.05006)*** 
-0.04419 
(0.25702) 
0.17489 
(0.03377)*** 
-0.26427 
(0.33754) 
0.19193 
(0.04687)*** 
Vocational senior secondary school 0.49952 
(0.27818)* 
0.25605 
(0.03667)*** 
0.85099 
(0.38401)** 
0.24999 
(0.05473)*** 
0.47435 
(0.26202)* 
0.25472 
(0.03465)*** 
0.85843 
(0.35236)** 
0.26624 
(0.05065)*** 
General senior secondary school 0.41734 
(0.26653) 
0.28374 
(0.03506)*** 
-0.05599 
(0.36214) 
0.29076 
(0.05002)*** 
0.38548 
(0.25022) 
0.28211 
(0.03300)*** 
-0.05269 
(0.32720) 
0.30729 
(0.04532)*** 
College 0.66718 
(0.35273)* 
0.43244 
(0.04643)*** 
-0.02464 
(0.41651) 
0.47517 
(0.05755)*** 
0.59061 
(0.33563)* 
0.42499 
(0.04425)*** 
-0.06447 
(0.37871) 
0.48571 
(0.05253)*** 
Undergraduate 0.18445 
(0.30950) 
0.54619 
(0.04050)*** 
-0.32789 
(0.40239) 
0.60051 
(0.05605)*** 
0.10254 
(0.29189) 
0.53985 
(0.04425)*** 
-0.36445 
(0.36292) 
0.61224 
(0.05091)*** 
Master 1.50524 
(0.77201)* 
0.76159 
(0.10243)*** 
0.61741 
(0.93097) 
0.75347 
(0.12868)*** 
1.40847 
(0.76460)* 
0.75266 
(0.10154)*** 
0.59571 
(0.91215) 
0.76868 
(0.12637)*** 
Experience 0.03801 
(0.02171)* 
0.00489 
(0.00288)* 
0.04190 
(0.02753) 
0.00718 
(0.00390)* 
    
Experience2 -0.00072 
(0.00046) 
-0.00009 
(0.00006)* 
-0.00087 
(0.00061) 
-0.00017 
(0.00009)** 
    
Age     0.08806 
(0.04356)** 
0.00574 
(0.00581) 
0.05718 
(0.05668) 
0.01006 
(0.00794) 
Age2     -0.00106 
(0.00056)* 
-0.00006 
(0.00074) 
-0.00073 
(0.00074) 
-0.00013 
(0.00010) 
Tenure  0.00933 
(0.01963) 
0.01104 
(0.00258)*** 
0.00107 
(0.02839) 
0.02388 
(0.00392)*** 
0.00754 
(0.01959) 
0.01149 
(0.00257)*** 
0.00688 
(0.02842) 
0.02471 
(0.00393)*** 
Tenure2 -0.00030 
(0.00064) 
-0.00014 
(0.00008)* 
-0.00046 
(0.00091) 
-0.00046 
(0.00013)*** 
-0.00021 
(0.00064) 
-0.00017 
(0.00008)** 
-0.00056 
(0.00093) 
-0.00048 
(0.00013)*** 
Marital Status 0.48181 
(0.00064)** 
0.01030  
(0.02661) 
0.04095 
(0.20942) 
-0.05472 
(0.02892)* 
0.45227 
(0.20141)** 
0.01285 
(0.02680) 
0.07268 
(0.21039) 
-0.04883 
(0.02915) 
Urban 1.15352 
(0.12244)*** 
0.02664  
(0.02168) 
1.35434 
(0.18322)*** 
0.03263  
(0.03486) 
1.15307 
(0.12239)*** 
0.02588 
(0.02169) 
1.35462 
(0.18329)*** 
0.03165 
(0.03488)*** 
PerHE 
 
 0.06070 
(0.01144)*** 
 0.06288 
(0.01624)*** 
 0.06094 
(0.01144)*** 
 0.06374 
(0.01620)*** 
PerHE-Ind 0.00545 
(0.00492) 
0.00088  
(0.00066) 
-0.00778 
(0.00703) 
0.00281 
(0.00096)*** 
0.00563 
(0.00491) 
0.00090 
(0.00066) 
-0.00756 
(0.00704) 
0.00288 
(0.00097)*** 
 
SSS-Population 17.08529 
(1.48993)*** 
 17.71374 
(2.08274)*** 
 17.09004 
(1.48925)*** 
 17.80774 
(2.08277)*** 
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 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Males Females Males Females 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher 
Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
 R2 
 
0.0991  0.1090  0.0995  0.1083  
Adjusted R2 
 
0.0946  0.1001  0.950  0.0993  
Observations 3017 3017 1511 1511 3017 3017 1511 1511 
 
Test Result 
        
 
Quality 
 
        
F  
 
 131.496  72.3352  131.689  73.103 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
 
Relevance (Hausman test) 
 
        
F 
 
 25.9324  11.0664  26.1807  11.4403 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0009***  0.0000***  0.0007*** 
Notes:Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table A7.17: Test for Imperfect Substitutability for the Workers with and without Higher Education (IV Estimations Using PerPoverty as 
an Instrument and AveSchool as Aggregate-Level Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model without Additional Individual 
Characteristics) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Workers without higher education Workers with higher education 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Average Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
Constant 9.06090 
(0.20203)*** 
3.08394 
(0.17655)*** 
8.63447 
(0.15907)*** 
2.91800 
(0.18497)*** 
9.05765  
(0.58752)*** 
2.07088 
(0.41951)*** 
8.62697 
(0.64991)*** 
1.40640 
(0.44343)*** 
Years of schooling 0.01971 
(0.00420)*** 
0.04124 
(0.00253)*** 
0.01574 
(0.00384)*** 
0.03709 
(0.00231)*** 
0.05188 
 (0.03687) 
0.10085 
(0.01972)*** 
0.04760  
(0.03733) 
0.09065 
(0.02001)*** 
Experience 0.01906 
(0.00377)*** 
0.01006 
(0.00228)*** 
  0.00996 
 (0.01027) 
0.03073 
(0.00547)*** 
  
Experience2 -0.00035 
(0.00008)*** 
-0.00013 
(0.00005)*** 
  -0.00028 
 (0.00030) 
-0.00058 
(0.00016)*** 
  
Age   0.03388 
(0.00721)*** 
0.01487 
(0.00436)*** 
  0.03016  
(0.02258) 
0.04971 
(0.01206)*** 
Age2   -0.00040 
(0.00009)*** 
-0.00014 
(0.00006)** 
  -0.00038  
(0.00029) 
-0.00050 
(0.00016)*** 
AveSchool  0.23426 
(0.02165)*** 
 0.23394 
(0.02167)*** 
 0.23838 
(0.03459)*** 
 0.23742 
(0.03462)*** 
AveSchool-Ind 0.01353  
(0.00871) 
0.02063 
(0.00531)*** 
0.01381 
 (0.00871) 
0.02078 
(0.00531)*** 
-0.02212  
(0.00442)*** 
0.01835 
(0.00940)* 
-0.02176  
(0.01770) 
0.01819 
(0.00942)* 
PerPoverty -0.06147 
(0.00222)*** 
 -0.06141 
(0.00222)*** 
 -0.06813  
(0.00442)*** 
 -0.06820 
(0.00441)*** 
 
 R2 
 
0.1974  0.1971  0.2223  0.2231  
Adjusted R2 0.1963  0.1961  0.2177  0.2185  
 
Observation 
 
3680 
 
3680 
 
3680 
 
3680 
 
848 
 
848 
 
848 
 
848 
 
Test Results 
        
 
Quality 
 
        
F  
 
 766.41  764.947  238.052  238.805 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
 
Relevance (Hausman test) 
 
        
F 
 
 100.948  100.138  26.5014  26.2884 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
   Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table A7.18: Test for Imperfect Substitutability for the Workers with and without Higher Education (IV Estimations Using PerPoverty as 
an Instrument and AveSchool as Aggregate-Level Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model with Additional Individual Characteristics) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Workers without higher education Workers with higher education 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
Constant 9.06170 
(0.10280)*** 
3.29859 
(0.16979)*** 
8.68636 
(0.16473)*** 
3.24863 
(0.17854)*** 
8.98109 
(0.58173)*** 
2.40432 
(0.41014)*** 
8.67869 
(0.67945)*** 
1.91312 
(0.44929)*** 
Years of schooling 0.01715 
(0.00439)*** 
0.03236 
(0.00249)*** 
0.01280 
(0.00396)*** 
0.03234 
(0.00224)*** 
0.03604 
(0.03660) 
0.09457 
(0.01907)*** 
0.03728 
(0.03717) 
0.08864 
(0.01942)*** 
Experience 0.01804 
(0.00432)*** 
0.00156 
(0.00248) 
  -0.00004 
(0.01223) 
0.02228 
(0.00637)*** 
  
Experience2 -0.00031 
(0.00009)*** 
-0.00004 
(0.00005) 
  -0.00015 
(0.00035) 
-0.00045 
(0.00018)** 
  
Age   0.03039 
(0.00823)*** 
0.00373 
(0.00471) 
  0.01908 
(0.02689) 
0.03595 
(0.01403)*** 
Age2   -0.00035 
(0.00011)*** 
-0.00005 
(0.00006) 
  -0.00032 
(0.00035) 
-0.00038 
(0.00018)** 
Tenure 0.00249 
(0.00398) 
0.01646 
(0.00226)*** 
0.00262 
(0.00399) 
0.01638 
(0.00226)*** 
0.00009 
(0.01079) 
0.01500 
(0.00563)*** 
-0.00217 
(0.01079) 
0.01604 
(0.00564)*** 
Tenure2 -0.00014 
(0.00013) 
-0.00027 
(0.00007)*** 
-0.00014 
(0.00013) 
-0.00027 
(0.00007)*** 
0.00023 
(0.00039) 
-0.00030 
(0.00021) 
0.00033 
(0.00040) 
-0.00032 
(0.00021) 
Marital Status 0.03353 
(0.03701) 
0.00458 
(0.02102) 
0.03630 
(0.03702) 
0.00400 
(0.02102) 
0.24273 
(0.07575)*** 
-0.05848 
(0.03984) 
0.23700 
(0.07596)*** 
-0.05653 
(0.04000) 
Urban 
 
0.10198 
(0.02565)*** 
0.04545 
(0.01486)*** 
0.10151 
(0.02565)** 
0.04546 
(0.01485)*** 
0.26391 
(0.06158)*** 
0.09528 
(0.03406)*** 
0.26283 
(0.06157)*** 
0.09653 
(0.03410)*** 
Female 
 
0.05403 
(0.02494)** 
-0.22437 
(0.01412)*** 
0.05250 
(0.02493)** 
-0.22459 
(0.01412)*** 
-0.03287 
(0.04949) 
-0.11743 
(0.02595)*** 
-0.03242 
(0.04957) 
-0.11781 
(0.02604)*** 
AveSchool  0.21912 
(0.02067)*** 
 0.21901 
(0.02069)*** 
 0.21548 
(0.03412)*** 
 0.21477 
(0.03413)*** 
AveSchool-Ind 0.00387 
(0.00896) 
0.02723 
(0.00511)*** 
0.00428 
(0.00896) 
0.02727 
(0.00511)*** 
-0.06735 
(0.00441)*** 
0.01730 
(0.00927)* 
-0.02431 
(0.01790) 
0.01689 
(0.00929)* 
PerPoverty -0.06130 
(0.00223)*** 
 -0.06125 
(0.00223)*** 
 -0.06735 
(0.00441)*** 
 -0.07643 
(0.00441)*** 
 
 R2 
 
0.2026  0.2023  0.2489  0.1414  
Adjusted R2 
 
0.2005  0.2001  0.2399    
Observations 3680 3680 3680 3680 848 848 848 848 
 
Test Results 
        
 
Quality 
 
        
F  
 
 755.254  753.771  233.52  234.265 
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 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Workers without higher education Workers with higher education 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
 
Relevance (Hausman test) 
 
        
F 
 
 92.24  91.9699  24.7992  24.7656 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
  Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table A7.19: Test for Imperfect Substitutability for the Workers with and without Higher Education (IV Estimations Using PerPoverty as 
an Instrument and PerHE as Aggregate-Level Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model without Additional Individual Characteristics) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Workers without higher education Workers with higher education 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Constant 8.54279 
(0.27487)*** 
4.76944 
(0.05482)** 
7.29440 
(0.57531)*** 
4.59800 
(0.09327)*** 
7.49143 
(2.49599)*** 
3.83006 
(0.31716)*** 
4.99759 
(2.76007)* 
3.23083 
(0.34984)*** 
Years of schooling 0.12282 
(0.01717)*** 
0.03845 
(0.00276)*** 
0.10606 
(0.01564)*** 
0.03461 
(0.00251)*** 
0.24449  
(0.16173) 
0.09767 
(0.02050)*** 
0.22685 
(0.16369) 
0.08768 
(0.02077)*** 
Experience 0.06309 
(0.01561)*** 
0.00970 
(0.00242)*** 
  0.06779 
 (0.04503) 
0.02834 
(0.00566)*** 
  
Experience2 -0.00107 
(0.00033)*** 
-0.00013 
(0.00005)** 
  -0.00190 
(0.00131) 
-0.00051 
(0.00016)*** 
  
Age   0.10444 
(0.02989)*** 
0.01483 
(0.00464)*** 
  0.17213 
(0.09898)* 
0.04483 
(0.01249)*** 
Age2   -0.00119 
(0.00039)*** 
-0.00014 
(0.00006)** 
  -0.00218 
(0.00127)* 
-0.00044 
(0.00016)*** 
PerHE 
 
 0.07480 
(0.00658)*** 
 0.07475 
(0.00658)*** 
 0.06819 
(0.00995)*** 
 0.06793 
(0.00996)*** 
PerHE-Ind 0.01112 
(0.00434)** 
0.00079 
(0.00068) 
0.01139 
(0.00435)*** 
0.00082 
(0.00068) 
-0.02146 
(0.00838)** 
0.00208 
(0.00109)* 
-0.02127 
(0.00837)** 
0.00205 
(0.00109)* 
PerPoverty -0.20930 
(0.00892)*** 
 -0.20902 
(0.0892)*** 
 -0.24384 
(0.01926)*** 
 -0.24405 
(0.01926)*** 
 
 R2 
 
0.1523  0.1518  0.1703  0.1711  
Adjusted R2 
 
0.1511  0.1506  0.1654  0.1661  
Observations 3680 3680 3680 3680 848 848 848 848 
 
Test Results 
        
 
Quality 
 
        
F  
 
 550.898  549.19  160.235  160.642 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
 
Relevance (Hausman test) 
 
        
F 
 
 150.351  149.248  30.5415  30.1308 
P-Value 
 
 0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
   Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table A7.20: Test for Imperfect Substitutability for the Workers with and without Higher Education (IV Estimations Using PerPoverty as 
an Instrument and PerHE as Aggregate-Level Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model with Additional Individual Characteristics) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Workers without higher education Workers with higher education 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Constant 7.96594 
(0.28573)*** 
4.92856 
(0.05329)*** 
6.85240 
(0.60273)*** 
4.87557 
(0.09321)*** 
7.07389 
(2.45530)*** 
3.99634 
(0.30949)*** 
6.64020 
(2.87374)** 
3.46227 
(0.36298)*** 
Years of schooling 0.08381 
(0.01783)*** 
0.03187 
(0.00271)*** 
0.06874 
(0.01607)*** 
0.03193 
(0.00243)*** 
0.15682  
(0.15919) 
0.09333 
(0.01988)*** 
0.16726 
(0.16170) 
0.08716 
(0.02023)*** 
Experience 0.06061 
(0.01771)*** 
0.00124 
(0.00268) 
  -0.01861 
 (0.05313) 
0.02324 
(0.00664)*** 
  
Experience2 -0.00105 
(0.00037)*** 
-0.00003 
(0.00006) 
  -0.00004 
 (0.00154) 
-0.00048 
(0.00019)** 
  
Age   0.09423 
(0.03375)** 
0.00372 
(0.00509) 
  0.02317 
(0.11686) 
0.03834 
(0.01458)*** 
Age2   -0.00108 
(0.00044)** 
-0.00005 
(0.00007) 
  -0.00058 
(0.00151) 
-0.00041 
(0.00019)** 
Tenure 0.00698 
 (0.01631) 
0.01636 
(0.00244)*** 
0.00877  
(0.01637) 
0.01619 
(0.00245)*** 
0.09483 
(0.04690)** 
0.00929 
(0.00593) 
0.08803 
(0.04690)* 
0.01029 
(0.00592)* 
Tenure2 -0.00030 
 (0.00052) 
0.00028 
(0.00008)*** 
-0.00033 
 (0.00053) 
-0.00028 
(0.00008)*** 
-0.00231  
(0.00171) 
-0.00010 
(0.00022) 
-0.00197 
(0.00172) 
-0.00013 
(0.00022) 
Marital Status 0.23020 
 (0.15180) 
-0.00739 
(0.02272) 
0.25320 
(0.15185)*** 
-0.00897 
(0.02272) 
0.85821 
(0.32896)*** 
-0.05978 
(0.04141) 
0.84465 
(0.32994)** 
-0.05817 
(0.04156) 
Urban 
 
0.97843 
(0.10339)*** 
0.00871 
(0.01742) 
0.97752 
(0.10341)*** 
0.00871 
(0.01742) 
1.55657 
(0.26796)*** 
0.05466 
(0.03797) 
1.55182 
(0.26796)*** 
0.05609 
(0.03797) 
Female 
 
0.26877 
(0.10194)*** 
-0.22652 
(0.01525)*** 
0.26363 
(0.10195)*** 
-0.22669 
(0.01524)*** 
-0.18808 
 (0.21546) 
-0.11157 
(0.02713)*** 
-0.18957 
(0.21585) 
-0.11179 
(0.02721)*** 
PerHE 
 
 0.07374 
(0.00661)*** 
 0.07372 
(0.00661)*** 
 0.06281 
(0.00999)*** 
 0.06257 
(0.00999)*** 
PerHE-Ind 0.00650 
 (0.00432) 
0.00109 
(0.00065)* 
0.00678  
(0.00432) 
0.00110 
(0.00065)* 
-0.02161 
(0.00845)** 
0.00207 
(0.00108)* 
-0.02152 
(0.00844)** 
0.00202 
(0.00108)* 
PerPoverty -0.20160 
(0.00890)*** 
 -0.20145 
(0.00890)*** 
 -0.23721 
(0.01900)*** 
 -0.23741 
(0.01900)*** 
 
 R2 
 
0.1753  0.1746  0.2130  0.2134  
Adjusted R2 
 
0.1730  0.1724  0.2036  0.2040  
Observations 3680 3680 3680 3680 848 848 848 848 
 
Test Results 
        
 
Quality 
 
        
F  
 
 513.292  512.11  155.84  156.176 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
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 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Workers without higher education Workers with higher education 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Relevance (Hausman test) 
 
F 
 
 148.148  147.735  29.6605  29.4765 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
   Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table A7.21: Test for Imperfect Substitutability for the Workers with and without Higher Education (IV Estimations Using SSS-Population 
as an Instrument and AveSchool as Aggregate-Level Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model without Additional Individual 
Characteristics) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Workers without higher education Workers with higher education 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
Constant 7.76039 
(0.09261)*** 
4.02250 
(0.20116)*** 
7.40670 
(0.15797)*** 
3.80970 
(0.20512)*** 
8.37884 
(0.63299)*** 
2.73305 
(0.52282)*** 
8.23324 
(0.70266)*** 
2.04730 
(0.53840)*** 
Years of schooling 0.01567 
(0.00434)*** 
0.04269 
(0.00240)*** 
0.01340 
(0.00397)*** 
0.03829 
(0.00220)*** 
0.03424 
(0.03989) 
0.10402 
(0.01900)*** 
0.03308 
(0.04041) 
0.09379 
(0.01930)*** 
Experience 0.01487 
(0.00389)*** 
0.01179 
(0.00240)*** 
  0.00019 
(0.01109) 
0.03059 
(0.00525)*** 
  
Experience2 -0.00027 
(0.00008)*** 
-0.00017 
(0.00005)*** 
  -0.00006 
(0.00032) 
-0.00058 
(0.00015)*** 
  
Age   0.02778 
(0.00745)*** 
0.01813 
(0.00415)*** 
  0.00981 
(0.02439) 
0.05039 
(0.01159)*** 
Age2   -0.00033 
(0.00010)*** 
-0.00018 
(0.00005)*** 
  -0.00015 
(0.00031) 
-0.00051 
(0.00015)*** 
AveSchool  0.11344 
(0.02505)*** 
 0.11371 
(0.02505)*** 
 0.15677 
(0.05282)*** 
 0.15708 
(0.05300)*** 
AveSchool-Ind 0.01669 
(0.00912)* 
0.03025 
(0.00516)*** 
0.01689 
(0.00912)* 
0.03037 
(0.00517)*** 
-0.06070 
(0.02045)*** 
0.01881 
(0.00903)** 
-0.06037 
(0.02045)*** 
0.01867 
(0.00906)** 
SSS-Population 7.26930 
(0.33108)*** 
 7.27128 
(0.33103)*** 
 6.67168 
(0.74424)*** 
0.01881 
(0.00903)** 
6.66933 
(0.74434)*** 
 
 R2 
 
0.1425  0.1426  0.0893  0.0895  
Adjusted R2 
 
0.1413  0.1414  0.0839  0.0841  
Observations 3680 3680 3680 3680 848 848 848 848 
 
Test Results 
        
 
Quality 
 
        
F  
 
 482.074  482.487  80.3606  80.2834 
P-Value  0.0000  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
 
Relevance (Hausman test) 
 
        
F 
 
 7.29325  7.31919  1.73892  1.77285 
P-Value  0.0070***  0.0069***  0.1876  0.1834 
   Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table A7.22: Test for Imperfect Substitutability for the Workers with and without Higher Education (IV Estimations Using SSS-Population 
as an Instrument and AveSchool as Aggregate-Level Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model with Additional Individual 
Characteristics) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Workers without higher education Workers with higher education 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
Constant 7.78994 
(0.09527)*** 
4.21566 
(0.19379)*** 
7.45043 
(0.16373)*** 
4.12239 
(0.19896)*** 
8.34669 
(0.62572)*** 
3.09337 
(0.50912)*** 
8.33199 
(0.73330)*** 
2.58978 
(0.53880)*** 
Years of schooling 0.01276 
(0.00453)*** 
0.03337 
(0.00237)*** 
0.00840 
(0.00408)** 
0.03293 
(0.00213)*** 
0.01394 
(0.03949) 
0.09586 
(0.01832)*** 
0.01808 
(0.04014) 
0.09025 
(0.01867)*** 
Experience 0.01557 
(0.00446)*** 
0.00345 
(0.00236) 
  -0.00961 
(0.01319) 
0.02150 
(0.00613)*** 
  
Experience2 -0.00026 
(0.00009)*** 
-0.00007 
(0.00005) 
  -0.00002 
(0.01165) 
-0.00045 
(0.00018)** 
  
Age   0.02748 
(0.00850)*** 
0.00709 
(0.00449) 
  -0.00145 
(0.02902) 
0.03600 
(0.01348)*** 
Age2   -0.00031 
(0.00011)*** 
-0.00009 
(0.00006) 
  -0.00008 
(0.00038) 
-0.00039 
(0.00017)** 
Tenure 0.00018 
(0.00411) 
0.01610 
(0.00215)*** 
0.00006 
(0.00412) 
0.01603 
(0.00215)*** 
-0.00002 
(0.01165) 
0.01488 
(0.00540)*** 
-0.00199 
(0.01166) 
0.01575 
(0.00542)*** 
Tenure2 -0.00011 
(0.00013) 
-0.00028 
(0.00007)*** 
-0.00009 
(0.00013) 
-0.00027 
(0.00007)*** 
0.00024 
(0.00043) 
-0.00028 
(0.00020) 
0.00032 
(0.00043) 
-0.00030 
(0.00020) 
Marital Status 0.00926 
(0.03823) 
0.00530 
(0.01998) 
0.00928 
(0.03823)*** 
0.00485 
(0.01998) 
0.22982 
(0.08189)*** 
-0.04404 
(0.03884) 
0.22524 
(0.08216)*** 
-0.04267 
(0.03898) 
Urban 
 
0.12372 
(0.02647)*** 
0.06268 
(0.01426)*** 
0.12347 
(0.02646)*** 
0.06262 
(0.01426)*** 
0.32245 
(0.06630)*** 
0.12433 
(0.03542)*** 
0.32125 
(0.06631)*** 
0.12508 
(0.03547)*** 
Female 
 
0.02370 
(0.02571) 
0.22454 
(0.01342)*** 
0.02259 
(0.02570) 
-0.22492 
(0.01342)*** 
-0.07053 
(0.05336) 
-0.12433 
(0.03542)*** 
-0.07050 
(0.05347) 
-0.12775 
(0.02546)*** 
AveSchool  0.10173 
(0.02397)*** 
 0.10179 
(0.02396)*** 
 0.13080 
(0.05144)** 
 0.13117 
(0.05161)** 
AveSchool-Ind 0.00584 
(0.00938) 
0.03508 
(0.00494)*** 
0.00613 
(0.00938) 
0.03515 
(0.00495)*** 
-0.06159 
(0.02072)*** 
0.01804 
(0.00891)** 
-0.06120 
(0.02072)*** 
0.01764 
(0.01764)** 
SSS-Population 7.21430 
(0.33090)*** 
 7.21609 
(0.33088)*** 
 6.66674 
(0.73981)*** 
 6.65780 
(0.73983)*** 
 
 R2 
 
0.1488  0.1487  0.1243  0.1243  
Adjusted R2 
 
0.1465  0.1464  0.1138  0.1138  
Observations 3680 3680 3680 3680 848 848 848 848 
 
Test Results 
        
 
Quality 
 
        
F  
 
 475.335  47.623  81.2053  80.9845 
P-Value  0.0000****  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
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 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Workers without higher education Workers with higher education 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Average 
Schooling 
IV-Earnings 
 
 
Relevance (Hausman test) 
 
        
F 
 
 5.30074  5.31882  1.36577  1.40563 
P-Value  0.0214**  0.0212**  0.2429  0.2361 
   Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table A7.23: Test for Imperfect Substitutability for the Workers with and without Higher Education (IV Estimations Using SSS-Population 
as an Instrument and PerHE as Aggregate-Level Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model without Additional Individual 
Characteristics) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Workers without higher education Workers with higher education 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Constant 4.63136 
(0.27766)*** 
4.85317 
(0.07065)*** 
3.64147 
(0.59949)*** 
4.66736 
(0.09786)*** 
4.08869 
 (2.65695) 
3.85643 
(0.32118)*** 
2.67013 
(2.94676) 
3.24886 
(0.34892)*** 
Years of schooling 0.11037 
(0.01795)*** 
0.04010 
(0.00280)*** 
0.09724 
(0.01635)*** 
0.03610 
(0.00256)*** 
0.19443  
(0.17260) 
0.06278 
(0.01872)*** 
0.18805 
(0.17477) 
0.08878 
(0.02074)*** 
Experience 0.04768 
(0.01630)*** 
0.01033 
(0.00235)*** 
  0.03087 
 (0.04791) 
0.02846 
(0.00557)*** 
  
Experience2 -0.00081 
(0.00035)** 
-0.00014 
(0.00005)*** 
  -0.00105 
 (0.00139) 
-0.00051 
(0.00016)*** 
  
Age   0.08230 
(0.03122)*** 
0.01593 
(0.00449)*** 
  0.09572 
(0.10539) 
0.04526 
(0.01236)*** 
Age2   -0.00095 
(0.00040)** 
-0.00016 
(0.00006)*** 
  -0.00130 
(0.00136) 
-0.00044 
(0.00016)*** 
PerHE 
 
 0.06062 
(0.01018)*** 
 0.06074 
(0.01019)*** 
 0.06278 
(0.01872)*** 
 0.06289 
(0.01878)*** 
PerHE-Ind 0.01608 
(0.00454)*** 
0.00112 
(0.00068)* 
0.01630 
(0.00454)*** 
0.00116 
(0.00068)* 
-0.03500 
(0.00906)*** 
0.00194 
(0.00114)* 
-0.03486 
(0.00906)*** 
0.00192 
(0.00114)* 
SSS-Population 18.45270 
(1.32668)*** 
 18.44920 
(1.32681)*** 
 18.83870 
(3.03951)*** 
 18.82352 
(3.03938)*** 
 
 R2 
 
0.0740  0.0737  0.0555  0.0559  
Adjusted R2 
 
0.0727  0.0724  0.0499  0.0503  
Observations 3680 3680 3680 3680 848 848 848 848 
 
Test Results 
        
 
Quality 
 
        
F  
 
 193.46  193.346  38.4146  38.3558 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
 
Relevance (Hausman test) 
 
        
F 
 
 31.4402  31.4789  5.52801  5.52755 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0189**  0.0189** 
   Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table A7.24: Test for Imperfect Substitutability for the Workers with and without Higher Education (IV Estimations Using SSS-Population 
as an Instrument and PerHE as Aggregate-Level Human Capital Measure - Mincerian Model with Additional Individual Characteristics) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Workers without higher education Workers with higher education 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Constant 4.27913 
(0.28864)*** 
4.99642 
(0.06899)*** 
3.25650 
(0.62417)*** 
4.92980 
(0.09696)*** 
3.97346 
 (2.61411) 
4.03725 
(0.31139)*** 
4.59169 
(3.06480) 
3.50711 
(0.36464)*** 
Years of schooling 0.06894 
(0.01861)*** 
0.03275 
(0.00267)*** 
0.05445 
(0.01676)*** 
0.03264 
(0.00239)*** 
0.09053 
 (0.16955) 
0.09423 
(0.01944)*** 
0.11113 
(0.17230) 
0.08822 
(0.01983)*** 
Experience 0.05324 
(0.01849)*** 
0.00193 
(0.00262) 
  -0.05369 
 (0.05650) 
0.02277 
(0.00653)*** 
  
Experience2 -0.00090 
(0.00039)** 
-0.00004 
(0.00005) 
  0.00077 
 (0.00164) 
-0.00047 
(0.00019)** 
  
Age   0.08620 
(0.03523)** 
0.00484 
(0.00495) 
  -0.05113 
(0.12435) 
0.03792 
(0.01424)*** 
Age2   -0.00098 
(0.00045)** 
-0.00006 
(0.00006) 
  0.00028 
(0.00161) 
-0.00041 
(0.00018)** 
Tenure -0.00413 
(0.01701) 
0.01620 
(0.00235)*** 
-0.00307 
(0.01707) 
0.01605 
(0.00235)*** 
0.09563 
 (0.04996) 
0.01008 
(0.00597)* 
0.08967 
(0.04997)* 
0.01101 
(0.00595)* 
Tenure2 -0.00011 
(0.00055) 
-0.00028 
(0.00008)*** 
-0.00011 
(0.00055) 
-0.00027 
(0.00008)*** 
-0.00232 
 (0.00183) 
-0.00012 
(0.00021) 
-0.00204 
(0.00183) 
-0.00014 
(0.00021) 
Marital Status 0.14173 
(0.15839) 
-0.00595 
(0.02186) 
0.15661 
 (0.15840) 
-0.00731 
(0.02188) 
0.77431 
(0.35079)** 
-0.05474 
(0.04146) 
0.76469 
(0.35194)** 
-0.05334 
(0.04161) 
Urban 
 
1.10190 
(0.10780)*** 
0.02419 
(0.01979) 
1.10138 
(0.10778)*** 
0.02413 
(0.01978) 
1.75700 
(0.28473)*** 
0.06970 
(0.04681) 
1.75161 
(0.28481)*** 
0.07068 
(0.04684) 
Female 
 
0.15610 
(0.10623) 
-0.22499 
(0.01470)*** 
0.15204 
 (0.10622) 
-0.22522 
(0.01469)*** 
-0.33856 
(0.00915)*** 
-0.11534 
(0.02738)*** 
-0.34137 
(0.00914)*** 
-0.11549 
(0.02750)*** 
PerHE 
 
 0.06125 
(0.01061)*** 
 0.06126 
(0.01060)*** 
 0.05456 
(0.01851)*** 
 0.05454 
(0.01857)*** 
PerHE-Ind 0.01102 
(0.00451)** 
0.00131 
(0.00064)** 
0.01125 
(0.00451)** 
0.00131 
(0.00065)** 
-0.03356 
(0.00915)*** 
0.00188 
(0.00111)* 
-0.03343 
(0.00914)*** 
0.00184 
(0.00111)* 
SSS-Population 17.11282 
(1.31619)*** 
 17.12299 
(1.31636)*** 
 18.39189 
(2.98533)*** 
 18.36727 
(2.98569)*** 
 
 R2 
 
0.1013  0.1009  0.1069  0.1070  
Adjusted R2 
 
0.0989  0.0984  0.0963  0.0963  
Observations 3680 3680 3680 3680 848 848 848 848 
 
Test Results 
        
 
Quality 
 
        
F  
 
 169.047  169.205  37.9549  37.8443 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
         
44 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Workers without higher education Workers with higher education 
Variable Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Reduced-Form 
Percentage of 
Workers with 
Higher Education 
IV-Earnings 
 
Relevance (Hausman test) 
 
F 
 
 30.9713  31.0164  4.69877  4.69634 
P-Value  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0305**  0.0305** 
    Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table A7.25: Social Return to Schooling (Models Based on Education Levels without Additional 
Variables for Individual Characteristics) 
Education Levels 
Specifications Samples PS JSS VSSS GSSS COLL UG MASTER 
OLS-1-a All 10.60 13.23 14.32 14.42 13.98 15.53 23.05 
  Males 11.01 12.51 13.48 13.98 14.77 15.45 24.24 
  Females 10.66 17.03 16.33 15.74 16.88 18.28 23.06 
OLS-2-a All 10.80 12.91 13.69 13.71 13.29 15.00 22.75 
  Males 10.99 12.09 12.91 13.34 14.14 14.93 23.78 
  Females 11.11 16.95 15.81 15.12 16.33 17.86 23.25 
OLS-1-b All 2.82 5.69 11.05 7.06 6.36 7.95 15.31 
  Males 2.99 4.67 5.78 6.50 6.95 7.68 16.25 
  Females 1.94 8.72 7.62 7.31 8.15 9.60 14.20 
OLS-2-b All 2.99 5.35 10.01 6.32 5.63 7.37 14.96 
  Males 2.98 4.27 5.23 5.87 6.34 7.17 15.80 
  Females 2.25 8.50 6.95 6.56 7.44 9.03 14.24 
IV-1A-a All 27.26 29.48 30.08 30.14 30.87 32.56 37.27 
  Males 26.08 27.30 27.92 28.14 29.73 30.64 36.63 
  Females 24.14 29.95 28.64 28.57 30.84 32.32 35.19 
IV-2A-a All 27.32 29.07 29.44 29.42 30.16 31.98 36.90 
  Males 25.93 26.79 27.30 27.46 29.07 30.07 36.11 
  Females 24.50 29.82 28.15 28.00 30.31 31.92 35.31 
IV-1A-b All 9.05 11.15 10.99 11.96 12.53 14.55 17.04 
  Males 8.82 10.01 9.95 10.98 12.23 13.90 16.90 
  Females 6.80 12.62 10.14 11.21 13.11 14.57 16.24 
IV-2A-b All 9.14 10.79 10.39 11.29 11.86 14.01 16.71 
  Males 8.75 9.63 9.48 10.45 11.71 13.46 16.50 
  Females 7.02 12.35 9.50 10.47 12.43 14.01 16.18 
IV-1B-a All 16.78 19.26 20.17 20.25 20.25 21.85 28.33 
  Males 16.42 17.82 18.66 19.06 20.14 20.90 28.69 
  Females 12.28 18.58 17.81 17.28 18.56 19.96 24.51 
IV-2B-a All 16.98 18.95 19.58 19.59 19.60 21.35 28.05 
  Males 16.39 17.40 18.11 18.44 19.54 20.40 28.24 
  Females 12.66 18.44 17.24 16.61 17.95 19.49 24.64 
IV-1B-b All 8.01 10.24 10.28 11.13 16.22 13.44 16.75 
  Males 8.05 9.31 9.42 10.40 11.54 13.07 16.88 
  Females 5.92 11.97 9.82 10.55 12.20 13.67 16.03 
IV-2B-b All 8.13 9.90 9.68 10.48 14.88 12.92 16.42 
  Males 8.00 8.94 8.95 9.87 11.02 12.64 16.48 
  Females 6.17 11.72 9.17 9.83 11.53 13.11 16.00 
OLS-1-a: OLS based on experience and average years of schooling; OLS-2-a: OLS based on age and average years of schooling; OLS-1-b: OLS based on experience 
and percentage of workers with higher education; OLS-2-b: OLS based on age and percentage of workers with higher education; IV-1A-a: IV using PerPoverty as an 
instrument and based on experience and average years of schooling; IV-2A-a: IV using PerPoverty as an instrument and based on age and average years of schooling; 
IV-1A-b: IV using PerPoverty as an instrument and based on experience and percentage of workers with higher education;  IV-2A-b: IV using PerPoverty as an 
instrument and based on age and percentage of workers with higher education;  IV-1B-a: IV using SSS-Population as an instrument and based on experience and 
average years of schooling; IV-2B-a: IV using SSS-Population as an instrument and based on age and average years of schooling; IV-1B-b:  IV using SSS-Population 
as an instrument and based on experience and percentage of workers with higher education;  IV-2B-b: IV using SSS-Population as an instrument and based on 
experience and percentage of workers with higher education; PS: primary school, JSS: junior secondary school; VSSS: vocational senior secondary school; GSSS: 
general senior secondary school; COLL: college; UG: undergraduate; MASTER: master degree. 
Sources: Tables  7.3, 7.5, 7.9. 7.11, 7.13, 7.16, A7.2, A7.6, A7.14. 
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Table A7.26: Social Return to Schooling (Models Based on Education Levels with Additional 
Variables for Individual Characteristics) 
Education Levels 
Specifications Samples PS JSS VSSS GSSS COLL UG MASTER 
OLS-1-a All 9.85 12.26 12.70 12.96 14.43 15.39 21.86 
Males 10.76 11.85 12.85 13.40 14.36 15.22 23.84 
Females 10.49 15.83 15.04 14.77 16.39 17.73 20.42 
OLS-2-a All 10.11 12.30 12.54 12.79 14.24 15.30 21.91 
Males 10.88 11.77 12.64 13.17 14.11 15.05 23.71 
Females 11.02 16.16 14.99 14.70 16.31 17.75 20.85 
OLS-1-b All 2.13 4.72 8.71 5.66 6.88 7.87 14.13 
Males 2.71 3.92 5.04 5.82 6.52 7.42 15.79 
Females 1.78 7.47 6.42 6.37 7.78 9.14 9.05 
OLS-2-b All 2.35 4.72 8.49 5.43 6.64 7.72 14.14 
Males 2.85 3.85 4.83 5.60 6.27 7.26 15.66 
Females 2.17 7.64 6.21 6.14 7.52 8.98 11.94 
IV-1A-a All 25.47 27.66 27.64 27.82 30.21 31.33 35.49 
Males 25.89 26.80 27.48 27.67 32.57 30.46 36.49 
Females 24.64 29.69 27.99 28.30 35.17 32.54 33.24 
IV-2A-a All 25.65 27.67 27.52 27.69 30.06 31.26 35.52 
Males 25.94 26.66 27.25 27.43 32.32 30.27 36.32 
Females 25.11 30.05 28.09 28.41 35.31 32.69 33.67 
IV-1A-b All 8.32 10.64 9.84 10.87 13.02 14.47 16.64 
Males 8.85 9.85 9.87 10.82 12.15 13.92 17.18 
Females 6.83 12.27 9.24 10.73 12.92 14.53 14.20 
IV-2A-b All 8.48 10.65 9.72 10.74 12.86 14.39 16.65 
Males 8.92 9.77 9.72 10.66 11.97 13.80 17.07 
Females 7.16 12.46 9.12 10.60 12.77 14.46 14.43 
IV-1B-a All 14.90 17.24 17.53 17.76 19.53 20.54 26.27 
Males 15.37 16.39 17.29 17.72 18.94 19.86 27.60 
Females 14.33 19.58 18.51 18.42 20.37 21.78 23.85 
IV-2B-a All 15.08 17.22 17.33 17.56 19.31 20.41 26.26 
Males 15.54 16.37 17.14 17.55 18.76 19.77 27.52 
Females 14.93 20.01 18.59 18.50 20.43 21.93 24.37 
IV-1B-b All 7.29 9.66 9.08 10.01 15.81 13.38 16.22 
Males 7.72 8.75 8.98 9.90 11.11 12.72 16.93 
Females 6.64 12.10 9.24 10.59 12.72 14.31 14.22 
IV-2B-b All 7.50 9.70 8.96 9.89 15.51 13.32 16.25 
Males 7.83 8.71 8.85 9.76 10.95 12.63 16.82 
Females 7.03 12.33 9.14 10.51 12.61 14.29 14.48 
OLS-1-a: OLS based on experience and average years of schooling; OLS-2-a: OLS based on age and average years of schooling; OLS-1-b: OLS based on experience 
and percentage of workers with higher education; OLS-2-b: OLS based on age and percentage of workers with higher education; IV-1A-a: IV using PerPoverty as an 
instrument and based on experience and average years of schooling; IV-2A-a: IV using PerPoverty as an instrument and based on age and average years of schooling; 
IV-1A-b: IV using PerPoverty as an instrument and based on experience and percentage of workers with higher education;  IV-2A-b: IV using PerPoverty as an 
instrument and based on age and percentage of workers with higher education;  IV-1B-a: IV using SSS-Population as an instrument and based on experience and 
average years of schooling; IV-2B-a: IV using SSS-Population as an instrument and based on age and average years of schooling; IV-1B-b:  IV using SSS-Population 
as an instrument and based on experience and percentage of workers with higher education;  IV-2B-b: IV using SSS-Population as an instrument and based on 
experience and percentage of workers with higher education; PS: primary school, JSS: junior secondary school; VSSS: vocational senior secondary school; GSSS: 
general senior secondary school; COLL: college; UG: undergraduate; MASTER: master degree. 
Sources: Tables 7.4, 7.6, 7.8, 7.10, 7.12, 7.14, 7.18, A7.4, A7.8, A7.10, A7.12, A7.16. 
